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Abstract: This thesis examines the treatment of tax in investor-state arbitration of 
expropriation and national treatment protection. The root of the study is the special 
characterisation of tax in the sovereignty of the state and the consequent sensitivity 
of states to have their tax policies being the subject of private adjudication. Tax has 
in the past been characterised as a non-arbitrable matter, but that is true only if 
states have purposefully deemed them so under the international investment treaties 
that they are party to. Tax is generally arbitrable under the expropriation provisions 
of international investment treaties, but states are seldom found liable for tax 
expropriation. National treatment, on the other hand, is generally not arbitrable 
under international investment treaties, but when an investment treaty permits the 
arbitration of alleged national treatment tax violations, violations are affirmed in 
more cases than not. The reason behind the comparable success rates is the difficulty 
in proving the existence of expropriation by taxation whereas national treatment tax 
violations are comparatively easier to substantiate. This thesis establishes what 
constitutes a tax expropriation, and how the success rate of claims for national 
treatment tax violations justifies the general exclusion of the application of national 
treatment protection to tax matters for sovereignty retention. In order to achieve the 
foregoing, this thesis examines sovereignty and the sovereign power to tax; the 
relinquishment of tax sovereignty under international investment treaties; the 
arbitrability of tax and the reasoning behind the reluctance of states to submit tax 
disputes to arbitration; the capability of tax to be expropriatory; the fundamentals of 
the expropriation standard under customary international law and international 
investment treaties and how they are applied by arbitral tribunals in tax 
expropriation claims; and the fundamentals of the national treatment protection and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1  Research Questions and Methodology 
 
Policy-makers, businesses, academics, lawyers and arbitrators face an on-going 
challenge in the interplay between a host state’s obligations to protect foreign 
investments under international law and flexing their power to tax. Arguably the 
greatest challenge is “to define expropriation with respect to tax measures.”
1
 The 
challenge exists because tax measures are in a special category in the context of 
expropriation. This is so the universal state prerogative of the power to tax is 
protected from expropriation claims. The primary focus of this thesis therefore is to 
examine “what extent and under what conditions the imposition of certain taxes 
could constitute expropriation”
2
 to determine whether tax has a lex specialis 
character in relation to the general international law rule of expropriation.  
 
This thesis also examines whether tax has a lex specialis character in relation to the 
international law of national treatment. If it does not, host states would be vulnerable 
to numerous claims from foreign investors for discrepancies or for striking deals with 
specific foreign investors or foreign investors from specific counties, thus putting 
into doubt a major aspect of fiscal sovereignty. Examining the treatment of tax under 
national treatment protection also serves as a comparator for the treatment of tax 
under the rules of expropriation, assisting in examining whether lex specialis truly 
exists for tax under expropriation rules or not.  
 
A number of major issues are also examined as a pretext to the expropriation and 
national treatment chapters. This includes introducing the reader to the notion of 
sovereignty and the sovereign power to tax, international investment treaties (IITs), 
the relationship between sovereignty and international investment arbitration, and 
vitally it discusses the arbitrability of tax disputes. 
 
                                                 
1
 UNCTAD, ‘Taxation’ (2000), Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, Doc. No. 





The methodology utilised to examine the treatment of tax in investor-state arbitration 
of expropriation and national treatment protection (the standard(s)) includes the 
following in each chapter respectively: (i) an introduction into each standard of 
treatment; (ii) the historical development of each standard; (iii) the relationship 
between the standard and tax; (iv) an examination of the provisions of the standard in 
IITs; and primarily (v) a first-hand examination of arbitral jurisprudence contained in 
arbitral awards to analyse how arbitrators treat tax in expropriation and national 
treatment claims. 
 
1.2  Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This thesis provides the first comprehensive text into the relationship between 
international investment law and taxation and international investment arbitration 
and taxation, most vitally in the context of expropriation and national treatment 
protection. It is the first write-up of its kind in which an extensive analysis of arbitral 
awards is conducted in order to draw conclusions on the treatment of tax in claims 
that expropriation rules and national treatment protection have been violated. Indeed, 
the school of academia has recognised the necessity for an in-depth analysis of 
arbitral jurisprudence to specific tax-related disputes that have been emerging under 
international law.
3
 The in-depth analysis has allowed the writer to draw conclusions 
on the lex specialis character of tax under IITs and in investment treaty arbitration 
and therefore furthers the knowledge of academics and can assist law practitioners in 
making and framing their claims (for investors) and defences (for host states). The 
thesis also gives policy-makers food for thought when drafting IITs because they can 
consider in one broad text how tax will be treated in investor-state claims according 
to the drafting of a relevant treaty – this is important for new drafts in the making. It 
also enables policy-makers to consider the advantages (for capital exporting 
investors) and the disadvantages (for capital importing states) of permitting the 
arbitration of tax expropriation and national treatment claims under the auspices of 
IITs. The thesis also brings into one write-up a historical account of the treatment of 
                                                 
3
 Thomas Wälde and Abba Kolo, Investor-State Disputes, ‘The Interface Between Treaty-Based 
International Investment Protection and Fiscal Sovereignty’ (2007) 35(8/9) Intertax 424, 449. 
3 
 
tax as expropriation at domestic and international law level and the role of tax in 
developing the national treatment standard as it is applied today. 
 
1.3  Brief Overview of the Thesis 
 
The state’s power to tax people and companies that work and operate in its 
jurisdiction is a central theme of state sovereignty and critical to the state’s very 
existence, including the funding of its governance and vital services that constitute 
good governance such as defence, policing, national health, environmental protection 
and education. 
 
Tax issues are therefore “powerful lightning rods for critics concerned about 
sovereignty”,
4
 predominantly for revenue raising and fiscal policy control reasons.
5
 
Debates on tax sovereignty usually arise in the international tax context, including 
international tax competition,
6
 control over tax policies in the European Union (EU)
7
 
                                                 
4




 International tax competition is the use of a country of its tax regime to “attract investment, business 
activity, or cash flow to the country itself” (ibid 184) – this is achieved by offering low tax rates and 
tax incentives; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is heavily 
vested in global tax cooperation and eliminating what it sees as harmful tax practices by employing 
counteractive ‘solutions’ to countries that employ such practices even if those countries are not OECD 
members (Allison Christians, ‘Sovereignty, Taxation, and Social Contract’ (2009) 18(1) Minn. J. Int’l 
L. 99, 117) and the counteractive measures include sanctions for uncooperative OECD members and 
non-members and reports on compliance thereafter (Allison Christians 117). These ‘solutions’ clearly 
infringe on the fiscal sovereignty of states on the receiving end of them, especially non-OECD 
members. 
7
 Indirect taxes such as turnover taxes and value-added-tax (VAT) are harmonised in the EU under 
Article 93 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) (Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community [2002] OJ C 325/33) to an “extent necessary to 
sustain the Single Market” (William Nicoll  and Trevor Salmon, Understanding the European Union 
(Routledge 2000) 243), and the necessary extent can mean minimum and maximum thresholds for tax, 
such as a standard rate of VAT at a minimum of 15% with exceptions to apply VAT rates under 15% 
for certain goods and services (European Union, ‘Summaries of EU Legislation: Common system of 
value added tax (VAT) (‘the VAT Directive’)’ 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/taxation/l31057_en.htm> accessed 28 December 2013); 
Direct taxes in the EU including income, corporate and property taxes are not harmonised (there is no 
equivalent article in the EC Treaty for direct taxes as there is for indirect taxes at Article 93), allowing 
EU member states complete sovereignty from the EU in that aspect, and whilst no EU institution 
including the European Court of Justice (ECJ) can mandate income tax rules without the unanimous 
consent of EU member states, the ECJ has encroached on the direct tax sovereignty of EU member 
states in a number of cases by negating the tax provisions of member states (Michael J. Graetz and 
Alvin C. Warren Jr., ‘Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of 
Europe’ (2006) 115 Yale L. J. 1186, 1193). Many of the domestic laws of EU member states that the 
ECJ has struck down have been anti-tax avoidance measures (Lilian V. Faulhaber, ‘Sovereignty, 
Integration and Tax Avoidance in the European Union: Striking the Proper Balance’ (2009-2010) 48 
4 
 
and control over tax policies at the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
8
 Countries 
also relinquish part of their sovereignty to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
when they enter into IMF loan programmes. IMF loan conditions require these 
countries to devalue their currency, cut their government spending, and alter their tax 
regime,
9
 which has nationalists criticising IMF programmes for “the loss of 
sovereignty”
10
 that they entail. 
  
States have liberalised access to their economies partly as a result of globalisation 
and subsequent economic integration through domestic deregulation and 
international cooperation on tax matters. The entering by states into agreements that 
affect their own internal tax regimes which reduce the level of sovereignty over their 
own tax affairs (tax sovereignty) are in themselves sovereign choices to make but are 
effectively ‘take it or leave it choices’,
11
 whereby if states do not enter into 
agreements where they partially cede their tax sovereignty as well as other areas of 





Disputes that occur between states on the alleged lack of conformity with agreements 
can be settled in private discussions among themselves but are often the subject of 
                                                                                                                                          
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 177, 180) and taken together the actions of the ECJ have been summarised as 
having the following effects: “Member State sovereignty is threatened, tax avoidance is more likely 
and no solution to this impasse currently exists” (Lilian V. Faulhaber 180). The ECJ rulings have 
definitely had an effect on EU member states’ internal policies: “The influence of the [ECJ] continues 
to loom large over developments in UK company taxation” (Stephen Bond, ‘Taxation of 
Multinationals and the ECJ’, (2007) Institute of Fiscal Studies IFS Green Budget 2007, 178 
<http://www.ifs.org.uk/budgets/gb2007/07chap10.pdf> accessed 6 July 2013). 
8
 See generally section 2.1 of Chapter 2. 
9
 Devesh Kapur, ‘The IMF: A Cure or a Curse’ (1998) No. 111 Foreign Policy 114, 116. 
10
 ibid 117. 
11
 This is expanded upon in Chapter 2. 
12
 This is typical of the debate on whether the United Kingdom should leave the EU or not. Whilst the 
EU provides a platform for member states to encroach on each other’s sovereignty, the benefits reaped 
are tremendous for business (and therefore the economy) and there is a genuine argument that the 
advantages outweigh the disadvantages of non-membership – see ‘Our Global Future: The Business 
Vision for a Reformed EU’ (2013) Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
<http://www.cbi.org.uk/media/2451423/our_global_future.pdf> accessed 28 December 2013, 
particularly: “Closing off from this world is not how the UK will create and keep the jobs it needs to 
pay for public investment and provide a decent standard of living for all its citizens, or maintain its 
status as a global leader” (at 24) and “Like any international arrangement, UK membership of the EU 
has had advantages and disadvantages. When countries sign bilateral treaties or join multilateral 
institutions, there will always be aspects of these arrangements that are trade-offs; the benefits of co-
operation almost by definition come with some form of compromise. But, for the UK, the net benefits 
of EU membership have been extensive” (at 58). 
5 
 
formal dispute resolution mechanisms at the WTO under the auspices of the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), and tax disputes have been among these.
13
 WTO 
disputes are decided by the DSB, but as part of the WTO and therefore all 159 WTO 
members,
14
 it can be said that the international community make the decisions. 
Although a country on the receiving end of DSB rulings and recommendations that 
require amendments/repeals to its tax laws takes from that country’s sovereignty of 
the highest order, the encroachment of sovereignty takes place at an internationally 
cooperative and diplomatic level. 
 
As part of these global developments and in order to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI), countries also enter into international investment treaties (IITs) which are 
mostly made up of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) but also multilateral 
investment treaties (MITs) and free-trade agreements (FTAs) with investment 
provisions which I will also refer to as MITs.
15
 IITs contain provisions for the 
protection of foreign investment and most also contain dispute resolution provisions 
that provide for arbitration (arbitration agreements in IITs) which give rise to 
investor-state arbitration (also known as ‘international investment arbitration’). The 
protections accorded to investors and investments of other states which can be 
violated through tax measures and result in the arbitration of tax matters (‘tax 
arbitration’) include the obligation to: (i) refrain from unlawful nationalisation or 
expropriation of foreign investments;
16
 (ii) provide national treatment;
17
 (iii) provide 
                                                 
13
 See section 2.1.2 of Chapter 2, in particular notes 56 to 59. 
14
 There were 159 WTO member states on 2 March 2013 (WTO, ‘Understanding the WTO – 
Members and Observers’ <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm> accessed 
5 July 2013. 
15
 For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). 
16
 Claims of expropriation by taxation (tax expropriation) are discussed in Chapter 3. The most severe 
tax measures that have eradicated investments occurred in 
16
 Kügele v Polish State, Arbitration before 
the Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal, 5 February 1932 (Kügele) (reprinted as Case No. 34 in Hersch 
Lauterpacht (ed), International Law Reports: Volume 6 – Annual Digest of Public International Law 
Cases 1931-1932 (CUP 1945) 69) and the expropriation by Russia of the Yukos Oil Company: 
Quasar de Valores SICA V S.A.,  0RGOR DE V AWRES SICA V S.A., GBI 9000 SICA V S.A., ALOS 
34 S.L. v The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. 24/2007, Award of 20 July 2012 (Quasar) and 
RosInvest Co. UK Limited v The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. V 079/2005, Final Award of 12 
September 2010 (RosInvest). 
17
 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 
3467, Award of 1 July 2004 (Occidental); Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States 
(ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1), Award December 16 2002; Archer Daniels Midland Company and 
Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/05/05, 
Final Award (Redacted Version) of 21 November 2007 (Archer Daniels); Cargill v United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award (Redacted Version) of 18 September 2009 (Cargill); 
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most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment; (iv) provide fair and equitable treatment;
18
 
(v) to guarantee full protection and security for investments;
19
 and (vi) to fulfil 
performance requirements.
20
 In addition, tax measures can also result in a claim 
being brought against a state for breach of a stabilisation clause
21
 in a contract 




The parties to an investment arbitration will be: (i) the investor(s) of one state (the 
investor is referred to in this thesis as an ‘investor’ or a ‘foreign investor’; the 
country that the investor originates from is called the ‘home state’); and (ii) the 
government of another state in which the investor(s) has invested in (in investment 
arbitration, the country receiving the FDI is called the ‘host state’ and will likewise 
be called the host state in this thesis). Investor-state arbitration can be triggered by 
the arbitration agreement in an IIT, by the domestic investment law of the host state 
or by an agreement between made between the foreign investor and the host state, for 
example through one of the host state’s ministries or entities. 
 
By entering into IITs, countries take the risk that they will be litigated against in 
international arbitration which are presided over by private adjudicators. Therefore, 
when an investor initiates investment arbitration against a host state and claims the 
host state has violated IIT protections through tax measures, the arbitral tribunal will 
be judging the legality of the host state’s tax laws and/or tax treatment of the 
investor. This is yet another example of the relinquishment of sovereignty by the 
state in its tax affairs. 
 
Unlike the surrender of sovereignty under the intergovernmental WTO agreements 
and subsequent settlement of state-state disputes under the WTO’s DSB, entering 
                                                                                                                                          
and Corn Products International Inc. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, 
Decision on Responsibility (Redacted Version) of 15 January 2008 (Corn Products). 
18




 Archer Daniels, Cargill and Corn Products. 
21
 A tax stabilisation clause or agreement is an agreement with the host state whereby the state agrees 
not to increase the rate of tax that the investor/concessionaire pays and the rate of increase can be 
capped to a certain threshold, or it can be capped at the applicable rate at the time when the 
stabilisation clause/agreement is negotiated or takes effect.  
22
 Revere Copper Brass Inc. v Overseas Private Investment Corporation, AAA Case No. 16 10 0137 
76, Award of 24 August 1978; and Duke Energy International Peru Investments No.1 Ltd v Republic 
of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/28, Award of 18 August 2008. 
7 
 
into IITs with other states, despite being intergovernmental agreements, provide for 
the settlement of investor-state disputes by foreign nationals (the arbitral tribunals).
23
 
International arbitration is not the only forum for the settlement of investor-state 
disputes and the natural forum for any disputes affecting private property rights are 
national courts, and when a dispute concerns a state party and the legitimacy of its 
laws and actions, the national courts of the host-state are the natural forum for such 
matters. Countries therefore prefer their national courts to have a monopoly
24
 on the 
adjudication of investor-state tax disputes which are really about the legitimacy of 
the state’s exercise of one of its most vital sovereign powers which governments rely 
on for their very existence, and the legitimacy of those powers should naturally be 
decided by the state’s own nationals in its own judiciary. Tax arbitration is therefore 
an inquisition of the state’s tax powers by private arbitrators acting outside of the 





It is said that “[o]ther than the power to declare war, a democracy's power to assess 
taxes affects the largest percentage of its citizens in almost every aspect of their 
lives”,
26
 hence the reluctance of states to pass that power on to arbitral tribunals. It is 
a fact, however, that that power is sometimes passed on to arbitral tribunals because 
tax is arbitrable in international investment arbitration if the state has agreed to it. In 
essence, the arbitrability of tax in investment arbitration depends on the state’s 
acquiescence to tax arbitration which must be contained in an IIT, in the state’s 
domestic investment law or in an agreement made with the foreign investor. 
 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, the sovereignty issues surrounding tax arbitration is 
studied. This entails a discussion on: (i) the sovereign power to tax; (ii) 
globalisation’s effect on sovereignty and the coinciding change in state sovereignty 
from the nation-state to the market-state; (iii) the emergence of IITs and an 
introduction to investor-state arbitration; (iv) the arbitrability of tax and the 
                                                 
23
 It is usually possible for a party-appointed member of the arbitral tribunal to be a national of the 
home or host state provided that the other party consents to that appointment. 
24
 William W. Park, ‘Arbitrability and Tax’ in Loukas A. Mistelis and Stavros L. Brekoulakis (eds), 
Arbitrability: International & Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International 2009) 180. 
25
 ibid 179. 
26
 James R. Repetti, ‘Introduction to the State of Federal Income Taxation: Rates, Progressivity, and 
Budget Processes’ (2003-2004) 45 B.C.L. Rev. 989. 
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arbitrability and public policy objections to the enforcement of arbitral awards; (v) 
the efficacy of IITs in attracting FDI with a focus on Brazil’s no-BIT-ratification 
policy and subsequent sovereignty retention; and (vi) the risks to host states’ tax 
sovereignty (especially developing countries) upon agreeing to international 
investment arbitration in IITs. 
 
In Chapter 3, the treatment of the expropriation protection in tax arbitration is 
studied. This entails a discussion on: (i) what expropriation is; (ii) the historical 
background and development of the expropriation principle; (iii) the capability of a 
host state to expropriate investments through taxation; (iv) an analysis of 
expropriation provisions in IITs and how they affect tax expropriation claims; (v) an 
analysis of inclusions, exclusions and vetoes in IITs to the application of the 
expropriation provision to tax measures; (vi) an introduction into the different types 
of expropriation (direct and indirect); (vii) an analysis on the requirements to be 
fulfilled to prove state liability for indirect expropriation; (viii) a study of how the 
principles for finding state liability for expropriation have been applied to tax 
arbitrations where tax expropriation is claimed; and (ix) following on from the last 
point, the circumstances in which a state will be found to have violated the 
expropriation standard through tax measures. 
 
In Chapter 4, the treatment of the national treatment protection in tax arbitration is 
studied. This entails a discussion on: (i) what national treatment is; (ii) the historical 
background and development of the national treatment principle; (iii) an analysis of 
national treatment provisions in IITs and how they shape the requirements to be 
fulfilled in finding state liability for breach of the national treatment protection; (iv) 
an analysis of inclusions and exclusions in IITs to the application of the national 
treatment provision to tax measures; (v) a study on how the principles that are 
applied to finding state liability for a violation of the national treatment protection 
have been applied to tax arbitrations where such violations through tax measures are 
claimed. 
 
There is a stark difference between the success of claimants in international 
investment arbitrations for tax expropriation claims and national treatment violations 
9 
 
by taxation, with claimants succeeding in tax expropriation claims only twice
27
 (and 
those arbitral awards were rendered throughout the time of my writing this thesis), 
whereas national treatment violations through tax measures had been successfully 
claimed before I began my research into the topic. 
 
I have focused on expropriation and national treatment for many reasons, namely 
because: 
 
(i) there is no comprehensive text on the treatment of taxation in investor-
state arbitration, and questions such as “to what extent and under what 
conditions [does] the imposition of certain taxes constitute 
expropriation?”
28
 and statements such as “there is a need to define 
expropriation with respect to tax measures”,
29
 need to be answered;
30
 
(ii) taxation is in a special category from the perspective of expropriation, 
whereby the levying of bona fide taxes are “not a taking of property”
31
 
because if they were, the universal state prerogative of the sovereign 
power to tax would be undermined by a guarantee of success in an 
expropriation claim – expropriations must therefore be extraordinary, 
arbitrary or punitive in amount to be expropriatory;
32
 
(iii) expropriation can occur through the physical taking of property, and so 
the taking or retaining of taxes that the state has no right to take or keep is 
capable of being a direct expropriation and this is something to examine; 
                                                 
27
 This does not include two situations in which tax expropriations occurred because those claims 
were brought against political risk insurers (Overseas Private Investment Corporation – OPIC) rather 
than the host states: (i) one of the tax expropriations ended in arbitration between the investor (Revere 
Copper Brass Inc.) and OPIC in which the claimant investor succeeded in its compensation claim 
(Revere); and  (ii) the other tax expropriation claim resulted in a settlement between the would-be 
claimant (Reynolds Metals Company) and OPIC (Settlement Agreement between OPIC and Reynolds 
Metals Company of 25 February 1975; see Mark Kantor, Michael D. Nolan and Karl P. Sauvant, 
Reports of Overseas Private Investment Corporation Determinations (OUP 2011) 320-321).  
28
 UNCTAD, ‘Taxation’ (2000), Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, Doc. No. 




 Although these two questions focus on expropriation and not national treatment, national treatment 
is used in this thesis because investors can succeed rather easily (especially in comparison to tax 
expropriation claims) in tax arbitration for alleged national treatment violations – it therefore works 
well as a comparator to the treatment of expropriation in tax arbitration and gives an excellent insight 
as to why it is excluded from applying to tax measures in most IITs (see section 4.2.6 of Chapter 4).  
31
 EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3481, Award of 3 February 2006 





(iv) tax can also be used to deprive an investor of the use and enjoyment of an 
investment, for example, by taxing 100% of profits, and that deprivation 
of profits makes tax capable of being an indirect expropriation (this 
includes covert taxation measures being applied by the state over a long 
period of time) – so it is important to try and gauge when these kinds of 
taxation measures are expropriatory;  
(v) tax expropriation may seem like an ‘easy’ option for claimants to claim 
under because of the ability of tax to be a direct expropriation and indirect 
expropriation and because the power to tax entails the power to destroy, 
but the reality is very different. In order to succeed in an expropriation 
claim, the claimant will have to succeed in proving the taxation was 
arbitrary or punitive (and not bona fide general taxation) as well as 
proving that the state substantially deprived the investor of his investment 
through the adoption of the taxation measures. These will not be easy to 
prove and expropriation is therefore the most difficult treaty protection to 
claim under in tax arbitration and I seek to explain why that is; 
(vi) taxation is also in a special category from the perspective of national 
treatment, whereby most IITs exclude the application of national 
treatment to tax measures
33
 (whereas most allow the application of 
expropriation provisions to tax measures)
34
; 
(vii) national treatment claims are generally not easy for claimants to succeed 
under, but as far as tax arbitrations are concerned, national treatment is 
the easiest treaty protection to successfully claim a violation of, 
predominantly because it will not require the claimant to prove that the 
taxation measures were arbitrary or punitive or that substantial harm came 
as a result of the adoption of the taxation measures by the host state. 
National treatment is, in short, quite straightforward to prove in relation to 
quantitative discrimination such as differential tax treatment;
35
 and  
                                                 
33
 UNCTAD ‘Taxation’ (n. 25) 2. 
34
 UNCTAD, ‘Expropriation’ (2012) UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II, Doc No. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7, 133 
<http://unctad.org/en/docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf> accessed 4 January 2013. 
35
 Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties – Standards of 
Treatment, (Kluwer Law International 2009) 184. 
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(viii) national treatment is not a black and white rule, however, it can be broken 
down into a question of whether the foreign investor is treated as 
favourably as a comparable
36
 national investor or not; i.e. all things being 
the same, is the foreign investor liable to pay a tax that a like host state 
investor is not; or does the foreign investor pay a higher rate of the same 
tax as compared with a like host state investor; or is the foreign investor 
denied tax rebates which are granted to a like host state investor? I 
therefore examine how straightforward it is to succeed on a national 




 case is a useful practical example of the varying level of success 
between a tax expropriation claim and a national treatment claim. In Occidental, the 
claimant (Occidental Exploration and Production Company – OEPC) claimed that 
Ecuador had violated the expropriation provision and the national treatment 
protection of the US-Ecuador BIT
38
 by retrospectively and prospectively declining 
OEPC’s tax refund applications for VAT paid on locally purchased or imported 
goods that were used in the production of exported oil. The arbitral tribunal found 
that OEPC was entitled to the tax refunds under Ecuador’s tax laws
39
 as well as 
under Andean Community Law.
40
 Despite this finding, the tribunal dismissed the 
claim for expropriation because the denial of the tax refunds, although due to OEPC, 
did not meet the thresholds required to find liability for expropriation.
41
 OEPC was 
successful, however, in the claim under the national treatment protection
42
 because 
there was a difference in treatment between OEPC and like host state investors. 
Additionally, in EnCana, a case which was based on the same laws and measures 
adopted by Ecuador in Occidental, the claimant (EnCana) could only claim under the 
                                                 
36
 Proving to the arbitral tribunal that host state investors/investments are in like circumstances 
(comparators) to the claimant or the claimant’s investments (in order to prove that the host state’s 
investors/investments were treated more favourably than the home state investor/investments) will be 
the most arduous task in proving a violation of national treatment. 
37
 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3467, 
Award of 1 July 2004. (Occidental Award). 
38
 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed 27 August 1993, entered into force 
11 May 1997 (US-Ecuador BIT). 
39
 Occidental Award at para 141. 
40
 ibid at paras 146 and152. 
41
 ibid at para 89. 
42
 ibid at paras 177 and 179. 
13 
 
Chapter 2 Sovereignty and Foreign Direct Investment as Drivers of 
Tax and Arbitration 
 
The sovereignty of the state is what gives a state the power to legislate, regulate and 
take action. In theory, countries have absolute sovereignty over their affairs. In practice, 
the necessity of participating in and benefitting from the globalised and mutually 
interdependent world has transformed absolute choices into ‘Hobson’s choices’.1 The 
effect of globalisation on sovereignty was summarised brilliantly by Lord John Boyd 
Orr who said that:  
 
“We are now physically, politically, and economically one world and nations so 
interdependent that the absolute national sovereignty of nations is no longer 
possible.”2 
 
Absolute sovereignty is almost impossible to achieve and is extremely rare3 because the 
cost of being isolated from the world can have disastrous effects on an isolated state’s 
economy and population.4 The rule now is deregulation and liberalisation of the 
domestic economy to foreign investment,5 some states such as Burma and North Korea 
being the exception.6 Tax sovereignty is no exception to the near impossibility of 
absolutism as well as deregulation rule in the face of globalisation,7 and this comes from 
voluntary market-induced tax sovereignty limitations,8 negotiated limitations on tax 
                                                 
1 A Hobson’s choice is a ‘take it or leave it’ option and is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary 
(online edition) as: “a choice of taking what is available or nothing at all”. ‘Hobson’s choice’ is named 
after Thomas Hobson (1554-1631) who hired out horses and gave his customers the ‘choice’ of the horse 
nearest the door or none at all (Oxford English Dictionary (online edition)). 
2 Lord John Boyd Orr, 23 September 1880 – 25 June 1971. 
3 “Of course, complete sovereignty is impossible, except perhaps for a country that is totally isolated from 
external influences, such as Burma” (Charles E. McLure Jr., ‘Globalization, Tax Rules and National 
Sovereignty’, (2001) Bulletin of International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 328, 329. 
4 Take for example North Korea, which is “largely isolated and disengaged from the world’s economy” 
and “remains an unreformed and essentially closed dictatorial state” and “[f]ormal trade is minimal” 
(‘2013 Index of Economic Freedom’ (The Heritage Foundation)  
<http://www.heritage.org/index/country/northkorea> accessed 31 December 2013. 
5 Thomas Wälde and Abba Kolo, ‘Confiscatory Taxation under Customary International Law and Modern 
Investment Treaties’ (1999) 4(17) CEPMLP Journal      
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/html/vol4/article4-17.html> accessed 25 May 2010. 
6 ibid. 
7 Natalia Quiñones Cruz, ‘International Tax Arbitration and the Sovereignty Objection: The South 
American Perspective’ (2008) Tax Notes International 533, 540. 
8 McLure (n. 3) 329; voluntary market-induced tax sovereignty limitations are unilateral tax decisions a 
country makes which it might not make if not for market forces and the necessity to compete with other 




sovereignty,9 externally imposed limitations on tax sovereignty10 and conflicts in 
sovereignty,11 all of which can play against each other.12 All of these limitations are the 
result of Hobson’s choices, even the voluntary limitations.13 
 
The type of tax sovereignty we are concerned with in this thesis stems from the 
voluntary market-induced tax sovereignty limitations which, as explained in Chapter 1, 
arise from countries entering into international investment treaties (IITs) which are 
predominantly bilateral investment treaties (BITs), but include multilateral investment 
treaties (MITs) and free-trade agreements (FTAs) with investment provisions, for the 
promotion and protection of foreign direct investment (FDI) from one state into the 
other. 
 
In this chapter, I will expand upon the sovereignty debate in the context of countries 
ceding tax sovereignty to arbitral tribunals who are able to rule on the legitimacy of 
states’ tax decisions in investor-state arbitrations14 and why that is almost patriotically 
taboo from the host state’s context. This will entail a discussion of the following: (i) the 
balance between a state’s sovereign power to tax on the one hand and justice for a 
foreign investor on the other; (ii) the effect of globalisation on sovereignty and how that 
                                                 
9 ibid 330; negotiated limitations on tax sovereignty are state-state agreements such as 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as well as bilateral tax treaties 
(BTTs) which provide for, inter alia, “source-country taxation of business profits” and “the 
primacy of residence-country taxation of interest, dividends and royalties” (ibid 330). 
10 ibid 331; externally imposed limitations on tax sovereignty are limitations that are forced upon a state 
at the decision of one or more states, such as sanctions imposed by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) on its members and non-members for using what the OECD 
perceives as harmful tax practices (Allison Christians, ‘Sovereignty, Taxation, and Social Contract’ 
(2009) 18(1) Minnesota Journal of International Law 99, 117). 
11 McLure (n. 3) 331-332; conflicts in sovereignty occur when one state (State X) uses its sovereignty to 
unilaterally determine its tax laws and, for example, offer zero or near zero tax rates (a ‘tax haven’) to 
foreign investors as an incentive for them to bring their capital into State X. The conflict occurs when a 
neighbouring country (State Y) must also decrease its tax rates and/or offer other or more incentives for 
investors to bring their capital to it instead of State X – that is effectively a ‘sovereign ‘decision that it  
would be forced to make, hence not really being sovereign at all. 
12 Take for example a state that makes a sovereign decision to become a tax haven but is then forced by 
the OECD at the threat of or actual use of sanctions to alter its tax regime in conformity with the OECD’s 
guidelines on tax co-operation. 
13 For example, if a state does not enter into negotiations with other states on tax policies and does not 
make demands and concede on its own sovereignty, then it will be isolated and isolation is a choice a 
state will seldom take. Likewise, a country threatened with sanctions can prevent the sanctions being 
employed by taking unilateral action that is demanded of it, and while it has the sovereign capacity to 
reject the demanded changes to its tax regime, sanctions are not an option it is likely to accept – it 
therefore does not really have much choice other than to comply with demands or to at least water down 
those demands through negotiations.  
14 See generally Chapter 1. 
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has affected tax sovereignty in the negotiated limitations context, using the World Trade 
Organisation15 (WTO) as a practical example of the necessity and popular method by 
which tax sovereignty is ceded and how that has brought us to where we are today in the 
IIT universe; (iii) the emergence of IITs and an introduction to international investment 
arbitration including the reasons to arbitrate and where arbitrations take place; (iv) the 
arbitrability of tax and public policy objections to tax arbitration including a discussion 
on exclusions and vetoes to tax arbitration; and (v) the risks to host states (especially 
developing countries) from entering into IITs with arbitration agreements or offering 
arbitration in their domestic investment law and why there is controversy surrounding 
the tax arbitration issue (this also includes a discussion on Brazil’s non-ratification of 
BITs policy and subsequent sovereignty retention). 
 
2.1 Sovereignty and Globalisation  
2.1.1 The Sovereign Power to Tax versus the Right to Justice 
 
The power to tax, born out of the formation of states,16 is at the core of national 
sovereignty.17 A primary source of income for states is raising money for public 
expenditure by taxing people and companies that work and operate in their territories 
because “taxes are what we pay for civilised society.”18 Governments protect and serve 
the people by controlling state-run departments such as education, health, military 
defence and policing, and to do so requires inhabitants who enjoy the luxury of freedom 
and civilised life to pay money into public coffers. Raising and spending money 
collected from taxation is at the heart of modern government practice,19 where in the 
United Kingdom, pre-19th Century taxes were raised primarily for expenditure on armed 
                                                 
15 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) was borne out of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organisation, Concluded at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994 (Registered by the Director-
General of the WTO acting on behalf of the Parties on 1 June 1995). 
16 Luca CM Melchionna, ‘Tax Disputes and International Commercial Arbitration’, (2003) 74 Diritto e 
Pratica Tributaria Internazionale 769, 771. 
17 Thomas Wälde, ‘National Tax Measures Affecting Investors Under The Discipline of International 
Investment Treaties’, (2008) 102 American Society of International Law Proceedings 51, 55; ECC, 
‘Report on the Scope for Convergence of Tax Systems in the Community’, Doc. No. COM(80)139 Final, 
27 March 1980, 6. 
18 Compañía General de Tabaco de Filipinas v Collector of Internal Revenue, (1927) 275 U.S. 87, 100, 
per Justice Holmes; William W Park, ‘Tax Arbitration and Investor Protection’ in Chapter 12 of 
Catherine A. Rogers and Roger P. Alford (eds), The Future of Investment Arbitration (2009 OUP) 227. 
19 William Park, ‘Arbitrability and Tax’ in Loukas A. Mistelis and Stavros L. Brekoulakis (eds), 
Arbitrability: International & Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International 2009), 179-180; and 




forces20 and post-19th Century tax expenditure from the Victorian era to date on military 
as well as social spending.21 A state’s ability to fund the necessities of civilisation, such 
as policing and the legal system comes from tax revenues “that an unregulated market 
cannot provide by itself.”22 
 
Ideally, a state would levy taxes legitimately, indiscriminately and to a reasonable level 
whether the levies are on investments of its nationals, investments of foreigners or on 
the incomes of its working population.23 Governmental systems such as taxation are, 
however, far from perfect, and wrongful takings by the state can and do occur. Whether 
such takings transpire with or without intention, the effect is the same and that should 
be compensated. It is therefore imperative that sovereignty does not legitimise wrongful 
state actions and this is summed up well by the following statement: 
 
“In the absence of justice, what is sovereignty but organised robbery?”24 
 
In the absence of a justice system for state accountability, the sovereign power to tax 
would be a form of organised robbery, where the wrongfully taxed, including foreign 
investors, cannot claim back what is rightfully theirs.25 The absence of justice against a 
sovereign state for any offences, including illegitimate taxation, would be a form of 
totalitarianism that would counter the principle of due process of law if the “absolute 
monarch, like the 800-pound gorilla, can do what he wants.”26 
 
                                                 
20 ‘Public Spending’ (n. 19); and Jari Eloranta, ‘Warfare and Welfare? Understanding 19th and 20th 
Century Central Government Spending’ (2004) University of Warwick, Warwick Economic Research 
Papers No.699, 2, < http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1489/1/WRAP_Eloranta_twerp699.pdf> accessed  13 
June 2011. 
21 ibid; social spending includes cash benefits, health care, education, food, housing, other welfare 
services and public debt (Eloranta (n. 20) 2). 
22 Diane M. Ring, ‘What’s at State in the Sovereignty Debate? International Tax and the Nation-State’, 
(2008) 49:1 Va. J. Int'l L. 155, 167. 
23 In previous centuries in the industrialised world when 10 to 16 hour work days for labourers were the 
norm, Robert Owen (14 May 1771 – 17 November 1858) campaigned for a more balanced day and 
coined the slogan: “Eight hours labour, eight hours recreation, eight hours rest”, and that eventually 
resulted in the eight hour work day. When workers are remunerated for their 8 hours of labour, ideally 
they will not be taxed to a point where they cannot enjoy their 8 hours of recreation and have enough 
money in the bank to be able to get their 8 hours of sleep at night. 
24 Saint Augustine, 13 November 354 – 28 August 430. 
25 If the state has breached an obligation(s) to the foreign investor. 




Despite the legitimate and positive undertones of taxation, it has its limits no matter 
who or what it is levied on, be it the tax levying host state’s population or companies 
within its jurisdiction or foreign nationals or their investments operating within its 
jurisdiction. These limitations have been likened to rearing sheep, where “it is well to 
stop when you get down to the skin.”27 We live in a globalised society where foreign 
investment between nations is rife and those investments are subject to taxation by host 
states. 
 
Most investor-state disputes, whether for a claim based on alleged illegitimate taxation28 
or any other state measure, take place in international arbitration.29 Arbitration is seen as 
a more neutral forum than the national courts of the host state where proper justice can 
be served and this is especially so in less developed countries where the national courts 
are not very independent from government pressure.30 The reasons that states adhere to 
international arbitration (either through IITs, their domestic laws or agreements with 
investors) and allow their laws, regulations, policies and decisions to be deliberated by a 
tribunal based outside the state’s jurisdiction and made up of private individuals rather 
than its own national judiciary is discussed in section 2.1.2 below. 
 
2.1.2 Sovereignty and Globalisation 
 
The sovereign’s form has evolved through time, from being a monarch/single leader 
(this stems from ‘absolutist theory’) and evolving to become the self-determination of 
                                                 
27 Attributed to Austin O’Malley (1858-1932), whose full quote reads, “In levying taxes and in sheering 
sheep it is well to stop when you get down to the skin.” The quote is similar to the saying by French 
Economist and Minister of Finance under King Louis XIV of France, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683): 
“The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest amount of feathers with the 
least possible amount of hissing.” 
28 Illegitimate taxation meaning that taxes were incorrectly levied resulting in nationalisation or 
expropriation, or a violation of national treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, fair and equitable 
treatment, the guarantee of full protection and security, performance requirements, or a breach of 
stabilisation clauses or any other obligations given by the host state to the foreign investor. 
29 Investor-state disputes are also sometimes raised at the courts of the host state, and failing the desired 
justice, they are then brought in international arbitration, such as in EnCana Corporation v Republic of 
Ecuador (LCIA Case No. UN3481, Award and Partial Dissent of 3 February 2006) (EnCana, EnCana 
Award or EnCana Partial Dissent). 
30 Even in some more developed states the judiciaries are not free from political influences, as 
demonstrated with the treatment of Yukos Oil Company (Yukos) in the ‘advanced development 
economy’ Russian state, where judges who did not act or refused to act in the manner that the government 
authorities wanted were either removed from the case or the bench, whereas those who supported State 
measures against Yukos were awarded with medals – (RosInvest Co. UK Limited v The Russian 
Federation, SCC Case No. V 079/2005, Final Award of 12 September 2010, at para 71; Ulric R. Nichol, 
Focus on Politics and Economics of Russia and Eastern Europe (Nova Science, 2006) 33 
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the people (‘popular sovereignty’/‘democracy’).31 Sovereignty was often an attribute of 
a powerful individual who gained the power to rule over territory purportedly from 
“direct or delegated divine or historic authority.”32 Political legitimacy now comes from 
popular support, whereby “the sovereignty of the sovereign became the sovereignty of 
the people.”33 
 
There are four ways that the word ‘sovereignty’ has been used:34 (i) national 
sovereignty, which is the authority of a sovereign (ruler) to govern its territory through 
domestic authority structures;35 (ii) international legal sovereignty, which is the mutual 
recognition of states and allows states to enter into agreements with one another and 
join international organisations36; (iii) Westphalian sovereignty, which refers to the 
territoriality of a state and the non-intervention by external actors from a state’s internal 
affairs37  (this is the embodiment of what is called the ‘nation-state’); and (iv) 
interdependence sovereignty, which is the ability of government authorities to control 
cross-border movements.38 
 
Globalisation has affected all the above types of sovereignties. The sovereign power to 
tax is a concept of national sovereignty in an authoritative context and is affected by 
international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty. Interdependence 
sovereignty is concerned with control (e.g. the ability to collect taxes) rather than 
authority (e.g. the authority to levy taxes)39 and is therefore outside the scope of this 
thesis as the research centres on the legitimacy of taxation, not the ability to collect it. 
                                                 
31 Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (Columbia University Press, 
1996) 2. 
32 W. Michael Reisman, ‘Sovereignty and Human ‘Rights in Contemporary International Law’ (1990) 84 
A.J.I.L. 866, 867. 
33 ibid. 
34 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, 1999) 9. 
35
ibid. 
36 ibid 9 and 14. 
37 ibid 9 and 20. 
38 ibid 9. 
39 Authority over cross-border movements is different from control over cross-border movements in the 
sense that the power to legislate is authoritative but strict enforcement of that legislation is subject to 
control. States cannot completely control the flow of goods, persons, pollutants, diseases or ideas across 
territorial boundaries nor can it completely shield itself from the effects of atmospheric pollution, the 
drugs trade and economic crises (ibid 12). For example, states can use their authority to legislate that 
counterfeit goods are illegal and must not enter its territory, however the state cannot completely control 
whether the counterfeit goods make it through its borders or not. This also works in the context of 
exports, for example, legislation dictates that it is illegal to export recreational or counterfeit 




Globalisation has influenced Westphalian sovereignty and transformed the role of the 
state from a ‘nation-state’ into a ‘market-state’.40 Globalisation has pushed (and been 
aided by) countries into using their international legal sovereignty to create and join 
international organisations such as the WTO and enter into IITs with one another for the 
sake of economic development and reciprocal protection of their interests. The joining 
of international organisations like the WTO and entering into IITs, although defined as 
Hobson’s choices at the outset of this chapter, are nevertheless voluntary decisions for 
states to make. These voluntary decisions allow the market-state model to flourish 
because they invite greater external influence on the national policies of nations in order 
to establish competitive markets41 which in turn has resulted in supranational control or 
discipline in many areas of state policy which transgress Westphalian sovereignty.42 
This is witnessed at WTO level through the WTO agreements and IITs which either 
prevent states from voluntarily taking actions which can result in IIT violations or force 
states to comply with IITs in fear of investor-state arbitration (see section 2.4.2 below). 
The transgression of Westphalian sovereignty therefore affects a state’s tax sovereignty, 
i.e. its power to effectively and unilaterally legislate on matters of taxation. 
 
Nations have accepted external influences on their state powers in the areas of “trade, 
investment… human rights”43 and the environment by international agreements,44 
whereby recourse for alleged breaches may be brought in several fora, including the 
WTO, where the WTO General Council delegates the solution of disputes to the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)45 under the Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes,46 commonly referred to as the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU); and in international investment arbitration at the World Bank’s 
                                                                                                                                               
example, legislate that excise duties are payable on goods purchased from outside the state by travellers, 
but it cannot control whether all travellers declare these goods nor can it check every passenger’s suitcase. 
40 Abba Kolo, ‘Tax “Veto” as a Special Jurisdictional and Substantive Issue in Investor-State Arbitration: 
Need for Reassessment?’ (2008-2009) 32 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev 475. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Krasner (n. 34) 20. 
43 Kolo (n. 40) 475. 
44 Trade agreement examples include WTO agreements such as the 1947 and 1994 General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 1995; investment 
agreements include the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), human rights agreements 
include the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and environmental agreements include 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) 1997 Kyoto Protocol. 
45 WTO Agreement, Article IV(3). 
46 WTO Agreement, Annex 2. 
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International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),47 the 
intergovernmental Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), or private institutions such as 
the London Courts of International Arbitration (LCIA), International Chamber of 
Commerce Court of Arbitration (ICC) or ad hoc arbitrations. 
 
The dilution of state autonomy by joining international organisations like the WTO and 
therefore accepting a high degree of policing by international panels in areas of law and 
regulation which were traditionally “the exclusive sovereign preserve of states”48 is 
required in order to compete in the globalised world, whereas the refusal to engage with 
other states would result in the exclusion from benefits such as trade liberalisation 
which would have negative consequences on the prosperity of the state. Similarly, it is 
perceived that entering into IITs is imperative to countries, especially capital-importing 
countries, to compete in attracting FDI (this point is expanded upon throughout this 
chapter). 
 
The WTO offers an excellent, practical and recently historical portrayal of the interplay 
between the state’s power to tax and the effect of outside forces on that power. The 
WTO was formed in 1995, replacing the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The GATT is still in force through its 1994 version (together ‘the GATT’). 
The WTO, from its beginnings as the GATT, began with a focus on trade liberalisation 
through the reduction in tariffs49 (taxes levied on the country’s borders on incoming 
capital and goods). The reduction in tariffs at the behest of other states is in itself a 
practical example of the trade-off of sovereignty for the sake of having a place in the 
global market (of course the state that reduces its tariffs also benefits its own exporters 
who can take advantage of reduced tariffs in other states). The WTO expanded the 
number of agreements under its belt during the Uruguay Round of negotiations to 
include the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS), the Trade-Related 
Investment Measures Agreement (TRIMs), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
                                                 
47 1965 Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States (ICSID Convention). 
48 Rajesh Pillai, ‘National Treatment and WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2002) 1(3) World Trade Review, 
321. 
49 Michael Daly, ‘WTO Rules on Direct Taxation’ (2006) 29(5) The World Economy 572, 528. 
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Measures (SCM) and the Agreement on Agriculture, and the Bali Round of negotiations 
which concluded on 7 December 2013 has produced the ‘Bali Package’.50 
 
The success of multilateral trade negotiations in over half a century resulted in tariffs 
declining.51 Meanwhile, internal taxes can also be used to have a detrimental impact on 
imported capital, goods and services and can vitiate the success of tariff reductions.52 
For that reason, the aforementioned agreements play an “increasingly important role in 
regulating the use of tax measures [i.e. internal taxation], especially where these 
measures affect the international movement of goods, services, capital, persons and 
technology”53 and whilst the WTO’s focus on tariffs resulted in trade-offs of 
sovereignty for the sake of trade, as a result of the expansion of WTO agreements, the 
WTO now has the ability to “encroach on Members’ freedom to decide their own 
internal tax policies”54 and tax disputes at the WTO on internal taxes are becoming 
more frequent.55 Tax disputes at the WTO have included Mexican tax measures on 
sweeteners other than cane sugar which are used in soft drinks,56 Japanese, Korean and 
Chilean tax measures on alcoholic beverages,57 Indonesian tax measures on the 
automotive industry58 and United States tax exemptions for the sale or lease of United 
States-produced goods for export outside the United States.59 
 
The dispute resolution mechanism between contracting parties under the GATT prior to 
the introduction of the WTO’s DSU was regulated by Article XXIII of GATT as it was 
in 1947 (GATT 1947), under which any contracting party, including the state whose 
conduct is complained of (the respondent state), could block the review process of its 
                                                 
50 WTO 2013 News Items, ‘5-7 December 2013 - Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference - Days 3, 4 and 5: 
Round the Clock Consultations Produce ‘Bali Package’ (7 December 2013) 
< http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/mc9sum_07dec13_e.htm> accessed 28 December 2013. 
51 Michael Daly (49) 528. 
52 ibid 528. 
53 ibid 529. 
54 ibid. 
55 ibid. 
56 WTO, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, adopted on 24 March 2006; the 
same tax measures were subject to international arbitration between Cargill Incorporated v United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award (Redacted Version) of 18 September 2009 and 
Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc. v United Mexican States 
(ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/05/05), Final Award (Redacted Version) of 21 November 2007. 
57 WTO, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, adopted on 1 November 1996; WTO, Korea – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages, adopted on 17 February 1999; and WTO Panel Report, Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, adopted on 12 January 2000. 
58 WTO, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, adopted on 23 July 1998. 
59 WTO, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations”, adopted on 20 March 2000. 
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conduct at any stage (i.e. it required a positive consensus). The current mechanism 
under the WTO’s DSU does not require a positive consensus, i.e. if a complaint is 
lodged by a GATT contracting party against the policies of another contracting party, 
the deliberation of those policies will proceed even if an objection to the review process 
is made by a WTO Member (including, of course, the respondent state). Under the old 
mechanism, the respondent state retained greater sovereignty because it could block the 
review of its employment of its sovereign powers.  Even if a state allowed the WTO to 
review its laws which were found to violate the GATT, the violating state could even 
block the authorisation of countermeasures against it for such non-implementation of 
the recommended changes to bring it into conformity with its GATT obligations.60 
Evidently, the capability of states to block the review of their laws and actions as well 
as blocking retaliatory actions against them for non-implementation of any WTO 
recommendations allowed them to theoretically maintain absolute sovereignty. 
However, the GATT 1947 dispute settlement procedure was seldom blocked because 
although a WTO report may have been unfavourable to the respondent state, it would 
have been unfavourable only in the short-term, whereas the long-term systemic benefits 
of not hampering the process served to prevent against retaliation by other member 
states61 who could have unilaterally neutralised a respondent state’s benefits of GATT 
membership through measures such as trade embargoes.62 For these same reasons, states 
exercise their sovereign powers to sign and ratify IITs, sovereignly trading-off their 
absolute independence not only to other states but to those states’ nationals (investors) 
too. States do this in the hope of becoming or remaining competitive in the international 
market-place and because in this modern era, more than ever before, nations depend on 
each other for resources, support and security. Pure and absolute sovereignty is not 
achievable if a country wishes to support itself and its population and to participate in 
international trade with any degree of success, whereby not participating in politico-
economics will ensure its failure to compete in exporting goods and services and 
                                                 
60 WTO, ‘Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 2: Historic Development of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System’, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c2s1p1_e.htm> accessed 11 May 
2011. 
61 ibid. 
62 Trade embargoes would have been agreed by states outside the GATT system because under GATT 
1947 the violating state also had the power to block measures such as trade embargoes against it. 
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attracting FDI into its country.63 The purpose of a state’s legislature is to effectively 
pursue and implement the policies of its people,64 and owing to globalisation, broadly 
speaking, it cannot do that alone.65 States therefore pursue paths that dilute their 
sovereignty because they desire the enrichment of their country, and this would hardly 
be achievable if they go at it alone because conditions outside their jurisdiction will 
affect the economy within their jurisdiction in any event.66 Globalisation has 
transgressed economic lines of division that used to be marked by political boundaries.67 
This brings us now to the discussion on IITs and arbitration. 
 
2.2 International Investment Treaties 
2.2.1 The Role of International Investment Treaties 
 
Countries whose regimes offer stability for investment, with their laws and regulations 
seldom used to impede investment, pose attractive attributes to attract foreign investors. 
Some states, such as Argentina, are known for their instability, and it is possible that the 
reservations foreign investors have when calculating investment risk in such a country 
is alleviated to some extent when said states are bound by IITs. A vital feature that 
benefits investors and is contained in most IITs is a dispute resolution provision that 
entitles an investor of one party to an IIT to initiate arbitration proceedings against the 
other party in its capacity as a state. It is also vital that states that are unsuccessful in 
their arbitrations implement the resulting arbitral awards;68 otherwise the concept of the 
arbitration provision in IITs and arbitration itself would be pointless. 
 
                                                 
63 In the discussion about Brazil in at 2.4.1 below, we shall see that Brazil have not ratified any IITs. But 
this does not mean that Brazil does not participate in the international community, it is a member of the 
WTO and it has signed many bilateral tax treaties and is a member of various free-trade zones in South 
America. Brazil also has an attractive domestic investment law.  
64 Ring (n. 22) 171. 
65 ibid. 
66 ibid, citing the work of Michal Zürn, ‘Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State’, in Michael 
Th. Greven & Louis W. Pauly (eds.), Democracy Beyond The State? The European Dilemma and the 
Emerging Global Order (Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 91, 93. 
67 John Ward Cutler, ‘The Treatment of Foreigners’ (1933) 27 A.J.I.L 225, 226. 
68 Recently there have been problems between US investors and Argentina who have refused to pay on 
two arbitral awards exceeding US $300 million – Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12, Award of 14 July 2006 and CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID 




2.2.2 The Emergence of International Investment Treaties 
 
IITs are primarily composed of BITs, but there are a number of MITs, free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with investment provisions, as well as economic partnership 
agreements and regional agreements.69 The first modern day BIT was signed on 25th 
November 1959 and made between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan and this was the only BIT concluded in 1959. The number of BITs 
in force grew decade upon decade: end of 1969: 72 BITs; end of 1979: 165 BITs; end of 
1989: 385 BITs. The number of BITs then grew exponentially in the 1990s to 1,857 
BITs by the end of 1999. In the 12 years from the end of 1999 to the end of 2011, the 
number of BITs in force grew to 2,833,70 as well as 331 other types of IITs (primarily 
MITs and FTAs), totalling 3,164 IITs by the end of 2011.71 The quantitative domination 
of BITs makes them the most instrumental tool in the IIT universe, however the 
economic significance of regional FTAs is on the rise, whereby a trilateral investment 
agreement between China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was 
concluded in 2012;72 Mexico signed a FTA with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua (Mexico-Central America FTA) in 2011;73 the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)74 has developed further, such as with the conclusion 
                                                 
69 UNCTAD, ‘Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies’ (2012) World Investment Report, xx 
<http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Full-en.pdf> accessed 8 August 2012. 
70 ibid. 
71 ibid. 
72 Agreement among the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of 
Investment, signed 13 May 2012. 
73 Tratado de Libre Comercio (TLC) Único entre México y Centroamérica (FTA between Mexico and 
Central America), signed 22 November 2011. 
74 The ASEAN is a 10-country strong economic area consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand (all previous countries are original members since 8th August 1967), Brunei, Burma 
(Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. 
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of the ASEAN-India FTA;75 and the European Commission now has the power to 
negotiate IITs on behalf of the entire European Union (EU).76 
 
The brief discussion in the preceding section 2.1.2 focused on the GATT because it was 
an agreement that significantly altered on a worldwide scale the dynamic between states 
by giving each other the ability to openly and publicly question each other’s sovereign 
economic decisions. The remainder of this thesis will focus on IITs, especially BITs, 
which have a substantially different application to the GATT and the WTO (referred to 
forthwith as the WTO). The WTO focuses primarily on trade liberalisation by inhibiting 
discrimination77 and provides a platform for states to challenge other states’ domestic 
discriminatory practices. These challenges are non-monetary and not brought by 
                                                 
75 The ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement (ASEAN-India FTA) consists of three agreements: (i) 
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Republic of India and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, signed 8 October 2003; (ii) Protocol to Amend the Framework 
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and the Republic of India, signed 13 August 2009; and (iii) Agreement on Trade in Goods Under 
the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of India, signed 13 August 2009; altogether entered into force 
1 January 2010. 
76 The Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, (2007/C 306/01), signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, entered into force 1 
December 2009 (“the Lisbon Treaty”). The Lisbon Treaty renamed the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (AKA “the Treaty of Rome”) to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“the 
TFEU”) (Lisbon Treaty, Article 2(1), C 306/42). Article 12 of the Lisbon Treaty gave the EU exclusive 
competence on the EU’s “common commercial policy” by amending the Treaty of Rome with the 
addition of Article 2B(e) (now Article 3.1(e)). The Treaty of Rome was amended with the inclusion of 
Article 188B (Lisbon Treaty, Article 157; now Treaty of Rome, Article 206), requiring the EU to 
contribute to the abolition of restrictions on international trade and FDI, and Article 188C (Lisbon Treaty, 
Article 158; now TFEU, Article 207.1), which requires that the common commercial policy be based on 
uniform principles including the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements and FDI. In a Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for managing 
financial responsibility linked to investor-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international 
agreements to which the European Union is party (Brussels, 21 June 2012, Doc. No. 2012/0163 (COD),  
(the Proposal)), it was confirmed by the European Commission (the Commission) that the EU has 
exclusive competence to conclude agreements relating to foreign investment (page 3, para 1.2). The 
Proposal established a legal and financial framework for investor-state dispute settlement (by arbitration) 
whereby a claim can be brought by a foreign investor against the EU as a state (European Commission, 
News archive, ‘EU takes key step to provide legal certainty for foreign investors’, Brussels 21 June 2012 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=808> accessed 25 June 2012). That said, none of 
this is final and in fact it is far from so. Under the Lisbon Treaty the EU gained competence in 
international trade and FDI but save for a few minor international trade agreements nothing substantive 
has taken place on the FDI front. The Commission/Parliament are of the view that intra-EU BITs are 
superseded by EU law whereas ICSID tribunals take the opposite view. 
77 Directorate-General for External Policies, ‘Responsibility in Investor-State Arbitration in the EU’ 
(2012) European Parliament, 17 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/fr/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=794
>  accessed 28 January 2013. 
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affected investors. On the other hand, IITs focus on investment liberalisation.78 IITs, 
especially BITs, promote foreign investment from state to state by affording certain 
safeguards (standards of treatment) by the host country to foreign investors, including 
national treatment, prompt and adequate compensation for expropriation or 
nationalisation, fair and equitable treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, protection 
of contractual rights and performance requirements. It is in this respect that BITs can be 
categorised “as a developing country’s way to compete for international capital by 
making a credible commitment to respect property rights.”79 An alleged breach by a 
state of a standard of treatment contained in an IIT will be rectified by providing a 
platform for the investors themselves to commence proceedings against that state and 
seek monetary compensation under the relevant IIT(s),80 whereas a finding at the WTO 
of a breach will not compensate individual investors for any harm suffered.  
 
2.2.3 International Investment Treaties and the Agreement to Arbitrate 
 
Countries enter into IITs to attract FDI. Most IITs contain an invitation for investors of 
the home state to arbitrate with the host state and this is called a ‘standing offer to 
arbitrate’. The standing offer to arbitrate is a trade-off of sovereignty because when 
invoked, the host state’s behaviour (as well as the legality of its decisions) when 
exercising its sovereign powers will be judged by a tribunal made up of foreign 
citizens.81 
 
2.2.3.1 Why Arbitrate? 
 
Arbitration is the primary method of litigation for investor-state disputes and is perhaps 
the most neutral method of getting to the bottom of any issues. Recourse to the host 
                                                 
78 Deborah L Swenson, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties and International Integration’, (August 2008) 
University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research, 5 
<http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/dswenson/BITsIntegration08.pdf> accessed 2 February 2012 
79 Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman and Beth Simmons, ‘Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000’ (2004) UC Berkeley, Boalt Working Papers in Public Law, 32 
<http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/1hg4f4dw> accessed 2 February 2012. 
80 Other types of relief can be sought at arbitration, however, monetary compensation is usually the main 
type of relief sought as it is the most easily enforceable due to the New York Convention and the ICSID 
Convention, compared to other types of relief, such as rectification, e.g. giving expropriated land back to 
the investor. 
81 It is standard practice for neutrality’s sake that the tribunal is not made up of members whose 
citizenship is the same as any party to the arbitration (unless otherwise agreed by the parties themselves). 
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state’s judiciary is an option, however it is an option that need not be inscribed in a legal 
instrument because it is a natural route for justice. Some investors may exploit the host 
state’s judiciary before or in unison with the arbitration route. In some BITs, utilisation 
of the home state’s courts is a prerequisite to commencing arbitration,82 the non-
exploitation of which could result in the arbitral tribunal declining jurisdiction to 
preside over the dispute.83 The standing offer to arbitrate contained in most of today’s 
IITs is the child of the drafters of 1980s IITs, which, in that period in time, was seen as 
an innovative step because it deviated from the traditional requirement for the consent 
to arbitrate to be contained in an arbitration agreement in a commercial contract.84 It 
was especially innovative in light of the fact that customary international law does not 
give private parties a right of action against host states. 
 
The arbitration agreement in IITs gives investors peace of mind by providing them with 
the ability to avoid putting to the test the real or imagined bias of local judges, with 
those worries possibly creating a commercial anxiety that prevents FDI.85 Arbitration 
was chosen because a tribunal for whom patriotism, government pressure or corruption 
is not an issue can be expected to judge the host state’s alleged illegitimate measures86 
more fairly than its own judiciary.87 We shall see at section 2.4 below that most 
respondents to investment arbitration are developing countries, and this could be 
“because courts in many poor countries are corrupt, inept or unfair”88 which necessitates 
the need for arbitration in international trade. 
 
                                                 
82 Article 6(4), Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of 
Turkey on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 24 January 1991, entered into 
force 7 April 1996 (Romania-Turkey BIT); Article X(3), Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments between Argentina and the United Republic of Spain, signed 3 October 1991, 
entered into force 28 September 1992 (Spain-Argentina BIT). 
83 Omer Dede and Serdar Elhüseyni v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/22, Award on Jurisdiction of 5 
September 2013. 
84 Gary Born, ‘BITs, BATs, and Buts – Keynote Speech’ (Kiev Arbitration Day, Kiev, 15 November 
2012) <http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/cdn/files/gar/articles/BITs_BATs_and_Buts2.pdf> 
accessed 15 June 2013. 
85 William W. Park, ‘Arbitration and the Fisc: NAFTA’s “Tax Veto”’ (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int'l L., 231, 232. 
86 Illegitimate measures being a breach of the relevant national law, IIT, or contract or investment 
agreement concluded directly with the foreign investor. 
87 This does not preclude an investor from attempting to bring the dispute before the national courts of the 
host state. 
88 Editorial, ‘The Secret Trade Courts’ New York Times (New York, 27 September 2004) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/27/opinion/27mon3.html?_r=0> accessed 25 December 2013. 
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Arbitration is also the chosen method for investors over and above diplomatic 
protection because the investors have direct recourse for their grievances against the 
host state and effectively take matters into their own hands and seek legal remedies in 
an independent international forum.89 Investors therefore avoid lobbying and save time 
by avoiding the diplomatic route. Arbitration is also more favourable than diplomatic 
protection because it depoliticises disputes which will therefore be decided on matters 
of law and not politics or diplomacy.90  
 
2.2.3.2 Where Do Investor-State Arbitrations Take Place? 
 
ICSID is the most prominent investor-state arbitration institution.91 Of the 514 known 
investment treaty arbitrations by the end of 2012,92 314 were brought under the ICSID 
Convention and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules (AF Rules).93 Arbitrations under 
the ICSID Convention are between the host state who is a contracting party to the 
ICSID Convention and a national of a country that is also party to the ICSID 
Convention. Arbitrations can be administered under the AF Rules if the host state is not 
a contracting party to the ICSID Convention, or if it is a contracting party but the 
investor is a national of a country that is not party to the ICSID Convention. 
Arbitrations under the AF Rules are administered outside of the ICSID Convention 
framework.  
 
ICSID was established by the World Bank to be an autonomous international institution 
for the resolution of investor-state disputes.94 As a World Bank institution it is 
                                                 
89 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Non-Disputing State Submissions in Investment Arbitration: Resurgence 
of Diplomatic Protection?’ in Chapter 15 of Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Marcelo G. Kohen and 
Jorge E. Viñuales (eds), Diplomatic and Judicial Means of Dispute Settlement (Brill Nijhoff 2012), 306. 
90 ibid. 
91 Todd L. Allee and Clint Peinhardt, ‘Contingent Credibility: The Reputational Effects of Investment 
Treaty Disputes on Foreign Direct Investment’ (2008) Unpublished Article by Univ. of Illinois and Univ. 
of Texas at Dallas, 8. 
< http://politicalscience.osu.edu/intranet/gies/papers/Allee%20Peinhardt%20Sept2009.pdf> accessed 8 
April 2013). 
92 UNCTAD, ‘Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)’ (2013) IIA Issues Note 
No.1, 3. (UNCTAD ISDS 2013). 
93
ibid 3; there have been 131 investor-state arbitrations brought under the UNCITRAL Rules and these 
arbitrations can be either ad hoc or administered by an arbitration institution, but because the UNCITRAL 
Rules do not specify an institution, one cannot compare the ICSID institution to a set of arbitration rules. 
However, the ICSID Convention/AF Rules by comparison to the UNCITRAL Rules still have more than 
double the number of investor-State arbitrations brought under them. 
94 ‘About ICSID’,  
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headquartered in Washington DC.95 The establishment of ICSID under an international 
convention as well as the fact that it is a World Bank institution has resulted in its 
prominence in investor-state arbitration.96 Pursuant to Article 54(1) of the ICSID 
Convention, ICSID arbitral awards are recognised and enforced as national court 
judgments in the country of enforcement97 and this gives the institution even more 
weight and credibility.98 This recognition and enforcement does not benefit an award 
made under the AF Rules, because the ICSID Convention does not apply to the AF 
Rules.99 The finality of awards under the AF Rules is subject to recognition and 
enforcement under the New York Convention100 (NYC), which is why the AF Rules 
require the seat of an AF Rules arbitration to be in a NYC signatory state.101 So rather 
than being automatically recognised and enforced in any national court of an ICSID 
Convention state, AF Rules awards may be subject to judicial control at the place of 
arbitration (which in some states is mandatory),102 and the awards may also be declined 
recognition and enforcement if they fall foul of the public policy where recognition or 
enforcement are sought or the matter is considered non-arbitrable by the recognising 
and enforcing state.103 
 
Another advantage of ICSID is that it publicises “the nature, timing and outcomes of its 
proceedings and awards”104 (including those under the AF Rules) which makes it a very 
transparent arbitral institution and the only one to publish such information.105  
 
2.2.3.3 Standing Offer to Arbitrate in Domestic Investment Laws 
 
Some domestic investment laws contain a standing offer to arbitrate, whereby the state 
consents in advance to arbitration commenced by a hypothetical investor. Article 8(2) 
                                                                                                                                               
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageN
ame=AboutICSID_Home> accessed 17 January 2013. 
95 ibid. 
96 Allee and Peinhardt (n. 91) 8. 
97 Article 54(1), ICSID Convention. 
98 Allee and Peinhardt (n. 91) 8. 
99 Article 3, ICSID AF Rules. 
100 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 
Convention). 
101 Article 19, ICSID AF Rules. 
102 Park (2001) (n. 85) 234. 
103 See section 2.3 below. 
104 Allee and Peinhardt (n. 91) 8. 
105 Many ICSID awards are available on its website and will be examined in this thesis. 
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Albanian Law No. 7764 of 1993 on foreign investment106 is a perfect example of this 
submission, which provides: 
  
“If a foreign investment dispute arises … then the foreign investor may submit 
the dispute for resolution and the Republic of Albania hereby consents to the 
submission thereof, to [ICSID]” (emphasis added).107 
 
Other domestic laws interpreted as containing a standing offer to arbitrate have included 
Article 16(2) of Law of Georgia No. 473-10 on the Investment Activity Promotion and 
Guarantees,108 Article 15 of El Salvador’s Foreign Investment Law of 1999,109 Article 
27 of Kazakhstan’s Law on Foreign Investments,110 and Article 8 of Egypt’s  1974 Law 
No. 43.111 
 
2.3 Arbitrability of Tax and Public Policy Considerations 
 
Tax arbitration is engulfed by doctrinal objections because “tax sovereignty is one of 
the fundamental components of national sovereignty, and … one of the fundamental 
prerogatives of national parliaments is the right to vote taxes.”112 
                                                 
106 Albanian Law No. 7764  of 2 November 1993, entered into force on 1 January 1994. 
107 ibid, Article 8(2); there are various versions of Article 8(2) of Albanian Law No. 7764 of 1993 online 
which do not contain the consent provision replicated here. The parts of Article 8(2) replicated here are 
accurate and have been obtained from Tradex Hellas S.A. v Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction of 24 December 1996, 174; and Michele Potestá, ‘The Interpretation 
of Consent to ICSID Arbitration Contained in Domestic Investment Laws’ (2011) 27:2 Arbitration 
International 149, 156. 
108 Law of Georgia No. 473-10 on the Investment Activity Promotion and Guarantees of 12 November 
1996 (Georgian Investment Law), which was considered by the arbitral tribunal in Zhinvali Development 
Limited v. Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/1, Award (unpublished). The Georgian 
Investment Law has now been amended to remove the standing offer to arbitrate – see section 2.4.2.3 
below. 
109 Republic of El Salvador, Ley de Inversion de 1999 (Foreign Investment Law of 1999). This has also 
been amended – see section 2.4.2.3 below. This law was considered in Inceysa Vallisoletana, SL v. 
Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award of 2 August 2006. 
110 Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Foreign Investments of 27 December 1994. This law containing 
the standing offer to arbitrate has been repealed – see section 2.4.2.3 below. It was, despite its repeal, 
used in conjunction with Article 6 of that same law (stabilisation clause) to successfully bring 
proceedings by the claimant in Telsim & Rumeli v Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16. 
More recently, the tribunal in Ruby Roz Agricol LLP v Republic of Kazakhstan, Ad hoc arbitration under 
the UNCITRAL Rules, Award on Jurisdiction of 1 August 2013, did not find they had jurisdiction to hear 
the dispute under that same law. 
111 Arab Republic of Egypt, Law No. 43 of 1974. Egypt’s standing offer has since been revoked – see 
section 2.4.2.3 below. The standing offer was used to commence proceedings by the claimant in Southern 
Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3.  
112 ‘Report from the Commission to the Council on the Scope for Convergence of Tax Systems in the 




Arbitral tribunals are made up of privately appointed individuals113 that preside over 
disputes which would ordinarily be entertained by the courts of the host state which 
naturally enjoys jurisdiction by reason of the parties’ residence, lis pendens, or other.114 
These tribunals are given the power to rule on the legitimacy of a state’s legislative 
measures (including tax measures). The decisions by adjudicators who are not judges of 
the host state dilutes the sovereignty of the state because its sovereignty is transgressed 
by the entire arbitral process; i.e. a state’s sovereignty is never questioned if its policies 
are reviewed by its own national courts because such review is an internal procedure in 
which the legitimacy of the exercise of the state’s powers is decided by its own 
judiciary and is therefore a completely internal sovereign process based on the 
separation of powers. On the other hand, investor-state arbitration results in foreigners 
outside the state’s jurisdiction deciding on “challenges to governmental measures, 
sometimes measures of general application intended to promote or achieve important 
public policy goals,”115 including environmental protection, public health and revenues 
from taxation, and this is clearly a ceding of sovereignty by the respondent host state. 
 
Despite the reputation for tax as being non-arbitrable because of the jurisdictional and 
doctrinal objections, “not all disputes relating to tax are outside the ambit of 
arbitration.”116 It is a fact that tax matters have been arbitrated in international 
commercial arbitration117 and investor-state arbitration  so it is useful now to predispose 
of that misconception. 
 
                                                 
113 Despite international investment arbitrations brought by foreign investors against states often taking 
place at the intergovernmental  PCA or at the World Bank’s ICSID, in similar fashion to commercialised 
courts of arbitration (LCIA, ICC, etc.), the arbitrators are appointed on a case-by-case basis. 
114 See generally Chapter 1. 
115 J. Anthony VanDuzer, ‘Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration Through 
Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation’, (2007) 52 McGill L.J. 681, 684. 
116 Ilias Bantekas, ‘The Foundations of Arbitrability in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2008) 27 
Australian YIL 193, 201. 
117 See generally Melchionna (n. 16); international commercial arbitration centring on taxation are 
generally disputes on commercial aspects of paying a tax and not the legality of the tax itself (as is the 
situation in investor-state arbitrations). In this context, disputes might arise between joint venture partners 
as to who is liable to pay a tax or the percentages in which the tax must be shared between them, or 
disputes might arise between a taxpayer and his tax adviser “when advice about a tax shelter proves 




2.3.1 Arbitrability  
 
The most important convention in international commercial arbitration is the NYC and 
it also plays a role in the recognition and enforcement stage of investment arbitration 
awards not made under the ICSID Convention.118  
 
The principle of party autonomy permits parties to an arbitration agreement to submit to 
arbitration any and all disputes that have arisen or may arise between them and this is 
recognised by the NYC.119 Arbitration agreements can therefore be tailored in a way 
that specifically includes or excludes certain matters, including taxation. Disputes 
centring on taxation will fall within the ambit of an arbitration agreement if the 
agreement encompasses all disputes, or specifies taxation as a matter to arbitrate, or 
discounts some types of matters but not taxation. The same concept applies to the 
dispute resolution provisions (i.e. arbitration agreements) in IITs. If state parties to an 
IIT want the IIT protections to apply to taxation measures but want a dispute on taxation 
to fall under the jurisdiction of only the host state courts, they can fulfil that desire by 
inserting an exclusion to the arbitration of tax matters in the IIT dispute resolution 
article.120 
 
Another limb to arbitrability is that matters referred to arbitration must concern “a 
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration”121 (emphasis mine). Article II(1) of 
the NYC is a perfect example of the two stages in which arbitrability is a condition that 
the parties must satisfy, namely in the arbitration agreement and the law and/or public 
policy of relevant jurisdictions. 
                                                 
118 For example, investor-state arbitral awards under the AF Rules will require enforcement through the 
New York Convention, and all of the rules in the New York Convention that allow states to not recognise 
and enforce awards will therefore apply, including non-recognition and enforcement for not non-
compliance with the state’s public policy or for being non-arbitrable. An award can be deemed non-
arbitrable at the country of recognition and enforcement even if it was deemed arbitrable in the lex arbitri 
(Bantekas (n. 116) 195). 
119 Article II(1), New York Convention: “Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing 
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or 
which may arise between them…” 
120 Tax matters are usually excluded from the ambit of arbitration by being excluded from the ambit of all 
or most IIT protections and such exclusions will prevent the arbitration of any foreseeable tax disputes as 
well as prevent the litigation under the IIT of tax disputes at the courts of the host state. This will not 
prevent an investor from bringing an action in the courts of the host state claiming a violation through 
taxation measures of any law other than the applicable IIT. 




Once the matter of the dispute is caught by the arbitration agreement, the scrutiny of 
whether that matter is capable of settlement by arbitration will be wholly dependent on: 
 
(i) the law and/or public policy of the place governing the arbitration 
agreement; 
(ii) the law and/or public policy of the place governing the arbitration, which 
will be the lex arbitri or the lex fori; and 
(iii) the law and/or public policy of the place of recognition and enforcement of 
the award. 
 
For the purposes of investor-state arbitration, tax will be an arbitrable matter under the 
lex arbitri unless the applicable IIT excludes its application to matters of taxation,122 
and this is the case despite the jurisprudential objections to arbitrating matters of 
taxation because they concern the (fiscal) sovereignty of the state. Indeed, it is the very 
sovereignty of the state that permits states to sign and ratify IITs123 under which matters 
of taxation will become arbitrable, and by entering into such IITs, states consciously 
declare tax disputes as arbitrable.124 The arbitrability of tax is therefore more 
straightforward to determine in international investment arbitration than it is in 
international commercial arbitration because the investment arbitration will be taking 
place on the backdrop of a treaty entered into by sovereign states who have consciously 
permitted tax arbitration by either not excluding the applicability of the IIT to tax 
matters or excluding only some treaty provisions from tax matters (tax exclusions) or 
inserting qualifications to jurisdiction on tax arbitration (tax vetoes).125 Furthermore, the 
exclusion of only some treaty protections to matters of taxation is even more obvious 
proof of the cognisant submission to the arbitrability of tax on the non-excluded 
                                                 
122 When certain matters (e.g. taxation) are “deemed arbitrable in the lex arbitri, there is no guarantee that 
the country of enforcement will itself consider it as both arbitrable or compliant with its public policy.” 
(Bantekas (n. 116) 195). There is therefore a real possibility that tax matters are deemed non-arbitrable at 
the recognition and enforcement stage if the recognition and enforcement is not governed by the ICSID 
Convention but is governed instead by the NYC or other regional conventions. 
123 S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Japan) [1923] P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1 (Aug. 17) at para 35: “The Court 
declines to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which a State undertakes to perform or refrain from 
performing a particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any convention creating an 
obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the State, in the 
sense that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way. But the right of entering into international 
engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty” (emphasis mine). 
124 Supra Bantekas (n. 116) 201. 
125 See: section 2.3.2 below, section 3.2.4 in Chapter 3; and sections 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 of Chapter 4. 
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matters. In an investor-state arbitration in which the claimant investor claims the host 
state has violated IIT protections through taxation, as long as nothing in the applicable 
arbitration agreement (which is likely to be the dispute resolution provision in the 
applicable treaty, or possibly a unilateral offer to arbitrate in the host state’s domestic 
law) precludes arbitration on matters of taxation (whether general or protection-specific 
(e.g. national treatment)) and/or as long as the applicable IIT containing the treaty 
protections does have tax exclusions for all or some treaty protections, an arbitral 
tribunal will have the jurisdiction to preside over the dispute. 
 
If an arbitral tribunal finds that it has jurisdiction, the burden of proof on a foreign 
investor to convince an arbitral tribunal to find a state liable for an alleged breach of a 
treaty obligation by taxation will not be straightforward whether it is for breach of 
national treatment, expropriation or any other treaty protection because there is a 
presumption of validity of the host state’s legislation. A quote from the recent El 
Paso
126
 award serves this point well: 
 
The tax policy of a country is a matter relating to the sovereign power of the 
State and its power to impose taxes on its territory. The Tribunal agrees that the 
State has a sovereign right to enact the tax measures it deems appropriate at any 
particular time. Every year, governments around the world propose the adoption 
of tax measures which constitute either new initiatives or amendments to the 
existing fiscal legislation. There is a presumption of validity in favour of 
legislative measures adopted by a State, and it is up to those who challenge such 
measures to demonstrate their invalidity. This idea has been embodied in Article 
XII of the BIT, the effect of which is to only limit slightly the State’s power to 
levy taxes127(emphasis mine). 
 
2.3.2 Tax Exclusions and Tax Vetoes in International Investment Treaties 
 
The avoidance of the applicability of treaty protections to matters of taxation comes in 
the form of exclusions or vetoes. Some IITs exclude the application of all IIT provisions 
                                                 
126 El Paso Energy International Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award of 
31 October 2011. 
127 ibid at para 290. 
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to matters relating to taxation128 and this makes all alleged treaty violations by taxation 
subject only to the courts of the host state. IITs generally do not exclude the application 
of all treaty provisions from tax measures, but most do exclude national treatment and 
most-favoured-nation (MFN)129 while permitting the application of expropriation 
provisions to tax matters.130 Sticking with national treatment and MFN for now, in 
practice, such exclusions will enable a host state to give advantages to its national 
investors or investments or those of a third state without extending the advantages to 
investors and investments of the other party to the IIT, basically amounting to 
favouritism/discrimination. The primary reason for the tax exclusion to national 
treatment and MFN protections is for IIT signatories to retain as much fiscal 
sovereignty as possible.131 Differential tax treatment between a foreign investor and a 
host state national or a national of a third state are, as stated in Chapter 1, 
straightforward to prove.132 Tax advantages and incentives (together ‘advantages’) are 
commonly given to host state nationals or nationals of third states (through reciprocal 
agreements), therefore disadvantaging many foreign investors who are nationals of 
states not privy to such advantages. These hypothetical aggrieved investors would have 
legitimate claims against a hypothetical host state through IITs that make tax matters in 
relation to national treatment and MFN arbitrable, thus resulting in: (i) a loss of fiscal 
sovereignty through arbitral awards finding the host state liable to pay damages; (ii) the 
host state amending its tax laws to avoid future claims by the same and other investors; 
(iii) a loss of tax sovereignty by acquiescing to investor demands on tax matters due to 
threats of arbitration (known as ‘regulatory chill’ – see section 2.4.2.3 below). 
                                                 
128 Article 5, Agreement between the Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of New 
Zealand for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 27 August 1999 (not entered 
into force as of 1 June 2013) (Argentina-New Zealand BIT); Article 8, Agreement between the 
Government of New Zealand and the Government of the Republic of Chile for the Promotion and 
Protection Of Investment, signed 22 July 1999 (not entered into force as of 1 June 2013) (Chile-New 
Zealand BIT); Article 5, New Zealand and China Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (with exchange of notes), signed 22 November 1988, entered into force 25 March 1989 
(China-New Zealand BIT); Article 8, Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the 
Government of New Zealand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 6 July 1995, 
entered into force 5 August 1995 (Hong Kong-New Zealand BIT). 
129 UNCTAD, ‘Taxation’ (2000), Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements, Doc. No. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/16, 2 <http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit16_en.pdf> accessed 15 August 2011; treaties 
that exclude taxation from national treatment and MFN standards are discussed in sections 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 
of Chapter 4. 
130 UNCTAD, ‘Expropriation’ (2012) UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
II, Doc No. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7 , 133 <http://unctad.org/en/docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf> 
accessed 4 January 2013 (UNCTAD Expropriation 2012). 
131 UNCTAD, ‘Taxation’ (2000) (n. 127) 36. 
132 Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties – Standards of 




If not for the national treatment and MFN tax exclusions in most IITs, host states would 
be constantly held to ransom over their tax policies and this is the position all states 
with a foreign corporate presence would be in, from ‘developed’ capital exporting 
countries to ‘developing’ capital importing countries. The situation can be contrasted 
with expropriation because most arbitral tribunals require substantial deprivation to find 
a host state liable for expropriation, so even if a tax measure results in tax takings of 
almost US$80 million, that may not be a substantial a deprivation133 when that figure 
amounts to approximately 5.6% of the value of an investment.134 National treatment, 
meanwhile, requires only differential treatment between a host state investor and a 
foreign investor and the significance of quantitative losses are not imperative in finding 
state liability. 
 
Tax vetoes that are contained in some IITs135 give home and host state tax authorities 
the option to review allegedly expropriatory tax measures and make a determination on 
whether the measures are expropriatory or not, and absent a determination between the 
authorities, the foreign investor can then bring a claim in arbitration. The reason why 
states allow the deliberation of tax measures to determine alleged violations 
expropriation but not violations of national treatment is because the application of 
national treatment to tax will not give countries enough leeway in pursuing their tax 
policies, whereby, for example, small quantitative differences in the treatment of host 
state nationals and foreign investors will result in a treaty violation; expropriation on the 
other hand will allow differences in the treatment of host state nationals and foreign 
investors, but to exclude tax matters from expropriation protection will be give states 
the scope to completely neutralise the enjoyment of foreign investments, for example by 
taxing all profits, and that would be wholly wrongful and not give investors the 
confidence to invest in certain countries. 
                                                 
133 US$78,347,323 was claimed in EnCana (EnCana Partial Dissent at para 74). 
134 The US$78.3 million claimed in EnCana is approximately 5.6% of the US$1.42 billion sale price that 
EnCana received for its investments in Ecuador from a Chinese joint venture (EnCana Corporation, ‘2005 
News Releases: EnCana to sell its oil and pipeline business in Ecuador to Andes Petroleum Company for 
US$1.42 billion’, 13 September 2005 
 <http://www.encana.com/news/newsreleases/2005/P1161204545248.html> accessed 14 December 
2010). 
135 For example NAFTA, Article 2103(6); and Article 170(4)(b), Agreement between Japan and the 




2.3.3 Enforcement of Awards 
 
An arbitration on tax matters under the ICSID Convention with an award in favour of 
the claimant investor for the host state’s violations of IIT obligations should not 
experience any hardship at the enforcement stage at the courts of the losing respondent 
(host) state for two reasons: (i) the award will be enforced as though it is a judgment of 
the respondent (host) state court;136 and (ii) if the lex arbitri has allowed the arbitration 
of tax matters, the respondent (host) state cannot decline enforcement of the award by 
claiming the award violates its domestic law by being on a non-arbitrable matter or for 
being contrary to its public policy – this is because the host state is estopped from 
claiming that its domestic law is a barrier to upholding its obligations under 
international law.137 States are not justified in violating their obligation to enforce 
foreign awards under the New York Convention by claiming that by doing so they are 
relying on their domestic law. This rule, well-recognised under customary international 
law, is reflected in Article 32 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. Nonetheless, 
given that Article V of the New York Convention grants member states the right to 
apply public policy considerations to foreign awards, their invocation of domestic 
public policy rules would not violate Article 32. However, an abusive application of 
public policy rules under Article V may give rise to the forum’s international liability. 
The principle of estoppel applies only to a state’s obligations under international law 
such as those in IITs; it will not apply to obligations contained in an agreement between 
a state and an investor.138 
 
Although it is generally a rule of public policy for the courts of a state to enforce arbitral 
awards (including awards made against the enforcing state itself), the enforcing courts 
will have to balance that rule with refusing enforcement of awards on non-arbitrable 
matters and awards that violate the public policy of the enforcing state. Arbitral awards 
                                                 
136 Article 54(1), ICSID Convention. 
137 This principle of estoppel is part of customary international law and is enshrined at Article 32 of the 
International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (ILC Articles); Article 32 of the ILC Articles is titled “Irrelevance of Internal Law” (emphasis 
original) and provides that: “The responsible State may not rely on the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for failure to comply with its obligations under this Part.” The obligations “under this Part” 
includes making full reparation for the injury caused by the wrongful act (Article 31, ILC Articles). 
138 BCB Holdings Ltd and The Belize Bank Ltd v Attorney General of Belize (on behalf of the Government 
of Belize), LCIA Case No. 81169, Award of 29 August 2009 (BCB Holdings (LCIA)); and the recognition 
and enforcement proceedings for the preceding arbitration: BCB Holdings Ltd and The Belize Bank Ltd v 
Attorney General of Belize [2013] CCJ 5 (AJ) (BCB Holdings (CCJ)). 
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on tax laws are an area that have been recognised as falling within the scope of public 
policy exceptions to enforcement.139 The arbitral tribunal in BCB Holdings (LCIA)140 
awarded the claimants damages in the region of GB£13.4 million/US$22 million141 for 
Belize’s renege on tax waivers that were part of a unique tax regime contained in a deed 
that was agreed to by and between the claimants and Belize’s Finance Minister in 
March 2005 and applicable from 1 April 2005.142 The tax regime contained in the deed 
was void of Belize’s public policy for two primary reasons: (i) it purported to be 
unalterable by Belize’s Parliament, which means it intended on supplanting and 
superseding all current and future statutes enacted by Belize’s legislature, for as long as 
the claimants operated in Belize143; and (ii) the power to enact tax legislation in Belize, 
including the granting of tax waivers, was constitutionally vested in the Belizean 
legislature which meant only Belize’s Parliament or a body selected by Parliament 
could give waivers to the payment of taxes,144 and the enactment of tax legislation is 
given an extraordinary value by the Belizean constitution which contains special 
provisions for the making of tax legislation,145 so Belize’s laws could not have been 
interpreted as granting the Finance Minister “the power to do what the Deed purported 
to do”146. Although the Finance Minister was not prevented from giving the waivers, the 
waivers could only be enforceable after being approved by Belize’s Parliament and that 
approval was not sought nor was there any intention by the Finance Minister or the 
claimants to seek such approval.147 The Finance Minister and the government 
administration at the time violated Belize’s constitution by giving the tax waivers and 
enforcing them until they left office to be replaced by a new administration.148 
Enforcement of the award was therefore declined on public policy grounds,149 and an 
otherwise decision would be “effectively… rewarding corporate citizens for 
                                                 
139 ILA, ‘Final Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards’ (2002) 
ILA New Delhi Conference: Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, 7 at para 30. 
140 ibid. 
141 Luke Eric Peterson, ‘Caribbean Court of Justice Refuses to Enforce $22 Million (US) LCIA Award 
that had Upheld Secretive “Illegal” Tax Waivers for Foreign-Owned Companies’ Investment Arbitration 
Reporter (New York, 31 July 2013) < http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20130731_1> accessed 1 
August 2013. 
142 BCB Holdings (CCJ) at paras 1, 4 and 36. 
143 ibid at para 36. 
144 ibid at para 43. 
145 ibid at para 46. 
146 ibid at para 47. 
147 ibid para 39. 
148 Investment Arbitration Reporter 31 July 2013 (n. 139). 
149 BCB Holdings (CCJ) at paras 3 and 61. 
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participating in the violation of the fundamental law of Belize and punishing the State 
for refusing to acquiesce in the violation.”150 Unfortunately, the court did not consider 
the non-arbitrability of tax because the public policy point disposed of the case.151 
 
Objections to enforcement of arbitral awards for tax matters should only occur for 
legitimate public policy objections such as that in BCB Holdings, or if tax was not 
arbitrable on the basis of tax exclusions,152 or if the awards order more than only 
monetary damages, such as a total impeachment on the sovereignty of the host state by 
requiring it to change its laws or not levy certain taxes.153 
 
In the pro-arbitration environment, courts apply the public policy objection in a 
restrictive manner because enforcement of awards is a public policy objective itself in 
light of globalisation and interdependence of the world, where “it is in the interest of the 
promotion of international trade and commerce that courts should eschew a uniquely 
nationalistic approach to the recognition of foreign awards.”154 
 
2.4 Foreign Direct Investment, International Investment Treaties and 
Tax Arbitration 
 
In this section, I will put together the complex web of interactions between FDI, IITs 
and tax arbitration. At 2.4.1, Brazil’s success in being a major capital importer of FDI 
without ratifying any BITs is discussed because the attraction of FDI is normally stated 
to be the primary reason that states enter into IITs and importantly IITs with arbitration 
agreements. 
 
At 2.4.2, the risks to host states in acquiescing to international investment arbitration are 
discussed. This will look at arbitrators’ expansive approach to jurisdiction which means 
that the investors’ claims are likely to reach the merits phase; economic risks to a 
                                                 
150 ibid at para 61. 
151 ibid at para 17. 
152 Republic of Ecuador v Occidental Exploration & Production Co [2006] EWHC (Comm) at para 3. 
153 An arbitral award in favour of the investor which awards monetary damages for illegitimate taxation 
measures will be an indirect way of ruling that the host state’s laws or actions are wrongful, and this 
would be an indication to the host state that it should amend whatever measure(s) have resulted in the 
arbitration and its subsequent losing the arbitration or else face more disputes in the future for the same 
measure(s); this is not to be confused with arbitration for a ‘lawful’ expropriation in lieu of compensation 
(see opening section of Chapter 3 on the distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation).   
154 BCB Holdings (CCJ) at para 24. 
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respondent state from arbitration; regulatory chill used by foreign investors (particularly 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) who have immense power and resources) to control 
host states’ laws; and moral hazards that affect the host states including the 
underdevelopment of developing host state’s judiciaries who do not get to rule on 
complex investment matters, the reputation of investment arbitration in putting 
corporate profits ahead of host states’ public interest and the perception of bias of 
arbitrators in favour of investors. The reason that these topics are discussed together is 
they intertwine with one another when host states make legislative decisions and take 
action. In short, the following is an example of what host states may think when 
exploring the possibility of introducing a new type of tax, e.g. a tax on oil exports over a 
certain threshold when all oil exporters who exceed that threshold are foreign investors 
(possible violation of national treatment and fair and equitable treatment): 
 
(i) if a foreign investor in the oil export industry brings a claim in arbitration, 
they are likely to succeed on jurisdiction (see 2.4.2.1); 
(ii) because the dispute will proceed to the merits phase, the state faces the risk 
of losing a substantial amount of money in defending the claim, and if 
unsuccessful in arbitration, in paying damages to the investor (see 2.4.2.2); 
(iii) before the dispute is even concluded, it will be public knowledge that the 
state is facing a claim for violations of international law and that can divert 
FDI away from that state (see 2.4.2.2); 
(iv) in addition to claimant-friendly awards on jurisdiction, investment 
arbitration has a reputation of putting corporate profits before the public 
interest and the public welfare is currently dependent on a boost in tax 
collections (e.g. to employ medical staff due to a public health crisis), so 
according to this perception the arbitral tribunal is likely to make its decision 
by erring on the side of the alleged treaty violation than the public welfare 
(see 2.4.2.4(ii)); 
(v) in addition to (iv) above, there is a perception of pro-investor bias by 
international investment arbitrators and so that is more reason why a loss in 
arbitration is likely (see 2.4.2.4(iii)) in favour of investors; and 
(vi) due to all of the above, the investors will threaten to bring arbitral 
proceedings before the tax is introduced to stop the state from introducing it, 
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and if it has been introduced, they will threaten arbitration to have the state 
withdraw the new tax and pay settlement monies for any taxes already taken 
(see section 2.4.2.3 below). 
 
2.4.1 Brazil’s Success in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment and Avoiding 
International Investment Arbitration 
 
The efficacy of IITs in attracting FDI is a disputed subject.155 Some authors have 
affirmed the effectiveness of BITs in attracting FDI156 and others dispute the same.157 
What is certain is that a country which respects foreign investors’ property rights158 will 
gain and maintain a good reputation among global investors,159 and if it has entered into 
BITs (which contain the minimum a foreign investor can expect from the host state), 
that further demonstrates an “ex ante willingness to respect FDI.”160 Brazil is a prime 
example of a state that respects foreign investments and has been able to become one of 
the biggest capital importers of FDI in the world without ratifying one BIT, therefore 
keeping hold of any sovereignty that it would have parted from by entering into BITs 
with other states that provide for international investment arbitration. 
 
Despite the rapid increase in the signing and ratification of BITs, Brazil only signed 14 
BITs in the 1990s but did not ratify any of them.161 This has not deterred inward FDI 
                                                 
155 Past research in this area has focused on the efficacy of BITs because their quantitative domination in 
the IIT universe make would make them the most influential type IIT for FDI. 
156 Swenson (n. 78) 14; Allee and Peinhardt (n. 91) 19; Eric Neumayer and Laura Spress, ‘Do Bilateral 
Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?’ (2005) LSE Research 
Online, 27 <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/627/> accessed 2 February 2012. 
157 Jennifer Tobin and Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment 
in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2005) Yale Law School, Centre 
for Law, Economics and Public Policy, Research Paper No. 293, 31 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=557121> accessed 2 February 2012; Bruce A. 
Blonigen and Ronald D. Davies, ‘The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI Activity’, (2004) 11:5 
Int'l Tax & Pub. Fin. 601, 616; Mary Hallward-Driemeier, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? 
Only a bit…and they could bite’, (June 2003) World Bank Development Research Group, 22 
<http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-3121> accessed 5 February 
2012. 
158 Some foreign investors will not be deterred if the host state does not respect the property rights of its 
nationals who could have fewer resources than the foreign investor to fight the government, or they could 
also be worse off than a foreign investor because there is no IIT for a national to bring a claim under. 
159 See discussion on Brazil at 2.4.1 below. 
160 Allee and Peinhardt (n. 91) 14. 
161 UNCTAD, Full List of Brazil’s concluded Bilateral Investment Agreements as of 1 June 2013 
<http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_brazil.pdf> accessed 14 September 2013. Conversely, it 
appears as though a treaty between Brazil and Paraguay was signed on 27 October 1956 and ratified on 6 
September 1957, but is no longer in force as it does not appear in any reference other than the online 
resource copied here: Foreign Trade Information System, Information on Paraguay: Bilateral Investment 
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away from Brazil, partly because BITs are not solely responsible for FDI.162 In 2012, 32 
Latin American and Caribbean countries received US$173.361 billion in FDI,163 
37.65% (US$65.272 billion164) of which was received by Brazil. This is in sharp 
contrast with Argentina, who received 7.24% (US$12.551 billion) of FDI in 2012,165 
despite 54 BITs being in force in that same period.166 
 
Investor-state arbitration is one of the primary grievances that developing countries 
have with BITs which they have ratified, especially Latin American countries, and these 
reservations were documented in Brazil when it had four BITs tabled together for 
signing in 1996.167 Brazil’s problem with international arbitration was the fact that it 
would allow foreign investors to unilaterally bypass the Brazilian national courts.168 A 
foreign investor bypassing the Brazilian national courts can be seen as putting the 
foreign investor in a more advantageous position than a Brazilian investor and that 
would undermine the Calvo Doctrine,169 under which foreign investors cannot be 
afforded more favourable treatment than national investors. Indeed, “South American 
rules of civil procedure require that all tax disputes be settled by national judicial 
authorities” and they therefore face a conflict between a “prohibition on submitting tax 
disputes to arbitration and international commitments to be bound by arbitration when 
there is an arbitration clause in a treaty.”170 Despite the need for international trade and 
investment pushing South American countries into ceding on their tax sovereignty by 
                                                                                                                                               
Treaties <http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/BRZ/BRZBits_e.asp> accessed 3 June 2012. The likelihood 
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<http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_argentina.pdf> accessed 14 September 2013. This list 
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(Minnesota University Press 1955) 18-19. 
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entering into IITs with arbitration agreements,171 Brazil has successfully created a win-
win situation for itself with respect to IITs and it seems to be in a special situation 
because South American states find it exceptionally difficult to attract risk-averse 
investors who would not invest capital in countries who have ratified BITs without 
arbitration agreements in them.172 
 
Although some BITs that were negotiated with Brazil eliminated international 
arbitration173 or required the government’s consent to arbitrate,174 as well as bringing 
other aspects of the BITs in line with Brazil’s public policy,175 Brazil never ratified any 
BITs.176 As is discussed below in section 2.4.2, BITs impose obligations on the host 
state but do not impose obligations on the foreign investor or his home state. This fact, 
together with parting with sovereignty, put Brazil off signing BITs, bearing in mind 
how much (or little) difference a BIT would make to FDI, especially because Brazil 
viewed BITs as a “by-product of the Washington Consensus under the neo-liberal 
influence”177 and drafted under the recommendation of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).178 The issue taken by Brazil with the 
Washington Consensus and the OECD was that BITs were promulgated by and drafted 
under recommendations favouring states in the position of a capital exporting home 
country, and do not impose duties on those home countries,179 or the investors (such as 
the responsible exploitation of natural reserves). 
 
Instead of jumping on the BIT bandwagon, Brazil chose to open its economy to foreign 
investment with domestic laws,180 and these laws are used to regulate foreign 
                                                 
171 ibid. 
172 ibid. 
173 Lemos and Campello (n. 162) 19. 
174 ibid 20. 
175 For example, compensation for expropriation in Brazil can be a 10 year debt payment (ibid 19 at 
footnote 16), rather than the prominent “prompt and adequate compensation” required under BITs and 
customary international law. 
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ratified a number of BTTs to encourage inward FDI. 
177 Dan Wei, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties: An Empirical Analysis of the Practices of Brazil and China’, 
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178 ibid. 
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investment,181 whereas it was believed by Brazil’s policymakers that BITs would have 
restricted the country’s ability to effectively regulate capitals182 in that active and 
necessary regulation (such as environmental regulation) could consequently result in an 
expensive arbitration under a BIT.183 
 
Out of the advanced economic development BRIC countries,184 China has signed 128 
BITs,185 103 of which have been ratified, making it the country with the most ratified 
BITs out of the four BRIC countries. Brazil on the other has not ratified any BITs, 
putting the two countries on two sides of a BIT spectrum. China’s FDI inflows in 2012 
is estimated to be US$253 billion (18% of global FDI inflows)186 which makes it the 
greatest FDI attractor, the United states (with 46 signed BITs and 40 ratified,187 as well 
as being a NAFTA member state and having signed FTAs with 20 countries188) was in 
second place with US$175 billion inward FDI, and Brazil was (without any ratified 
BITs) in third place with US$65 billion, which is a significant feat for the country. 
 
One cannot say what difference will be made (if any) to Brazil’s inward FDI if it signs 
and ratifies BITs, but it has done remarkably well without any BITs,189 meanwhile 
preserving its sovereignty by dictating its investment laws itself190 and having its 
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conduct assessed in its own national courts by its own national judges. On the 
arbitration front, the Brazilian Congress passed a pro-arbitration law in 1996 (Brazilian 
Arbitration Law),191 which gives a domestic arbitral award the same effect on the parties 
as a judgement issued by a Brazilian state court.192 The Brazilian Arbitration Law also 
recognises and allows for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,193 subject to 
homologation by the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court,194 and homologation can only be 
refused for the usual reasons found in most progressive national arbitration laws, such 
as requiring a valid arbitration agreement, the correct procedures being followed, the 
award does not fall foul of the public policy of the state of enforcement, the matter was 
capable of settlement by arbitration (arbitrable), etc. Recognition and enforcement of a 
foreign award, like its domestic counterpart, has the same effect on the parties as a 
judgement by a Brazilian state court.195 Prior to the enactment of the Brazilian 
Arbitration Law, the procedure for homologation of a foreign arbitral award was the 
same as that applied to foreign national court judgments which was a procedure carried 
out by the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court under Article 102(I)(h) of the Brazilian 
Constitution,196 which did not have the typical rules for recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards found in most modern national arbitration laws. Brazil also ratified the 
all-important New York Convention, as well as the Panama Convention197 and the 
Montevideo Convention.198 
 
2.4.2 The Threat of Arbitration to Tax Sovereignty as a Trade-Off to Attract 
Foreign Direct Investment 
 
What is certain about IITs is their effectiveness in increasing the number of claims 
brought by foreign investors against host states, especially by claimants from capital-
exporting developed countries against developing host nations. A country that ratifies a 
BIT in order to attract investment is at risk of having to settle or defend claims for 
compensation being brought by foreign investors for either genuine claims or 
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alternatively for losses the investors would otherwise have assumed as being part of the 
normal risk in establishing and running a business.199 The cause of this is the famous 
asymmetry of BITs, whereby they grant investors of home states rights but do not 
impose obligations on them, but they impose obligations on host states which are 
unaccompanied by rights.200 This is a prima facie asymmetry and is easy to recognise in 
the title of most IITs that include the words “promotion and reciprocal protection of 
investment”. However, this asymmetry exists not because of a pro-investor bias, but 
because host states can give rights to themselves in their own domestic legislation. In 
addition, any risk that factually meritless claims may be made by investors should not 
(and do not) preclude the rights of said investors from making (what they believe to be) 
genuine claims, because investors, whether individuals or corporate entities, and 
whether local or foreign, have the right to expect the countries in which they are 
investing to uphold their rights. Although some investors try to cut their losses (or 
maybe try to make extra gains) by bringing a claim against a host state, to apply a 
blanket prohibition of recourse to a fair and just judiciary or tribunal would be a denial 
of justice, resulting in sovereignty being nothing more than organised robbery. 
 
Over recent years, there has been a steady increase in the number of governments who 
have responded to one or more investment treaty arbitrations, from 61 at the end of 
2005201 to 95 at the end of 2012,202 61 were developing countries, 18 were developed 
countries and 16 were countries with economies in transition.203 By the end of 2012, 
there were a total number of 514 known treaty-based investor-state arbitrations,204 with 
the largest number of claims brought against Argentina (52 claims), followed by 
Venezuela (34), Ecuador (23), Mexico (21) and Czech Republic (20).205 
 
A state that exercises its sovereignty by utilising its decision making powers within its 
territories will (as discussed above) concede some of its sovereignty by having the 
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legitimacy of those decisions debated either in arbitration or in a supranational arena 
like the WTO. Those compromises can in themselves lead to further concessions that 
states make when acquiescing to arbitration, such as the possibility of arbitrators taking 
an expansive (claimant-friendly) approach to matters of jurisdiction and admissibility, 
economic risks, regulatory chill effects and moral hazard issues all of which are 
discussed in sections 2.4.2.1 to 2.4.2.4 below. In the context of the foregoing, the reader 
must keep in mind that what is written in those sections is included for arguments sake 
on an unquantified and rather unquantifiable possibility that states risk losing some tax 
sovereignty on the basis expansive jurisdictional awards, economic risks, regulatory 
chill and moral hazard issues. These are discussed because they can factor into why 
states, whether they are developed or developing capital importers, or developed or 
developing capital exporters, include tax exclusions and tax vetoes in their IITs. The 
reader is also directed to the conclusion of this chapter which contains the major caveat 
to the foregoing sections. 
 
2.4.2.1 Expansive Jurisdiction Awards 
 
A respondent state could have a claim dismissed early on in proceedings if it is 
successful in making a preliminary objection, for example under ICSID Rule 41(5), 
whereby the objector must prove that a claim is manifestly without legal merit,206 or 
under a preliminary objection governed by the relevant IIT.207 Yet even on this premise, 
a claim that has the legal merit to be tried but for which the factual allegations are of a 
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frivolous or vexatious nature will go past the preliminary stage of proceedings and will 
be a costly endeavour for a respondent to submit to. 
 
It is common knowledge that arbitrators tend to take a claimant-friendly approach on 
preliminary matters of jurisdiction and this assertion was proved by a recent study that 
examined 140 awards dealing with jurisdictional matters in investment treaty 
arbitrations up to May 2010.208 These awards determine (among other preliminary 
matters) objections to jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal under provisions such as 
ICSID Rule 41(5). The study reported a tendency of arbitrators to take an expansive 
‘claimant-friendly’ approach rather than a restrictive ‘respondent-friendly’ approach on 
matters of jurisdiction and admissibility,209 especially under a BIT or the ECT210 and 
most notably for claimants from Western capital-exporting states,211 specifically the 
United States followed by the United Kingdom and France.212 This effectively means 
that respondent-states will most likely fail in an attempt to halt the arbitration from 
proceeding any further, resulting in costs being incurred which run into millions of 
pounds, dollars or euros, and even if the claim is of a vexatious or frivolous nature and 
is the waste of time and money for natural justice (not necessarily a waste of time and 
money for corporate purposes – see section 2.4.2.3 below), the likelihood is that each 
party will bear its own costs and pay half of the arbitral tribunal’s fees213 (investor-state 
arbitration costs usually run into the millions of pounds – see Economic Risk next 
below). 
 
2.4.2.2 Economic Risk 
 
The economic risks of arbitration faced by governments are twofold; (i) there is the 
monetary cost of arbitration, including legal fees, arbitrators’ fees, expert witnesses, 
venue hire, and recognition and enforcement proceedings; and (ii) there is a negative 
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reputational risk suffered by a state who is respondent in arbitrations, resulting in a 
decrease of inward FDI. 
 
(i) Monetary Arbitration Costs 
 
The cost of international arbitration has been identified as a major 
disadvantage of arbitration214 and costs can run into the hundreds of 
thousands up to the multiple millions of pounds or dollars. 
 
As already mentioned, most respondent-states are developing nations. Two 
major problems stemming from arbitration are posed for these countries, 
firstly, costs incurred on legal fees for a successful defence to a claim (and 
‘reasonable’ costs are not always paid by an unsuccessful claimant to a 
successful respondent) could be better spent on developing the country and 
helping its inhabitants; secondly, if the respondent loses on the merits, the 
arbitral award can be a significant percentage of its gross domestic product 
(GDP).215 
 
(a) In respect of the cost of arbitrators’ fees, legal fees and administrative 
fees, a respondent-state that wins the case can still be liable for very 
hefty fees. For example, in Plama Consortium Limited216 the arbitral 
tribunal decided in favour of Bulgaria, ruling that the damage suffered to 
the claimant was not attributable to any unlawful action by the state217 
and that in any event the claimant obtained its investment in Bulgaria 
through fraudulent misrepresentation.218 Despite this, the tribunal 
ordered the claimant to pay the tribunal’s fees and expenses of 
US$948,000, to pay the respondent’s advance on costs of US$460,000 
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and US$7 million of Bulgaria’s legal costs.219 This left the Bulgarian 
government, i.e. the Bulgarian taxpayer, liable for the remaining 
US$6,243,357220 of the costs for defending a meritless claim. This was at 
a time of a healthcare crisis due to the shortage of nurses in Bulgaria, and 
US$6,243,357 would have paid the salaries of 1,796 nurses.221 Although 
Bulgaria’s legal costs were substantially more than the claimant’s 
US$4.6 million legal costs, resulting in the tribunal deciding that $US7 
million would have been reasonable costs for defence, the fact is the 
claimant brought a meritless claim for over US$122 million for losses it 
incurred under a contract procured by fraudulent misrepresentation, so it 
should be the host state’s right to incur whatever fees are necessary to 
defend such a frivolous claim. 
 
(b) With respect to arbitral awards, the cost to a developing nation can be 
significant. The likelihood of a respondent-state being a developing 
country is high. For example, by the end of 2012, the United States was 
the home country in 123 arbitrations (24% of all known investor-state 
disputes),222 and 80% of the United States’ investment treaties are with 
developing countries (as classified by the World Bank),223 statistically 
therefore most investment arbitrations involving the United States as 
home state will be against a developing country. Five awards rendered in 
favour of United States investors (four against Argentina and one against 
Ecuador) have ranged between US$2.7 to US$5.5 per capita of the 
Argentinian/Ecuadorian populations.224 The average award that Canada 
is liable to pay a United States investor amounts to 0.003% of its annual 
government expenditure or US$ 12 cents per capita.225 Arbitral awards 
made against developing countries as a percentage of government annual 
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expenditure amounts to 0.53% or US$ 99 cents per capita.226 The 
average award rendered in favour of a United states investor is US$47 
million227 and when excluding awards it has won against Canada (which 
is the only high-income country against which a United States investor 
has won an arbitration)228 that number increases to US$50 million.229 
The average award paid by Canada as a host country respondent in 
arbitration against a United States investor is US$3.9 million.230 
Argentina on the other hand averages a pay-out of US$107 million 
against United States investors.231 Therefore, for developing countries, 
taking into account the fact that arbitrators are likely to rule in favour of 
their own jurisdiction, the average size of awards, and the size of awards 
as a measure against GDP or percentage of annual government 
expenditure, the threat of arbitration alone is enough to persuade 
developing nations to settle claims (the ‘chilling effect’ or ‘regulatory 
chill’),232 including those which may be brought for losses which would 
otherwise be considered part of the investment risk. 
 
(ii) Reputational Risk 
 
In short, “one of the costs of arbitration for states is a detrimental impact on 
its ‘investor-friendly’ reputation.”233 This can be the case whether the 
arbitration is on-going, decided in favour of the investor, settled before a 
final award is made, or even if the arbitration is decided in favour of the host 
state. The fact that a foreign investor claims against a host state for breach of 
an investment treaty brings with it a reputation that the host state is a risk to 
invest in (notwithstanding the investment risk posed by the commercial 
venture). The host state can (perhaps undeservingly) gain a reputation that it 
does not respect investors’ property rights and does not abide by the 
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minimum standards of treatment enshrined in international law, even if those 
actions or inactions could be for bona fide regulation. Of course bona fide 
regulation does not preclude the necessity for compensation to be paid to an 
investor for outcomes of that regulation, such as for an expropriation by the 
state of land owned by the investor for environmental reasons. 
 
Reputational risk has been included under the title ‘Economic Risk’ because 
it has a direct bearing on FDI. A 2008 study by Todd L. Allee and Clint 
Pienhardt (the 2008 study) on the reputational effects of investment treaty 
disputes on FDI234 discovered one-third of arbitrations in its analysis resulted 
in an award against the respondent-state.235 The same study also discovered 
that one-quarter of arbitrations were settled,236 and with settlements 
construed as a “de facto admission of guilt”237 by the respondent-state, this 
could also be viewed negatively by investors when deciding on where to 
export their capital to. With one-third of awards decided against the 
respondent and the one-quarter being settled depicting an admission of guilt 
by the respondent, 60% of arbitrations in the study were therefore decided 
against the respondent-state. A study of the outcome of arbitrations brought 
by United States investors by 2011238 shows 15 awards in favour of the 
investor (29.4%), 14 settlements (27.5%), and 17 awards in favour of the 
host state (43.1%). Ignoring the settlements, a respondent-state has a greater 
than 50% chance of the award being rendered in its favour, but this is not 
good news for host states, especially those which are developing countries, 
because a “50% chance of catastrophic economic loss would factor into most 
risk assessments as a bad bet”239 and therefore this alone is a risk for 
countries to cautiously consider when signing and ratifying IITs. If one 
considers settlements as de facto admissions of guilt and therefore losses for 
the respondent-state, the win-lose ratio is 56.9% on the host state losing 
against a United States national. These statistics also raise the possibility that 
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developing countries acquiesce to demands of investors under the threat of 
arbitration, and therefore also do not include unpublicised settlements 
entered into before proceedings are commenced.240 
 
The transparency of ICSID proceedings was mentioned in section 2.2.3.2 
above and included the openness of the nature, timing and outcomes of 
disputes. The transparency of ICSID is excellent and is rightfully lauded as 
such, however, because ICSID is the most utilised institution for investment 
arbitration, this transparency may affect FDI due to reputational effects of 
investment arbitrations – host state losses and post-commencement 
settlements become public knowledge. The 2008 study reported that FDI is 
reduced even when ICSID arbitrations are pending or unresolved241 and this 
reduction becomes greater with an ultimate loss, whereby one loss for a state 
offset “the predicted FDI benefits associated with signing between seven and 
ten additional BITs.”242 
 
2.4.2.3 Regulatory Chill 
 
In addition to and because of the above economic risks of a country ratifying either or 
both IITs with arbitration provisions or the ICSID Convention, the threat of arbitration 
can also be used by foreign investors against a host state for what is called the 
regulatory chill hypothesis. Regulatory chill is used to describe the threat by investors 
of commencing arbitration proceedings against a host State if that host state does or 
does not do certain things that may affect the investments and tax measures are no 
exception. A host state may then acquiesce to the investors’ demands in fear of the 
economic damage it could suffer as respondent in arbitration proceedings. Regulatory 
chill and the economic risks outlined above are some of the reasons that countries have 
either not entered into (Brazil) or are withdrawing from BITs,243  do not have standing 
offers to arbitrate in their IITs or domestic investment laws, and/or have not entered into 
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or are withdrawing from the ICSID Convention,244 all in order to avoid bowing to 
investors’ threats, as long as they can still attract FDI.245 The standing offers to arbitrate 
in the Georgian,246 El Salvadoran,247 and Egyptian248 investment laws listed above at 
section 2.2.3.3 have all been amended to remove the standing offer to arbitrate and in 
the case of Kazakhstan,249 the provision has been repealed completely. 
 
Regulatory chill is now a fact and no longer a mere hypothesis. It definitely exists, it is 
used in practice and it makes complete commercial sense for MNEs to use it to their 
advantage when deemed necessary. The threat of litigation is used in commerce no 
matter what the investments are worth, be they thousands of pounds up to the multiple 
billions, and the threat of arbitration in negotiations with a host state on regulatory 
issues is no exception. Below are two reported examples of regulatory chill experienced 
by Costa Rica: 
 
(i) In Costa Rica, 2002 was an election year and all three leading candidates for 
president voiced their opposition to oil exploration in the country. The 
winner of the election race was Abel Pacheco, and declaring ‘peace with 
nature’, he placed a moratorium on future oil and gas exploration and large-
scale open pit mining projects.250 Four years prior to the election, in 1998, a 
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United states based company called MKJ Xploration acquired four 
concession blocks (two onshore and two offshore), and in November 1998 
another United states company called Harken Energy acquired an 80% stake 
in that concession251 (the Concession). Harken Energy’s exploration was 
halted because of the moratorium as well as its Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) being below par (confirmed by an independent external 
review). Harken Energy took the view that its EIA was arbitrarily rejected 
because of the moratorium and subsequently submitted a request for ICSID 
arbitration under the concession agreement (the Dominican Republic-Central 
America FTA (CAFTA-DR)252 was not in force and there was no BIT 
between the United states and Costa Rica), and although it claimed to have 
lost US$9-12 million in exploration activity and other costs, it sought US$57 
billion for damages and lost future profits.253 The concession agreement 
required exhaustion of local remedies (i.e. litigation in Costa Rica’s courts) 
before arbitration, which could have resulted in the arbitral tribunal declining 
jurisdiction, but the request for arbitration was nevertheless successful in 
placing the company in a stronger negotiating position254 and the claimant 
dropped the case 17 days after the request for arbitration.255 The then Costa 
Rican Environment Minister Carlos Manuel Rodriguez was reported as 
saying the government would negotiate a settlement between US$3-12 
million which would be less costly compared with litigation256 and that such 
a settlement would also be better than facing sanctions by the United States 
government257 with whom multinational corporations have strong ties to put 
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diplomatic pressure on host states.  Costa Rica and Harken Energy ended up 
settling,258 but the settlement details are unreported. 
 
(ii) In June 2000, Canadian company Vannessa Ventures (Vannessa) acquired 
two properties in Costa Rica that were being utilised for ten gold mining 
concessions. Vannessa opened a subsidiary in Costa Rica called Industrias 
Infinito S.A. (Infinito). This was a large-scale open-pit mining conession for 
which in 2002 a moratorium was in place (as above). Vannessa’s EIA was 
rejected by the Costa Rican authorities and the company claimed that “the 
political environment that manifests itself in the declarations and actions of 
the President and Minister may have involuntarily influenced the legal and 
administrative process and resulted in unfair treatment of Infinito and its 
shareholders.”259 The company threatened to sue the Costa Rican state under 
the Canada-Costa Rica BIT for breach of fairness, transparency and non-
discrimination and would have sought around US$200 million. A Costa 
Rican court required the Costa Rican regulator to review the EIA and 
meanwhile Vannessa dealt with the regulator’s qualms with the EIA. 
Environmentalists then successfully challenged the company’s mining 
concession in 2004 in the Costa Rican courts on the grounds that it was 
awarded in breach of the Central American Biodiversity Convention260 as 
well as Article 50 of the Costa Rican Constitution for a right to a healthy 
environment.261 Again, threatening an ICSID arbitration claim for US$240 
million plus US$36 million in expenses and compound interest, Vannessa 
was successful in having its mining concession reinstated and its EIA 
approved, with Infinito’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) noting that the 
request for arbitration at ICSID was crucial pressure that “helped” the Costa 
Rican regulator solve the issue.262 Vannessa subsequently withdrew its 
ICSID arbitration request. Although Vannessa faced further protests with its 
concessions, in July 2010, a Costa Rica government-commissioned study 
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reported that cancelling the company’s concessions could risk a claim for 
US$1.7 billion being brought against the host state, which would have been 
unaffordable for the government.263 
 
The difference in the outcomes of the two above examples in Costa Rica could be down 
to the fact that Vannessa’s claim had more rigour because it was backed up by a BIT, 
whereas Harken’s claim was hollow because it was not supported by a BIT or CAFTA-
DR and the concession agreement required exhaustion of local remedies first.264 
 
2.4.2.4 Moral Hazard 
 
Governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the general public in 
countries, especially those with an ecosystem that requires conservation but also have 
natural resources that multinational corporations would like to (and do) exploit, such as 
countries in Latin America including Costa Rica, Ecuador and El Salvador, would 
without doubt prefer those countries to have a Brazil-type independence from 
investment treaty arbitration whilst securing requisite inward FDI. It is fundamental that 
justice is available when an exercise of sovereign  power in an unjust manner, for 
example an expropriation without prompt and adequate compensation would require 
justice and arbitration has provided that justice for decades now, especially since the 
formation of the Iran-United states Claims Tribunal (Iran-USCTR).265 
 
Although provisions for justice against the host state are necessary, there is a perception 
within developing countries’ governments, NGOs and other concerned parties, that 
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(i) Non-Exhaustion of Local Remedies 
 
Firstly, domestic courts are stripped of the presumption that they are capable 
of delivering justice;266 secondly, the host state should be given the 
opportunity to correct any wrongs done to a foreign investor before they 
become an international issue;267 and thirdly, unlike foreign nationals in a 
general sense (such as tourists), foreign investors are not under a duty to take 
into account the domestic means to redress wrongs.268 When large and 
complex claims are removed from the jurisdiction of domestic courts in 
developing countries, the improvement of their judicial systems is impeded 
and it could even result in a downgrade of local institutional quality.269 
Although in some circumstances the independence of the judiciary is 
questionable either from political pressure or public pressure, the denial of a 
country of the attempt to rectify an internal problem domestically before 
making it an issue of international jurisdiction can be perceived as unfair. Of 
course a foreign investor will not feel obliged to take the risk of being denied 
justice or take the risk of feeling the brunt of any ill-founded judgments by a 
domestic court for the reason of helping that country’s judiciary improve 
itself, however, the denial of domestic justice for a foreign investor can itself 
form an entire claim or part of a claim in arbitration at a later time, as can 
matters on the merits if they are brought under different laws than those 
reviewed by the domestic courts (such as international law, i.e. an IIT), 
because arbitration cannot be used as a court of appeal.270 
 
(ii) Investor Interests v Public Interest 
 
Investment arbitration is garnering a reputation for putting corporate profits 
before the host state public’s interests, including on matters such as human 
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rights and the environment,271 with investment lawyers ignoring or 
denouncing arguments on human rights and sustainable development. 
 
The arbitral tribunal in Pac Rim Cayman LLC v The Republic of El 
Salvador
272 ruled in favour of its jurisdiction under El Salvador’s own 
investment law to decide on the merits of Pac Rim’s US$315 million273 
claim against the government not issuing it with a metallic mining permit 
which the company blames on the government’s de facto ban on mining. 
Although Pac Rim may have a legitimate claim for compensation for the 
ban, viewing the claim from a non-commercial perspective, El Salvador is a 
cash-strapped country and its litigation costs stand at over US$5 million, 
which could have been used to educate 140,000 adults under its National 
Literacy Program.274 Further litigation costs, a settlement or at worst a loss 
in this arbitration would clearly damage its economy. The metallic mining 
ban has been instilled for water security because fresh water supplies have 
been ravaged by the metal mining industry.275 Therefore, if the country is 
(by regulatory chill) persuaded to discontinue its ban on mining then that is 
likely to have severe human and environmental repercussions. 
 
Developing countries are not the only states that have decisions of public 
importance challenged in arbitration by a party seeking to enforce its 
commercial interests, as with Australia and Philip Morris (see paragraph 
immediately below). Germany has also been on the receiving end of an 
offensive from Swedish energy company Vattenfall for the shutdown of two 
nuclear power plants in its operation276 as part of Germany’s nuclear phase-
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out.277 One arbitration between Vattenfall and Germany ended with a 
settlement278 and another was initiated on 31 May 2012279 with no 
significant updates at the time of writing. 
 
Commercial interests also clash with public health. Tobacco company Philip 
Morris commenced (separate) proceedings against Australia280 and 
Uruguay281 over their new cigarette packaging regulations, with Australia 
requiring uniform ‘plain’ packaging for all cigarette brands282 and Uruguay 
requiring health warnings to cover 80% of cigarette packages, up from 
50%.283 Both countries have introduced the cigarette packaging rules to curb 
smoking and its effects on their health care systems.284 In both cases Philip 
Morris argue that the packaging rules breach their right to use legally 
protected trademarks and displaying them in their proper form.285 
Extraordinarily, in both arbitrations, Philip Morris is seeking annulment of 
the new cigarette packing ‘health’ law, in addition to damages,286 and it is 
highly unlikely that that would be achieved (that would be a significant 
impediment on the country’s sovereignty which would not have been 
envisaged when signing up to any IITs). 
 
Uruguay’s objection to jurisdiction in its dispute with Philip Morris centred 
on public health being a primordial right and supreme good (‘bien supremo’) 
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and that the country could not bestow rights to foreign investors in conflict 
with public health.287 
 
(iii) Alleged Bias of Arbitrators in International Investment Arbitration 
 
There exists a perception of a pro-investor bias in international investment 
arbitration, from the negotiation of IITs288 (and preventing their 
renegotiation)289 to systemic bias of arbitrators in decisions on jurisdiction290 
and arbitrator bias in proceedings on the merits of claims.291 
 
Arbitrators, unlike domestic court judges who are on salaries, make money 
from the duration and complexity of arbitrations over which they preside and 
also have a professional stake292 in the system whereby they rely on repeat 
business. A recent empirical analysis of arbitrator bias has discovered: (i) 
arbitrators with a record of repeat appointments by investors are more likely 
to affirm jurisdiction than those without such a record; (ii) arbitrators who 
double up as counsel in different proceedings (i.e. they wear different hats 
for each role) are more inclined to affirm jurisdiction (without significantly 
affecting decisions on liability); and (iii) arbitrators with experience of 
working in international organisations have a higher likelihood of affirming 
jurisdiction and liability.293 
 
A select number of arbitrators are known by insiders as the “inner circle”294  
and a group of 15 “super arbitrators” have also been called an “inner 
mafia”.295 The 15 “super arbitrators” have decided approximately 55% (247 
cases) of all investor-state treaty-based arbitrations, approximately 64% (123 
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cases) of all investor-state treaty-based arbitrations with a value of at least 
US$100 million and 75% (12 cases) of investor-state treaty-based 
arbitrations with a value of at least US$4 billion.296 
 
There is strong evidence to show that investment arbitration lawyers and 
arbitrators (including those who double up as arbitrator or counsel) have 
advised countries, especially capital-importing developing countries, on their 
investment treaty negotiations and signings, encouraging them to sign IITs to 
advance laissez-faire economic policies and to promote arbitration-friendly 
provisions,297 resulting in potential lucrative business if they come to 
represent those states in arbitrations (or when acting against those states). 
Investment lawyers are also accused of lobbying to kill investment treaty 
reform which will impede on their ability to make claims against states after 
“identifying potential hooks for investment claims,”298 for investors as 
claimants. Developing countries have even been invited to meetings full of 
negotiators organised by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) that result in developing states leaving the 
meetings as signatories to dozens of investment treaties.299 The lead 
organiser of such UNCTAD meetings is now a lawyer representing states in 
investor-state disputes and advises states on treaty drafting.300 
 
Investment lawyers are also accused of ‘ambulance chasing’ by persuading 
companies to sue countries under investment treaties for the introduction of 
environmental, public health and tax laws.301 In fact, investment lawyers are 
accused of more than just ambulance chasing because by doubling up as 
arbitrators, they create the accidents and then chase the ambulance, “a bit 
like ambulance chasing after your friend has put banana peels on the 
road.”302 Ambulance chasing is of course part and parcel of bringing in big 
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business, for example, an arbitration commenced under CAFTA-DR against 
El Salvador’s mining ban for which jurisdiction was rejected303 was almost 
revived on behalf of the claimants by a Magic Circle firm who helped the 
claimants seek third party funding for proceedings to overturn the rejection 
of jurisdiction by the tribunal304 – notably, one of the 15 super arbitrators is 
the co-head of international arbitration at that firm. 
 
As a caveat to the above, it must be said that despite the above ‘concerns’, 
arbitrators are competent, trustworthy, experienced and professional people 
with integrity. Without such qualities arbitrators would not be able to get 
their appointments, and one should not forget that a respondent-state gets to 
appoint an arbitrator itself, so the concerns about arbitrator bias, despite their 
merit, should not be taken at face value, where friends, contacts and self-
interest take second place to the facts of a dispute at hand.305 
 
In light of the economic consequences, regulatory chill consequences and overall 
perception of a pro-investor environment in international investment arbitration, states 
are increasingly trying to abandon the arbitration system. As already stated above, 
Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador have withdrawn from the ICSID Convention, but they 
have also terminated BITs.306 Meanwhile Australia announced in 2011 that it will not 
include arbitration provisions in its future IITs.307 
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It is a fact that tax is an arbitrable matter in investment treaty arbitration. The question 
of arbitrability arises because tax is a sensitive and fundamental sovereign prerogative 
of all governments. All government powers are enshrined in the sovereignty of the state. 
Globalisation has in a metaphorical sense stripped away the borders of countries as they 
are drawn on maps, with economies so reliant on one another that a mortgage crisis in 
the United States caused a global economic crisis, the effects of which will be felt for 
years to come. With globalisation came FDI and subsequently the emergence of IITs for 
states to promote and protect foreign investment. When a government uses its position 
as a sovereign and harms foreign investment, the investor reserves his rights to justice, 
otherwise sovereignty would legalise state robbery. Most IITs, especially BITs, contain 
arbitration agreements for the investor to bring the host state before an arbitral tribunal 
who will decide on whether an injustice has occurred or not. The fact that the state is 
called into question is itself a question of its sovereignty and questioning its sovereignty 
outside its territorial jurisdiction by foreign judges and not in its own courts by its own 
national judges is a further impediment to its sovereignty. However, countries accept 
the curtailment of their sovereignty by participating in IITs and international 
organisations like the WTO to advance their economies, and agreeing to arbitration has 
become one of those things that they almost always have to accept to benefit from 
international cooperation and investment. IITs and their arbitration agreements 
primarily protect the investors of capital exporting countries (mainly developed 
countries) who invest in capital importing countries (mainly developing countries). 
 
Arbitration serves to protect investors’ rights because of the concept that it is more 
politically and procedurally neutral than host state courts.308 While that might actually 
be the case in some jurisdictions, investor-state arbitration has been considered to be 
politically and neutrally bias towards investors because: (i) fiscal, public health and 
environmental policies, all of which are fundamentally important matters to be ruled 
upon by a government in any civilised society, are arbitrated for the sake of the 
corporate profits of foreign investors, which should come behind the welfare of the state 
and not ahead of it; (ii) the threat of arbitration alone can prejudice bona fide regulation 
in a host state because of regulatory chill which is effective due to the direct (costs of 
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arbitration) and indirect (decrease in FDI) economic risks of arbitration; (iii) IITs are 
drafted to advantage foreign investors by placing obligations only on the host state; and 
(iv) the arbitrators’ backgrounds are often corporation orientated (including working at 
law firms which are businesses at the end of the day) and have a direct interest in 
arbitration (to make a profit from their appointments). These factors, however, are not 
black and white, especially in the case of alleged bias of arbitrators. Certainly arbitrators 
take an expansive view to jurisdiction because to get to the heart of the legal matters and 
alleged violations by a state of international law, they need to give themselves 
jurisdiction to preside over disputes. If we start to see more restrictive jurisdiction 
awards on the basis of apparently meritless claims, that would imply that arbitrators are 
presiding over the merits in jurisdictional hearings. The biggest caveat in relation to 
risks posed to host states from investment arbitration is the section above on alleged 
bias of arbitrators. Arbitrators work within the confines of the system that currently 
exists and the system is not at the time of writing perfect.309 Part of that system is the 
party appointed arbitrator. Most investor-state arbitrations are decided by a panel of 
three arbitrators, one chosen by each party and the third by the party appointed 
arbitrators, which can nullify the possibility of arbitrator bias. If a party (including the 
host state) has doubts about the independence of an arbitrator, whether a sole arbitrator 
or part of a panel, that party can utilise rules to question the impartiality of the arbitrator  
and have her/him disqualified. In addition, because arbitrators rely on reputation and 
repeat appointments, it is not in their interest to be bias towards either investors or host 
states. Investors and host states also have the option to have arbitral awards annulled. 
For example, in an ICSID arbitration, the award will be reconsidered by a different 
panel to that which presided over the case. In addition, the empirical studies discussed 
at section 2.4.2 above, whilst fascinating and informative, often rely on proxies and 
make generalisations that may or may not be true and make “unwarranted inferences on 
decision making.”310  
 
Investor-state arbitration serves justice and we are lucky to live in an age where private 
individuals have recourse against host states under international law which is a 
departure from the customary international law position that does not give an automatic 
                                                 
309 See generally Stavros Brekoukalis, ‘Systemic Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration: A 
New Approach to Arbitral Decision-Making’ (2013) 4(4) J. Int’l Dis. Sett. 553. 
310 ibid, 565. 
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private right to claim against a state. Where, for example, would justice have come from 
for investors of the United States or Iran without the existence of the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal? Systems of law and governance seldom work perfectly, so despite, for 
example, the risk of a host state paying its costs in an arbitration that it succeeds in 
(costs which could be used on the welfare of the state), that cost would be insignificant 
in the grand scheme of its monetary policy; meanwhile, the risk to investors of bringing 
claims before host state courts which are either patriotic and/or not independent from 
lawmakers is greater than the economic losses to host states. In respect of the loss of 
FDI as a result of being respondents in arbitration, states could very easily advertise 
their take on any disputes while arbitration is on-going and advertise their success post-
arbitration, subject of course to the confidentiality of certain aspects of proceedings. The 
costs spent by host states in defending claims in international arbitration is likely to be a 
fraction of the GDP which FDI brings into the state, otherwise why would states 
acquiesce to arbitration in IITs if the FDI would not be worthwhile? Let us not forget 
also that it is within the sovereignty of states to voluntarily enter into international 
engagements that restrict their sovereignty.311 Those international engagements include 
IITs in which states undertake to perform or refrain from performing particular acts. 
Why, therefore, should a state enter into IITs to attract FDI, receive that FDI into its 
jurisdiction, but not expect to be called to justice in the most independent possible 
forum currently available to us (i.e. arbitration) when there is a claim that it has violated 
that very tool of international law that brought the investment into its jurisdiction? The 
simple answer is that states should not expect that and most actually do not expect it. 
The fact remains that the studies outlined in section 2.4.2 above indicate that host states 
succeed in arbitrations the majority of the time, which means they have received FDI, 
successfully defended a claim and get most or all of their legal costs reimbursed. On the 
topic of results from the empirical studies and the settlements made between investors 
and states, the studies fail to take into account that settlements are often made in good 
faith to preserve the status quo of relationships and they also fail to consider that host 
states may actually be the parties in stronger shoes during negotiation of those 
settlements. To illustrate, many of those settlements could be the investor dropping the 
claim and paying the legal costs of the host state. Arguably the most significant aspect 
which states will find difficult to avoid is the regulatory chill factor which could affect 
                                                 
311 Jan Paulsson, ‘The Power of States to Make Meaningful Promises to Foreigners’ (2010) 1(2) J. Int’l 
Dis. Sett. 341, 343. 
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states’ tax sovereignty. States most certainly take regulatory chill into account when 
signing IITs with arbitration agreements, and just like the decision to cede sovereignty 
to other member states of the WTO in order to engage and have a voice in the 
international arena, states also take the decision that ceding sovereignty to arbitral 
tribunals and to foreign investors as a result of possible regulatory chill is worth the risk 
in the grand scheme of their economic development. However, tax exclusions are 
inserted into most IITs for national treatment and most-favoured-nation treatment 
protection, and an inference can be made that they are willing to bear the risk of 
regulatory chill in relation to certain aspects of their sovereignty, but not their tax 
sovereignty. 
 
As for arbitrability, the feeling of tax being non-arbitrable existed because it was 
untested terrain until only quite recently. There are a number of plausible reasons that 
tax measures have been seldom arbitrated: (i) from a jurisprudential perspective it is a 
very sensitive subject and the applicability of IIT protections are subjected to exclusions 
from matters of taxation, especially the easiest to prove (national treatment and MFN); 
(ii) investors might have been advised against pursuing treaty violation claims based on 
taxation because of the difficulty in proving such violations, and this is especially so 
with respect to apparently bona fide taxation measures which are allegedly 
expropriatory, so unless the evidence is strong and unless the claim would be for a 
substantial amount of money, an arbitration might not be worth pursuing and the 
relationship with the state not worth hindering312; (iii) investors and states have 
probably settled most tax disputes and these settlements are private – we therefore 
cannot know how many tax arbitrations there would have been if not for such 
settlements313; (iv) states have probably not introduced taxes that they were 
contemplating the introduction of because of regulatory chill; and (v) the recent 
emergence of BITs in the 1990s to the present date has gone hand in hand with the 
emergence of investor-state arbitration, so the emergence of BITs may have lowered or 
                                                 
312 MNEs usually delve into diplomacy for the sake of winning contracts and being granted concessions, 
so the arbitration for a small gain would not be worth risking the relationship for. 
313 A good reason for states to settle would be that a loss in arbitration means the tax law/action violates 
IIT protections and this could lead to other investors in that state bringing claims. Host states would 
therefore prefer to secretly settle disputes with investors so that they can keep applying the tax measure 
(e.g. levying the tax on others or not granting tax refunds to others). This also advantages the investor 
who has settled in comparison to the competition who are still subjected to the taxation measures (e.g. 
still paying the tax or not receiving tax refunds). 
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maintained a low incidence of taxation that existed pre-IIT protections, but would, post-
IIT protections, likely result in IIT violations, and this has incidentally prevented the 
prevalence of tax arbitration. 
 
In summary, the sovereign power to tax, just like any other type of legislative power 
that affects private individuals and corporations, is arbitrable if the IIT or arbitration 
agreement for the settlement of investor-state disputes allows it to be, and that is a good 
thing. As I have already written and will repeat again, the sovereignty of the state 
should not and does not give it the power to do whatever it wants. The arbitral tribunal 
in ADC314 said the following about the state’s right to regulate: 
 
The Tribunal cannot accept the Respondent’s position that the actions taken by it 
against the Claimants were merely an exercise of its rights under international 
law to regulate its domestic economic and legal affairs. It is the Tribunal’s 
understanding of the basic international law principles that while a sovereign 
State possesses the inherent right to regulate its domestic affairs, the exercise of 
such right is not unlimited and must have its boundaries… the rule of law, which 
includes treaty obligations, provides such boundaries. Therefore, when a State 
enters into a bilateral investment treaty like the one in this case, it becomes 
bound by it and the investment-protection obligations it undertook therein must 
be honoured rather than be ignored by a later argument of the State’s right to 
regulate.315 
 
Finally, there is an amusing paradox between tax and arbitration: when a government is 
sued in international investment arbitration, “arbitrators have the power to divert 
taxpayers’ money to corporations.”316 In tax arbitration, the foreign investor would be 
suing to be paid taxpayers’ money for being taxed in the first place. 
 
                                                 
314 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/16, Award of 2 October 2006. 
315 ibid at para 423. 
316 Eberhardt and Olivet (n. 221) 35. 
69 
 
Chapter 3 The Treatment of Tax in Expropriation Claims in 
Investor-State Arbitration 
 
Expropriation in the investment treaty context is a governmental taking of or 
interference with foreign investment which deprives the investor of the meaningful 
benefits of ownership and control. Expropriation can be very direct, such as the 
taking of property by military intervention, or it can occur indirectly through the use 
of regulatory powers such as the power to tax and other legislative functions of the 
state. A state can expropriate an investment by directly or indirectly neutralising the 
enjoyment of property1 thereby making ownership of the property irrelevant, for 
example by blocking entrances to a construction site (direct) or revoking previously 
granted permits to build on that site (indirect). 
 
The current wording of expropriation provisions in most international investment 
treaties (IITs) are very similar if not identical. Expropriation provisions in IITs 
mostly read along the lines of: 
 
Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalised, 
expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to 
nationalisation or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) in 
the territory of the other Contracting Party except for a public purpose… on a 
non-discriminatory basis and against prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation… The investor affected shall have a right, under the law of the 
Contracting Party making the expropriation, to prompt review, by a judicial 
or other independent authority of that Contracting Party, of his or its case…2 
(emphasis mine). 
 
The process to draft the above text and similar expropriation provisions was achieved 
by the early attempts of treaty framers to codify customary international law3 which 
                                                 
1 James Crawford et al, ICSID Reports: Volume 9: v.9 – International Convention on the Settlement of 
Disputes Reports (CUP 2006) 92. 
2 Article 5(1), Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments, signed 11 December 1990, entered into force 19 February 1993 (UK-Argentina BIT). 
3 Campbell McLachlan QC, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, International Investment 
Arbitration – Substantive Principles, (OUP 2008) 266. 
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they have successfully achieved.4 Treaty claims for alleged expropriations and the 
arbitral awards accompanying them which interpret provisions like the one above 
have become the principal focus of expropriation jurisprudence.5 Treaty texts are of 
course vital, for without a provision on expropriation in an IIT, there can be no claim 
by an investor, and the success or failure of any claim can fall on the interpretation 
by an arbitral tribunal on the broadness or narrowness of the treaty text. 
 
The expropriation provision reproduced above, like almost all expropriation texts, 
outlines the following four requirements which have sufficiently crystallised in treaty 
texts to the represent the customary international law6 of when an expropriation will 
not result in state liability7: 
 
(i) it is for a public purpose; 
(ii) it is carried out on a non-discriminatory basis;  
(iii) it is in accordance with due process of law;8 and 
(iv) it is promptly followed by adequate and effective compensation.9 
 
I will refer to (i) to (iii) as ‘conduct requirements’, (iv) as the ‘compensation 
requirement,10 and altogether as the ‘four requirements’. 
 
More recent bilateral investment treaties (BITs) also show the same characteristics, 
for example: 
 
                                                 
4 UNCTAD, ‘Expropriation’ (UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, 
201, Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7) 27 <http://unctad.org/en/docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf> 
accessed 4 January 2013, (UNCTAD on Expropriation) 
5 McLachlan et al (n. 3) 266. 
6 UNCTAD Expropriation 2012 (n. 4) 27. 
7 ibid. 
8 In the UK-Argentina BIT, the due process of law requirement is set out by the BIT requiring the 
investor be given the right “to prompt review, by a judicial or other independent authority of that 
Contracting Party, of his or its case” (Article 5(1)). 
9 Some United States BITs, as represented by the US Model BIT 2012, go one step further than the 
four requirements set out by customary international law by also requiring the expropriation to be 
carried out under the principles of fair and equitable treatment, however the fair and equitable 
treatment requirement is likely to be breached in any event if any of the four principle requirements 
are breached. 
10 The label ‘conduct requirements’ for requirements (i) to (iii) and the label ‘compensation 
requirement’ for requirement (iv) was given to the four requirements by Audley Sheppard, ‘The 
Distinction Between Lawful and Unlawful Expropriation’ (2008) 1:1-2 World Arbitration & 
Mediation Review 137, 138. 
71 
 
Investments or returns of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be 
nationalized, expropriated or subjected to measures having an effect 
equivalent to nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as 
“expropriation”) in the territory of the other Contracting Party, except for a 
public purpose, under due process of law, in a non-discriminatory manner 
and provided that such expropriation is accompanied by prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation11 (emphasis mine). 
 
Some investment treaties also incorporate the words ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ in their 
expropriation provisions, such as most United States BITs: 
 
Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or 
indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization 
("expropriation")…12 (emphasis mine). 
 
The traditional concept and definition of expropriation is a taking of property by the 
state with the requirement for the expropriating state to pay compensation.13 That 
concept stems from the origins of expropriation which is the direct type, i.e. the 
taking by governmental authorities of tangible assets. The concept now applies to 
investments in a more general sense and investments are often comprised of both 
tangible and intangible properties which can be affected by state measures which 
extend beyond physical acts14 (physical takings) and include measures which deprive 
                                                 
11 Article VI, Agreement between Canada and the Czech Republic for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, signed 6 May 2009, entered into force 22 January 2012. 
12 Article III(1), Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning 
the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed 27 August 1993, entered into 
force 11 May 1997 (US-Ecuador BIT); the United States’ BITs and their model BITs including the 
United States Model BIT 2012 (Article 6(1)) use the words ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ in the expropriation 
articles, and the practice is not limited to the United States, see for example Article 4(1), Agreement 
between the Government of the Republic  of Finland and the Government of the People's Democratic 
Republic of Algeria on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 13 January 
2005, entered into force 25 February 2007 (Finland-Algeria BIT). 
13 Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties – Standards of 
Treatment, (Kluwer Law International 2009), 322; and McLachlan et al (n. 3) 266. 
14 UNCTAD Expropriation 2012 (n. 4) 6; see also CME Czech Republic BV (The Netherlands) v 
Czech Republic, Arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, Partial Award of 13 September 2001 




the investor of the “meaningful benefits of ownership and control”15 through 
legislation, regulation or the enforcement or non-enforcement thereof. In addition, 
the state need not attain something of value to be found liable for an expropriation 
and legal title can also remain with the investor, whereby the investor need only be 
deprived of the use and enjoyment of his or its investment.16 These concepts 
epitomise indirect expropriation, including measures tantamount to expropriation.17 
 
Takings that are expropriatory must be distinguished from non-compensable 
government takings. Non-compensable government takings are police power 
regulations that result in the deprivation of property but do not require the payment 
of compensation. These include measures carried out to maintain public order and 
morality18 (a taking for public order can include the confiscation of criminal property 
or the proceeds of crime), to protect public health and the environment19 and bona 
fide general taxation.  
 
Of the four requirements that a government must not violate when expropriating an 
investment, the compensation requirement, which is a just and equitable condition, is 
arguably the oldest and most important requirement which can be traced to as far 
back as ancient Greece.20 The most universally accepted standard of compensation21 
for expropriation is ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation.22 Ideally, 
                                                 
15 Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award of 
16 December 2002 (Feldman or Feldman Award) at para 100. 
16 Starrett Housing Corporation, Starrett Systems Inc, Starrett Housing International Inc. v The 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran et al, Iran - Iran-USCTR, Case No. 24, Interlocutory 
Award No. ITL 32-24-1 of 19 December 1983:  “…it is recognized in international law that measures 
taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so 
useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the State does not purport to 
have expropriated them and the legal title to the property formally remains with the original owner.” 
17 See 3.2.2 below. 
18 Andrew Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law’ (2005) 
20:1 ICSID Review-FILJ, 24 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=789706> accessed 28 October 2010. 
19 ibid. 
20 See section 3.1.1 below. 
21 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on 
International Arbitration (5th Ed, OUP 2009), 508. 
22 The payment of ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation is known as the ‘Hull Formula’, 
named after its articulator, the United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull. In the aftermath of 
Mexico’s expropriation of United States investors-owned petroleum companies, Mexico’s Foreign 
Minister wrote to Hull on the topic of compensation, claiming that no rule in international law obliges 
an expropriating state to make payment of immediate or even deferred compensation for 
expropriations of general and impersonal characters. Hull replied, stating that “[u]nder every rule of 
law and equity, no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purposes, 
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compensation in convertible currency for the full value of the expropriated property 
will be paid immediately after the expropriation so the investor who suffered the 
expropriation has the ability to reinvest the money or take it home23 as soon as 
possible, thereby keeping financial harm to a minimum. Immediate payment can be 
feasible in some instances of direct expropriation but seldom feasible with indirect 
expropriations which can occur incrementally over a period of time and even the 
existence of indirect expropriation is likely to be debated by the state. ‘Prompt’ 
payment, which is characterised as the payment of compensation without delay,24 is 
therefore a practical solution in that it gives the host state the necessary flexibility to 
compensate the investor as soon as possible depending on the circumstances of the 
individual merits of each expropriation (including whether arbitration is required to 
determine the very existence of expropriation and therefore the existence of the 
requirement to compensate).25 Compensation is ‘adequate’ when it correlates to the 
value required by the relevant IIT which can be the market value,26 the fair market 
value,27 the genuine value,28 the real value29  or the real economic value.30 The fair, 
genuine, and real values are likely to achieve the same effect31 because they are 
“generally considered to reflect the same standard of compensation”.32 
Compensation is ‘effective’ when it is “paid in convertible or freely usable 
                                                                                                                                          
without provision for prompt, adequate and effective compensation” (emphasis mine) 
(Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, (3rd Ed, CUP 2010), 
414 note 2); OECD, ‘”Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment 
Law’, (2004) OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Doc. No. 2004/4 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf> accessed 23 October 2010. 
23 Sornarajah (n. 22) 414. 
24 UNCTAD Expropriation 2012 (n. 4) 40. 
25 The payment of compensation without delay provides flexibility because the existence of 
expropriation must sometimes be ascertained through arbitration/litigation, and if compensation is 
determined to be payable by the arbitral tribunal or court, it must then be paid without delay. Prompt 
payment also does not impede on host state sovereignty because it does not oblige an expropriating 
state to pay compensation immediately because that would be impractical and the state would almost 
always be in breach if immediate payment was the standard norm. 
26 Article IV(2), Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Hellenic Republic Concerning 
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 20 January 2000, entered into force 
24 November 2001 (Greece-Turkey BIT). 
27 UNCTAD Expropriation 2012 (n. 4) 40; Article 1110(2), North American Free Trade Agreement 
1994 (NAFTA); Article III, US-Ecuador BIT.  
28 Article 5(1), UK-Argentina BIT; Article 6(c), Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments between the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of the Netherland, 
signed 9 May 1995, entered into force 1 May 1999 (Netherlands-South Africa BIT). 
29 Article 4(2), Agreement Between the Republic of Turkey and Republic of Slovenia on the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 23 March 2004, entered into force 19 June 2006 
(Slovenia-Turkey BIT). 
30 UNCTAD Expropriation 2012 (n. 4) 40. 
31 ibid. 
32 Redfern and Hunter (n. 21) 508 
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currency”33 The expropriated investment will often be appraised for compensation 
purposes at its value immediately before the expropriation took place34 and 
compensation will include interest.35 
 
The compensation requirement brings with it a debate over whether an expropriation 
which abides by the conduct requirements but does not compensate the investor 
should be labelled a lawful or unlawful expropriation. It may seem obvious that host 
state measures in violation of the law (whether it’s the host state’s domestic law or 
international law) is unlawful, including the non-payment of compensation for 
expropriation, but it is not as clear-cut as that. When that logic is applied to an 
expropriation that takes place for a public purpose, with due process and no 
discrimination, but violates the compensation requirement, that expropriation would 
be labelled as ‘unlawful’ and some arbitral tribunals have given it that label.36 The 
issue surrounding this topic is the air of negativity that comes with the term 
‘unlawful expropriation’ because it denotes wrongdoing and malice by the state, and 
that that normally denotes a violation of the conduct requirements. The requirement 
to compensate stems from the origins of expropriation as being the physical taking of 
property,37 whereby the direct expropriation of, for example, a farm without adequate 
compensation for the owner would be theft by the sovereign,38 and it is fair to say 
therefore that the failure of a state to compensate for a direct expropriation will make 
such an expropriation an unlawful one even if it does not violate the conduct 
requirements,39 unless it is agreed that compensation shall be paid but there is a 
disagreement over the value of compensation that is due.40 
                                                 
33 UNCTAD Expropriation 2012 (n. 4) 40. 
34 Article 1110(2),  NAFTA; Article IV(2), Greece-Turkey BIT;  Article III, US-Ecuador BIT; Article 
5(1), UK-Argentina BIT; Article 6(c), Netherlands-South Africa BIT; Article 4(2), Slovenia-Turkey 
BIT. 
35 ibid. 
36 Siemens A.G. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award of 6 February 2007, at paras 
273 and 349; ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v Republic of Hungary, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award of 2 October 2006, at para 476; numerous Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal (Iran-USCTR) tribunals have considered the compensation requirement to be 
“relevant to the lawfulness of a taking under customary international law” (Charles N. Brower and 
Jason D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Brill, 1998), 499). 
37 See section 3.1 below. 
38 See quotation at the beginning of Chapter 2 of this thesis: “In the absence of justice, what is 
sovereignty but organised robbery?” (Saint Augustine, 13 November 354 – 28 August 430). 
39 UNCTAD Expropriation 2012 (n. 4) 44. 
40 Compañía de Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v The Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. 




An indirect expropriation claim, on the other hand, will almost always be less clear 
cut than a direct expropriation claim because it will not involve an outright taking41 
and the host state will likely oppose the expropriation claim and contend that the 
nature of the measure(s) was a bona fide and non-expropriatory use of its sovereign 
powers for which pre-emptive compensation should not be expected.42 Indeed, the 
legitimate actions of a state which are a lawful exercise of its sovereign powers (i.e. 
they do not violate the conduct requirements) will only require compensation if they 
are expropriatory, and sometimes investor-state arbitration is required to establish 
whether those actions are expropriatory or not, and if they are judged to be 
expropriatory, compensation becomes due when the award is rendered.43 It is, 
accordingly, undesirable for an indirect expropriation to be branded unlawful if it 
violates only the compensation requirement, especially when the existence of 
expropriation was, pre-arbitration, unknown. Many arbitral tribunals have 
consequently refrained from branding indirect expropriations that violate only the 
compensation requirement as ‘unlawful’.44 That is not to say the state should not 
compensate – it simply means that an expropriation carried out within the confines of 
the conduct requirements should be labelled as a ‘lawful expropriation in lieu of 
                                                 
41 The existence of an outright taking in direct expropriations is almost unarguable by the 
expropriating state, unless it is a non-compensable taking such as the confiscation of criminal 
property. 
42 UNCTAD Expropriation 2012 (n. 4) 43. 
43 ibid 44; in Antoine Goetz and Others v Republic of Burundi, ICSID Arbitration No. ARB/95/3, 
Award of 10 February 1999, the arbitral tribunal decided that the Belgium-Burundi BIT under which 
the claim was brought required compensation within a reasonable period of time and not pre-emptive 
compensation, therefore, the respondent state, Burundi, could still satisfy the compensation 
requirement and establish the international legality of its allegedly expropriatory measure (at para 
131) (the original text reads: “C’est dire que la question de la licéité internationale de la décision du 
29 mai 1995 reste en suspens. De deux choses l’une, en effet. Ou bien la République du Burundi 
satisfait dans un délai raisonnable à la condition de l’indemnisation adéquate et effective en versant 
une indemnité répondant aux critères et aux exigences du paragraphe 2 de l’article 4 de la 
Convention. En ce cas, la licéité internationale de la décision du 29 mai 1995 se trouvera 
définitivement établie”. 
44 For example, in Amoco International Finance Corporation v Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran et al, IRAN-USCTR Case No. 56, Award No. 310-56-3 of 14 July 1987 (Amoco), the 
expropriation was found to be in violation of only the compensation requirement, and when analysing 
the damages that must be paid for the expropriation, the arbitral tribunal described the measures as a 
“lawful expropriation” (at para 195); in Santa Elena there was a disagreement between the claimant 
and the respondent (Costa Rica) on how much compensation was due for the expropriation of land 
taken for the protection of the environment which met the public purpose, non-discriminatory and due 
process of law requirements - when analysing the standard of compensation, the arbitral tribunal (and 
the parties to the arbitration themselves) described the expropriation as lawful, stating that there “… is 
a duty… to pay compensation in respect of even a lawful expropriation” (emphasis mine) (at para 68) 
and “… the amount of compensation properly payable in respect of a lawful taking…” (emphasis 
mine) (at para 69); in Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Award on the Merits of 20 May 1992 (SPP), the respondent (Egypt) 
cancelled the claimant’s tourist development project with the public purpose of preserving and 
protecting antiquities - the right of the host state to cancel the project was not challenged by the 
claimant who only claimed for compensation for expropriation - the arbitral tribunal said the measure 
“constituted a lawful exercise of the right of eminent domain” (emphasis mine) (at para 158) and that 
the claimant is seeking compensation “… for a lawful expropriation, and not ‘reparation’ for an 
illegal act…” (emphasis mine) (at para 183). 
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compensation’, with the compensation becoming when it is established that an 
expropriation has in fact occurred. This can be contrasted with claims when any of 
the conduct requirements are violated, in which the expropriations will be deemed 
unlawful45 whether they are direct or indirect expropriations. 
 
Arbitral tribunals’ approach in finding state liability for alleged expropriations can be 
narrowed down to two questions: (i) has there been an expropriation; and (ii) was 
one or more of the four requirements (or fewer or more conditions as set out in the 
applicable IIT) breached by the state? Question (i) comes first because the “practical 
matter [of] whether there has been an expropriation”46 must be established before 
examining whether the state might be liable to the investor under question (ii). For 
the purposes of answering (i), what is a direct expropriation will be quite obvious, 
and the discussion in arbitral awards that form most of the current expropriation 
jurisprudence is on the topic of indirect expropriation because it is not as black and 
white as direct expropriation and also because for around the past three decades the 
majority of expropriations have been the indirect type, with the number of direct 
expropriations declining in the late 1970s and remaining relatively constant at a very 
low level through to the mid-1980s,47 with seemingly only three direct expropriations 
occurring between 1984 to 1986, one by Nicaragua (1984) and two by Peru (1985 
and 1986), and none thereafter until at least 1992.48 Indirect expropriation overtook 
direct expropriation as the “dominant form of state interference with foreign 
investment.”49 In fact, “[i]ndirect expropriation has significantly increased the 
number of cases before international arbitral tribunals”50 generally, let alone in the 
context of expropriation. If (i) is answered in the affirmative, the state will be liable 
to the foreign investor if (ii) is also answered in the affirmative. That said, evidence 
of government measures, including taxation measures, violating the conduct 
requirements (which fall under (ii)) will denote unlawful conduct by the host state 
and such unlawful activity will help to convey to arbitral tribunals that said measures 
                                                 
45 UNCTAD Expropriation 2012 (n. 4) 44. 
46 McLachlan et al (n. 3)  272. 
47 Michael S Minor, ‘The Demise of Expropriation as an Instrument of LDC Policy’, (1994) 25(1) 
Journal of International Business Studies 177, 178. 
48 ibid 181 at Table 2. 
49 George Chifor, ‘Caveat Emptor: Developing International Disciplines For Deterring Third Party 
Investment In Unlawfully Expropriated Property’, (2002) 33 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 179, 185. 
50 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 
3467, Award of 1 July 2004 (Occidental or Occidental Award) at para 85. 
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err on the side of unlawful government action rather than non-compensable 
government measures51 and can therefore help to answer (i) by “imparting a degree 
of circularity to the ‘expropriation versus regulation’ dichotomy.”52 For example, 
discriminatory and arbitrary taxation can signify unlawful takings and unlawful 
deprivation of property, whereas bona fide general taxation will signify lawful 
takings and lawful deprivation of property. 
 
I will now turn to discuss the recent historical background and development of the 
expropriation standard which has resulted in the investment treaty provisions we 
have in modern IITs. 
 
3.1  Historical Background and Development 
 
3.1.1 Pre-Modern Day Literature on Expropriation 
 
The taking of another’s property has occurred throughout the history of time, from 
inter and intra species battles for land or the taking by an alpha male of others’ 
properties, or tribal battles and ancient Greek and Roman wars over land and 
resources, to modern takings such as the taking of Palestinian land for the 
establishment and expansion of the Israeli state53 and the invasion of Iraq in part for 
the exploitation of its oil resources.54 The taking of and battles for territories and 
resources is part of nature and is a well-documented occurrence in the animal 
kingdom.55  The ‘natural’ aspect is not to detract from the shady, and more often than 
not, wrongful nature of invasions by one sovereign of another sovereign’s territories 
                                                 
51 Feldman Award at para 99. 
52 ibid. 
53 Haim Sandberg, ‘Expropriations of Private Land of Arab Citizens in Israel: An Empirical Analysis 
of the Regular Course of Business’ (2010) 43 Israeli Law Review, 590, 591. 
54 Antonia Juhasz, ‘Why the War in Iraq Was Fought for Big Oil’, CNN (15 April 2013) 
<http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-oil-juhasz/> accessed 18 April 2013. In Antonia 
Juhasz’s article, she has quoted the following: ““Of course it's about oil; we can't really deny that," 
said Gen. John Abizaid, former head of U.S. Central Command and Military Operations in Iraq, in 
2007. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan agreed, writing in his memoir, "I am 
saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war is 
largely about oil." Then [Senator] and now Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said the same in 2007: 
"People say we're not fighting for oil. Of course we are.””. 
55 See for example International Wolf Centre, ’10 Things You Need to Know About Wolves and 




for the purposes of taking land/property, including the taking of private property in 
those lands – but it has happened in the past and is likely to occur in the foreseeable 
future. Such actions by sovereign states denotes a lack of (or non-existent) respect 
for the property rights of invaded populations, however, higher property rights being 
accorded by a state to its own populations is historical and this is evidenced by the 
recognition of the right of the state to expropriate but not in lieu of compensation. 
 
The right of a state to expropriate is an inherent aspect of its sovereignty by public 
and constitutional law56 and exists even without the written consent thereof in statute 
or constitution.57 But it is the limitations on a state’s right to expropriate, not the 
existence of the right to expropriate, that has concerned legal literature for over 2000 
years.58 
 
In ancient Greece, the sovereign was able to exercise the right of expropriation but if 
a taking lacked compensation it “was regarded as inconsistent with the nature of the 
institution of property”.59 Likewise, in ancient Rome, “expropriation was almost 
unknown, for the Roman feeling for individual liberty and respect for vested rights 
allowed expropriation to occur only in the most exceptional circumstances”,60 
although “that did not prevent emperors from confiscating property if they felt the 
need to do so. But such confiscations would tend to be regarded as the hallmark of a 
‘bad’ ruler. Perhaps that is what Mann meant by ‘exceptional circumstances’.”61 
 
On 15 June 1215, the Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta) was 
signed by King John, legislating that individuals’ properties such as timber and 
horses could not be taken by the King’s constable or constable’s bailiff without the 
                                                 
56 F.A. Mann, Outlines of a History of Expropriation, (1959) 75 LQR, 188, 192. 
57 ibid, 193, also quoting Strong J in Kohl v United States (1876) 91 U.S. 449, at p. 451: “The right [to 
expropriate] is the offspring of political necessity and it is inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied 
to it by its fundamental law”. 
58 ibid 193. 
59 ibid, quoting John Walter Jones, The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks (Clarendon Press, 1956), 
198. 
60 Mann (n. 56) 193. 
61 Email from Prof. Kevin Butcher to author (20 December 2013). Kevin Butcher is a Professor of 
Classics and Ancient History and Head of Department (2013/14) at Warwick University. 
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owner’s consent62 and without payment.63 The Magna Carta contained the earliest 
provisions of the compensation requirement at Chapters 19 and 21 for what were 
called ‘royal requisitions’.64 In 16th Century England, statutes were enacted which 
allowed for the compulsory expropriation of land for public purposes65 (such as for 
supplying water),66 which were intrinsic in the construction of cities. These statutes 
also legislated for “proper compensation to be paid”67, for example, in the case of the 
First London Water Act 1543, compensation had to be determined by “three or four 
indifferent men”68 and if the level of compensation had not been agreed by those 
men and the expropriating government authority did not satisfy the owner with 
compensation, the owner could bring an action for trespass.69 
 
In 1766, Lord Camden of the English parliament said “[t]he sovereign authority… 
cannot take away any man’s private property without making him a compensation.”70 
At around the same time, another parliamentarian, Sir William Blackstone, said that 
the law of private property is so great that it cannot be violated even in the public 
interest without the permission of the owner of a property if his land is to be taken or 
used, and although the legislature can and does compel the owner to acquiesce to the 
use or taking, it must not do so “in an arbitrary manner… but by giving him a full 
indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained.”71 
 
Private property protections existed in France in the 14th Century, requiring 
compensation for damage when fortifications were built,72 through to the 17th 
Century when a public purpose and compensation were required for works carried 
out by the state which impeded on private property.73 Developments in Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland took a similar course and the public purpose and 
                                                 
62 Elizabeth Brubaker, Property Rights in the Defence of Nature (Environment Probe 1995) Chapter 
12 <http://environment.probeinternational.org/chapter-12-no-expropriation-without-full-
compensation/> accessed 19 December 2013. 
63 ibid; and Mann (n. 56) 194. 
64 Mann (n. 56) 194. 
65 ibid. 
66 ibid. 
67 Sheppard (n. 10) 140. 
68 Mann (n. 56) 194. 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid 195, quoting Lord Camden as obtained from Parliamentary History, XVI, 168. 
71 ibid, quoting Sir William Blackstone as obtained from Parliamentary History, XVI, 139. 




compensation requirements for expropriation were well established in medieval 
Italian cities and became general law in Italy by 1600.74 In continental Europe,75 
from the Middle Ages until the 18th Century, “[n]o case is known in which property 
was taken… for reasons other than public necessity or without at least the promise of 
compensation.”76 
 
The respect for private property in the United States can be traced to 15 December 
179177 under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides 
that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”78 
 
3.1.2  Historical Literature on Tax as Expropriation 
 
The historical literature on taxation as expropriation is scarce but does exist, 
particularly in the context of taxation as unlawful takings.  
 
In Chapter 2, taxation was described as “what we pay for civilised society”79 and that 
“[t]he art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest amount 
of feathers with the least possible amount of hissing.”80 By putting these two 
statements together, one can derive that taxation itself must be levied and collected in 
a civil manner by being bona fide and general in nature, and if the taxman goes (or 
‘plucks’) too far, the tax itself becomes an uncivil levy by being arbitrary or punitive, 
thus making the former statement collapse on itself because something civil cannot 
rightfully be borne out of something uncivil. 
 
                                                 
74 ibid 203-204. 
75 Sheppard (n. 10) 140. 
76 Mann (n. 56) 203. 
77 United States of America Constitution – Amendment 5 – Trial and Punishment, Compensation for 
Takings <http://www.usconstitution.net/const.html> accessed 12 December 2013. 
78 ibid; the text is actually written in a form of old English as: “… not shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.” 
79 Compañía General de Tabaco de Filipinas v Collector of Internal Revenue, (1927) 275 U.S. 87, 
100 per Justice Holmes; William W Park, ‘Tax Arbitration and Investor Protection’ in Chapter 12 of 
Catherine A. Rogers and Roger P. Alford (eds), The Future of Investment Arbitration (2009 OUP), 
227. 
80 French Economist and Minister of Finance under King Louis XIV of France, Jean-Baptiste Colbert 
(1619-1683) (see Chapter 2, (n. 27)). 
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As established in the introduction of this chapter (and will be further expanded upon 
at sections 3.3 and 3.4 below), expropriation’s original definition was a taking of 
property but that has now expanded to include the deprivation of the use and 
enjoyment of property, with the deprivation akin to the property having been taken. 
Taxation is unique when compared with other police powers such as environmental 
regulations which impose rules, restrictions and targets on business’ activities which 
can in themselves result in a deprivation of the use and enjoyment of property 
(potential indirect expropriation), whereas taxation as a taking81 has the potential of 
being a direct expropriation (as regards the monies taken) and it can deprive an 
investor of the benefits of an investment, namely profits, which has the potential of 
being an indirect expropriation. 
 
The most prominent historical literature on taxation and expropriation comes from 
United States court cases from over a century ago. In the United States Supreme 
Court case of County of Mobile v Kimball,82 a distinction between taxation and the 
expropriation of property was given by Mr. Justice Field: 
 
“Taxation only exacts contribution from individuals of the State or of a 
particular district, for the support of the government or to meet some public 
expenditure authorised by it, for which they receive compensation in the 
protection which government affords,83 or in the benefit of the special 
expenditure. But when private property is taken for public use, the owner 
receives full compensation. The taking differs from a sale by him only in that 
the transfer of title may be compelled and the amount of compensation be 
                                                 
81 In Mann (n. 56) 212, it was said that “there is a vital difference between taxation and the taking of 
property… in definition and substance” – it is likely that Mann meant is there is a difference between 
bona fide general taxation and expropriation, because bona fide general taxation (which is not 
arbitrary or punitive) is not expropriatory and therefore is not ‘a taking of property’ in the 
expropriation sense. My use of ‘taking’ or ‘taking of property’ is in the general sense of the term (i.e. 
not meaning ‘expropriation’), and because money is property, when one is taxed (including bona fide 
general taxation), money is taken. 
82 (1880) 102 U.S. 691. 
83 In Richard A. Epstein’s Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Harvard 
University Press 1985) at 95, Epstein suggests that “[a]ll regulations, all taxes, and all modifications 
of liability rules are takings of private property prima facie compensable by the state” (emphasis 
original). Epstein’s assessment does not necessarily entail the monetary compensation by the state 
(that would be counterproductive to collecting tax) but that taxes should not be taken without benefit 
being given to the public in governance, policing and military protection, public health, environmental 
protection, education, etc., and is therefore compatible with Mr Justice Field’s passage. 
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determined by a jury or officers of the government appointed for that 
purpose. In the one case, the owner bears only a share of the public burdens; 
in the other, he exchanges his property for its equivalent in money. The two 
things are essentially different”84 (emphasis mine). 
 
The above passage shows that: (i) government protections (or ‘public benefits’) that 
are funded by taxed money (such as policing and even governance itself) are 
provided in ‘compensation’ for the collection of taxes, with the owner of the taxed 
money bearing only a share of the public burden to pay for those benefits (this is 
bona fide general taxation); and (ii) the taking of private property for public use 
(such as privately owned land taken for building a road) must be paid for by the state 
with ‘full compensation’ because although the owner of that land will also benefit 
from the public use (use of the road in the example given), he would have 
contributed the entirety of the property for the public benefit. The passage, however, 
fails to address the possibility of a person contributing the entirety of his earnings to 
the taxman and so it fails to address the possibility of taxation being arbitrary or 
punitive. 
 
United States case law did eventually recognise that the power to tax can be 
exceeded by the state if the tax “is a flagrant abuse, and by reason of its arbitrary 
character is mere confiscation of particular property”.85 The American law on the 
matter was formulated by Mr. Justice Sutherland representing a unanimous court86 in 
A. Magnano Co. v Hamilton
87, definitively recognising that the confiscation of 
property can be disguised through taxation: 
 
                                                 
84 County of Mobile v Kimball at 703, as quoted by Mann (n. 56) 213 at note 25; a similar passage 
with similar effect was given by a New York court in People v Mayor of Brooklyn (1857) 4 N.Y. 419: 
“Eminent domain differs from taxation in that, in the former case, the citizen is compelled to surrender 
to the public something beyond his due proportion for the public benefit. The public seize and 
appropriate his particular estate, because of a special need for it, and not because it is right, as between 
him and the government, that he should surrender it. To him, therefore, the benefit and protection he 
receives from the government are not sufficient compensation; for those advantages are the equivalent 
of the taxes he pays, and the other public burdens he assumes in common with the community at 
large. And this compensation must be pecuniary in its character, because it is in the nature of a 
payment for a compulsory purchase” (see Mann (n. 56) 203). 
85 Houck v Little River Drainage District (1915) 239 U.S. 254, per Mr. Justice Hughes at 264. 
86 Mann (n. 56) 213 at note 27. 
87 (1933) 292 U.S. 40. 
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“Except in rare and special instances the due process of law clause contained 
in the Fifth Amendment is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred 
upon Congress by the Constitution… That clause is applicable to a taxing 
statute such as the one here assailed only if the Act be so arbitrary as to 
compel the conclusion that it does not involve an exertion of the taxing 
power, but constitutes, in substance and effect, the indirect exertion of a 
different and forbidden power, as for example the confiscation of property… 
Collateral purposes or motives of a legislature in levying a tax of a kind 
within the reach of its lawful power are matters beyond the scope of judicial 
inquiry… Nor may a tax within the lawful power be stricken down under the 
due process clause simply because its enforcement may or will result in 
restricting or even destroying particular occupations or businesses…; unless 
indeed, as already indicated, its necessary interpretation and effect be such as 
plainly to demonstrate that the form of taxation was adopted as a mere 
disguise under which was exercised, in reality, another and different power 
denied by the Federal Constitution to the state”88 (emphasis mine). 
 
The judgment above determines that: (i) the intent behind the levying of a tax can be 
challenged89; (ii) the exertion of the taxing power that results in arbitrary levies 
changes the nature of the tax into an unlawful taking (“constitutes, in substance and 
effect, … a forbidden power” (emphasis mine)); (iii) taxation is capable of 
unlawfully being adopted as a disguise for the exercise of a different power which 
includes the taking of property (i.e. indirect/creeping expropriation); and (iv) bona 
fide general taxation that results in restrictions or the destruction of business is not 
unlawful.90  
 
                                                 
88 ibid at 44, as quoted in Mann (n. 56) 213-214 at note 27. 
89 The due process of law provision of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution was 
invoked in this case, and the Fourteenth Amendment had also been invoked in case law when a 
“proposed tax will deprive [an owner] of [his] property without due process of law in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” (Browning et al v Hooper et al (1926) 269 U.S. 396, at 400. 
90 For example, if a company in England and Wales will enter financial difficulties because of national 




Similar principles were established in Germany, where bona fide taxation that 
prejudiced the solvency of a business was lawful91 but the imposition of a tax that 
completely eliminated profits or required recurrent resort to disposing of capital 
resulting in the destruction of business92 was challengeable as being an unlawful 
exercise of the power to tax. 
 
It is clear from the above that taxation was deemed capable of constituting an 
unlawful taking of property93 by domestic courts since over 100 years ago. 
International tribunals within the past century, however, did consider fiscal measures 
and more specifically taxation as being capable of having an expropriatory nature94 
and investors were left without recourse to arbitration from arbitrary taxation.95 
 
In Kügele,96 an ethnic German in Upper Silesia took the Polish State97 to arbitration 
at the tribunal set up by the Geneva Convention, named the Upper Silesian Arbitral 
Tribunal (Tribunal Arbitral de la Haute Silésie) which was independent of the local 
courts and the diplomatic protection of the investor’s home state.98 Poland imposed a 
licence fee99 on a brewery owned by an Upper Silesian German, which he claimed 
was a confiscatory tax which forced him to close his business. He therefore filed for 
compensation at the Arbitral Tribunal for Upper Silesia, claiming that the tax was 
what is now called an indirect expropriation. The arbitral tribunal decided against the 
brewery owner on the reasoning that imposition of a tax recognises he trades in the 
business, and if he pays the tax, he may carry on trading in the business, and 
therefore “the increase of the tax cannot be regarded as… taking away or impairment 
of the right to engage in the trade”.100 The President of the Upper Silesian Arbitral 
                                                 
91 Mann (n. 56) 214. 
92 ibid. 
93 Mann (n. 56) 213. 
94 Park in Rogers and Alford (n. 79) 235 
95 William Park, ‘Arbitrability and Tax’ in Loukas A. Mistelis and Stavros L. Brekoulakis (eds), 
Arbitrability: International & Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International 2009), 187. 
96 Kügele v Polish State, Arbitration before the Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal, 5 February 1932 
(Kügele), reprinted as Case No. 34 in Hersch Lauterpacht (ed), International Law Reports: Volume 6 
– Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 1931-1932 (CUP 1945) 69. 
97 Upper Silesia (which is now part of Poland) was divided between Germany and Poland by the 
League of Nations through a Geneva Convention in 1922. Some Polish-speakers remained in what 
was the German side and some German-speakers remained in what was the Polish side of Upper 
Silesia. 
98 Park in Rogers and Alford (n. 79) 236. 
99 The equivalent today is an excise duty. 
100 Lauterpacht (n. 96) 69. 
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Tribunal, Georges Kaeckenbeeck wrote an article in 1936 stating that the exercise by 
a state of its tax power “whatever the sacrifice it may impose on individuals” does 
not require compensation by the standards of international law101 and that the 
grounds for compensation in tax expropriation claims is for the alleviation of 
exceptional hardship rather than for reparation of a wrong.102 Kaeckenbeeck also 
pressed the point that a state which receives foreign investors into its territory does 
not insure those investors against losses accruing to them as a result of legislative 
changes and shifts in policies, “however radical these may be.”103 This doctrine 
allowed sovereignty to be a form of robbery because it prevented justice – the 
positive thing is that it has since been discredited104 and investors generally do have 
access to justice for arbitrary taxation (see section 3.5 below). 
  
3.1.3  Influential Texts in the Development of Modern Expropriation 
Provisions 
 
Certain international conventions and other texts which have been intrinsic in the 
development of the identical or very similar language in expropriation provisions in 
modern IITs are discussed next, and although the 1950 European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) is the only binding text of those discussed, the others have 
been influential in the development of the expropriation doctrine.105 
 
3.1.3.1    1950 European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Property rights are codified under Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR. There are 
three distinct but connected rules under Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR.106 The 
first rule lays down the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, whereby 
                                                 
101 Georges Kaeckenbeeck, ‘The Protection of Vested Rights in International Law’ (1936) 17 Brit. 
Y.B. Int'l L.1, 16. 
102 ibid 
103 ibid; see section 3.4.3 below on investment treaties not being insurers of business risks. 
104 Park in Mistellis and Brekoulakis (n. 95) 187; it is still correct that host states do not act as insurers 
of foreign investors and their investments and IITs do not act as insurance policies (see 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 
below), but this is only applicable now with respect to business risks and not ‘radical’ governmental 
and political decisions. 
105 OECD (2004) (n. 22) 6. 
106 National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building 
Society v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application No. 117/1996/736/933-935, Judgment of  23 October 
1997, at para 78. 
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every natural and legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of their 
possessions.107 
 
The second rule covers the deprivation of property, making the deprivation of 
property conditional on being in the public interest and “subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”108 
 
The third rule recognises the necessity for states to interfere with property rights and 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 therefore does not “impair the right of a State to enforce such 
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties”109 (emphasis mine). 
 
The three rules are connected with one another because “the second and the third 
rules are concerned with particular interferences with the right to peaceful enjoyment 
of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle 
enunciated in the first rule.”110 
 
International laws aim to balance people’s rights with the rights of the state to 
govern. Consequently, the ECHR recognises people’s rights to property as well as 
the rights of governments to enforce laws that may affect peoples’ use or enjoyment 
of their properties. The embodiment of this balance in the ECHR has served to shape 
IITs that also recognise the ability of the state to intervene with private property for 
legitimate public policy purposes. If international conventions and treaties did not 
recognise the right for states to govern then they would fail to garner signatories 
because potential signatories would assess those laws as impeding too much on their 
sovereignty and open up Pandora’s box for claims by individuals and companies 
against the state for bona fide governance. 
 
For that reason, the ECHR recognises the sovereign power to enforce tax laws, and 
the same principle is followed in modern IITs. Under the ECHR at the European 
                                                 
107Article 1 of Protocol 1, ECHR. 
108 ibid. 
109 ibid. 
110 National & Provincial Building Society at 78. 
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Court of Human rights (ECtHR), “[i]n so far as the tax sphere is concerned … the 
[ECtHR’s] well-established position is that States may be afforded some degree of 
additional deference and latitude in the exercise of their fiscal functions under the 
lawfulness test”,111 the lawfulness test being striking a fair balance between the 
legitimate state interest in enforcing the tax debt and the protection of the applicant’s 
rights set forth in Article 1 of Protocol 1.112  
 
A state can therefore be found liable under the ECHR by a court with jurisdiction113 
for enforcing its sovereignty in an unfair manner.114 
                                                 
111 OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia, ECtHR Application No. 14902/04, Judgment of 17 
January 2012 (Yukos v Russia), para 559; see also National & Provincial Building Society at para 80: 
“a Contracting State… when framing and implementing policies in the area of taxation, enjoys a wide 
margin of appreciation and the [ECtHR] will respect the legislature’s assessment in such matters 
unless it is devoid of reasonable foundation”. 
112 ibid at para 646. 
113 Courts with jurisdiction to rule on ECHR violations are national courts of the European host states 
and the ECtHR. International human rights laws and HCtHR cases have however been used in 
assessing whether expropriations have occurred (Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of 29 May 2003 (Tecmed at para 122 note 
140); international human rights law is sometimes used by host states to justify their actions (Siemens 
at para 75 – Argentina claimed the human rights incorporated into its constitution would be 
disregarded by recognising the claimant’s property rights in the social and economic conditions of 
Argentina during its 1998-2002 economic crisis); human rights laws (unless incorporated into an 
investment treaty) are non-investment treaty obligations, and are held in the same vain as other non-
investment treaty obligations such as environmental protection obligations which have been dismissed 
as irrelevant to determining the legal character of expropriation (Santa Elena at para 71; see also Ioana 
Knoll-Tudor, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard and Human Rights Norms’, in Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy, Fransesco Francioni and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (OUP 2009) 339); it is, however, possible for human rights to be 
taken into account by arbitral tribunals without overreaching their jurisdiction by applying 
inapplicable laws (i.e. they can do so without risking revision or annulment of award proceedings 
under Articles 51 and 52 of the ICSID Convention respectively or under Article V of the New York 
Convention) if: (i) the arbitration is at ICSID, which permits tribunals to apply international law in the 
absence of an agreement of the applicable law by the parties to the arbitration agreement giving rise to 
the arbitration; (ii) the IIT directs arbitral tribunals to apply international law (e.g. Article 1131, 
NAFTA); (iii) human rights violations trigger investment law violations, because investment 
arbitration tribunals only have jurisdiction to preside over investment disputes (Eric De Brabandere, 
‘Human Rights Considerations in International Investment Arbitration’ (2013) Grotius Centre for 
International Legal Studies Working Paper 201/001-IEL, 13 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2230305> accessed 28 December 2013); or (iv) 
when non-parties to an arbitration raise human rights issues in amicus curiae submissions (Luke Eric 
Peterson and Kevin R. Gray, ‘International Human Rights in Bilateral Investment Treaties and in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2003) International Institute for Sustainable Development Research 
Paper, 20 
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_human_rights_bits.pdf> accessed 28 December 2013. 
114 As part of the Yukos affair (see section 3.5.1.6 below), Yukos brought claims against the Russian 
state at the ECtHR (Yukos v Russia (n. 111)). Tax assessments made against Yukos in 2004 for the 
year 2000 fell outside a three-year statutory time-bar set out in Article 113 of the Russian Tax Code 
(Yukos v Russia at para 561 and 564), but because the tax assessments for the year 2000 were subject 
to criminal proceedings, a 14 July 2005 decision by Russia’s Constitutional Court changed the 
interpretation of the rules on statutory time-limits to tax assessments subjected to criminal proceedings 
(Yukos v Russia at para 565). The ECtHR judged the change in interpretation to be a violation of 
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3.1.3.2    1959 Draft Convention on Investments Abroad 
 
The 1959 Draft Convention on Investment Abroad (the Abs-Shawcross Draft 
Convention)115 was summoned by lawyers and European business people under the 
guidance of Hermann Abs who was Chairperson of the Deustche Bank in Germany, 
and Lord Shawcross, former Attorney-General of the United Kingdom.116 The Abs-
Shawcross Draft Convention contains a provision on expropriation in Article III: 
 
“No Party shall take any measures against nationals of another Party to 
deprive them directly or indirectly of their property except under due process 
of law and provided that such measures are not discriminatory or contrary to 
undertakings given by that  Party and are accompanied by the payment of just 
and effective compensation” (emphasis mine). 
 
The word expropriation is not used in the draft text, and interestingly neither is 
nationalisation, words which come together in nearly every provision on 
                                                                                                                                          
Article 1 of Protocol 1 notwithstanding the margin of appreciation for states to exercise their powers 
for the collection of taxes (Yukos v Russia  at para 574). In addition, the unlawful tax assessment for 
the year 2000 led to Yukos being fined as a repeat offender in 2001 for its 2001 tax assessments, 
resulting in a 100% increase in fines payable (i.e. a double fine) (Yukos v Russia  at para 575). The 
double fine was also a violation by Russia of Article 1 of Protocol 1 (Yukos v Russia  at para 575);  
and with respect to measures utilised by Russia to enforce Yukos’s tax debt, including attachment and 
freezing orders, seizure orders and orders to pay enforcement fees (Yukos v Russia  at para 646) and 
the sale of the Yukos’s main production unit (OAO Yuganskneftegaz (YNG)) in bankruptcy 
proceedings (which claimant claimed the  was unlawful, arbitrary and disproportionate to the 
legitimate aims of those measures sought (Yukos v Russia  at para 621)  because as the company’s 
main oil production unit (Yukos v Russia  at para 619) YNG should have been auctioned last under 
domestic legislation rules and because it was sold at a low price to a sham bidder (Yukos v Russia  at 
para 621)), were all said to be interference with the applicant company’s rights under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 (Yukos v Russia  at para 646). These measures constitute the enforcement of “such laws as 
[they] deem necessary to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties” (Article 1 of 
Protocol 1), but the court had to determine whether the Russian state authorities complied with the 
lawfulness test under the ECHR. The court found that the Russian authorities lacked flexibility in their 
enforcement of the laws with respect to enforcement of the tax debt (Yukos v Russia  at para 656) 
which at the time of auction stood at some EUR 11.061 billion (Yukos v Russia  at para 645), and 
“given the pace of the enforcement proceedings, the obligation to pay the full enforcement fee and the 
authorities’ failure to take proper account of the consequences of their actions, the Court finds that the 
domestic authorities failed to strike a fair balance between the legitimate aims sought and the 
measures employed” (Yukos v Russia  at para 657) resulting in a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 
(Yukos v Russia  at para 658). 
115 Reprinted in UNCTAD, ‘International Investment Instruments: A Compendium’, (2000) Volume 
V - Non-Governmental Instruments, Doc. No. UNCTAD/DITE/2(Vol.V), 332-335 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/Compendium//en/137%20volume%205.pdf> accessed 
14 October 2010. 
116 ibid 302. 
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expropriation in IITs and are altogether referred to as expropriation.117 The Abs-
Shawcross Draft Convention instead uses the term ‘deprive’. Deprivation is one of 
the tests used in finding an indirect expropriation (see sections 3.2.3 and 3.4.4 
below). Another term commonly used to describe expropriation is ‘taking’, for 
example, the term ‘direct takings’ is sometimes used instead of ‘direct 
expropriation’. Takings and deprivations both effectively amount to the same result 
and that is because an investor is deprived of his property when it is taken and is also 
deprived of his property when he is prevented from using/enjoying it, and the two 
terms have been used interchangeably.118 The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention does 
not contain a provision for measures equivalent or tantamount to nationalisation or 
expropriation.119  
 
3.1.3.3 1961 Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States  
for Injuries to Aliens 
 
The codification of the customary international law on expropriation was attempted 
by the 1961 Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for 
Injuries to Aliens120 (1961 Harvard Draft).121 Article 10 of the 1961 Harvard Draft is 
titled Taking and Deprivation of Use or Enjoyment of Property, which outlines the 
following rules: 
 
1. The taking, under the authority of the State, of any property of an alien, or of 
the use thereof, is wrongful: 
(a) If it is not for a public purpose clearly recognised as such by a law of 
general application in effect at the time of the taking, or 
                                                 
117 For example, Article 1110(1) of NAFTA states: “No party may… nationalize or expropriate an 
investment of another party or take measures tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an 
investment (“expropriation”)”. 
118 Section 192, Restatement (Second) Foreign Relations Law of the United States 1965 (Second 
Restatement). The exact definition of taking in the Second Restatement is: “conduct attributable to a 
state that is intended and does, effectively deprive an alien of substantially all the benefit of his 
interest in property even though the state does not deprive him of his entire legal interest in the 
property” (emphasis mine); see discussion on levels of deprivation at sections 3.2.3 and 3.4.4 below. 
119 Measures equivalent or tantamount to nationalisation or expropriation are now included in almost 
every modern IIT and as discussed at section 3.2.2 below, measures tantamount/equivalent to 
expropriation is another term for indirect expropriation. 
120 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 13) 329. 
121 Louis B. Sohn and R. R. Baxter, ‘Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of 
Aliens’, 1961) 55 A.J.I.L. 545-584. 
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(b) If it in violation of a Treaty. 
2. The taking, under the authority of the State, of any property of an alien, or the 
use thereof for a public purpose clearly recognised as such by a law of 
general application in effect at the time of the taking is wrongful if it is not 
accompanied by prompt payment of compensation in accordance with the 
highest of the following standards: 
(a) compensation which is no less favorable than that granted to nationals of 
such State; or 
(b) just compensation in terms of the fair market value of the property or of 
the use thereof; or 
(c) if no fair market value exists, just compensation in terms of the fair value 
of such property or of the use thereof… 
3. (a) A “taking of property” includes not only an outright taking of property but 
also any such unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment, or disposal 
of property as to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not be able to 
use, enjoy, or dispose of the property within a reasonable period of time after 
the inception of such interference… (emphasis mine) 
 
Article 10(1) and (2) embody the concept of direct expropriation and this is 
confirmed by the 1961 Harvard Draft’s Explanatory Note where it is written that 
indirect takings fall under Article 10(3),122 making indirect takings the embodiment 
of indirect expropriation. The Explanatory Notes provide examples of methods states 
might use to take property and these include, inter alia, eminent domain, requisition, 
pre-emption, expropriation and nationalisation.123 The main contributor to an 
expropriation to be regarded as wrongful is the non-payment of adequate 
compensation to the investor or restitution of the property ceteris paribus.124 The 
Explanatory Notes also give examples of state measures that cause an ‘interference’ 
with the use, enjoyment or disposal of property, such as making it impossible for a 
foreign investor to operate a factory which he owns by blocking the entrances to the 
factory to allegedly maintain order125 or the state forbids the foreign investor to sell 
                                                 
122 ibid 555. 
123 ibid. 
124 ibid 556; Ceteris paribus is Latin for “all other things being equal or held constant” – i.e. 
restitution of the property in condition no worse than at the time it was taken. 
125 ibid 559. 
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his property thereby depriving that property of its value.126 Whilst the 1961 Harvard 
Draft provides these examples, they are not limiting examples and this is conveyed 
by the text’s recognition of the need for “unreasonableness of an interference with 
the use, enjoyment, or disposal of property”127 to be decided according to the 
international legal standard recognised by the principal legal systems of the world 
which is “best worked out by international tribunals”,128 and this has since been 
worked out by international arbitral tribunals and the international legal standard 
continues to develop. 
 
Article 10(3)(a) sets a time requirement whereby a period of time must lapse for an 
expropriation129 to exist, said time being an unreasonable duration until the investor 
is once again able to use his property. The Explanatory Notes leave it to the 
adjudicator to determine when restriction on the use of property ceases to be 
temporary and falls to become an unreasonable period of time, for example, if “an 
objective observer would conclude that there is no immediate prospect that the owner 
will be able to resume the enjoyment of his property.”130 
 
Article 10(2) of the 1961 Harvard Draft also recognised the requirement of prompt 
compensation and its sub-articles provided a means of calculating adequate 
compensation, with Article 10(2)(a) interestingly employing the national treatment 
principle in calculating adequate compensation.  
 
On the topic of taxation, Article 10(5) provides that an uncompensated taking of 
property or the deprivation of the use and enjoyment of property of a foreign investor 
resulting from the execution of tax laws shall not be considered wrongful if “…it is 
not an unreasonable departure from the principles of justice recognized by the 
principal legal systems of the world…131 and… it is not an abuse of powers… for the 
purpose of depriving an alien of his property.”132 




129 i.e. the “taking of property” including an outright taking of property or unreasonable interference 
with the use, enjoyment, or disposal of property. 
130 Article 10(3)(a), 1961 Harvard Draft. 
131 ibid, Article 10(5)(c). 




3.1.3.4    1967 Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property 
 
The 1967 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property133 (1967 OECD Draft Convention) 
states: 
 
“No Party shall take any measures depriving, directly or indirectly, of his 
property a national of another Party unless the following conditions are 
complied with: 
i. The measures are taken in the public interest and under due 
process of law; 
ii. The measures are not discriminatory; and 
iii. The measures are accompanied by provision for the payment of 
just compensation. Such compensation shall represent the genuine 
value of the property affected, shall be paid without undue delay, 
and shall be transferable to the extent necessary to make it 
effective for the national entitled thereto.”134 
 
Like the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention, the text of the 1967 OECD Draft 
Convention refers to direct and indirect deprivation and does not mention measures 
equivalent or tantamount to ‘deprivation’. The notes and comments on Article 3 do 
however call deprivation “expropriation” or “nationalisation”, with indirect 
deprivation said to constitute “any measures taken with the intent of wrongfully 
depriving the national concerned of the substance of his rights and resulting in such 
loss (e.g. prohibiting the national from selling his property or forcing him to do so at 
a fraction of the fair market price) (emphasis original).”135 By using the words ‘any 
measures’, the text can be seen as broad enough to consider the concept of creeping 
expropriation and actually refers to ‘creeping nationalisation’.136 The notes and 
comments also outline how wrongful interference by a state on an investor’s property 
                                                 
133 ‘O.E.C.D. Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property’, (1967) 7 ILM 117-143. 
134 Article 3, 1967 OECD Draft Convention. 
135 ibid.  
136 OECD ILM (n. 133) 125-126; see section 3.4.5 below on creeping expropriation. 
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(be it unreasonable or discriminatory) can amount to an indirect deprivation, and 
although such deprivation may seem temporary, there comes a point where “there is 
no immediate prospect that the owner will be able to resume enjoyment of his 
property.”137 The notes and comments tell us that ‘creeping nationalisation’138 falls 
under Article 3 and this was a new method of expropriation at that time.139 Creeping 
nationalisation is defined in the text as lawful measures that are applied in a way to 
ultimately deprive the foreign investor of the use or enjoyment of his property 
without the state committing any acts which are noticeably an outright deprivation.140 
Examples include “excessive or arbitrary taxation” (emphasis mine) as well as the 
“prohibition of dividend distribution coupled with compulsory loans; imposition of 
administrators; prohibition of dismissal of staff; refusal of access to raw materials or 
essential export or import licences.”141 
 
The recognition by the drafters of the 1967 OECD Draft Convention that the new 
method of expropriation (new at that time), ‘creeping expropriation’ (or ‘creeping 
nationalisation’ as it was referred to in the Convention’s text), can be deployed by 
excessive or arbitrary taxation, was profound recognition and that assertion remains 
the same today.  
 
3.1.3.5    Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
 
The OECD guided the negotiations of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI) in 1995. The negotiations for the MAI were discontinued early in April 1998 
before the text could be finalised and it therefore remains a draft text (Draft MAI). 
The intention was to have the MAI as “a free-standing international treaty open to 
both OECD countries and non-OECD countries.”142 The definition of expropriation 
contained in the Draft MAI is as follows: 
                                                 
137 OECD ILM (n. 133) 125. 
138 Now referred to as creeping expropriation. 
139 OECD ILM (n. 133) 125-126; the text says creeping nationalisation had been “recently practiced 
by certain States.” 
140 ibid 126. 
141 ibid. 
142 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, ‘Multilateral Agreement on Investment’, 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3343,en_2649_33783766_1894819_1_1_1_1,00.html> 




“A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalise directly or indirectly 
an investment in its territory of an investor of another Contracting Party or 
take any measure or measures having equivalent effect (hereinafter referred to 
as "expropriation") except: 
a) for a purpose which is in the public interest, 
b) on a non-discriminatory basis, 
c) in accordance with due process of law, and 
d) accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation 
in accordance with Articles 2.2 to 2.5 below…”143 (emphasis mine). 
 
The expropriation article of the Draft MAI contains, by in large, the type of 
expropriation provision that we now find in most IITs and that is because it was 
being drafted in the 1990s boom of BITs which by that stage many BITs had been 
signed and ratified by states across the globe. The Draft MAI therefore includes a 
provision on direct and indirect expropriation (and uses the word expropriation in 
the article itself), and includes “measures having equivalent effect” to direct or 
indirect expropriation.144 An interpretative note to the expropriation provision states 
that expropriation, nationalisation and “measures tantamount to expropriation or 
nationalisation” are measures that require compensation regardless of the labels 
applied to them and this is the case “even if title to … property is not taken.”145 The 
same note also elaborates that this type of expropriation provision does not establish 
a new requirement that compensation is payable for losses that an investor or 
investment incurs through regulation and revenue raising (i.e. taxation).146 
 
The Draft MAI also contains a tax exclusions/inclusions article at Article VIII under 
which the expropriation article of the Draft MAI applies to taxation measures 
(Article VIII(2)). Taxation measures include: 
 
                                                 
143 Section VI, Article 2.2.1, Draft MAI (OECD Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI), ‘The Multilateral Agreement on Investment- Draft Consolidated Text’ (22 April 
1998) Doc. No. DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1 <http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf> 
accessed 27 November 2010. 
144 See section 3.2.2.2 for the meaning behind ‘measures equivalent/tantamount to expropriation’. 




(i) any provision relating to taxes of the law of [a] Contracting Party or of a 
political subdivision thereof or a local authority therein, or any 
administrative practices of [a] Contracting Party relating to taxes; and 
(ii) any provision relating to taxes of any convention for the avoidance of 
double taxation or of any other international agreement or arrangement by 
which the Contracting Party is bound.147 
 
The interpretive notes also recognise some taxation measures as being capable of 
constituting an expropriation, though taxes in the general sense will not constitute 
expropriation, especially if they are “within the bounds of internationally recognised 
tax policies and practices.”148 
 
3.2 Expropriation Provisions in Modern Investment Treaties 
 
The text of expropriation provisions is fairly uniform across most BITs and 
multilateral investment treaties (MITs) but small variations in the texts themselves or 
any supplementary protocols or letters of exchanges do exist and these differences 
can result in a broader or narrower definition of expropriation. Because an arbitral 
tribunal will have a duty to examine the expropriation provision applicable to the 
specific dispute before it, if those variations have any weight assigned to them (and 
therefore the expropriation articles are construed as either broad or narrow) the 
outcome of the same expropriation claim can be different under various IITs. The 
differences and any relevant interpretations of IIT articles are discussed next. 
 
3.2.1 ‘Measures’ and ‘Taxation Measures’ 
 
The majority of IITs do not define ‘measures’ but those that do provide a definition 
define it broadly as “any law, regulation, procedure, requirement, or practice”149. The 
Draft MAI contains a definition of ‘taxation measures’ which includes “any 
provision relating to taxes of the law of the Contracting Party or of a political 
                                                 
147 Article VIII(5)(b), Draft MAI. 
148 Draft MAI (n. 143) 86. 
149 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica and the Government of Canada 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 18 March 1998, entered into force 29 
September 1999 (Canada-Costa Rica BIT). 
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subdivision thereof or a local authority therein, or any administrative practices of the 
Contracting Party relating to taxes” and taxes are taken to include “direct taxes, 
indirect taxes and social security contributions.”150 
 
For investment treaty and arbitration purposes, anything that is an action or inaction 
attributable to the host state will be a measure and likewise anything that is an action 
relating to taxation (e.g. the levying of taxes) or inaction relating to taxation (e.g. the 
refusal to grant tax refunds) will be a taxation measure attributable to the host state. 
However, whether those measures are expropriatory will only be decided “based on 
the facts of specific cases.”151 Some BITs even provide examples of measures that 
can amount to an expropriation, such as the US-Egypt BIT152 which lists the “levying 
of taxation”153 as one such measure. According to the Letter of Submittal of the US-
Egypt BIT, the state parties “agree to international law standards for expropriation” 
and the meaning of expropriation in the BIT is “broad and flexible [and] includes any 
measure which is ‘tantamount to expropriation or nationalization.’”154 The Letter of 
Submittal of the US-Morocco BIT155 also sets out the broadness and flexibility of 
what can constitute an expropriation, whereby the definition of expropriation is said 
to be “broad and flexible” enough to allow “essentially any measure regardless of 
form, which has the effect of depriving an investor of his management, control or 
economic value in a project”156 (emphasis mine). Therefore, because taxation can be 
used both in theory and in practice to effectively expropriate an investment, tax 
measures will be ‘measures’ for the purposes of investors’ claims under 
expropriation provisions contained in investment treaties. 
 
                                                 
150 Article VIII(5)(b), Draft MAI; social securities are likely to be interpreted by an arbitral tribunal as 
taxes – Hellenic Electric Railways Ltd v Government of Greece, Ad Hoc Arbitration, Geneva, Award 
of 18 March 1930, in which the arbitral tribunal rejected the distinction between social security 
contributions and taxes. 
151 Feldman Award at para 102; the United States Model BIT 2012 at Annex B para 4(a) states that 
“[t]he determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, 
constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry….” 
152 Treaty between the United States of America and the Arab Republic of Egypt Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, with a Related Exchange of Letters and a 
Supplementary Protocol, signed 11 March 1986, entered into force 27 June 1992 (US-Egypt BIT). 
153 ibid, Article III. 
154 ibid, under the heading ‘The U.S.-Egypt Treaty’. 
155 Treaty between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Morocco Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, with Protocol, signed 22 July 1985, entered 
into force 29 May 1991 (US-Morocco BIT). 
156 ibid Letter of Submittal. 
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The tribunal in EnCana157 summarised what taxes, tax measures and tax laws are 
under the international law of IITs. Under the EnCana definition, tax includes not 
only direct taxes (including income tax, corporation tax, capital gains tax) but 
indirect taxes too (such as excise duties and VAT).158 Tax measures relate not only to 
the actual provisions of the law that impose taxes, but all “aspects of the tax regime 
which go to determine how much tax is payable or refundable…”159 and a “taxation 
law is one which imposes a liability on classes of persons to pay money to the State 
for public purposes.”160 Measures are taxation measures if they “are part of the 
regime for the imposition of a tax”161 and measures providing relief for taxation are 
also tax measures to the same extent as measures that impose taxes.162 Taxation 
measures therefore extend to laws that provide “relief from taxation”163 as well as a 
“law imposing an obligation on a supplier to charge VAT… a law imposing an 
obligation to account for VAT received, a law entitling the supplier to offset VAT 
paid to those from whom it has purchased goods and services, as well as a law 
regulating the availability of refunds of VAT resulting from an imbalance between 
an individual’s input and output VAT.”164 
 
3.2.2 Different Headings of Expropriation – Under Which Does Tax Fall? 
 
‘Direct expropriation’ and ‘indirect expropriation’ are noticeably different by name 
and what constitutes a direct expropriation and an indirect expropriation is discussed 
in sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this chapter respectively. However, whether measures 
equivalent or tantamount to expropriation is a part of indirect expropriation or is a 
separate concept must be examined here because the different wording of 
expropriation articles has led to the same being addressed in arbitral awards. 
 
                                                 
157 EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3481, Award and Partial Dissent 
of 3 February 2006 (EnCana, EnCana Award or EnCana Dissent). 
158 EnCana Award at para 142(2). 
159 ibid at para 142(3). 








3.2.2.1   Tantamount v Equivalent 
 
I will firstly dispose of the question of whether a difference might be construed 
between measures tantamount to expropriation and measures equivalent to 
expropriation.165 A quick reference to the Oxford Dictionary will show us the 
definition of ‘tantamount to’ is “equivalent in seriousness to; virtually the same 
as”166 and ‘equivalent to’ is “having the same or a similar effect as.”167 It is 
extremely unlikely that an arbitral tribunal will, all things being the same, decide an 
expropriation claim differently because the expropriation article in the IIT contains 
the word tantamount instead of equivalent and vice versa. The Pope & Talbot168 and 
S.D. Myers
169 tribunals both deduced that the words tantamount and equivalent are 
synonyms of each other,170 with the S.D. Myers tribunal following the same thought 
process as I have done.171 The S.D. Myers tribunal concurred with the Pope & Talbot 
tribunal “that something that is ‘equivalent’ to something else cannot logically 
encompass more.”172  
 
Therefore, ‘measures tantamount’ and ‘measures equivalent’ are the same and will 
be used interchangeably for the remainder of this chapter. 
 
3.2.2.2   Indirect Expropriation v ‘Measures Tantamount’ 
 
NAFTA is a free trade agreement (FTA) with investment treaty provisions and 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA effectively qualifies as a MIT. The signatories to NAFTA are 
                                                 
165 McLachlan et al (n. 3) 273. 
166 Oxford Dictionary Online 
<http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0844240#m_en_gb0844240>  accessed 23 
November 2010. 
167 Oxford Dictionary Online, 
<http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0271460#m_en_gb0271460> accessed 23 
November 2010. 
168 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Government of Canada, NAFTA Arbitration, Interim Award of 26 June 
2000 at para 104. 
169 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Government of Canada (NAFTA Arbitration), First Partial Award of 13 
November 2000 at para 285. 
170 Pope & Talbot Interim Award at para 104; S.D. Myers First Partial Award at para 285. 
171 Referring to the Oxford Dictionary. 
172 S.D. Myers Partial Award at para 286. 
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the United States, Canada and Mexico. Article 1110 is titled ‘Expropriation and 
Compensation’ and says the following: 
 
“No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment 
of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment 
(“expropriation”)…”173 (emphasis mine). 
 
The NAFTA text appears to differentiate between direct and indirect expropriation 
on the one hand and measures tantamount to expropriation on the other with the 
inclusion of the word “or” at Article 1110(1). The arbitral tribunal in Waste 
Management
174
 gave Article 1110(1) that interpretation, stating that “an indirect 
expropriation is … a taking of property”175 in the same way direct expropriation is, 
and these are to be distinguished from a measure that is tantamount to expropriation 
which requires the measure(s) to have an effect on property which makes formal 
distinctions of ownership irrelevant”176 and need not involve the “actual transfer, 
taking or loss of property by any person or entity.”177 The tribunal determined that 
the phrase "take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an 
investment" was included in Article 1110(1) “to add to the meaning of the 
prohibition” against nationalisation and expropriation which is “over and above the 
reference to indirect expropriation.”178 
 
The Waste Management tribunal, by giving “measures tantamount” a meaning which 
is over and above indirect expropriation could be seen as creating a new category of 
expropriation. In Metalclad,179 which was also a NAFTA arbitration, the government 
of the United States (the home state) made a written submission to the arbitral 
tribunal in which it “rejected the suggestion that the term “tantamount to 
                                                 
173 Article 1110(1), NAFTA. 
174 Waste Management Inc. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00.3, Award of 30 
April 2004. 
175 ibid at para 143. 
176 ibid. 
177 ibid. 
178 ibid at para 144. 
179 Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award of 30 
August 2000.  
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expropriation” was intended to create a new category of expropriation not previously 
recognised in customary international law.”180 
 
Jurisprudence on ‘measures tantamount’ under Article 1110(1) of NAFTA generally 
does not agree with the Waste Management definition, whereby it is generally held 
that ‘measures tantamount’ fall under the indirect expropriation heading. In S.D. 
Myers, the arbitral tribunal found that the addition of ‘measures tantamount’ to treaty 
texts was to embrace the concept of creeping expropriation,181 and creeping 
expropriation is part of indirect expropriation (see section 3.4.5 below on creeping 
expropriation). In Metalclad, the claimant claimed that Mexico had interfered with 
the operation of its investment and that the interference constituted a “measure 
tantamount to expropriation.”182 In its award, the Metalclad tribunal combined the 
concepts of indirect expropriation and measures tantamount to expropriation by not 
drawing a distinction between the two,183 finding that Mexico “must be held to have 
taken a measure tantamount to expropriation”184 and concluding that Mexico had 
“indirectly expropriated” the claimant’s investment.185 The non-distinction by the 
Metalclad tribunal has been interpreted as the tribunal combining indirect 
expropriation and ‘measures tantamount’ together.186 In Feldman, the arbitral 
tribunal deemed indirect expropriation and ‘measures tantamount’ to be “functionally 
equivalent”187 Despite the dissonance between the NAFTA tribunals’ interpretations 
of Article 1110(1) and the lack of a singular definition, the findings that ‘measures 
tantamount’ are part of indirect expropriation are greater in number and are in line 
with the interpretation under other IITs as discussed next. 
 
                                                 
180 Metalclad Award at para 27. 
181 S.D. Myers Partial Award at para 286; see Creeping Expropriation at section 3.4.5 below. 
182 Rachel D. Edsall, ‘Indirect Expropriation under NAFTA and DR-CAFTA: Potential 
Inconsistencies in the Treatment of State Public Welfare’ (2006) 86 B.U.L. Rev. 931, 941. 
183 Metalclad Award at paras 104, 107 and 111-112; Edsall (n. 182) 942 at note 77. 
184 Metalclad Award at para 104. 
185 Ibid para 112. 
186 Edsall (n. 182) 942 at note 77. 
187 Feldman Award at para 100. 
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Investment treaties which the United States is a party to188 that are “based on the 
1994 U.S. prototype BIT”189 (i.e. United States Model BIT 1994) contain a provision 
on expropriation as follows: 
 
“Neither Party shall expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either 
directly or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or 
nationalization (“expropriation”)…”190 
 
The above provision does not make ‘measures tantamount’ a separate concept to 
indirect expropriation and instead it integrates the two together. This is made clear by 
reading the provision which does not contain the word “or” after “directly or 
indirectly”, i.e. it does not read as “directly or indirectly or through measures 
tantamount…” Of course, following on from the examination of the expropriation 
provision in NAFTA, even if the above provision did contain the word “or”, that 
would not make ‘measures tantamount’ a distinct concept on its own (because it is 
not a distinct concept under NAFTA, as discussed above), however the fact that it 
does not separate indirect expropriation from ‘measures tantamount’ does help to 
drive the point that they are one and the same. The Letters of Submittals that precede 
the provisions of the United States BITs which contain the above provision state that 
the articles on expropriation incorporate into the treaties the “customary international 
law standards for expropriation”191 and that the obligations brought about by the 
above article apply to indirect expropriations “through measures ‘tantamount to 
                                                 
188 Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the State 
of Bahrain concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, with Annex and 
Protocol, signed 29 September 1999, entered into force 31 May 2001 (US-Bahrain BIT); Treaty 
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Bolivia concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, with Annex and 
Protocol, signed 17 April 1998, entered into force 6 June 2001 (US-Bolivia BIT); Treaty between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, with Annex and 
Protocol, signed 2 July 1997, entered into force 13 June 2003 (US-Jordan BIT); Treaty between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, with Annex, signed 1 August 
1997, entered into force 2 August 2001 (US-Azerbaijan BIT); Treaty between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Georgia concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, with Annex, signed 7 March 1994, entered 
into force 17 August 1997 (US-Georgia BIT). 





expropriation or nationalization’”192. Finally, as regards United States BITs, Article 6 
of the United States Model BIT 2012 (US Model BIT 2012) states: 
 
“Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either 
directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or 
nationalization (“expropriation”)…”193 (emphasis mine). 
 
The above model article also does not contain the word ‘or’ between the words 
“indirectly” and “through measures equivalent to…”. Annex B to the United States 
US Model BIT 2012 states that Article 6 is “intended to reflect customary 
international law”194 and in doing so it addresses two situations, one of which is 
direct expropriation195  and the other is “indirect expropriation, where an action or 
series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without 
formal transfer of title or outright seizure.”196 This further confirms that ‘measures 
tantamount’ and indirect expropriation are one and the same. Evidently, the 
Metalclad tribunal’s assessment that ‘measures tantamount’ are over and above 
indirect expropriations is not the internationally accepted standard. This assessment 
is also made clear by IITs which do not contain the words ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ in 
their expropriation articles, but nevertheless do provide for the two different 
headings of expropriation. Such IITs include most United Kingdom BITs,197 the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Agreement for the Promotion and 
                                                 
192 ibid. 
193 Article 6, US Model BIT. 
194 Annex B para 1, US Model BIT 2012. 
195 Annex B para 3, US Model BIT 2012. 
196 Annex B para 4, US Model BIT 2012. 
197 Article 5(1), Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments, signed 11 June 1975, entered into force 24 February 1976 (UK-Egypt BIT) – this was 
the first BIT adopted by the United Kingdom; Article 5(1), Agreement between the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Mozambique for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 18 March 2004, entered into 
force 27 February  2007 (UK-Mozambique BIT) – an interesting point is these two BITs which were 
signed and adopted three decades apart have almost identical provisions, whereas the US-Morocco 
BIT (signed 22 July 1985, entered into force 29 May 1991) and the US-Egypt BIT (signed on 11 
March 1986, entered into force 27 June 1992) were separated by only one year but contrasted 
significantly in their expropriation provisions, with the US-Egypt BIT providing examples of 
measures that can be expropriatory in the article itself and the US-Morocco BIT containing a more 
conventional expropriation provision similar to expropriation provisions in most modern IITs.  
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Protection of Investments198 (ASEAN Agreement)199 and the Energy Charter 
Treaty200 (ECT).201 For example, the ECT provides that: 
 
“Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other 
Contracting Party shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a 
measure or measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or 
expropriation…”202 (emphasis mine). 
 
For the ECT, the italicised words signify direct expropriation and the underlined 
words (i.e. ‘equivalent to’) signify indirect expropriation. This interpretation was 
confirmed by the tribunal in Electrabel203 who said that the ECT “provides 
investments of investors with protection from both direct and indirect expropriation, 
with the ‘effect’ of the latter [i.e. indirect expropriation] defined as ‘equivalent to 
nationalisation or expropriation’.”204 
 
Most United Kingdom BITs are very similar to the ECT, such as the UK-
Mozambique BIT: 
 
“Investments of Nationals or Companies of either Contracting Party shall not 
be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures having effect 
equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation…”205 (emphasis mine). 
 
The same interpretation as the Electrabel tribunal’s interpretation of Article 13(1) of 
the ECT applies to the UK-Mozambique BIT and other similar treaties of other 
countries. The UK-Mexico BIT206 resembles most United Kingdom BITs except that 
                                                 
198 ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 15 December 1987. 
199 Article VI(1), ASEAN Agreement. 
200 Energy Charter Treaty 1994. 
201 See also Article 4(1), Slovenia-Turkey BIT; Article 6(1), Agreement between the Republic of 
Chile and the Republic of Tunisia on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 
23 October 1998, not entered into force as of 1 June 2013 (Chile-Tunisia BIT). 
202 Article 13(1), ECT. 
203 Electrabel S.A. v The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability of 30 November 2012. 
204 ibid, VI-14 at para 6.51. 
205 Article 5(1), UK-Mozambique BIT. 
206 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the United Mexican States for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, signed 12 May 2006, entered into force 25 July 2007 (UK-Mexico BIT). 
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its expropriation provision contains the words ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’, presumably 
added to satisfy the Mexican counterparty. The Mexico-UK BIT provides that: 
 
“Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalised 
or expropriated, either directly or indirectly through measures having effect 
equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation (“expropriation”) in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party except for a public purpose, on a non-
discriminatory basis, in accordance with due process of law and against 
compensation”207 (emphasis mine). 
 
The above provision contains the direct expropriation provision first (in italics) and 
contains the indirect provision second (after the word ‘or’ in bold) and ‘measures 
equivalent’ are part of the indirect expropriation provision (underlined) which is 
evident from the reading of the text, i.e. “… indirectly through measures having 
effect equivalent to…”. If the UK-Mexico BIT wanted to try and make ‘measures 
equivalent’ a separate concept to indirect expropriation, it would have added the 
word “or” after the word “indirectly” and it therefore would have read as “… directly 
or indirectly or through measures…”  
 
This analysis shows that expropriation provisions, whether they expressly refer to 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ expropriation or separate or join indirect expropriation with 
‘measures tantamount’ are not broader or narrower in scope than each other. The 
term ‘expropriation’ in international law is prevalent as direct or indirect 
expropriation, with the NAFTA and other IITs’ provisions that refer to ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’ expropriation being more specific with their language whilst IITs such as 
the ECT which do not refer to ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ expropriation are simply not as 
specific, therefore the NAFTA etc. and ECT etc. expropriation articles are just as 
broad as one another.208  
 
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties209 (Vienna Convention), “[a] 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
                                                 
207 ibid, Article 7.1. 
208 McLachlan et al (n. 3)  272-273. 
209 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.  
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be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”210 Therefore, treaty drafters, by inserting an expropriation provision, shall 
be determined to have incorporated the expropriation provision as it is traditionally 
used, i.e. providing for direct and indirect expropriation, and if the treaty aims to be 
more broad or more narrow in its scope than the common expropriation provisions in 
IITs, it must state so in the text and/or accompanying letters of submittal and 
incidental documents which will make the different and uncommon intention 
obvious from the outset. Likewise, if there is a question mark on the intention of the 
provision, that can be cleared up by the state parties to the IIT, as the United States 
did in Metalclad by confirming that that the ‘measures tantamount’ text was not 
intended to create a new category of expropriation which was not previously 
recognised in customary international law.211 ‘Measures tantamount’ therefore falls 
under indirect expropriation in NAFTA and all other IITs unless otherwise stated by 
the treaty, of which there are none.  
 
3.2.2.3   Expropriation Headings That Taxation Measures Fall Under 
 
Taxation measures can fall under both the direct and indirect expropriation headings 
and claimants will claim under both headings so as not to restrict their statements of 
claim. The arbitral tribunals then have the opportunity to distinguish between the 
headings accordingly. I will now discuss why taxation can fall under both direct and 
indirect expropriation headings. 
 
(i) Direct Expropriation 
 
It was made clear in the introduction to this chapter that the concept of 
expropriation came about through the direct taking of tangible assets by the state. 
Taxation measures, whether they are the levying and collection of taxes or the 
refusal to refund taxes, have a direct correlation with a physical taking of 
physical assets (i.e. cash), whereby under the former example cash is taken and 
under the latter example the cash is not given back. Taxes have therefore 
                                                 
210 Article 31(1), Vienna Convention. 
211 Metalclad Award at para 27. 
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previously been described as a “form of property seizure.”212 Taxation can 
conceptually be used to directly expropriate an investment and in EnCana213 the 
arbitral tribunal focused primarily on the direct expropriation tax claim. 
 
(ii) Indirect Expropriation 
 
Taxation lends itself perfectly to the concept of indirect expropriation, especially the 
creeping type, because tax measures can be used to deprive the investor of the use 
and enjoyment of the investment including the repatriation of profits, and these are 
the embodiment of indirect expropriation, i.e. measures which have the effect of a 
taking of property whereby the investor’s investment is rendered useless. 
 
In addition, tax measures can be applied repeatedly and incrementally with each 
measure not in itself being a substantial deprivation, but have the cumulative effect 
of depriving the investor of the reasonably expected benefits of the investment 
(creeping expropriation). The Third Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations of 
the United States214 (Third Restatement) recognised the ability of taxation to achieve 
such a goal, where it defined creeping expropriation as “taxation and regulatory 
measures designed to make continued operation of a project uneconomical so that it 
is abandoned”215 and stated that “[a] state is responsible… for an expropriation of 
property… when it subjects alien property to taxation… that is confiscatory, or that 
prevents, unreasonably interferes with, or unduly delays, effective enjoyment of an 
alien’s property or its removal from the state’s territory…”216 A state will not, 
however, be liable for expropriation where there is a loss of property or economic 
disadvantage which results from bona fide general taxation.217 
 
Interestingly, the arbitral tribunal in Feldman asserted that tax measures, if 
expropriatory, can only be an indirect expropriation and not direct expropriation.218 
                                                 
212 William W. Park, ‘Arbitration and the Fisc: NAFTA’s “Tax Veto”’ (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int'l L., 231. 
213 EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3481, Award and Partial Dissent 
of 3 February 2006. 
214 Third Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations of the United States 1987. 
215 ibid, §712, Reporter’s Note 7. 
216 ibid, §712 comment (g). 
217 ibid. 
218 Feldman Award at para 101. 
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Although a claim for alleged expropriation by taxation is more likely to fall under 
indirect expropriation because of the nature of taxation, that does not preclude the 
possibility that a claim under direct expropriation can be made. Whether taxation 
measures are argued to be direct or indirect expropriation will depend on the 
measures themselves, the circumstances of the case and how the claim is framed by 
the claimant. For example, if a claimant alleges that it has a right to tax refunds, it 
can attempt to streamline its claim to define its investment as the tax refunds 
themselves or returns to investments or claims to money (EnCana), and if the host 
state has refused to grant the refunds, that can theoretically amount to a direct 
expropriation.219 Therefore it is not entirely accurate to say that taxation measures 
that have the effect of expropriation will only be indirect expropriation. 
 
3.2.3 Levels of Deprivation in IITs for Indirect Expropriations and the Impact 
on Tax Expropriation Claims 
 
As we shall see in the discussion on deprivation at section 3.4.4 below that the extent 
of deprivation required to succeed in an indirect expropriation claim can vary 
between arbitral tribunals, however the internationally accepted standard is a 
‘substantial deprivation’.220 This is because the effect of an indirect expropriation 
                                                 
219 In CME, the claimant’s (CME’s) 99% owned subsidiary had the exclusive right to use a licence to 
operate a television station (CME at para 107). CME claimed its investments were the shares in the 
subsidiary and its indirect ownership of the assets of the subsidiary and an asset included the exclusive 
right to use the licence (CME at para 4). The arbitral tribunal agreed that the assets held by the 
subsidiary including the licence were investments of the claimant under the relevant BIT (CME at 
para 376). The exclusive right to operate the licence was revoked by the host state (Czech Republic) 
and the claimant’s subsidiary’s contribution towards the licence changed to “the use of the know-how 
of the Licence” (CME at para 593). That resulted in the destruction of the claimant’s subsidiary’s 
operations which was left as a company with assets but no business (CME at para 591). Czech 
Republic argued that the claimant was not deprived of its investment because there was no physical 
taking of property by the state or because the licence was kept untouched (CME at para 591). That 
defence was judged by the tribunal to be “irrelevant” (CME at para 591) and the tribunal concluded 
that the change to claimant’s use of the licence was “nothing else than the destruction of the legal 
basis… of the Claimant’s investment” (CME at para 593) and that the deprivation of the subsidiary’s 
exclusive use of the licence qualifies as expropriation (CME at para 609). Although CME was an 
indirect expropriation claim, the concept of the licence as being an investment and the deprivation of 
its exclusivity being an expropriation can apply to taxation, e.g. the right to tax refunds can be an 
investment or the right to not be taxed in the first instance can be an investment (but only if there is an 
agreement with the host state to that effect). So if a company has paid a tax that will be refunded at a 
later stage and the state refuses to give the refund (i.e. the cash), then there might be a claim for direct 
expropriation. Similarly, if an investor is excepted from paying taxes (i.e. there is no need to go 
through the refund route because the tax is not paid in the first place), and that tax advantage is 
revoked, the revocation of that tax advantage can theoretically be an indirect expropriation. 
220 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 13) 344. 
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must be equivalent to a direct expropriation,221 the result of which would be a 
substantial or a total impairment of property rights. Most investment treaties remain 
silent on the level of deprivation required to find a state liable for expropriation and 
this gives arbitral tribunals the scope to use the substantial deprivation standard or to 
deviate from it at their own judgment on a case-by-case basis. Some BITs which the 
United States is a party to do mention ‘deprivation’ in their Letters of Submittal and 
it is worth addressing the impact that can occur as a result of such provisions because 
the parties to such BITs may have displaced the customary international law standard 
for expropriation (which is not a mere deprivation)222 by doing so. 
 
The Letters of Submittal of the US-Ukraine BIT223 which is based on the United 
States Model BIT 1992 contains a definition of creeping expropriation and in its 
definition a creeping expropriation is said to occur when measures “… result in a 
substantial deprivation of the benefit of an investment without taking of the title to 
the investment”224 (emphasis mine). The US-Ukraine BIT therefore codified the 
customary international law standard of deprivation required for state liability in 
expropriation and will restrict arbitral tribunals from deviating from the accepted 
standard. The US-Morocco BIT’s Letter of Submittal states that any measure “which 
has the effect of depriving an investor of his management, control or economic value 
in a project”225 (emphasis mine) may constitute an expropriation. 
 
The US-Egypt BIT also contains a provision on ‘deprivation’. The US-Egypt BIT 
describes expropriation as: 
 
“No investment or any party of an investment of a national or a company of 
either Party shall be expropriated or nationalized by the other Party or a 
political or administrative subdivision thereof or subjected to any other 
                                                 
221 UNCTAD Expropriation 2012 (n. 4) 127; this is supported by the Annex B(4)) of the 2012 US 
Model BIT which provides that an indirect expropriation “has an effect equivalent to direct 
expropriation”; see also GAMI at para 126: “the affected property must be impaired to such an extent 
that it must be seen as “taken.”” 
222 McLachlan et al (n. 3)  279. 
223 Treaty between the United States of America and Ukraine concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, with Annex, and Related Exchange Letters, signed 4 March 
1994, entered into force 16 November 1996 (US-Ukraine BIT). 
224 ibid, Letter of Submittal. 
225 US-Morocco BIT, Letter of Submittal. 
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measure, direct or indirect (including, for example, the levying of taxation, 
the compulsory sale of all or part of such an investment, or impairment or 
deprivation of management, control or economic value of such an investment 
by the national or company concerned), if the effect of such other measure, or 
a series of such other measures, would be tantamount to expropriation or 
nationalization (all expropriations, all nationalizations and all such other 
measures hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”)”226… (emphasis mine). 
 
The US-Egypt BIT, like the US-Morocco BIT, requires a ‘deprivation’ of the 
enjoyment of the investment. 
 
Whether requiring a ‘deprivation’ is more or less restrictive than an IIT which 
requires a substantial deprivation or one which remains silent can be interpreted at 
two extremes. At one end, by requiring only a ‘deprivation’, an IIT could allow an 
arbitral tribunal to lower the internationally accepted standard of substantial 
deprivation by requiring only some deprivation227 for a finding of state liability (and 
the tribunal would already have the capacity to deviate when an IIT is silent on 
deprivation). At the other end, an IIT that requires a ‘deprivation’ could allow an 
arbitral tribunal to increase the barrier to finding an expropriation from the 
internationally accepted standard of substantial deprivation to a ‘complete’ or ‘total 
deprivation’,228 whereas a tribunal is unlikely to increase the barrier if the IIT is 
silent on deprivation because silence would usually denote the incorporation of 
customary international law. It is for these reasons that by signing an IIT with such a 
provision the parties may have displaced the customary international law standard for 
expropriation. Although the codification of the ‘substantial deprivation’ standard is 
undesirable because it lacks flexibility, a positive can be taken in its certainty, 
whereas parties to an expropriatory action claim under the US-Egypt BIT or the US-
Morocco BIT (or other like IITs) would be subjected to flexibility but also to 
uncertainty.229 Overall, the codification of the level of deprivation is undesirable 
because expropriatory action must be “based on the facts of specific cases”230 and 
                                                 
226 Article III, US-Egypt BIT. 
227 McLachlan et al (n. 3) 279. 
228 ibid. 
229  ibid. 
230 Feldman Award at para 102. 
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although the substantial deprivation level is the deprivation standard most commonly 
used in expropriation claims, arbitral tribunals have at times found it necessary to 
lower that standard to what is called a ‘partial deprivation’231  and for that reason, the 
deprivation suffered in a dispute could be judged differently by two different 
tribunals examining the same case under the same treaty. 
 
Indeed, the most recent United States Model BIT (2012) acknowledges the 
requirement for “a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry”232 taking into account: 
 
(i) The economic impact of the government action, but an economic impact 
alone will not establish an indirect expropriation having occurred; 
(ii) The extent the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable 
investment-backed expectations; and 
(iii) The character of the government action.233 
 
The US Model BIT 2012 also provides an exception where state measures will not be 
expropriatory, albeit in “rare circumstances”, and this is when a state takes non-
discriminatory regulatory action to “protect legitimate public welfare objectives” 
including “public health, safety, and the environment.”234 The US Model BIT 2012 
also defines “customary international law” which applies to expropriation provisions 
of their BITs as “a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a 
sense of legal obligation.”235 The US Model BIT 2012 evidently provides arbitral 
tribunals with guidelines on how to determine whether an expropriation has 
occurred, and allows arbitral tribunals to not be confused by certain terms and 
characterisations whose interpretations would vary between person to person and 
therefore between arbitral tribunals, for example, it does not use the words 
“deprivation” or “substantial deprivation”. A deprivation alone may mean a complete 
deprivation or a mere deprivation, and the US Model BIT 2012 says economic 
impact alone is not enough to find an expropriation, but it must be coupled with 
                                                 
231 See section 3.4.4 below; S.D. Myers at para 283; GAMI Investments Inc. v United Mexican States 
(NAFTA Arbitration), Final Award of 15 November 2004 (GAMI), 126. 
232 Annex B, para. 4(a), United States Model BIT 2012. 
233 ibid. 
234 ibid, Annex B, para (4)(b). 
235 ibid, Annex A. 
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interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations of the investor(s) and 
the character of the government action. This provides arbitral tribunals with clarity 
(unlike the aforementioned United States BITs), without being restrictive. 
 
In tax arbitrations, the application of the substantial deprivation standard will result 
in most claims for tax expropriation being dismissed. That is because tax 
expropriation claims are seldom based on the investments becoming useless and 
most will still function and generate revenues and profits. To that end, if the 
substantial deprivation standard is codified in IITs or even if only ‘deprivation’ is 
codified (which can be interpreted by an arbitral tribunal as requiring a complete 
deprivation) then that will restrict arbitral tribunals from finding a partial deprivation 
in tax arbitrations under those IITs. Therefore, an IIT’s silence on the deprivation 
standard will be all the more vital if a claimant attempts a partial tax expropriation 
claim, and this is especially important if the claimant has no claim under national 
treatment protection which does not require a substantial deprivation (a national 
treatment claim only requires less favourable treatment of the foreign 
investor/investment compared with a comparable host state investor/investment, and 
the state will be found liable even if the claimant has not made much losses).236   
 
That said, an IIT that does not contain a provision on deprivation and an IIT that does 
contain the word ‘deprivation’ are both likely to be interpreted as requiring a 
substantial deprivation because that is the customary international law standard. In 
any event, expropriatory action must be “based on the facts of specific cases.”237  
 
3.2.4 Inclusions, Exclusions and Vetoes to the Application of Expropriation in 
Matters of Taxation 
 
Most IITs permit the application of expropriation provisions to tax matters,238 
making tax expropriation arbitrable in the majority of IITs. Whilst most IITs contain 
tax exclusions to national treatment protection, some also restrict the application of 
tax measures to expropriation by including tax exclusions to the entire IIT and 
                                                 
236 See section 4.2.6  of  Chapter 4 (National Treatment Tax Exclusions). 
237 Feldman Award at para 102. 
238 UNCTAD Expropriation (n. 4) 133. 
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therefore capture expropriation within such exclusion.239 Some IITs attempt to block 
the deliberation of tax in expropriation claims through ‘tax vetoes’.240 The NAFTA, 
DR-CAFTA, ECT, Canada-Ecuador BIT and Japan-Mexico BIT are examples of 
said IITs,241 containing provisions preventing a foreign investor from commencing 
proceedings against a state claiming expropriation by taxation without the express or 
implied consent of the tax authorities of his home state.242 
 
Under the above treaties, an investor can only commence such a claim by first 
submitting a notice to arbitrate to the tax authorities of the home and host states. If 
within six months of the notice of intent to arbitration, the tax authorities jointly 
determine the tax or taxation measure is not an expropriation, the investor is 
precluded from commencing the claim.243 If the tax authorities fail to reach a joint 
determination within six months, the investor may commence the claim244 (express 
consent of the home state tax authority to continue with the claim245). If the tax 
authorities fail to come to a determination at all within six months, then the investor 
may commence the arbitration246 (implied home state consent247). The Canada-
Ecuador BIT also applies the same methodology for a contractual claim by the 
investor against the host state for breach of an agreement with the host state248  such 
                                                 
239 Article 5, Agreement between the Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of 
New Zealand for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 27 August 1999 
(not entered into force as of 1 June 2013) (Argentina-New Zealand BIT); Article 8, Agreement 
between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the Republic of Chile for the 
Promotion and Protection Of Investment, signed 22 July 1999 (not entered into force as of 1 June 
2013) (Chile-New Zealand BIT); Article 5, New Zealand and China Agreement on the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments (with exchange of notes), signed 22 November 1988, entered into force 25 
March 1989 (China-New Zealand BIT); Article 8, Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong 
and the Government of New Zealand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 6 July 
1995, entered into force 5 August 1995 (Hong Kong-New Zealand BIT). 
240 Article 2103(6), NAFTA; Article 21.3(6), DR-CAFTA; Article 21(5), ECT; Article XII(4) Canada-
Ecuador BIT; Article 170(4)(b), Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States for the 
Strengthening of the Economic Partnership (Japan-Mexico BIT). 
241 ibid. 
242 ibid. 
243 NAFTA, Article 2103(6); DR-CAFTA, Article 21.3(6); and Canada-Ecuador BIT, Article XII(4). 
244 NAFTA, Article 2103(6); DR-CAFTA, Article 21.3(6); and Canada-Ecuador BIT, Article XII(5). 
245 The host state’s tax authority will of course contend the tax or taxation measure is not 
expropriatory, so if the two tax authorities do not come to a conclusion on the matter then of course in 
the home State’s opinion there has been an expropriation, which in essence is an express consent for 
the investor to commence the claim. 
246 NAFTA, Article 2103(6); DR-CAFTA, Article 21.3(6); and Canada-Ecuador BIT, Article XII(5). 
247 Silence on the part of the host State grants the investor the right to commence the arbitration, 
therefore this is an implied consent. 
248 Canada-Ecuador BIT,Article XII(3). 
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as a concession agreement which includes a tax stabilisation clause (or for breach of 
a standalone tax stabilisation agreement). 
 
An arbitral tribunal can and is likely to reject jurisdiction over a tax expropriation 
claim if the investor does not fulfil the procedural requirements of a tax veto article. 
 
The express provision that facilitates to block the arbitration of tax disputes 
demonstrates the politically sensitive interaction between revenue raising and 
national sovereignty.249 The expropriation tax veto exists for three main reasons: 
 
(i) to serve as a screening process to block the commencement of 
proceedings for bona fide taxation. The tax authorities of both the home 
and host state sort through claims to conclude whether the tax measure is 
bona fide taxation or arbitrary, confiscatory, or has some element pointing 
towards expropriation. If both tax authorities fail to reach a unanimous 
decision that a tax measure is not an expropriation then the claimant can 
proceed with a claim in arbitration; 
 
(ii) to give the host state a sense of sovereignty retention, whereby it has the 
opportunity to convince the tax authority of the home state that the tax 
measure was not in breach of an investment treaty or contractual 
agreement with the investor. The ability of the host state to delay the 
arbitration may itself provide some satisfaction to the host state and give 
it more time to prepare its arbitration defence and compromise with the 
adjacent tax authorities and/or the claimant(s); 
 
(iii) perhaps most importantly but most overlooked in tax arbitration literature, 
it is there to prevent or limit investors’ use of regulatory chill to control 
the tax policies of the host state. 
 
3.3 Direct Expropriation 
 
                                                 
249 Park (2001) (n. 212) 232. 
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Direct expropriation is easy to recognise. It often involves the state taking direct 
actions such as seizing property by police or military power, transferring title in the 
property to itself or a third party,250 and formalising likely The obviousness of a 
direct expropriation means that the state’s intent to take from or deprive the investor 
of his property rights is not masked. It can entail a taking such as “a compulsory 
transfer of property rights”251 or a deprivation such as “governmental authorities take 
over a mine or factory, depriving the investor of all meaningful benefits of ownership 
and control.”252 Although direct expropriation is often referred to as direct takings253 
(and expropriation is sometimes referred to generally as ‘takings’), it can be a taking 
or a deprivation and the terms ‘taking’ and ‘deprivation’ are largely synonymous 
with each other in this context.254 As far as tax expropriation is concerned, tax can be 
a taking (by taking money from the investor/investment (tax money)) or it can be 
used to deprive the investor of the investment (e.g. tax assessments can be made 
against a company that result in a tax debt which the tax authorities demand payment 
of immediately, and if it is not possible for the company to immediately satisfy that 
debt, the company’s assets are frozen – the freezing of assets will be a deprivation of 
property because they cannot be used). Despite takings and deprivation being 
synonymous in the context of expropriation, the term ‘taking’ gives the impression 
that legal ownership of the investment is taken or that the state has acquired 
something of value, which is not actually necessary, and that is why the tribunal in 
Tippetts,255 preferred the term ‘deprivation’ instead of ‘taking’ when referring to 
expropriation and I adopt that view also. In fact, when legal title is taken, the investor 
is deprived of his investment, and if legal title is not taken (such as the freezing of 
assets), the investor is still deprived of the use and enjoyment of the investment (the 
meaningful benefits of ownership and control) and that is the case whether an 
expropriation is direct or indirect. In the theory of tax expropriation (both direct and 
                                                 
250 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets L.P. v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
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indirect), a tax can be expropriatory because of the ‘taking’ of money and it can be 
expropriatory if the investor is ‘deprived’ of a tax benefit. The labels, essentially, do 
not matter. What is of importance is the nature of the measure and the context in 
which that measure has occurred. 
 
We can derive from this definition of direct expropriation that a direct expropriation 
can occur even though the investor retains legal title in the investment.256 
 
The Hong Kong-Netherlands BIT257 recognises the above line of reasoning by 
referring to expropriation as deprivation: 
 
“Investors of either Contracting Party shall not be deprived of their 
investments nor subjected to measures having effect equivalent to such 
deprivation in the area of the other Contracting Party…”258 (emphasis mine) 
 
The Hong Kong-Netherlands BIT’s expropriation provision is not the specific type, 
i.e. it does not refer to direct and indirect expropriation by name, but the reasoning in 
section 3.2.2.2 above applies in the same way.259 
 
The taking of property and ownership rights are easily recognisable types of direct 
expropriation and require ‘positive intent’ to “establish a causal link between the 
measure in question and the title to property.”260 They require direct malice or 
culpa.261 When a direct expropriation occurs, there can be no doubt that something of 
value has been taken by the state. 
 
The appropriation of private property is the most common type of direct 
expropriation.262 In Santa Elena, Costa Rica expropriated land that was intended to 
                                                 
256 Section 192, Second Restatement. 
257 Agreement on the Encouragement and Protection of Investments between the Government of Hong 
Kong and the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, signed 19 November 1992, entered 
into force 1 September 1993 (Hong Kong-Netherlands BIT). 
258 Article 5(1), Hong Kong-Netherlands BIT. 
259 “Shall not be deprived of their investments” is the direct expropriation provision and “measures 
having effect equivalent to such deprivation” is the indirect expropriation provision. 
260 Sempra Award at 282. 
261 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 13) 340; culpa is Latin for mistake or fault. 
262 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 13) 340. 
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be turned into a resort by majority United States investors. The expropriation took 
place by an expropriation decree on 5 May 1978 (the 1978 Decree) with Article 1 of 
the 1978 Decree stating: 
 
“the property owned by the Compañia de Desarrollo Santa Elena S.A. 
described in the third whereas clause of this decree, is hereby 
expropriated.”263 
 
Although the expropriation took place in 1978, and was not contested by Santa 
Elena, the level of compensation could not be agreed upon by the two parties, and the 
nearly twenty year delay from the date of the 1978 Decree to the ICSID proceedings 
was due to intermittent inactivity and intensive legal proceedings between the parties 
in the national courts of Costa Rica.264 The land was appropriated from Santa Elena 
for environmental purposes as the ecological features of the property were unique 
and in need of protection from the type of development planned by Santa Elena265 
and land needed to be used in addition to the Santa Rosa National Park to maintain 
stable populations of feline species such as pumas and jaguars,266 the chosen land 
being the property of the Claimant. This direct expropriation occurred for 
environmental purposes, but that still requires compensation just as any other type of 
expropriation does, no matter how beneficial to society267 and the parties did not 
contest this.268 Expropriation does not have to be malicious, it is a government’s right 
to expropriate private property, so long as such expropriation is accompanied by just 
compensation as required by international law.269 
 
The taking by a state of entire industries and sectors of the economy occurs through 
nationalisation,270 essentially the twin of expropriation but on a larger scale. In 1952, 
nationalisation was defined by the Institut de Droit International as: 
                                                 
263 Santa Elena Award at para 18. 
264 ibid at para 20. 
265 ibid at para 46. 
266 ibid at para 18, quoting the 1978 Decree. 
267 ibid at para 72. 
268 ibid at para 73. 
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Norway v United States of America, PCA, Award of 13 October 1922 (Norwegian Shipowners’ 
Claims). at 332, commenting on the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the 
requirement for compensation in the public international law of all civilised countries. 




“The transfer to the State, by a legislative act and in the public interest, of 
property or private rights of a designated character, with a view to their 
exploitation or control by the State, or the their direction to a new objective 
by the State.”271 
 
In the early to middle of the 20th Century, nationalisation was a relatively new legal 
term because nationalisations were relatively rare.272 Although nationalisations are 
historically ancient, they did not occur in the number and magnitude that they did in 
the 20th Century, with the Mexican nationalisation of its oil industry in 1938273 and 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company nationalisation in Iran.274 The state’s power to 
nationalise or expropriate foreign-owned property in its territory is embedded in its 
sovereignty, unless the state has stripped itself of such rights through an IIT or any 
other binding international obligation.275 If we look at any BIT, for example, Article 
III(1) of the US-Ecuador BIT prohibits expropriation or nationalisation of 
investments directly or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation, 
unless it complies with the conduct and compensation requirements. These 
exceptions provide the rules for a legal expropriation or nationalisation to take place, 
and if they are not adhered to, for example if compensation is not paid, an investor 
could claim that an applicable treaty has been violated and if the arbitral tribunal 
agrees, the state will be held to account. 
3.4 Indirect Expropriation 
 
Indirect expropriation is now the basis of most arbitral disputes relating to 
expropriation.276 It is also known as creeping, constructive and de facto 
expropriation, and measures tantamount to expropriation also fit into this category.277 
Indirect expropriations “effectively neutralize the benefit of the property of the 
                                                 
271 ibid 324 note 14, quoting from M Domke, ‘Foreign Nationalizations: Some Aspects of 
Contemporary International Law’ (1961) 55 A.J.I.L. 585, 588. 
272 D. Edward Re, ‘The Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property’, (1951) 36 Minn L. Rev 323, 325. 
273 Lee Stacy, Mexico and the United States, (Marshall Cavendish Corp, 2003), 604. 
274 Edward (n. 272) 323. 
275 ibid 326. 
276 Chifor (n. 49) 183-184. 
277 See 3.2.2.2 above. 
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foreign owner [and] are subject to expropriation claims. This is undisputed under 
international law”.278 
 
3.4.1 The Form of Measure vs. Impact of Measure 
 
In Tippetts the arbitral tribunal judged “the form of the measures of control or 
interference [to be] less important than the reality of their impact”279 This means the 
impact on an investor/investment will go to show an expropriation has occurred, 
rather than what form of measure is used. To further illustrate this point, the tribunal 
in Pope & Talbot rejected the argument put forward by Canada that non-
discriminatory regulations cannot be expropriatory. The tribunal rejected the 
argument because an exception for regulatory measures would create “a gaping 
loophole in international protections against expropriation.”280 This would be a return 
to the now discredited doctrine mandated by the Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal,281 
namely that “police or taxation power whatever sacrifice it may impose on 
individuals, requires no compensation by the international standard.”282 Regulatory 
measures taken in the public interest can and do result in expropriations and do not 
allow States to avoid paying the subsequent compensation. In Santa Elena283 the 
government of Costa Rica expropriated land based on environmental regulations and 
were liable to pay compensation. Had Canada’s argument in Pope & Talbot been 
accepted by the tribunal, it would have even gone against the grain of justice as old 
as ancient Greek and Roman doctrines. The Pope & Talbot tribunal was right to 
reject Canada’s argument because no investor, home or foreign, should lose their 
investment because the state has committed expropriation through its law and 
regulation making power. Regulatory measures with an impact parallel to direct 
taking are de facto expropriatory, and states cannot escape liability by labelling 
measures as regulation (including taxation) in the public interest.284 Finally, a state 
cannot escape its responsibilities by cloaking its sovereign acts as commercial or 
                                                 
278 CME Partial Award at para 604. 
279 Tippetts Award at Part III Section 1. 
280 Pope and Talbot Interim Award at para 99. 
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mercantile,285 for example by using a state-run entity;286 as long as expropriatory 
actions are attributable to the state, it will be liable.  
 
3.4.2 State Intent vs. Effect of State Conduct 
 
For most arbitral tribunals, the effect of a measure on an investment is what is 
fundamental to finding liability for expropriation, not the intention of the state. In 
Metalclad, the tribunal decided that expropriation: 
 
… includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, 
such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favour of 
the host State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of 
property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in 
significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of 
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State287 
(emphasis mine). 
 
Clearly, the Metalclad tribunal decided that if state interference with property has the 
effect of a complete or significant deprivation, such interference can leave the state 
open to an expropriation claim even if the allegedly expropriatory measures do not 
obviously benefit it (lack of intent). 
 
In CME, the arbitral tribunal confirmed the Metalclad determination that the effect of 
an interference with the use of an investor’s property that deprives the investor of the 
                                                 
285 ibid. 
286 Noah Rubins and N. Stephan Kinsella, International Investment, Political Risk and Dispute 
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use or reasonably expected economic benefit is expropriatory.288 The CME tribunal 
further stated that a state’s actions as well as its refusal to take action (i.e. inaction) 
can and will result in an expropriation,289 which was unlike the Olguin290  tribunal, 
who required “a teleologically driven action”291 to find an expropriation. The Olguin 
tribunal decided that no matter how shocking omissions might be, on their own they 
are insufficient for an expropriation to have taken place292 because intention to 
expropriate was key.293 The Metalclad Award was rendered in 2000 and both the 
CME and Olguin Awards were rendered in 2001, which shows the inconsistencies 
that can arise between arbitral tribunals on a case-by-case basis. But which reasoning 
ought to be is preferred, the Metalclad/CME test or the Olguin test? It has been 
asserted that the “Olguin ‘teleologically driven’ test is to be preferred” because it 
recognises “that investment treaties do not give foreign investors a guarantee of 
investment success”294 (the ‘insurance policy’295) and it recognises that “an 
assessment of indirect expropriation in any of its forms has not somehow been 
disconnected from a requirement of State conduct of some sort.”296 I agree with the 
insurance policy point because it is true that no investment should be guaranteed 
success by any government backing, but that should only be in respect of business 
risks and not losses attributable to the compensable conduct of the host state. To 
illustrate, the CME and other tribunals who have concluded that the effect has greater 
weight than the intent297 have concluded so with good reason, predominantly because 
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the Olguin doctrine, by requiring culpa, gives respondent states an exceedingly 
robust and almost fail-proof ‘benefit of the doubt’ defence. In Vivendi II,298 
Argentina unsuccessfully argued that absent proof of bad faith, actions of the State 
must be presumed to be regulatory299 (i.e. non-compensable government takings). 
The Vivendi II tribunal made two crucial points in this respect: (i) proving intent is 
advantageous, but “the effect of the measure on the investor, not the state’s intent, is 
the critical factor”300; and (ii) “international tribunals, jurists and scholars have 
consistently appreciated that states may accomplish expropriations in ways other 
than by formal decree; often in ways that may seek to cloak expropriative conduct 
with a veneer of legitimacy.”301 Even if it is a genuine overlooking by the State, an 
investor should not suffer as a result. 
 
Crucially, a state’s “mere declaration that expropriation is not intended is not 
determinative of the issue”302 and even state conduct in good faith can result in an 
expropriation as an unintended consequence.303 For example, if the use of Property X 
is so closely connected to Property Y and Property Y has been expropriated and that 
makes the investment in Property X useless, then the investment in Property X may 
have been indirectly expropriated as a result.304 Because Property X would not have 
been adversely affected without “state conduct of some sort,”305 even if it was not the 
state’s intention for Property X to be affected (e.g. the state was not even aware of 
the link between the properties), the losses would be attributable to state conduct and 
not business risks for which the investor should be indemnified. 
 
3.4.3 Legitimate and Reasonable Expectations of the Investor 
 
A foreign investor is expected to be able to exercise his tangible and intangible rights 
acquired under host state law.306 This is to be balanced with the rule that IITs are not 
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designed to guarantee investment success307 and a foreign investor must not rely on 
them for that purpose. In Maffezini308 the arbitral tribunal were clear that “Bilateral 
Investment Treaties are not insurance policies against bad business judgments”309 
and therefore with every investment there is a risk of not achieving a specific 
financial or economic target, including investments made under the auspices of an 
IIT. Similarly, unfortunate economic circumstances at a specific moment in time will 
not give rise to compensation under a claim of expropriation.310 In Fireman’s 
Fund
311
 the claimant insurance company (Fireman’s Fund) made a debenture 
investment in a bank in poor financial condition. When the risk did not pay off, 
Fireman’s Fund claimed the Mexican government deprived them of the use and 
value of their investment, and did so in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner.312 The 
arbitral tribunal found the claimant made “an almost valueless”313 investment due to 
the financially poor condition of the bank they invested in, a condition that “was not 
caused by any government act or omission, but rather by the economic circumstances 
prevailing at the time.”314  Meanwhile, the Mexican government’s failure to enter 
into a binding agreement to improve the bank’s poor condition and possibly the 
debenture investment did not deprive the Claimant of economic use or value of their 
investment because the investment was already valueless and useless at the time of 
the government’s failure,315 therefore the claim of expropriation was rejected. 
 
Nevertheless, circumstances do apply when a State’s failure to act for a specific 
investment will be found to be expropriatory, for example when express 
commitments and representations have been made by the host state and the state then 
acts contrary to those commitments.316 Measures indiscriminately enacted for a 
public purpose which affects a foreign investor will not be deemed to be 
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expropriatory, “unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating 
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the 
government would refrain from such regulation”317 (emphasis mine).318 The word 
‘contemplating’ provides guidance that if a state gives certain commitments before 
the foreigner makes his investment, the host state could be liable for expropriation 
for violating those commitments, but if no commitments have been made prior to 
investment, the investor’s business risk includes the risk that the laws and regulations 
in the host state will change during the life of the investment. 
 
3.4.4 Extent of Deprivation 
 
The accepted international standard of deprivation required to find liability for an 
indirect expropriation is a substantial deprivation,319 which is not always the term 
used - it has been called radical deprivation and substantial interference. The Tecmed 
tribunal required the claimant to be “radically deprived of the economical use and 
enjoyment of its investments”320 (emphasis mine). The tribunal in M.C.I.321 required 
a definite “substantial interference on the part of the State that affects the use and 
enjoyment of the protected investment”322 (emphasis mine). The Telenor323 tribunal 
studied the decisions of cases under ICSID and general public international law, 
concluding the magnitude of interference is agreed to be enough to “substantially… 
deprive the investor of the economic value, use or enjoyment of its investment.”324 
The LG&E325 tribunal confirmed the international standard, requiring the impact of a 
governmental measure on a business to be “substantial in order that compensation 
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may be claimed for the expropriation.”326 In Tippetts, the tribunal required a state 
measure to deprive the investor of fundamental rights of ownership and “that the 
deprivation is not merely ephemeral”327 (emphasis mine). A substantial deprivation 
does not mean the investor need be completely deprived of the use and economic 
benefits of the investment, but the deprivation must be “in whole or in significant 
part.”328 
 
A finding of substantial deprivation will be decided on a case-by-case basis, which 
Christie329 suggested nearly 50 years ago as “probably the only method”330 to decide 
what kind of interference constitutes an expropriation. This is because expropriation 
is fact-based and dependent on the judgment of the tribunals who do not bind one 
another. With no precise definition on an indirect expropriation to this day, “the more 
arduous but realistic approach suggested by Professor Christie is the way 
forward.”331 
 
The contrast between tribunal decisions on substantial deprivation can be 
exemplified by looking at the Pope & Talbot, S.D. Myers and GAMI332 decisions. In 
Pope & Talbot, the tribunal referred to the claimant’s Counsel as “correctly” 
conceding “that under international law, expropriation requires a ‘substantial 
deprivation’”333 and with reference to the test for expropriation (and therefore 
substantial deprivation), the tribunal required “that interference is sufficiently 
restrictive to support a conclusion that the property has been ‘taken’ from the 
owner”334 (emphasis mine). This gives the impression that the Pope & Talbot 
tribunal required deprivation to be equivalent to property being taken in its entirety, 
which would be better defined as a ‘complete deprivation’ of property. The GAMI 
tribunal also questioned whether that was the thinking behind the Pope & Talbot 
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definition.335 The Pope & Talbot tribunal referred to the Third Restatement336 under 
which an indirect expropriation occurs if it “prevents, unreasonably interferes with, 
or unduly delays, effective enjoyment of an alien’s property.”337 By referring to the 
Third Restatement, it is unlikely the Pope & Talbot tribunal required a complete 
deprivation, although that is not unheard of.338   
 
In contrast, the S.D. Myers tribunal said in some contexts and circumstances a 
deprivation may amount to an expropriation “even if it were partial or temporary”339 
but did not elaborate on the point and the temporary measures in that case were not 
expropriatory.340 The tribunal in GAMI built on the S.D. Myers decision by giving an 
excellent example of why state action affecting only part of an investment should be 
considered expropriatory, stating that “the taking of 50 acres of a farm is equally 
expropriatory whether that is the whole farm or just a fraction.”341 As long as the 
“affected property” is impaired342 to find an expropriation, not the whole property. 
The GAMI reasoning is better referred to as ‘partial deprivation’. 
 
The point here is the extent of deprivation that one tribunal views as ephemeral based 
on the substantial deprivation reasoning can easily be viewed as substantial or 
complete by another tribunal based on the GAMI reasoning. For that reason, a 
deprivation affecting part of an investment can deprive the investor of that part either 
significantly and even completely.343 
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a licence granted to the investor for the bulk importation and storage of cement was an investment (at 
para 101) under the Egypt-Greece BIT, and that the revocation of the licence amounted to an 
expropriation of the licence (as an investment) (at para 107). 
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In addition, a dispute under an IIT that specifies guidance on deprivation has the 
potential to displace the international standard344 although it is unlikely that it would. 
We have seen United States BITs using the words deprivation345 alone, substantial 
deprivation,346 or avoiding the word deprivation completely.347 An arbitral tribunal 
faced with a BIT using only the word deprivation would be unlikely to lower the 
barrier to finding an expropriation or raise it to require a complete deprivation, with 
most tribunals likely to adopt the accepted international standard of ‘substantial 
deprivation’. 
 
3.4.5 Creeping Expropriation 
 
A creeping expropriation is an indirect expropriation, and ‘measures tantamount’ 
have been said to specifically cater for creeping expropriation,348 although in actual 
fact ‘measures tantamount’ covers indirect expropriation generally,349 and creeping 
expropriation is within its ambit. Whilst a de facto expropriation (indirect) 
expropriation occurs through: (i) a single and unique measure and quite obvious 
measure, such as a plot of land being expropriated through the expropriation of 
shares in a company that owns only that land; or (ii) a group of measures taking 
place in a close period of time or simultaneously,350 creeping expropriation is an 
even more subtle form of indirect expropriation and occurs when a series of state 
actions take place over a prolonged period of time. Although each action alone is not 
enough to be considered expropriation and probably might not even be obviously 
leading up to expropriation, when combined, the actions have the effect of 
expropriation – namely a substantial deprivation of investment. 
 
Creeping expropriation is defined by the Letters of Submittal to some United States 
BITs as a series of measures taken that result in an expropriation of an investment 
without taking title.351 
                                                 
344 McLachlan et al (n. 3) 279. 
345 US-Egypt BIT and US-Morocco BIT. 
346 US-Ukraine BIT. 
347 See for example US Model BIT 2012. 
348 S.D. Myers Partial Award at para 286. 
349 See 3.2.2.2 above and LG&E Decision on Liability at para 188. 
350 ibid. 





In Telenor, creeping expropriation was defined as a series of acts over a period of 
time which alone are of insufficient gravity to constitute an expropriatory act, but 
“together produce the effects of expropriation.”352 Creeping expropriation is said to 
be identified in retrospect because expropriatory intent is difficult or impossible to 
recognise at a level of host state government,353 and the effect of a combination of 
state measures over time will reveal an expropriation. The isolated state measures,354 
whether legal or not, may seem harmless, do not point towards a potential 
expropriation and “may not be expropriatory in themselves”355 but in hindsight it 
becomes evident the accretion of those State measures resulted in an 
expropriation.356 A plea of creeping expropriation is based on an investment existing 
at one point in time, and the temporal State actions erode the investor’s rights to the 
investment, thereby violating the international standard of protection against 
expropriation.357  
 
References have also been made to creeping expropriation in international 
conventions. The 1967 OECD Draft Convention calls it “creeping nationalisation”, 
defined as state measures applied in such a way to ultimately deprive the alien of the 
use or enjoyment of his property, without committing any acts that are manifestly an 
outright deprivation.358 The International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles) describes a 
creeping expropriation as a composite act which results from a state breaching its 
international obligations through a series of acts or omissions which are in aggregate 
wrongful,359 and the breach extends from the period of the first action or omission to 
as long as the actions or omissions are repeated whilst remaining not in conformity 
with the state’s international obligations.360 Any cocktail of measures can amass into 
a creeping expropriation, generally including “taxation, regulation, denial of due 
                                                 
352 Telenor at para 63. 
353 W. Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, ‘Indirect Expropriation and Its Valuation in the BIT 
Generation’ (2004) 74 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 115, 124. 
354 Including actions and non-actions CME Partial Award at para 607. 
355 Reisman and Sloane (n. 352) 124. 
356 ibid. 
357 Generation Ukraine, Inc. v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award of 16 September 2003, at 
para. 20.22. 
358 OECD ILM (n. 133) 126; see also 3.1.3.4 above. 
359 Article 15(1), ILC Articles. 
360 ibid Article 15(2). 
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process, delay and non-performance, and other forms of government malfeasance, 
misfeasance and nonfeasance”361 (emphasis mine). It is possible to be more specific 
with the general measures, to include “excessive or arbitrary taxation; prohibition of 
dividend distribution coupled with compulsory loans; imposition of administrators; 
prohibition of dismissal of staff; refusal of access to raw materials or essential export 
or import licences;”362 or “non-payment, non-reimbursement, cancellation, denial of 
judicial access, actual practice to exclude, non-conforming treatment, inconsistent 
legal blocks, and so forth.”363 
 
 
3.5 Tax as Expropriation in International Investment Arbitration 
 
So far in this chapter, the reader has gained a historical background into 
expropriation and tax as expropriation; investment treaty provisions covering 
expropriation; and the not so basic ‘basics’ of expropriation which will allow the 
reader to understand the phraseology of the expropriation standard and the matters 
that need to be addressed to find state liability for tax expropriation. The remainder 
of the chapter will now analyse how the international standard of expropriation has 
been applied to alleged tax expropriations. In order to do so, the facts of recent 
arbitrations that form the bulk of tax expropriation jurisprudence must be outlined to 
properly form an understanding of how the principles have applied to the merits of 
claims. 
 
3.5.1 Tax Expropriation Arbitrations 
3.5.1.1 Feldman 
 
Feldman concerned the alleged breach by Mexico of a tobacco exporting company’s 
right to a refund of excise duties paid on cigarettes that were exported out of Mexico. 
Marvin Feldman, a United States national, was the sole owner and controller of 
Corporación de Exportaciones Mexicanas, S.A. de C.V. (CEMSA), and he brought a 
                                                 
361 Reisman and Sloane (n. 352) 121. 
362 OECD ILM (n. 133) 126. 
363 Waste Management, Dissenting Opinion of Keith Highet at paras 17-18. 
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claim against Mexico under Article 1110 of NAFTA.365 CEMSA was a company 
established under Mexican law and engaged in buying, reselling and exporting 
cigarettes.366 Mexico’s Impuesto Especial sobre Producción y Servicios (IEPS) 
which translates to ‘Special Tax on Production and Services’ levied taxes on the 
production and sale of cigarettes, however, in some circumstances, a ‘zero tax rate’ 
was applied to exported cigarettes.367 The zero-tax rate applied to exported cigarettes 
from 1990 to 1997 to generally to countries that had income tax rate above 30% (i.e. 
not low income tax jurisdictions, or, ‘tax havens’).368 In most instances, when 
cigarettes were bought in Mexico and the purchase price included the tax, the tax 
amounts paid could be rebated on export.369 
 
As a reseller of cigarettes, CEMSA paid cigarette producers a price that included the 
excise duties, and when exporting the same, it received a rebate on taxes paid. 
CEMSA started trading in 1990 and received tax rebates in full from 1990 to 1991.370 
In 1991, Mexico amended the IEPS371 to grant refunds only to exporting producers 
of cigarettes and not to exporting resellers such as CEMSA.372 CEMSA contested the 
constitutionality of the amendments before the Mexican courts (the Amparo 
action),373 and before a final resolution was determined in that case, the Mexican 
Congress again amended the IEPS effective 1 January 1992, which allowed CEMSA 
to receive tax rebates. The Mexican Supreme Court ruling on the Amparo action 
judged the 1991 amendment to be unconstitutional by violating the principles of tax 
equity and non-discrimination by permitting tax rebates to only producers and their 
distributors, opining that CEMSA should therefore receive the 0% tax rate on 
cigarette exports.374  The Supreme Court did not discuss or rule whether CEMSA 
                                                 
365 Claims were also filed in the same arbitration under NAFTA Article 1102 (National Treatment) 
and Article 1105 (Minimum Level of Treatment). 
366 Feldman Award at para 10. 
367 ibid at para 7. 
368 ibid at para 8. 
369 ibid. 
370 ibid at para 9; Feldman contended the tax refunds were for cigarettes but Mexico contended the 
refunds were for exports of beer and alcoholic beverages. 
371 Amendment of Article 2(3) of the IEPS. 
372 Feldman Award at para 10. 
373 CEMSA initiated an Amparo action in February 1991 in the Mexican courts (at para 11). The 
decision in April 1991 by the Fifth District Judge of in Administrative Matters dismissed CEMSA’ 
Amparo in part, but importantly ruled that Mexico’s Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público 
(SHCP) (Ministry of Finance and Public Credit) did not have the authority to issue the implementing 
fiscal regulations in 1991 which denied CEMSA the refunds. 
374 Feldman Award at para 16. 
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should be granted rebates notwithstanding the inability to produce itemised 
invoices.375 In 1993, CEMSA’s cigarette exporting business was shut down again 
because CEMSA could not comply with a condition of the tax laws requiring the 
IEPS tax paid on cigarettes to be itemised “separately and expressly on their 
invoices.”376 It is the producers and not the resellers of cigarettes who have access to 
the itemised invoices,377 and CEMSA was once again unable to receive tax refunds. 
CEMSA contested the tax law in the national courts of Mexico and in August 1993 
the Supreme Court of Justice ruled in CEMSA’s favour, finding the IEPS refunds to 
only producers and their distributors was unconstitutional, discriminatory and 
violated principles of tax equity.378 However, the court did not explicitly rule that 
CEMSA would be entitled to rebates despite its inability to produce invoices 
detailing the taxes paid separately.379 Therefore, the tax authorities in Mexico 
recognised CEMSA as entitled to tax rebates but continued to demand the invoice 
requirements as per Article 4 of the IEPS.380 According to CEMSA, Mexican tax 
officials negotiated an oral agreement with CEMSA in 1995 to grant the refunds and 
confirmed and implemented the same in 1996.381 Despite the existence of an oral 
agreement being denied by Mexico and with neither party producing conclusive 
evidence to prove or deny the claim,382 CEMSA did receive tax refunds from June 
1996 to September 1997 for a total of sixteen months.383 CEMSA believed its 
apparent oral agreement with tax officials was the reason for it being granted 
rebates,384 meanwhile Mexico claimed the method of its tax authorities was to pay 
the tax refunds upon requests, and then audit the tax returns to determine whether the 
IEPS laws had been complied with.385 
 
CEMSA was dealt a major blow by Mexico on or before 1 December 1997 when 
rebates to CEMSA were terminated.386 Refunds of excise duties in the amount of US 
                                                 
375 ibid at para 16. 
376 Feldman Award at para 15; the itemisation was required by Article 4 of the IEPS. 
377 ibid at para 15. 
378 ibid at para 16. 
379 ibid. 
380 ibid at para 17. 
381 ibid at para 18. 
382 ibid. 
383 ibid at para 19. 
384 ibid. 
385 ibid. 
386 ibid at para 20. 
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$2.35 million paid on exports during the period October-November 1997 were 
declined387 and amendments to the IEPS388 effective 1 December 1997389 made tax 
rebates for taxes paid on cigarettes available only to the ‘first sale’390 – this meant 
when CEMSA purchased cigarettes from producers or distributors in Mexico, the 
producers would be entitled to the tax refund, and when CEMSA subsequently 
exported the cigarettes for resale, they would not be entitled to a tax refund. The 
IEPS amendments also obliged exporters of certain goods (including cigarettes) to 
register on the Sectorial Exporters Registry (SER) to be entitled to apply for the zero-
rate tax on exports.391 CEMSA was subsequently refused registration on the SER as 
an authorised exporter of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages,392 the repercussions 
being Mexican Customs authorities not issuing export documentation to export 
goods from Mexico.393 Mexico claimed the refusal to accept CEMSA on the SER 
was due to an on-going audit of CEMSA’s claims for tax refunds.394 On 14 July 
1998, Mexico’s Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP) (Ministry of 
Finance and Public Credit) began an audit of CEMSA, resulting in a demand that 
CEMSA repay approximately US$25 million that it received as tax refunds for taxes 
paid on cigarettes during a twenty-one month period from January 1996 to 
September 1997, including interest and penalties.395  
 
CEMSA was thereafter unable to engage in the business of reselling and exporting 
Mexican cigarettes and was “deprived completely and permanently of any potential 
economic benefits from that particular activity.”396 At the same time as all the above 
events occurred, at least two other companies in Mexico who were under Mexican 
ownership were also exporters and resellers of cigarettes,397 and they were granted 
rebates and were not audited  (see section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4). Feldman, the owner of 
CEMSA, brought the Mexico to arbitration claiming a violation of Article 1110 of 
                                                 
387 Ibid. 
388 IEPS Articles 11 and 19. 






395 ibid at para 22. 
396 ibid at para 109. 




NAFTA for the expropriation of his as well as a claim for violation of national 
treatment a claim for arbitration under NAFTA Article 1120 at the ICSID Additional 
Facility rules on April 30th 1999, claiming Mexico had breached its obligations under 
NAFTA Article 1110 by “expropriating his investments without providing prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation”,398 in particular claiming the denial of IEPS 
rebates on cigarette exports resulted in “an indirect or “creeping” expropriation… 
and were tantamount to expropriation… They were also arbitrary, confiscatory and 
discriminatory, [and] a violation of the Claimant’s right to due process.”399 As 
explained in section 3.2.2 above, indirect expropriation and ‘measures tantamount’ 
are the same, and at section 3.4.5 that creeping expropriation falls under indirect 
expropriation. Similarly, the Feldman arbitral tribunal deemed indirect expropriation 
and ‘measures tantamount’ to be functionally equivalent”400  and with Feldman 
alleging that Mexico carried out a creeping expropriation of his investment, the 
tribunal determined the claim fell under the category of indirect expropriation.401 
 
3.5.1.2  EnCana and Occidental 
 
EnCana was a claim brought by a Canadian company under the Canada-Ecuador 
BIT and Occidental402 was a claim brought by a United States company under the 
US-Ecuador BIT, both against the state of Ecuador. Occidental Exploration and 
Production Company (OEPC) entered into a participation contract in Ecuador with 
the state-owned company, Petroecuador, for the exploration and exploitation of oil in 
Ecuador. These are the same cases discussed in Chapter 3, but a different light shall 
be shed on them in this chapter. EnCana was a beneficiary of four participation 
contracts entered into by its wholly-owned subsidiaries AEC Ecuador Limited (AEC) 
and City Oriente Limited (COL). Although EnCana and Occidental are two distinct 
cases, they revolve around the same change in laws by Ecuador and similar 
                                                 
398 ibid at para 24(a). Feldman at the same time filed a claim under NAFTA 1105 (Minimum Standard 
of Treatment) claiming Mexico failed to accord CEMSA fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security. An additional request was made at a later date under the same arbitration for a 
breach of NAFTA Article 1102 (National Treatment) by Mexico failing to accord CEMSA with 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own (Mexican) investors. 
399 Feldman Award 30 at para 89. 
400 ibid  at para 100. 
401 ibid at para 101. 
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 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 
3467, Award of 1 July 2004 (Occidental or Occidental Award). 
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interpretations of the laws by and actions of Ecuador’s tax authority, the Sericio de 
Rentas Internas (SRI). 
 
Ecuador’s Hydrocarbons Law as amended in 1993 provided the basis for oil 
exploration and exploitation in Ecuador. The Hydrocarbons Law allowed the 
contractor the power to explore and exploit hydrocarbons “on its account and risk all 
the investments, costs and expenses required for exploration, development and 
production.403 Up until 30 April 1999,404 foreign oil companies in Ecuador were 
reimbursed by the Ecuadorian state for the value-added-tax (VAT) paid on purchases 
necessary for oil exploration.405 Prior to the changes in the Ecuadorian tax policy, 
exporting producers of goods and services were entitled to receive tax credits in full 
for VAT paid on locally purchased or imported goods that would become part of 
their fixed assets, raw materials, inputs and services.406 As part of the reform of the 
Ecuadorian tax regime, the SRI was created as Ecuador’s tax authority. The 
Ecuadorian tax law governing the participation contracts was the Internal Tax 
Regime Law (ITRL). Article 69A of ITRL came into force on 30 April 1999, and 
stated that natural persons or companies that have paid VAT on local purchases or 
imported goods used in the manufacture (fabricación) of goods to be exported are 
entitled to a refund. Despite the enactment of this law, the SRI passed denying 
resolutions to reject the refunds to foreign oil companies407 as well as annulling 
original resolutions which granted refunds to the oil companies. The SRI based its 
denial of VAT refunds on two grounds. The first basis rested on the assumption that 
VAT reimbursement was accounted for under “Factor X” of the participation 
contracts.408 Factor X is a formula in the participation contracts which sets the 
participation percentages that Petroecuador and the oil companies are respectively 
                                                 
403 EnCana Award at para 26, citing Ecuador’s Hydrocarbons Law as amended in 1993, unnumbered 
Article inserted in Chapter III after Article 12. 
404 On 30 April 1999, Ecuador’s Internal Tax Regime Law (ITRL) was amended, thereby affected oil 
exploration companies. 
405 Devashish Krishan, ‘Introductory Note to EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador’, (2006) 45 
ILM  895. 
406 Article 65 of the Ecuadorian Tax Law (pre-30 April 1999); Elihu Lauterpacht and Christopher 
Greenwood, International Law Reports: Volume 138 (CUP 2010) 70. 
407 EnCana was claiming on behalf of its Ecuadorian subsidiaries who were denied VAT 
credits/refunds; they will be referred to as a whole as EnCana. In the EnCana Award, the subsidiaries 
are referred to as the Companies, and EnCana as the Claimant. 
408 EnCana Award at para 23; Occidental Award at para 99. 
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entitled to.409 Factor X did make reference to taxes in EnCana’s contract,410 outlining 
that any changes in the tax regime would result in adjustments of the participation 
percentages to absorb the increase or decrease in taxes, maintaining the economic 
balance of the contracts,411 otherwise known as a tax stabilisation clause or economic 
stabilisation clause. However, reference was made to several types of taxes including 
income tax and labour participation percentages, but never VAT. Similarly, Factor X 
in the OEPC contract outlined that Ecuador “shall receive income tax and other taxes 
in accordance with pertinent laws”412 and like the EnCana contract it had a provision 
on economic stability.413 However, neither contract contained provisions on VAT 
and its reimbursement.414 The second basis for the SRI’s denial of VAT refunds lay 
in its interpretation of the amended Article 69A of ITRL, which entitled natural 
persons or companies to refunds for VAT on locally purchased or imported goods 
“employed in the fabricación of exported products”.415 According to the SRI, 
petroleum was not considered to be a manufactured good416 for the purposes of 
Article 69A, with the right to refunds “inapplicable to activities concerning the 
exploitation of non-renewable natural resources owned by the State of Ecuador”.417 
 
OEPC and EnCana brought arbitration proceedings separately and each on their own 
merits. The majority of commentary on the facts of the tax expropriation claims from 
these two cases will be based on EnCana because expropriation was the only claim 
that the EnCana tribunal had jurisdiction over and so it formed the ‘merits of the 
claim’ commentary of that award. The Occidental tribunal on the other hand ruled in 
favour of their jurisdiction to hear OEPC’s claims under national treatment  and fair 
and equitable treatment protections,418 and although they entertained the tax 
expropriation claim, it was dismissed in the Occidental award without much 
discussion.419 We will see from Chapter 4 that the merits of OEPC’s national 
treatment claim was based largely on the same facts as EnCana’s expropriation 
                                                 
409 Occidental Award, at para 97 and EnCana Award at para 31. 
410 EnCana Award at para 34. 
411 EnCana Award at para 34.  
412 Occidental Award at para 98; referencing the Occidental Contract at 8.5.2. “Other Income”. 
413 ibid at para 98. 
414 Occidental Award at para 143; EnCana Award at para 150. 
415 SRI Resolution 293(e); EnCana Award at para.83. 
416 ibid, SRI Resolution 293(f). 
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claim, such as Ecuadorian nationals being granted VAT refunds for exported goods 
that ought to have also not been considered as ‘manufactured’ if petroleum did not fit 
that classification also. Another reason for the focus on the EnCana Award is the 
level of detail it goes into regarding communications between the SRI and 
Petroecuador as well as the detail of SRI’s submissions in the dispute. 
 
EnCana’s Ecuadorian subsidiaries, AEC Ecuador Ltd (AEC) and City Oriente 
Limited (COL), were denied VAT refunds at the time of the notice of arbitration420 
of approximately US$80,000,000.421 Prior to the SRI’s denying resolutions, the 
EnCana subsidiaries did have some tax credits granted to them. In the period 
between March 2000 and March 2001, AEC applied for and was granted tax refunds 
for VAT paid on inputs used in the production of oil for export between May 1999 
and August 2000 (the “Original Resolutions”).422 AEC then made further 
applications for refunds to SRI for VAT paid in the period of January 1998 to April 
1999 and September 2000 to May 2001, whilst COL applied for refunds for the 
period January 1999 to December 2000. Most of these claims for VAT refunds were 
granted.423 Similarly, OEPC applied for and was granted refunds for VAT paid in the 
period July 1999 to September 2000.424 In mid-2001, SRI amassed an auditing team 
to study the tax refunds granted after the change in the law, with a specific onus on 
the refunds made to oil companies425 and this also included refunds to OEPC. SRI 
wanted to determine whether VAT was considered a cost factor in the participation 
contracts, and whether the change in tax laws as regards to VAT would set off the 
economic stability provision in the participation contracts.426 After many exchanges 
between SRI and Petroecuador, there was a lack of clarity as to whether VAT was 
considered a cost expense in the participation contracts. By one letter on 11 July 
2001 from Petroecuador to the tax authorities, Petroecuador stated that bidders for 
participation contracts are “cognizant of all national legislation applicable to 
hydrocarbon matters, including tax legislation, and could discern which taxes 
directly increase the cost of the project and which have an indirect effect since they 
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426 ibid at para 65. 
136 
 
are reimbursable, as in the case of VAT”427 (emphasis mine). Despite the letter not 
being explicitly clear on whether oil companies consider VAT to be reimbursable 
under Factor X or under law, the letter was relied on by SRI to issue further denying 
resolutions for VAT refunds.428 
 
Ecuador’s Hydrocarbons Law made clear the costs and expenses were part of the risk 
and investment the contractor assumes.429 Article 16 of the Hydrocarbons Law 
contained a provision on economic stability, which required adjustment of the 
participation percentages to restore the economy of the contract “when the tax 
system applicable to the contract has been modified” which effectively puts the 
investor in the same position as before any modifications occurred.430 The position of 
the SRI at this point was oil companies like EnCana’s subsidiaries and OEPC should 
not be receiving any refunds from the SRI, because as per the Hydrocarbons Law, 
VAT is included as a cost in the participation contracts, and should therefore not be 
refunded by the tax authorities, but reimbursed via Petroecuador. Whether the 
participation contracts included reimbursement of VAT had to be clarified with 
Petroecuador clearly and in writing, so after conversations between SRI’s Director 
and Petroecuador’s President, SRI asked for confirmation in writing that VAT was 
included as a cost in the participation contracts, because Petroecuador confirmed in 
those conversations that VAT was included within the costs of the oil companies, 
specifically citing OEPC as having “clearly included the VAT” as a cost in their 
contract.431 However, by letter on 20 November 2001, Petroecuador refused to 
confirm whether EnCana included VAT as a cost.432 At the time of receipt of the 
                                                 
427 ibid at para 66. 
428 ibid at para 67. 
429 Standalone Article after Article 12, Ecuador Hydrocarbons Law. 
430 EnCana Award at para 69. 
431 ibid at para 72. Although Occidental will be discussed separately, the Ecuador participation 
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AEL and COL (EnCana) did include VAT as a cost in the participation contracts, thereby refunded via 
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432 ibid at para 71; Dr Rodolfo Barniol, the then President of Petroecuador, to Dr de Mena, the then 
Director General of SRI, by letter, said: “It is not mandatory to submit a description of their [the 
bidders of participation contracts i.e. the EnCana subsidiaries] economic, financial, technical, market 
studies, etc. For this reason, Petroecuador cannot certify whether the bids of interested companies 
consider VAT as a cost.” 
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letter from Petroecuador, SRI had already denying resolutions to EnCana’s 
subsidiaries433 and to OEPC.434 
 
However, at this stage of the enigma, SRI had not yet needed to determine the 
meaning of fabricación in Article 69A of ITRL, because they assumed EnCana’s 
subsidiaries were entitled to VAT refunds via Factor X and the Hydrocarbons Law. 
 
EnCana’s tax expropriation claim against Ecuador was brought on the premise of 
direct and indirect expropriation,435 and OEPC claimed the same.436 
 
3.5.1.3  Burlington 
 
Burlington
437 was a claim brought under the US-Ecuador BIT by Burlington 
Resources Inc. (Burlington) against Ecuador for the alleged expropriation by 
Ecuador of Burlington’s investments in two oil exploration blocks, Block 7 and 
Block 21. Burlington invested in the participation contracts for the oil blocks through 
its wholly-owned subsidiary, Burlington Oriente.438 Burlington contracted into the 
participation contracts for Blocks 7 and 21 in mid-2001439 as a minority contractor, 
holding 42.5% of Block 7 and 46.25% of Block 21, with the remainder in both 
blocks held by Perenco.440 
 
Under the participation formulae, the contractors were entitled to between 65% and 
76.2% of oil produced in Block 7 and between 60% and 67.5% of oil produced in 
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Block 21, with the relevant percentage depending on the daily average production of 
oil in barrels in year.441 
 
The dispute arose from Ecuador’s want of a greater participation in oil revenues 
when the price for oil increased exponentially from the time most participation 
contracts in Ecuador (not only for Blocks 7 and 21) were negotiated and executed. 
Ecuador maintained that the contracts were based on an oil price projection of 
US$15/bbl (per barrel)442 with which the contractors could cover their expenses and 
obtain a reasonable return on their investments.443 Burlington acquired interests in 
Blocks 7 and 21 in September 2001 when the price of oil was US$20.15/bbl.444 
Prices began to rise in 2002 and by June 2008 the price of Oriente crude was 
US$121.66/bbl.445 Although oil prices fell to below US$30/bbl at the end of 2008 
and the beginning of 2009, they increased again and stabilised in the region of 
US$60-70/bbl in 2009-2010.446 
 
Ecuador wanted an increased share in the revenues which were over and above what 
it believed to be unprecedented and unexpected increases in the price of oil when the 
contracts were negotiated or executed. For example, Ecuador submitted in the 
arbitration that it wanted a greater share of revenues from oil prices over 
US$15/bbl447 for Block 7 (US$15/bbl being the projected price of oil in Annex V of 
the Block 7 contract), or a greater share of revenues when the price of oil exceeded 
the price on execution of the participation contracts.448 Of course these two 
submissions were inconsistent with one another, because by enacting Law No. 2006-
42 on 19 April 2006 (Law 42), Ecuador took a greater percentage of oil revenues 
when the oil price was over the price at the date of execution of the relevant 
participation contracts. 
 
                                                 
441 ibid at paras 18 and 19. 
442 ibid 54-55 at para 138. 
443 ibid; the price of oil on when the Block 7 contract was executed on 23 March 2000 was US$25.11 
per barrel (Burlington Award at para 291). 
444 ibid at para 23. 
445 ibid at para 24. 
446 ibid. 
447 The parties’ oil price projections at US$15/bbl was referenced in Annex V of the Block 7 
participation contract (Burlington Award at para 272). 
448 Ecuador Law No. 2006-42 of 19 April 2006 (Law 42). 
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According to Ecuador, the “unprecedented price increase affected the economic 
equilibrium”449 of the contracts, which in turn (in Ecuador’s view), meant that the 
contracts needed readjusting,450 especially because the state, as the owner of the oil, 
should be the main beneficiary of extra revenues and windfall profits from high oil 
prices.451 Ecuador submitted that the contractor’s share of production includes a ‘P’ 
factor, which is “the oil price projections estimated over the life of the contract”.452 
However, the arbitral tribunal did not find a link between the economies of the 
contracts and any price assumptions, and “that the contractor was entitled to the 
economic value of its oil participation share irrespective of the price of oil…”453 
Importantly, the contracts for Blocks 7 and 21 were distinguished with a participation 
contract for a block named the Tarapoa Block, which clearly provided that: 
 
"If the price of crude oil in the Block exceeds USD 17 per barrel, the surplus 
of the benefit brought about by the price increase in real terms (calculated at 
constant values of [1995]) will be distributed between the Parties in equal 
shares.”454 
 
Although a clause like that in the Tarapoa contract was specifically discussed during 
Block and 21 contract negotiations, the contractors rejected its inclusion.455 The non-
inclusion of a price-based oil revenue distribution clause “was not the product of 
inadvertence but a deliberate choice of the contracting parties.”456 
 
Before enacting Law 42, Ecuador tried, unsuccessfully, to negotiate the so-called 
economic disequilibrium with the contractors,457 with Burlington outright refusing 
the requests for a change in distribution of revenues.458 As a result of unsuccessful 
attempts at negotiating a change in participation percentages for oil revenues over a 
specific price, Ecuador enacted Law 42 which amended Ecuador’s Hydrocarbons 
                                                 
449 Burlington Award 54 at para 136. 
450 ibid at para 137. 
451 ibid. 
452 ibid at para 279. 
453 ibid at para 281. 
454 Clause 8.1 of the Tarapoa Contract (Burlington Award at para 294). 
455 Burlington Award at para 299. 
456 ibid. 




law. Law 42 required oil companies to pay to the state “50% of the amount, if any, 
by which the market price of oil [exceeded] the price of oil at the time the 
[participation contracts] were executed”459 (Law 42 at 50%). Law 42 referred to oil 
revenues which exceeded the price of oil at the time the participation contracts were 
executed as ‘extraordinary revenues’. The 50% was increased to 99% on 18 October 
2007 by Ecuador Decree 662 (Law 42 at 99%). Under the threat of litigation from oil 
companies,460 Ecuador then passed the Ley de Equidad Tributaria (LET) (Tax Equity 
Act) on 28 December 2008 in order to open new negotiations with oil companies.461 
If oil companies took advantage of the LET, the state’s participation in extraordinary 
revenues would drop from 99% to 70%.  Burlington and Perenco did not take 
advantage of the LET.462  
 
Burlington initiated arbitration proceedings against Ecuador on 21 April 2008.463 
Burlington made Law 42 payments to Ecuador under protest from their introduction 
in mid-2006 until May 2008, and in June 2008, Burlington, through a tax consortium 
(Consortium) set up with Perenco, began making Law 42 payments to a segregated 
account in the United States and not remitting the same to Ecuador.464 As a result, on 
19 February 2009, Ecuador initiated coactiva proceedings (administrative 
proceedings) against the Consortium465 (and therefore Burlington)466 and began to 
seize Burlington’s share of oil production in March 2009.467 As part of the coactive 
proceedings, from March 2009 to mid-2010, Burlington’s share of oil production was 
auctioned off to the sole bidder, Petroecuador, at below market prices.468 On 16 July 
2009, Burlington and Perenco ceased operation of Blocks 7 and 21 and on the same 
day Ecuador took possession of the blocks.469 Finally, Ecuador terminated the 
participation contracts for the blocks in July 2010 under what was called a caducidad 
                                                 
459 ibid at para 32. 
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process470 (the caducidad process leads to a declaratoria de caducidad del contracto 
(‘declaration of nullity of the contract’)). 
 
Burlington brought its expropriation claim on the premise that Ecuador’s measures 
individually and in the aggregate constituted an unlawful expropriation of its 
investment.471 The individual measures were the enactment of Law 42 at 50% and at 
99%, the coactiva proceedings that resulted in the seizure of Burlington’s share of oil 
production, the takeover of Blocks 7 and 21, and the caducidad declarations (i.e. 
contract terminations).472 
 
The focus here is on Law 42. In the Burlington award on jurisdiction473 and in the 
final award, Law 42 was deemed to be a tax law for the purposes of the US-Ecuador 
BIT.474 Although Law 42 was not a tax law under Ecuadorian law “in a very 
narrow… technical sense”475 because it amended Ecuador’s Hydrocarbons Law 
which is not a tax law,476 under the EnCana definition of taxation477 Law 42 was a 
tax law. That was because: (i) Law 42, as indicated by its name, was a law; (ii) it 
imposed a liability on a class of persons (oil companies with participation contracts 
with Petroecuador/Ecuador) to pay money to the state; and the money paid/collected 
were available for the state to use for public purposes.478 Burlington made Law 42 
payments to Ecuador and then to the segregated United States account through the 
Consortium which was used to pay income taxes for Blocks 7 and 21.479 With respect 
to (ii) and payments being made to the state, it is important to note that, unlike 
participation revenues that were paid to Petroecuador, and more like all tax 
payments, Law 42 payments went “directly into the account of the State” and not “in 
the account of Petroecuador”.480 
 
                                                 
470 ibid. 
471 ibid at para 254 and at para 337. 
472 ibid at para 337. 
473 Burlington Resources Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 2 June 2010 (Burlington Jurisdiction Award). 
474 Burlington Jurisdiction Award at para 167; Burlington Award at para 31. 
475 Burlington Jurisdiction Award at para 133. 
476 ibid. 
477 See 3.2.1 above. 
478 Burlington Jurisdiction Award 36 at para 166. 
479 ibid. 
480 ibid at para 132. 
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To demonstrate how arbitral tribunals can differ significantly in their findings, 
Occidental II
481 is a case in point. When assessing quantum, the Occidental II 
tribunal agreed to take into account the Law 42 payments made by OEPC to 
Ecuador,482 because the claimants contended Law 42 was unlawful and the payments 
made under the law should be taken into account on assessment of damages.483 Upon 
examining Law 42, the Occidental II tribunal decided that Law 42 was not “a 
royalty, a tax, a levy or any other measure of taxation under the Participation 
Contract”484 but was “a unilateral decision of the Ecuadorian Congress to allocate to 
the Ecuadorian State a defined percentage of the revenues earned by contractor 
companies… that hold participation contract [sic].”485 Luckily, for the purposes of 
this thesis, the Burlington tribunal did hold Law 42 to be a tax law which permits its 
examination in this thesis. 
 
3.5.1.4  Archer Daniels, Cargill and Corn Products 
 
Archer Daniels,486Cargill,487 and Corn Products488 were three cases brought by 
United States investors against Mexico under Article 1110 of NAFTA. The claims 
centred on the amendment by Mexico of the IEPS tax law of Mexico being amended 
to their detriment. On 30 December 2001 with effect on 1 January 2002, Articles 1, 
2, 3 and 8 of the IEPS were amended to impose a 20% excise tax on soft drinks and 
syrups (the sweetener tax), with the same tax applied on services utilised to transfer 
and distribute soft drinks and syrups.489 Soft drinks and syrups that contained 
                                                 
481 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v 
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award of 5 October 2012 (Occidental II or 
Occidental II Award); in Occidental II, the claimants succeeded in convincing the tribunal that 
Ecuador violated the US-Ecuador BIT by failing to accord the claimants fair and equitable treatment, 
treatment no less than that required by international law, indirect expropriation and by breaching 
customary international law (Occidental II Award at para 876). 
482 ibid at para 462. 
483 ibid at paras 461and 462. 
484 ibid at para 509. 
485 ibid at para 510. 
486 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc. v United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/05, Award (Redacted Version) of 21 November 2007 (Archer 
Daniels or Archer Daniels Award). 
487 Cargill Incorporated v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award (Redacted 
Version) of 18 September 2009 (Cargill or Cargill Award). 
488 Corn Products International Inc. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, 
Decision on Responsibility (Redacted Version) of 15 January 2008 (Corn Products or Corn Products 
Award). 
489 Archer Daniels Award at para 2. 
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sweeteners other than cane sugar were levied with the tax, and soft drinks and syrups 
sweetened with only cane sugar were excluded from the tax. Cargill, through its 
Mexican subsidiary, Cargill de Mexico S.A. de C.V. (CMSC) sold high fructose corn 
syrup (HFCS) which is an alternative to sugar, in Mexico.490 Similarly, Archer 
Daniels Midland Company (Archer Daniels) Tate & Lyle Ingredients America 
(TLIA) also sold HFCS in Mexico through their joint venture Mexican company, 
Almidones Mexicanos S.A. de C.V. (ALMEX).491 Corn Products Inc. (CPI) was in 
the same HFCS business and had the greatest market share for HFCS in Mexico 
before the sweetener tax took effect.492 CPI sold HFCS in Mexico through its 
Mexican subsidiary, Corn Products Ingredientes (CPIng).493  
 
HFCS is an alternative and cost-effective sweetener, and when it became available in 
Mexico, Mexican producers of soft drinks and syrups substituted cane sugar with 
HFCS,494 and Coca Cola productions in Mexico blended HFCS with cane sugar495 
thereby using less cane sugar than previously. Sugar in both Mexico and the United 
States benefitted from a “State supported price”,496 it was a “politically active 
industry and of considerable social significance in certain parts of each country”497 
and HFCS threatened the sugar industry by being an aggressive competitor of 
sugar.498 
 
The sweetener tax was introduced by Mexico on the back of failed negotiations with 
the government of the United States to allow surpluses of Mexican sugar to be sold 
on the United States market.499 
 
The sweetener tax originated from a proposal by some members of the Mexican 
Congress on with a report by the Committee on Treasury and Public Credit of the 
Mexican Congress reporting the tax should be introduced “with the objective of not 
                                                 
490 Cargill Award at para 1. 
491 Archer Daniels Award at para 8. 
492 Corn Products Award at para 119. 
493 ibid at para 2.  
494 Archer Daniels Award at para 49. 
495 Archer Daniels Award at para 54. 
496 Archer Daniels Award at para 55. 
497 ibid. 
498 Archer Daniels Award at para 56. 
499 ibid at paras 71 to 79; Corn Products Award 18 at paras 33 and 37; Cargill Award at para 81 to 99. 
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causing a major injury to the sugar industry.”500 When the tax proposal was 
introduced to the Mexican Congress, a Representative at the Mexican Congress said 
the legislators were “committed to protecting the domestic sugar industry… To that 
effect, it is proposed the tax on soft drinks apply only to those which [utilise] 
fructose in substitution for sugar.”501 The United States initiated World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) Dispute Settlement Proceedings with regard to the sweetener 
tax being contrary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT).502 
The Panel decided503 with regard to HFCS that the tax resulted in dissimilar 
treatment to HFCS in comparison with directly competitive or substitutable products 
thereby inconsistent with Article III(2) second sentence of the GATT;504 HFCS is 
afforded less favourable treatment than like products of national origin, inconsistent 
with Article III(4) of the GATT;505 and imported soft drinks and syrups sweetened 
with sweeteners other than cane sugar (including HFCS) “were subject to internal 
taxes in excess of those applied to like domestic products,”506 inconsistent with 
Article III(2) first sentence of the GATT.507 The United States and Mexico agreed 
that Mexico had until 1 January 2007 to implement the WTO ruling508 and the 
sweetener tax was repealed by the Mexican Senate on 20 December 2006.509 
 
All claimants in the three arbitrations against Mexico claimed that Mexico had 
indirectly expropriated their investments in violation of Article 1110 of NAFTA,510 
as well as national treatment at Article 1102, performance requirements at Article 
                                                 
500 Archer Daniels Award at para 80, quoting Cámara de los Diputados, affo II, No.6, 21 December 
2002, at p.692. 
501 ibid, quoting Minutes of Legislative Debate, 21 December 2001, pp. 711-712. 
502 Consultations requested by United States on 16 March 2004. 
503 WTO, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, adopted on 24 March 2006. 
504 ibid, 161 at para 9.2(a)(ii); GATT Article III(2) second sentence reads: “..no contracting party shall 
otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner 
contrary to the principles set forth in [Article III] paragraph 1 [internal taxes and other internal 
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements… should not be applied to imported or domestic 
products so as to afford protection to domestic production]”. 
505 ibid, at para 9.2(a)(iii); GATT Article III(4): “The products of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations…” 
506 ibid, para 92(iv). 
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into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal 
taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like 
domestic products.” 
508 Archer Daniels Award at para 96. 
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1106, and Cargill also claimed under fair and equitable treatment principles at Article 
1105. 
 
3.5.1.5  Link-Trading 
 
Link-Trading
511 was claim brought by a United States and Moldovan joint venture 
company against the Department for Customs Control of Republic of Moldova 
(Moldova) under the US-Moldova BIT.512 Link-Trading was established in July 1996 
under the laws of the Republic of Moldova. Its principal line of business was the sale 
to retails consumers products that it imported into the Free Economic Zone of 
Chisinau513 (the FEZ). In November 1996 Link-Trading registered as a resident in 
the FEZ,514 exempting it at that time from import duties and VAT on goods it 
imported into the FEZ,515 and the company began operations at the beginning of 
1997.516 When it began trading at the beginning of 1997, Link-Trading’s customers 
had the right to a partial exemption from excise duties and VAT517 with the limits set 
annually by the Law on State Budget of the Republic of Moldova (the Budget Law). 
At the beginning of 1997, the partial exemption entitled Link-Trading’s customers up 
to US $600 tax-free on the goods they purchased within the FEZ per month.518 On 21 
March 1997, the Budget Law for 1997 was adopted, and it reduced the tax exemption 
to Link-Trading’s customers to US$400. Subsequently on 27 December 1997, the 
Budget Law for 1998 was adopted, further reducing the partial exemption for 
consumers to US$250. Finally, Law No. 96 of 16 July 1998 amended the Budget 
Law for 1998 and completely eliminated the partial exemption for consumers of 
retailers in the FEZ, effective 6 August 1998.519 The Moldovan Department for 
Customs Control issued Order No. 466 on 21 October 1998 demanding the residents 
                                                 
511 Link-Trading Joint Stock Company v Department for Customs Control of the Republic of Moldova, 
UNCITRAL Arbitration, Final Award, 18 April 2002 (Link Trading or Link Trading Award). 
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517 Ibid at paras 3-4; Moldova Ministry of Finance, Regulation No. 05/1-07/507, Article 1(1)(8), 11 
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of the FEZ, the Link-Trading included, to collect customs duties and VAT for the 
state by adding to the price of their goods sold to customers for import into 
Moldovan territory (outside the FEZ) and to remit the amounts to the state.520 Link-
Trading protested the government measures, claiming expropriation took place on 8 
August 1998521 when a letter522 was sent to the Administration of the FEZ detailing 
the amended Budget Law for 1998. As part of the new Budget Law, although 
partially tax-exempt shopping was removed in the FEZ, people had the right to 
import certain consumer products from their travels abroad partially tax-free based 
on quantitative quotas.523 Link-Trading argued that Moldova had violated guarantees 
of tax stability it had given the claimant for a 10 year period, by changing the 
customs and tax treatment of Link-Trading’s customers, thereby substantially 
depriving Link-Trading of its business through measures tantamount to expropriation 
for which compensation was due under the US-Moldova BIT.524 The implementation 
of the final tax measure coincided with failings of the business shortly thereafter.525 
 
Link-Trading’s argument that it had a 10-year guarantee against changes in the tax 
laws was primarily based on Moldova’s Law No. 625,526 as well as Law 998 on 
Foreign Investment,527 Law of the Free Zones 1451–XII,528 and the Minister of 
Finance Regulation No. 05/1–07/507.529 Article 7 of Law No. 625 stated that if new 
laws were adopted which deteriorated the circumstances of activity of residents of 
the FEZ with regard to the customs and tax regime, then those residents of the FEZ 
would be entitled to be subjected to the law of Moldova which was in force on the 
date of their registration in FEZ for a period of ten years.530 
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Moldova countered the 10-year guarantee claims by arguing that the guarantee in 
Article 7 of Law No. 625 was restricted in application to the Customs Regime and 
Tax Regime contemplated in Law No. 625 itself, and those regimes were set out in 
Articles 5 and 6 of Law No. 625.531  This law therefore did not cater to the partial 
exemption contained in the Budget Law for retail customers of the Claimant’s 
imported goods.532  The Respondent also asserted that the Minister of Finance 
Regulation No. 05/1–07/507 was not a law, and rights which did not derive from a 
law could not exist.533 
 
The stability provision that protected businesses from changing laws contained in 
Law No. 998 on Foreign Investment, Article 43(1), did not include protection from 
changes in the customs and tax regime according to Article 43(2) of that Law which 
stated that “Section 1 does not apply to customs, tax…”534 
 
Link-Trading contended that the tax amendments were discriminatory, unfair and 
arbitrary, to which Moldova countered that the amendments were in fact normal 
regulatory measures, were fair by their nature, and were not arbitrary or 
discriminatory in their application.535  Furthermore, the changes in law including the 
gradual decreases in the partial tax exemption from US$600 to US$250 and 
subsequently the revocation of such exemption were commercial risks “assumed by 
the Claimant at the time of its investment.”536 Furthermore, according to Moldova, 
the business setbacks of Link-Trading were attributed to the Russian financial crisis 
in August 1998, when the Moldovan currency was devalued by more than 100%, and 
Moldova supported this argument by saying Link-Trading continued business 
through most of 1999 despite the amended Budget Law.537 
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3.5.1.6  Goetz I and Goetz II 
 
In Goetz I,538 the claimants owned a company called Affinage des Métaux 
(AFFIMET)539 which was incorporated under Burundian law.540 On 31 August 1992, 
Burundi established a free zone regime.541 In January 1993 AFFIMET applied for542 
and in February 1993 it was granted a free zone certificate (Certificate) by Burundi’s 
authorities to operate in the free zone.543 Companies operating in the free zone 
benefitted from tax and customs duties (together referred to as ‘tax’ or ‘taxes’) 
exemptions.544 AFFIMET’s Certificate was suspended by Burundi from 17 August 
1993545  until 10 January 1994.546 In the ensuing arbitration, the claimants sought 
reimbursement of the taxes paid by AFFIMET to Burundi during the period of 
suspension.547 The Certificate was then withdrawn from AFFIMET on 29 May 
1995,548 effective 13 August 1996.549 The claimants brought an action for 
expropriation under Article 4 of the Belgium-Luxembourg-Burundi BIT550 for 
revocation of the Certificate because the revocation forced AFFIMET from 
conducting its business activities.551 The arbitral tribunal found in favour of the 
claimants and gave Burundi the option of compensating the claimants for the 
expropriation in order to make the expropriation lawful552 or restoring the Certificate 
to AFFIMET.553 Given the choice, Burundi chose to compensate the claimants and 
the compensation was agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between 
the parties that was attached to the Goetz I Award. The compensation entailed a 
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payment of almost US$3 million for taxes and other charges paid to Burundi between 
20 August 1993 to 10 January 1994 and 29 May 1995 to 13 August 1996.554 
Although the MoU specified the compensation as being for taxes and other charges, 
the arbitral award did not focus on the suspension and revocation of the tax 
exemptions (as a result of the suspension and revocation of the Certificate) as being 
expropriatory, focusing only on the revocation of the Certificate as being 
expropriatory because AFFIMET had to cease operations as a result. Despite the 
foregoing, Goetz I is not irrelevant in the context of tax expropriation because in 
addition to the MoU that was agreed by the parties and attached to the Goetz I award 
was an agreement called the Special Convention on the Operation of AFFIMET 
(Special Convention). Article 4 of the Special Convention gave AFFIMET certain 
exemptions from paying taxes, including an exemption from paying taxes on 
imports,555 a full exemption from household and property taxes,556 a total exemption 
on profit tax for 10 years of the company’s operations557 and a tax exemption on 
exports (including existing and future direct and indirect royalties).558 Burundi did 
not stick to the Special Convention, and among other issues between the parties, 
another arbitration was commenced, resulting in Goetz II.559 In Goetz II, among the 
issues was Burundi’s non-compliance with Article 4(4) of the Special Convention, 
namely the tax exemption on exports.560 The tax exemptions on exports were 
suspended by Burundi from April to June 2002 without any given reasons,561 and 
this, together with a string of other measures,562 according to the claimants, forced 
the closure of AFFIMET in 2002 and constituted an indirect expropriation.563 
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3.5.1.7  El Paso 
 
In El Paso,564 the United States claimant company (El Paso International Energy 
Company (El Paso)) owned shares in four companies constituted under Argentinian 
Law: Compañías Asociadas Petroleras (CAPSA) (45%); Capex (28.06% 
shareholding565 as a result of CAPSA’s 60.36% shareholding in Capex); 
SERVICIOS (99.2% shareholding) and Constanera (12.335% shareholding)566 
(collectively referred to as the Argentinian Companies). El Paso’s shares in the 
Argentinian Companies were protected investments567 under the US-Argentina 
BIT568 and Argentina brought a claim for expropriation under the BIT, as well as 
claims for violation of discriminatory treatment, fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security protections.569 
 
The dispute arose out of measures and lack thereof taken by Argentina to contain and 
counteract the Argentine economic crisis of 1998-2002. Among the measures taken 
by Argentina for contingency and recovery purposes was the enactment of Public 
Emergency Law No. 25,561 of 2 January 2002570 (Public Emergency Law). The 
Public Emergency Law devalued the Argentinian Peso (the Peso) by abolishing the 
parity between the Peso and the US Dollar571 and authorised the Argentinian 
government to impose withholding taxes on hydrocarbon exports.572 
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El Paso complained that Argentina was responsible for expropriation by taxation in 
three aspects: (i) by imposing withholding taxes;573 (ii) by not taking into account 
inflation for tax depreciation purposes574 (hence the mention of lack of measures in 
the immediately preceding paragraph) and (iii) by limiting tax deductions that the 
Argentinian Companies could make when considering the devaluation of the Peso 
was unreasonable575 (this was another non-measure complained of). 
 
The two last claims were “based on the idea that a foreign investor has a right to 
certain tax deductions.”576 In short, these ‘deduction claims’ centred on the 
calculation of amounts that companies can deduct from their incomes and assets for 
tax assessment purposes. Both arose as a result of the Public Emergency Law. The 
last claim was based on the devaluation of the Peso, and the second claim was based 
on the onset of inflation as a result of the devaluation of the Peso, with inflation 
reaching 118% in 2002.577 Under Argentina’s Income Tax Law, the value of 
companies’ fixed assets was depreciated annually according to their estimated life 
expectancy.578 El Paso contended that Argentina’s non-recognition of inflation for 
tax depreciation purposes was unreasonable and confiscatory.579 Argentina stressed 
that Law No. 24,073 of 4 February 1992 “froze all applicable indices and provisions 
for inflation adjustment purposes, including those related to tax depreciation…”580 
The laws relating to inflation and tax deprecation were therefore in place since 1992, 
and El Paso was therefore complaining about “no change in the law.”581 
 
As for the withholding taxes, El Paso claimed they constituted a direct expropriation 
of CAPSA and Capex’s export revenues582 and an indirect expropriation of CAPSA 
and Capex’s revenues by artificially depressing domestic prices of crude and 
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) thus resulting in less revenue for CAPSA and 
                                                 
573 ibid at para 282. 
574 ibid at para 283. 
575 ibid at para 284. 
576 ibid at para 285. 
577 ibid at para 283. 
578 ibid at para 111. 
579 ibid at para 283. 
580 ibid at para 287. 
581 ibid at para 295, quoting El Paso’s Memorial at 366. 
582 ibid at para 282, and 267 at para 728. 
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Capex.583 The petroleum prices on the domestic market were artificially depreciated 
by the imposition of the withholding taxes because the withholding taxes created an 
‘export parity’.584 An export parity is created when the price of exported petroleum 
on foreign markets drops as a result of the imposition of the withholding taxes. 
Domestic buyers will then refuse to buy petroleum at a price that is higher than the 
price of exported petroleum after deduction of export costs which include the 
withholding taxes. El Paso alleged that CAPSA and Capex therefore had to sell crude 
oil and LPG at prices “that were significantly lower than those prices that would 
have prevailed in the domestic market in the absence of the Export Withholdings.”585 
 
El Paso also claimed that all measures (including non-tax measures) taken by 
Argentina forced it to sell its shares in the Argentinian Companies at a considerable 
loss.586 
 
3.5.1.8  Yukos 
 
There are a number of cases relating to the expropriation of Yukos Oil Company 
(Yukos) by the Russian state. Yukos-related arbitrations which have rendered final 
award are Quasar587 and RosInvest.588 Other cases with awards pending are Yukos 
Universal,589 Hulley,590 and Veteran.591 The claimants in Yukos Universal, Hulley 
and Veteran are all companies “owned by Cyprus-based GML (formerly Group 
                                                 
583 ibid. 
584 ibid at para 728. 
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586 ibid at para 258. 
587 Quasar de Valores SICA V S.A.,  0RGOR DE V AWRES SICA V S.A., GBI 9000 SICA V S.A., 
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588 RosInvest Co. UK Limited v The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. V 079/2005, Award on 
Jurisdiction of 1 October 2007 (RosInvest Jurisdiction Award); RosInvest Co. UK Limited v The 
Russian Federation, SCC Case No. V 079/2005, Final Award of 12 September 2010 (RosInvest or 
RosInvest Award). 
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227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 30 November 2009 (Yukos Universal or 
Yukos Universal Jurisdiction Award). 
590 Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v Russian Federation, ECT Arbitration, PCA Case No. AA 
226, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 30 November 2009 (Hulley or Hulley 
Jurisdiction Award). 
591 Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v Russian Federation, ECT Arbitration, PCA Case No. AA 




Menatep), which is, in turn, owned by a cluster of seven Guernsey-based trusts.”592 
The latter three arbitrations are pending final awards and are being heard in parallel 
proceedings. GML was Yukos’ major shareholder.593 As Quasar and RosInvest are 
the only Yukos cases whose arbitration proceedings have rendered final awards at 
the time of writing, the treatment of tax as expropriation in only those two Yukos 
cases will be examined in this chapter, and any analysis will revolve around the 
treatment of Yukos by Russia rather than the claimants in the specific cases as they 
and their investments (shares in Yukos) were not directly targeted by the Russian 
state but indirectly suffered as a result of the state directly targeting Yukos. 
 
RosInvest was brought under the UK-Russia BIT594 and Quasar under the Spain-
Russia BIT.595 Claimants in both arbitrations were minority shareholders in Yukos. 
 
In a nutshell, Yukos was once Russia’s biggest oil company596 and the largest 
taxpayer in Russia597 until it was subjected to tax audits and reassessments for the 
years 2000 to 2004 by the Russian Tax Ministry. These assessments in turn resulted 
in asset freezes that made paying the tax debts insurmountable tasks, which in turn 
resulted in the seizure of Yukos’s shares in its subsidiaries and the auctioning of 
those companies (one of which was worth between US$15 billion and US$57.7 
                                                 
592 Luke Eric Petersen, ‘Despite Khodorkovsky Release, Majority Owners of Yukos Have No Plans to 
Drop $113 Billion Arbitration Claim Against Russian Federation as a Final Ruling Looms’ IA 
Reporter (24 December 2013) < http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20131224> accessed 24 
December 2013. 
593 Matteo M. Winkler, ‘Arbitration Without Privity and Russian Oil: The Yukos Case before the 
Houston Court (2006) 27:1 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.115, 116  
594 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment, signed 6 April 1989, entered into force 3 July 1991 (UK-Russia BIT); 
interestingly, the claimant in RosInvest was allowed to import the expropriation provision of the 
Denmark-Russia BIT (Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the 
Government of the Russian Federation concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, signed 4 November 1993, entered into force 26 August 1996) using the most-favoured-
nation provision of the UK-Russia BIT. RosInvest sought to do this because under the UK-Russia 
BIT, the arbitrators would not have jurisdiction to decide whether there was an expropriation and 
whether it was legal (Rosinvest Jurisdiction Award 73 at para 114 and 74 at para 118), and would have 
jurisdiction only in matters such as those concerning amount or payment of compensation due for an 
expropriation. 
595 Agreement between Spain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 26 October 1990, entered into force 28 November 1991 
(Spain-Russia BIT). 
596 ‘Yukos Ten Years On’ (The Yukos Library, 2013) < http://www.theyukoslibrary.com/en/the-
yukos-affair-ten-years-on/> accessed 10 January 2014. 
597 Quasar at para 102. 
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billion598 and accounted for 60% of Yukos’s total oil production599 and was 
auctioned off for US$9.8 billion to settle the year 2000 tax reassessment of US$3.5 
billion) to settle the tax debts. Meanwhile, Yukos’ CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was 
charged and imprisoned on fraud and tax evasion charges, as was his business 
partner and president of GML (formerly Group Menatep), Platon Lebedev. Other 
Yukos executives fled from Russia, and Yukos’ staff lawyers and external 
independent counsel were arrested and charged with embezzlement.600 To put some 
perspective on the tax assessments, the assessments together with taxes already paid 
by Yukos for the years 2000 to 2003, amounted to more than 90% of Yukos’ annual 
consolidated gross revenues for those years.601 From an alternative perspective, 
Yukos’s net income from 2000 to the third quarter of 2003 was US$13 billion, and 
with the last of Russia’s tax assessments included, the total tax assessments with 
fines and surcharges for 2000 to 2004 amounted to more than US$24 billion.602 
 
Despite the above summary, it will be helpful and interesting to go into the detail of 
the Yukos affair. On 28 April 2003, the Tax Ministry’s specialised top level division 
that was instituted for large oil companies completed a six month audit of Yukos 
finding only minor tax liabilities603 which Yukos paid in full.604 Yukos’ tax affairs 
were, therefore, in the eyes of the Russian Tax Ministry (Tax Ministry), in order. 
Later that year, things began to change for Yukos and its top level executives. On 2 
July 2003, Platon Levedev was arrested605 and has since been convicted of fraud, tax 
evasion, embezzlement and money laundering.606 On 25 October 2003, Mikhail 
                                                 
598 OAO Yuganskneftegaz (YNG) was: (i) valued by the Quasar claimants as at least US$15 billion 
(ibid at para 84); (ii) sold at auction for US$9.4 billion which was just over half of its appraisal value 
by Russia’s own advisors (ibid at para 163); (iii) valued before its auction by investment bankers at 
US$22 billion (RosInvest Jurisdiction Award at para 2, quoting the claimant’s Request for 
Arbitration); and (iv) valued by Russian-state-owned oil company Rosneft, YNG’s ultimate post-
auction owner, at US$57.7 billion (Quasar Award at para 84).  
599 Quasar Award at para 162. 
600 ibid at para 162. 
601 RosInvest Jurisdiction Award at para 2, quoting the claimant’s Request for Arbitration. 
602 Quasar Award at para 47, quoting the claimants’ Statement of Claim. 
603 RosInvest Award at para 494. 
604 Quasar Award  at para 47. 
605 Winkler (n. 592) 116; and Lebedev v Russia, ECtHR Application No. 4493/04, Judgement of 25 
October 2007. 
606 Lebedev is due for release from prison: Kathrin Hille, ‘Khodorkovsky’s Pusiness Partner to be 
Freed from Jail’ Financial Times (Moscow, 23 January 2014) < http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4ec7e7a-
8414-11e3-b72e-00144feab7de.html#axzz2rw7RaNeE> accessed 24 January 2013. 
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Khodorkovsky was arrested607 and was also convicted of fraud, tax evasion, 
embezzlement and money laundering.608 Khodorkovsky crossed swords with the 
Russian government by: confronting President Putin “with a thinly veiled allegation 
of top-level corruption in a televised meeting in February 2003”;609 trying to build a 
private oil pipeline to China which contravened state policy610 and would have 
undermined the state’s monopoly over the oil exportation infrastructure;611 and 
he/Yukos tried to sell a majority stake in Yukos to ExxonMobil (an American oil 
company)612 which would have put a lot of Russian oil under foreign (and more 
particularly, American) control. Politics aside, the wealth that Yukos could generate 
for the Russian state by being part of state-owned oil company Rosneft would of 
course be a lot more significant than the taxes it paid to the state, albeit being the 
largest taxpayer in Russia. By taking Yukos, Russian oil truly would be mostly under 
state control. 
 
In McCulloch v. Maryland,613 Chief Justice Marshall said “… the power to tax 
involves the power to destroy…”614 The Yukos affair is certainly an apt example of 
the abuse of that power. 
 
Following the arrest of Khodorkovsky and despite the six month tax audit of Yukos 
by the Tax Ministry’s special division, on 8 December 2003, a re-audit of Yukos’ 
was announced615 and it lasted only three weeks with the report released on 29 
December 2003 finding Yukos’s liable for an additional US$3.5 billion in taxes for 
2000616 (Y2000 taxes).  
 
                                                 
607 Winkler (n. 592) 116; and Quasar Award 26 at para 47. 
608 Khodorkovsky was released from prison on 20 December 2013, a few months earlier than his 
August 2014 release date:  Courtney Weaver, Kathrin Hille and Neil Buckley, ‘Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky Arrives in Germany After Putin Pardon’ Financial Times (London and Moscow, 20 
December 2013) <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d93bdafc-6951-11e3-89ce 
00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz2rK4MjrLn> accessed 20 December 2013. 
609 Neil Buckley, ‘One Day in the Life of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’ Financial Times (24 October 2013) 
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610 ibid. 
611 RosInvest Award at para 4, quoting the Claimant’s Post-Hearing Reply Brief of 4 May 2010.  
612 ibid; and Neil Buckley  (n. 608). 
613 (1819) 17 U.S. 327. 
614 ibid, Chief Justice Marshall at 431. 
615 Quasar Award at para 47, quoting claimants’ Statement of Claim. 
616 Quasar Award at para 47, quoting claimants’ Statement of Claim. 
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The reassessments that resulted in extra tax liabilities for Yukos came from the Tax 
Ministry’s ‘discovery that Yukos was using trading companies (that it owned) in low 
tax regions to sell oil to the ultimate non-Yukos purchaser. i.e. Yukos sold oil to its 
trading companies at low prices, and these companies also traded between 
themselves, and then the oil was finally sold on the market to companies independent 
from Yukos (at market price). The inter-trading and selling of oil from the trading 
companies meant that: (i) Yukos paid less tax on the low price it sold oil to its 
trading companies than it would have done selling at the market price; and (ii) the 
trading companies in the low-tax regions paid low tax on the sale of oil at market 
price, with the profits eventually ending up in the pockets of Yukos/Yukos’ 
shareholders. It was a legitimate use of the tax system used by companies to 
minimise their tax liabilities. The low-tax region was called the Republic of 
Mordovia (Mordovia) and under the Law of the Republic of Mordovia on Conditions 
of Efficient Use of the Social and Economic Potential of the Republic of Mordovia, 
the region was empowered to apply a tax regime to specific entities, supervise 
compliance under that regime and set out the record keeping required of taxpayers.617 
 
Yukos, having been granted tax concessions in Mordovia, set up its trading entities 
who never fell short of legal requirements that granted benefits.618 Despite this, the 
Tax Ministry’s Y2000 audit (and subsequent audits) punished Yukos for using the 
low-tax region as it did and claimed it was unaware of the utilisation of the region by 
Yukos. This punishment was on the basis that the tax benefits available in Mordovia 
were rules of good faith that were exploited by Yukos,619 especially since the tax 
benefits for Yukos were disproportionate to its investment in the region.620 This 
finding was despite: (i) Mordovia’s entitlement to supervise compliance with the tax 
laws in its territory (and it did not see fit to make a ‘proportionate investment’ 
rule);621 (ii) the Tax Ministry’s undoubted awareness of Yukos’ use of trading 
companies622 and its billions in tax savings published in its annual financial 
                                                 
617 ibid at para 53. 








statements;623 and the Tax Ministry’s special oil company division’s audit of the 
trading companies in Mordovia expressed no concern over their role and Yukos’s 
control over them.624 
 
As a result of the Tax Ministry’s ‘discoveries’, the trading companies were labelled 
as ‘shams’ and all intra-group transactions with those companies as ‘sham 
transactions’ because they were in breach of the ‘good faith’ use of the tax system.625 
Yukos, however, had complied with the written word of the tax law.626 As a result of 
the Tax Ministry’s stance, Yukos became liable for: (i) VAT-related levies, fines and 
interest at US$13.5 billion627 (for VAT the trading companies had actually paid for 
on exported oil and for which they were due refunds for because there is 0% tax on 
exports – the Tax Ministry also did not allow Yukos to benefit from the VAT refund 
requests submitted by the trading companies nor did it allow Yukos to submit its own 
refund documentation even though it was now viewed as the seller/exporter);628 and 
(ii) by declaring the trading companies as shams, Russia assessed Yukos as being 
liable for US$9.4 billion (including US$1.5 billion in repeat offender fines) of profit 
tax – tax which the trading companies had for years filed tax returns and paid billions 
thereto.629 
 
On 14 April 2004, the Tax Ministry issued a resolution demanding payment of the 
Y2000 taxes by 16 April 2004.630 On 15 April 2004, the Tax Ministry petitioned the 
Moscow Arbitrazh Court for the recovery of the amounts due and a wide ranging 
asset freeze to secure the Y2000 liability was awarded.631 Yukos could have paid the 
Y2000 taxes if not for the 15 April 2004 asset freeze632 because it needed to sell or 
borrow against the frozen assets.633 The deadline for voluntarily paying the Y2000 
taxes expired on 16 April 2004 and on 22 April 2004, Yukos unsuccessfully 
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625 Quasar Award at para 66. 
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petitioned the Moscow Arbitrazh Court to unfreeze its assets on the basis that the 
freeze was unlawfully disproportional and asked the courts to freeze its shares in a 
company called Sibneft instead, an apparently reasonable offer since the shares in 
Sibneft were worth more than the Y2000 taxes634 at US$4.6 billion.635 On 17 May 
2004 Yukos appealed the rejection of its 22 April 2004 petition and the Moscow 
Arbitrazh Court of Appeal rejected the appeal on 2 July 2004. 
 
The asset freeze gave Russia the power to choose how Yukos would satisfy its tax 
liabilities because the bailiffs had the final decision against which assets the debt 
could be enforced.636 Yukos also tried to settle or discharge the Y2000 tax liability 
with the Tax Ministry who ignored its pleadings.637 On 30 June 2004, the Russian 
courts issued a writ of execution for the Y2000 tax against Yukos and the bailiffs 
gave Yukos five days to pay up, whereas the Tax Ministry could take up to three 
years to act on the writ.638 Yukos attempted to deliver a package to the bailiffs that 
permitted execution against Yukos’ Sibneft shares but deliver was not taken.639 The 
bailiffs, on 14 July 2003, decided to seize Yukos’ shares in OAO Yuganskneftegaz 
(YNG),640 which accounted for 60% of Yukos’ oil production capacity.641 The Tax 
Ministry had also begun audits for Yukos; 2001-2003 tax years. Before and after the 
bailiff decision to take the YNG shares, Yukos attempted, three times, to settle with 
the Tax Ministry, offering US$8 billion for any and all known and possible (from the 
ongoing audits of the 2001-2003 tax years) outstanding taxes, fines and interest for 
the years 2000 to 2003, which were not responded to.642 Yukos also requested a 
deferral of six months or payments in instalments.643 None of Yukos’ attempts to 
negotiate or settle were rejected, they were simply were not responded to.644 On 6 
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August 2004, Yukos mounted a successful legal challenge to have the YNG seizure 
set aside645 but the Tax Ministry successfully appealed the decision on 23 August 
2004. 
 
Between 2 September 2004 and 9 December 2004, Tax Ministry reassessments for 
Yukos’ 2000 to 2003 tax years were issued, which, together with Yukos’ 2004 tax 
liability, amounted to US$20.6 billion in taxes, fines and punitive interest.646 Yukos 
faced double fines for the 2001 to 2003 tax reassessments for being a repeat 
offender647 (the normal fine was 20%).648 
 
The bailiffs ordered the Russian Federal Property Fund who were in charge of the 
YNG auction to sell enough shares to cover the combined tax liabilities for 2000, 
2001 and 2003, despite Yukos having, by that time, settled the 2000 assessments in 
full and a portion of the 2001 assessments.649 The bailiffs responded to that fact by 
merging the 2002 assessments for collection by sale of the YNG shares along with 
the 2001 and 2003 assessments, and ordered the sale of all YNG shares to do so.650 
 
The YNG auction took place on 19 December 2004 and lasted only 10 minutes, with 
only one bidder buying all the YNG shares651 for US$9.3 billion.652 The buyer, 
BaikalFinansGroup (BFG), a company with no physical presence at its registered 
address and incorporated only days before the YNG auction, was bought by state-
owned Rosneft on 22 December for US$360, together with the voting shares in 
YNG, before the YNG payment price had to be paid.653 
 
                                                                                                                                          
ECtHR found that Russia “should have given very serious consideration to the other options” (Yukos v 
Russia (n. 111) at 654). 
645 ‘Timeline’ (The Yukos Library) < http://www.theyukoslibrary.com/en/library/timeline/> accessed 
14 June 2012. (The Yukos Library: Timeline). 
646 RosInvest Award at para 4, quoting the Claimant’s Post-Hearing Reply Brief; and The Yukos 
Library: Timeline (ibid). 
647 RosInvest Award at paras 69- 70. 
648 ibid at para 444. 
649 ibid at para 70. 
650 ibid. 
651 ibid. 
652 Quasar Award at para 104, quoting claimants’ Statement of Claim. 
653 RosInvest Award at para 76. 
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As recognised by the ECtHR, the auction of YNG “was capable of dealing a fatal 
blow to [Yukos’] ability to survive the tax claims and to continue its existence.”654 
The appropriation by Rosneft, and the Russian state as the ultimate beneficiary, was 
described by President Putin’s own chief economic adviser, Andrei Illarionov, as 
“expropriation of private property” and deserving of the prize for “swindle of the 
year”.655 Even Rosneft said its purchase of YNG was “the most monumental bargain 
in Russia’s modern history.”656 
 
As a result of the freezing orders on Yukos’ assets, Yukos defaulted on a US$1 
billion loan issued by a consortium led by Société Générale (SocGen), who obtained 
an English court judgment to enforce the outstanding US$472 million of that loan.657 
SocGen, applied to enforce the English judgment in the Russian courts, but in doing 
so, it entered into an agreement with Rosneft who discharged the US$472 million in 
full, with SocGen agreeing to pursue bankruptcy proceedings against Yukos.658 It 
was done in this way for appearance’s sake because Russia did not want to put begin 
the liquidation of Yukos when the state itself had stopped Yukos from discharging its 
SocGen debt (with the asset freeze).659 Therefore, when the Moscow Arbitrazh Court 
accepted the SocGen consortium’s bankruptcy petition, “Rosneft assumed Yukos’ 
debt from the consortium and, with the court’s approval, stepped into the shoes of the 
consortium in the bankruptcy proceedings.”660 Rosneft and the Russian state were 
now the only significant creditors of Yukos.661 The Quasar tribunal saw the 
bankruptcy sequence of events as being at odds with bankruptcy law and was 
actually “the use of insolvency as a device for gaining control of assets rather than 
satisfying debt.”662 In July 2006, Yukos kept fighting for survival. The Tax Ministry 
and Rosneft, together holding 94% of votes at the first creditors meeting on 20 and 
25 July 2006,663 rejected Yukos’ proposals to “immediately sell off $15.7 billion 
worth of core assets, and use $1.5 billion held in the Netherlands to pay off other 
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creditors - including Rosneft as the Societe Generale consortium's assignee. This 
would have left Yukos with core assets valued at $20.5 billion, which the Yukos 
management team explained could generate some $3 bil1ion per year to pay off the 
remaining recognised claims.”664 Instead, the decision was put forward to liquidate 
Yukos’ remaining assets.665 The choices of Yukos’ main creditors were, according to 
the Quasar tribunal “clearly… part of an overall confiscatory scheme.”666 On 1-4 
August 2006, Yukos was declared bankrupt.667 The auction of the remainder of 
Yukos’ assets resulted in 93% of Yukos being under the control of the Russian 
Federation,668 although Rosneft did borrow US$22 billion from the world’s leading 
financial institutions to buy the assets.669 
 
According to the claimant in RosInvest, the Tax Ministry also levied taxes against 
other oil companies for using the same tax planning strategies but not to the same 
level as applied to Yukos;670 and the other oil companies were able to settle their 
debts on reasonable terms when compared with the transfer of Yukos’ assets to a 
state-owned company.671  The claimant’s expert witness in RosInvest, Professor Peter 
Maggs, reported on the treatment of Yukos, in which he said: “The treatment of 
Yukos by the Russian tax authorities was inconsistent with the treatment of other 
comparable taxpayers. The authorities developed, and secured court approval of 
totally new theories of tax liability for the Yukos case. Even though a number of 
other large oil companies had made extensive use of trading companies in low tax 
regimes, these companies were not subjected to ruinous tax consequences.”672  
 
The central theme of the Yukos arbitrations was why Russia treated Yukos as it did if 
the true intention was a bona fide assessment and collection of taxes.673 This relays 
the substantial difference between the Yukos arbitrations and the ECtHR case of 
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 because the ECtHR case focused on whether Russia violated 
specific provisions of the ECHR, with no consideration of whether Russia 
expropriated Yukos and the foreign investments (foreign held shares) through its 
actions.675 
 
In RosInvest, although the claimant did not contend that the retroactive tax 
assessments made against Yukos caused a substantial deprivation (focusing on the 
auctions as being expropriatory),676 the tax elements were nevertheless assessed by 
the RosInvest tribunal together with all other actions attributed to the state, including 
the conduct (not the decisions)677 of the Russian courts in the context of denial of 
justice.678 Interestingly, according to the claimant in RosInvest, Russian judges “who 
ruled in favour of Yukos were removed from the case or the bench, those who ruled 
against [Yukos] were awarded the Order of Friendship and the Medal for Service to 
the Fatherland.”679 
 
The tribunal in Quasar was “concerned with whether Yukos’ tax delinquency was 
actually a pretext for the seizing of Yukos’ assets and the transfer of them to Rosneft 
or one of its affiliates.”680 
 
3.5.2 Tax Arbitration: Form of Measure vs Impact of Measure 
 
This section concerns the analysis of whether a state acting under its sovereign power 
to tax can get away with its measures not being analysed for expropriation purposes. 
 
In Feldman, the claimant (Feldman) contended that if the form of government 
measure used to carry out an expropriation happens to be tax laws that are applied in 
such a way to accomplish an expropriation does not convert the ensuing 
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expropriation into valid regulation.681 Feldman claimed the tax laws were used to 
drive CEMSA out of the cigarette export business by: (i) declining tax refunds to 
CEMSA; (ii) Mexico’s tax officials’ non-compliance with Amparo decision which in 
the claimant’s view meant that CEMSA was entitled to the zero-tax rate 
notwithstanding not being able to fulfil the itemised invoice requirement as required 
by Article 4(III) of the IEPS and the tax authorities’ strict application of the invoice 
requirement was contrary to the court decision and CEMSA’s rights to tax rebates;682 
(iii) retrospectively ordering the repayment by CEMSA of rebates already paid to it 
(with fines and penalties on top) for cigarette exports between April 1996 and 
September 1997 as well as denying applications for rebates for exports October and 
November 1997;683 and (iv) refusing CEMSA’s applications to register on the SER 
(with the Mexican authorities claiming the tax debt was the reason for the refusal). 
 
 
The Feldman tribunal acknowledged the ability of tax measures to be expropriatory, 
albeit only as indirect expropriation.684 The tribunal recognised that governmental 
authorities can force companies out of business with confiscatory taxation, but at the 
same time, states must have the freedom to act in the broader public interest with 
new or modified tax regimes.685 The Feldman tribunal did not give a hard-and-fast 
rule on when the power to tax results in a compensable taking under international 
law, stating that it requires a case-by-case analysis.686  
 
                                                 
681 Feldman Award at para 91. 
682 ibid at para 91; Mexico countered the proposition of non-compliance with the Amparo action by 
contending that the detailed invoice requirement was not dealt with in the Amparo decision, and 
therefore the tax authorities made the zero-tax rate available to CEMSA but were nevertheless subject 
to the fulfilment of all requirements of the tax law (ibid at para 92). According to Mexico, the tax 
officials “did not, and could not have, abrogated from the other requirements of the [IEPS] law, 
including but not limited to providing invoices with tax amounts separately stated...” (ibid at para 93). 
The tribunal confirmed that the Amparo decision did not deal with the invoice requirement because 
the claimant failed to challenge it during the Amparo proceedings (ibid at para 122). The invoice 
requirement received inconsistent court decisions thereafter, with the Mexican Circuit Court deciding 
the invoice requirement was not inconsistent with the principles of tax equity (ibid at para 94), and a 
Mexican court of appeal apparently holding (on 29 March 2002, during the course of the arbitration) 
“that the Claimant did have a constitutional right under the IEPS law in force in 1996-1997 
notwithstanding his inability to produce invoices showing the tax amounts separately, on the ground 
that the invoice “formality” discriminates among different taxpayers (producers and exporters) who 
carry on the same activity” (ibid at para 83). 
683 Feldman Award at para 91. 
684 ibid at para 101; see section 3.5.3 below. 
685 ibid at para 103. 
686 ibid at para 102. 
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By not throwing the case out just because the government measure in question 
centred around the state’s sovereign power to tax, the Feldman tribunal gave 
precedence to the impact of the government measure over and above the form of 
measure, with an analysis of the facts required to determine whether those tax 
powers were used to unlawfully expropriate an investment. 
 
In EnCana, the tribunal found that “taxation is in a special category”687 (emphasis 
mine) from an expropriation perspective. The tribunal was clear that tax laws, which 
are a legal liability on a class of persons to pay money to the state, are not takings of 
property.688 ‘Takings’ in this context means ‘expropriation’ in the traditional sense. 
The tribunal said that taxes cannot be ‘takings’ because otherwise the power to tax 
which is a “universal State prerogative”,689 would be impossible to utilise on account 
of “a guarantee against expropriation”.690 Notwithstanding, if the tax measure is 
“extraordinary, punitive in amount or arbitrary in its incidence”,691 it could it be 
expropriatory. This means that if the impact of a tax measure has the former 
qualities, it can be expropriatory, despite the allegedly unlawful state conduct being 
shielded by the sovereign prerogative to tax. 
 
In Occidental, Ecuador claimed that taxation cannot be expropriatory,692 but the 
arbitral tribunal disagreed, stating that taxation can indeed be expropriatory just as 
other regulatory measures can.693 But, like all claims for expropriation, the impact of 
the tax  measure  must “meet the standards required by international law” 694 to be 
expropriatory. This proves again that in investor-state arbitration, the merits of tax as 
expropriation will be examined and not disregarded by arbitral tribunals just because 
the form of state measure used for an alleged expropriation is a tax measure. 
 
                                                 





692 Occidental Award at para 82. 
693 ibid at para 85. 
694 ibid at para 86. 
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The Burlington tribunal recognised that tax is a non-compensable taking695 and said 
it is “by definition an appropriation of assets by the State.”696 Despite the non-
compensable characteristic of tax, as well as its being an essential prerogative of 
sovereignty,697 the tribunal determined that a state can be liable for violating 
protections granted under international law (i.e. under an IIT) and specifically for the 
purposes of the case under the expropriation protection of the US-Ecuador BIT 
through tax measures.698 The tribunal said that under customary international law, 
“taxes may not be discriminatory and they may not be confiscatory.”699 The tribunal 
determined that confiscatory taxation correlates to expropriatory taxation,700 and the 
terms ‘confiscatory taxation’ and ‘expropriatory taxation’ can be used 
interchangeably.701 Referring to the 1961 Harvard Draft702 and its provision that “the 
execution of tax laws is not wrongful provided that the tax “is not an abuse of [...] 
powers [...] for the purpose of depriving an alien of his property””703 as well as the 
Third Restatement which “provides that states are responsible for “expropriation [...] 
when it subjects alien property to taxation [...] that is confiscatory […]””,704 the 
Burlington tribunal entertained the submissions by the claimant that Law 42 was 
expropriatory. However, in deciding whether Law 42 was expropriatory/confiscatory 
or permissible under international law, the impact of the tax was the most important 
factor in distinguishing so.705 Essentially, the Burlington tribunal decided that the 
characterisation of an allegedly expropriatory measure as a tax will not prevent a 
finding that the state has breached international law if the impact of the tax is 
confiscatory. 
 
The Archer Daniels tribunal said that expropriations can occur through measures 
other than direct takings, specifically citing taxation as an example of such 
                                                 
695 Burlington Award at para 391. 
696 ibid. 
697 ibid. 
698 ibid at para 392. 
699 ibid at para 393. 
700 ibid at para 394. 
701 ibid; the Burlington tribunal referred to the interchangeable use of ‘confiscatory taxation’ and 
‘expropriatory taxation’ in Thomas Wälde and Abba Kolo, Investor-State Disputes, ‘The Interface 
Between Treaty-Based International Investment Protection and Fiscal Sovereignty’ (2007) 35(8/9) 
Intertax 424, 441. 
702 See 3.1.3.3 above. 
703 Burlington Award at para 394. 
704 ibid. 
705 ibid at para 395. 
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expropriations.706 The tribunal was, in effect, saying that taxation can be indirect 
expropriation. Indeed, Article 2103(6) of NAFTA contains a tax veto clause, which, 
as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, indicates that tax as expropriation is an 
arbitrable matter which in itself is recognition of the capability of tax to be 
expropriatory. Although the Cargill and Corn Products tribunals did not assess the 
form of measure against the impact of the measure, they recognised the tax veto in 
NAFTA,707 with the Cargill tribunal pointing out that the United States tax 
authorities “would not… agree that the [sweetener tax] was not an expropriation”708 
which paved the way for arbitration under Article 1110.709 
 
In Link-Trading, the tribunal, whilst recognising Moldova’s right to regulate its 
customs and make changes as it deems necessary, said that an abuse of the tax power 
can be tantamount to expropriation.710 The arbitral tribunal recognised that tax can be 
expropriatory on two bases: (i) under the provisions of the relevant IIT, which in 
Link-Trading was Article X of the US-Moldova BIT (the tax exclusions article), 
under which the application of the expropriation provision of the BIT (Article III(1)) 
was not excepted to taxation measures;711 and (ii) if taxes are abusive takings.712 
Abusive takings were defined as unfair and inequitable treatment of the investment 
by the state; measures that are arbitrary and discriminatory in their character or their 
implementation; or measures that are contrary to an obligation that the state has 
given to the investor/investment713 (i.e. a violation of legitimate expectations). 
 
The El Paso tribunal reiterated the sovereign right of states to enact taxes that are 
deemed appropriate at any particular time714 and there is a presumption of validity in 
favour of said taxes and the tax exclusion clause at Article XII of the US-Argentina 
BIT embodied that idea by restricting the effect of the BIT on the state’s tax 
powers.715 Those limitations did not and do not include tax as expropriation716 which 
                                                 
706 Archer Daniels Award at para 238. 
707 Cargill Award at para 16; Corn Products Award at note 70. 
708 Cargill Award at para 17. 
709 ibid. 
710 Link-Trading Award at para 68. 
711 Link-Trading Award at para 63. 
712 ibid at para 64. 
713 ibid. 




is why the tribunal went on to examine whether Argentina’s tax measures constituted 
expropriation.717 As shall be seen in the sections below, the El Paso tribunal required 
tax measures to violate legitimate expectations and/or be substantial deprivations by 
resulting in the neutralisation of an investor’s property rights. 
 
In RosInvest, the tribunal was clear that, despite the normal application of domestic 
tax laws in a host state is not in itself expropriation, the mere fact that host state 
measures take the form of tax law application and enforcement does not prevent a 
tribunal from examining whether those tax measures are expropriatory under an 
IIT.718 Similarly, the Quasar tribunal, upon finding that Russia’s tax measures were a 
pretext to expropriation (see 3.5.4 below), said that their finding does not mean that 
“ostensible tax measures are in fact compensatory takings” and “the presumption 
must be that measures are bona fide, unless there is convincing evidence that, upon a 
true characterisation, they constitute a taking”719 (emphasis mine). 
 
It is clear from the analysis of the above tax arbitrations that host states cannot avoid 
arbitrating the question of tax expropriation on the premise that their measures 
concern the sovereign power to tax. All of the arbitral tribunals recognised the power 
to tax but that the power has to be balanced with the rights of investors under 
international law. Essentially, all the tribunals above found that taxes can have 
expropriatory impacts, and so the labelling of allegedly expropriatory measures as 
taxation measures will not prevent a tribunal from examining the facts of the case. 
 
3.5.3 Tax Arbitration: Direct Expropriation 
 
This section analyses when certain tax measures might amount to a direct 
expropriation. 
 
In El Paso, although the claimant claimed Argentina’s tax measures constituted a 
direct and indirect expropriation, the tribunal did not distinguish between the two in 
their award, and their dismissal of El Paso’s are discussed in the sections below. 
                                                                                                                                          
716 ibid at para 292-292. 
717 ibid. 
718 RosInvest Award at para 628. 
719 Quasar Award at para 181. 
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EnCana was the only case from those described at 3.5.1 above that was analysed 
extensively in the context of direct expropriation. This was despite the Feldman 
tribunal’s viewpoint that tax measures by their nature can amount only to indirect 
expropriation.720 
 
As discussed at times throughout this chapter, taxation can amount to a direct 
expropriation because it can be a taking of money. This is made possible in the 
context of tax refunds because the money (property) is already in the hands of the 
state, and if the money is considered to be an investment under the IIT, if it is taken, 
or most likely, not given back in the form of tax refunds, then it might have been 
directly expropriated. 
 
In EnCana, EnCana argued that, through its subsidiaries, it had been wrongly denied 
of its right to tax refunds, in breach of Ecuadorian law,721 and that breach amounted 
to a direct expropriation. Under the Canada-Ecuador BIT, as with most IITs, an 
investment is widely defined. The BIT defines investment as “any asset owned or 
controlled either directly, or indirectly through an investor of a third State, by an 
investor of a Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party and 
includes… (iii) money [and] claims to money.”722 The examples of an investments at 
Article I(g) of the BIT are not exhaustive and do not form a restrictive genus by the 
insertion of the words “in particular, though not exclusively” before citing the 
examples of investments, making the definition of investment very broad.723 Article 
VIII of the BIT (expropriation provision) states that “Investments or returns of 
investors of either Contracting Party shall not be… expropriated…”724 (emphasis 
mine). ‘Returns’ is defined in the BIT as “all amounts yielded by an investment and 
in particular, though not exclusively, includes profits, interest, capital gains, 
dividends, royalties, fees or other current income” (emphasis mine).725 The EnCana 
tribunal decided the BIT contained a very broad definition of an investment is and 
what a return is, therefore tax refunds fell within the BIT’s definitions. In Occidental, 
                                                 
720 Feldman Award at para 101. 
721 EnCana Award at para 179. 
722 Article I(g), Canada-Ecuador BIT. 
723 EnCana Award at para 182.. 
724 Article VIII(1), Canada-Ecuador BIT 
725 Article I(j), Canada-Ecuador BIT; EnCana Final Award, para 117. 
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OEPC tried to persuade the tribunal that rights to VAT refunds were investments in 
themselves726 under the definition of investment in the US-Ecuador BIT which 
includes “a claim to money… associated with an investment”727 but this was rejected 
by the tribunal728 who said that “[h]owever broad the definition of investment might 
be under the Treaty it would be quite extraordinary for a company to invest in a 
refund claim.”729 The tribunal did not, however, preclude the possibility of a refund 
claim being a claim to money,730  and that is actually what was found in the 
affirmative by the EnCana tribunal within the ambit of the Canada-Ecuador BIT. 
 
The next hurdle was to determine whether either or both the prospective and 
retrospective denial of VAT refunds could amount to an expropriation under the BIT. 
 
The EnCana tribunal determined that the prospective denial of VAT refunds for 
future transactions which is based on changes to the tax regime is within Ecuador’s 
normal state prerogative as is determining and varying the levels of taxes.731 So, 
prospective denials could not be an expropriation and were not examined as such. 
The right of an investor to be paid VAT refunds which had been denied in retrospect, 
i.e. those “accrued in respect of past transactions”,732 did fall under the BIT’s broad 
scope of “amounts yielded by an investment.”733 Therefore, Ecuador’s retrospective 
denial of VAT refunds fell under the tribunal’s jurisdiction to be heard as a claim for 
expropriation under Article VIII(1)734 and Article XII(4)735 of the BIT.736 
 
As to the applicable law to decide the expropriation claim, the tribunal decided that 
the tax laws of Ecuador must be applied to the necessary extent to answer the 
claim737 because the tax measure was created by Ecuadorian authorities and laws.738 
                                                 
726 Occidental Award at para 81. 
727 Article I(1)(a)(iii), US-Ecuador BIT. 
728 Occidental Award at para 86. 
729 ibid. 
730 ibid. 
731 ibid at para 183. 
732 ibid. 
733 ibid; quoting Article I(j), Canada-Ecuador BIT, “returns”. 
734 Expropriation. provision. 
735 Article XII(4) contained a tax veto provision which permitted the application of Article VIII 
(expropriation) to taxation measures subject to the tax authorities of both states not agreeing within 6 
months that there has been an expropriation. 
736 EnCana Award at para 183. 




Ecuador’s Interpretative Law No. 2004-41  of 11 August 2004739 (the Interpretative 
Law) gave an interpretation of Article 69A of ITRL, clearly stating that “petroleum 
is not a good that is fabricated” for the purposes of Article 69A ITRL, thereby ruling 
out VAT refunds for inputs in oil exploration and exploitation under Article 69A. 
The right to refunds to be decided by the tribunal was for periods before and after the 
Interpretative Law was enacted because the denying resolutions that made the basis 
of the dispute were for trading periods before the passing of the Interpretative Law740 
but EnCana made a claim for VAT refunds in the arbitration (through its Statement 
of Claim) for its subsidiary AEC for periods when tax was paid after the enactment 
of the Interpretative Law.741 For the post-Interpretative Law claims to tax refunds, 
the Interpretative Law would have to be unconstitutional for the tribunal to decide 
the issue, but the tribunal refused to determine the Interpretative Law’s 
constitutionality, declaring that the constitutionality of Ecuador’s laws had to be 
determined through the methods provided under Ecuador’s Political Constitution.742 
Therefore, the Interpretative Law was presumed to be constitutional and the claims 
for expropriation of tax refunds after the enactment of the Interpretative Law were 
rejected.743 
 
The questions to then be determined by the tribunal were whether the EnCana 
subsidiaries had a right to VAT refunds under Ecuadorian law for the period before 
the Interpretative Law was enacted, especially those periods covered by the denying 
resolutions, and if so, whether that right was expropriated by Ecuador.744 The 
tribunal acted on the assumption that EnCana did have a right to VAT refunds under 
Ecuadorian law on the basis that the Occidental tribunal determined so, even though 
the Occidental decision was not binding on the EnCana tribunal.745 The EnCana 
arbitrators also assumed that SRI made a policy decision “to do everything within its 
                                                                                                                                          
738 ibid at para 184. 
739 ibid at  para 95. 
740 ibid at para 185. 
741 ibid. 
742 ibid at para 186. 
743 ibid at para 186 and 187. 
744 ibid at para 188. 




power to deny refunds to the oil companies.”746 They then analysed whether the 
denial of EnCana’s right to VAT refunds and the SRI’s policy actioned by the 
denying resolutions was expropriatory within the meaning of the BIT.747  
 
The EnCana tribunal adopted the position that when a tax law is not itself a violation 
of rights, but the tax legislation is breached by a governmental body, including the 
tax authorities, that does not equate to an outright taking of property (or an indirect 
expropriation) unless it is accompanied by a denial of due process (i.e. no access to 
Ecuadorian courts through legal or practical means).748 
 
The EnCana tribunal said that a tax authority has the right under international law to 
take a position (even if it is wrong in law) regarding tax claims by 
individuals/companies as long as that position is made in good faith and the authority 
is ready to defend its stance in the courts.749 The policy of a tax authority is not 
reviewable under expropriation provision in IITs “unless that policy in itself amounts 
an actual and effective repudiation of legal rights.”750 The legal right to tax refunds 
can be repudiated, according to the EnCana decision, if: (i) the refusal is not merely 
wilful; (ii) the aggrieved party has access to the courts; and (iii) the courts’ decisions 
are independent of the state and cannot be overridden or repudiated by the state.751 
 
Applying the above criterion set out by the EnCana tribunal, prior to the 
Interpretative Law, oil companies could and did challenge the SRI’s decisions in 
Ecuador’s courts and succeeded on some occasions; when it lost, the SRI complied 
with the court decisions without delay;752 the SRI’s director (Dr. de Mena - who 
personally oversaw the VAT refund situation of oil companies and was in contact 
with Petroecuador’s President to determine whether or not VAT refunds were 
included in Factor X of the participation contracts) acted in good faith and this was 
                                                 
746 ibid at para 190. 
747 ibid at para 191. 
748 EnCana Award at para 192-195; the EnCana tribunal arrived at this decision by adopting the 
position by the Waste Management tribunal that “the mere non-performance of a contractual 
obligation” (emphasis mine) does not equate to a taking of property or a measure tantamount to 
expropriation (Waste Management Award at para 174). 
749 EnCana Award at para 194. 
750 ibid at para 195. 
751 ibid at para 194. 
752 ibid at para 196. 
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not denied by EnCana753; and the decisions of Ecuador’s decisions were not 
bipartisan, biased against oil companies or non-independent.754 
 
On analysis of the above, EnCana’s claim that its VAT payments were directly 
expropriated by Ecuador was rejected755 because the SRI’s policy on VAT refunds 
“never rose to the level of repudiation of an Ecuadorian legal right.”756 
 
The EnCana decision tells us that tax measures will not amount to direct 
expropriation unless they are accompanied by a violation of the conduct 
requirements, namely due process. This is of course a deviation from the usual rule 
that the conduct requirements’ role is to differentiate between lawful and unlawful 
expropriation. Although a violation of due process can help to prove that a state’s 
measures err on the side of expropriation rather than non-compensable government 
takings, the fact that due process is not violated, in my opinion, does not bar a state 
measure from being expropriation, it just happens to be a lawful expropriation 
without compensation. 
 
There could have been an interesting divergence between the EnCana decision and 
the Occidental decision had the Occidental tribunal proceeded with the line of 
reasoning that tax refunds were claims to money. The Occidental tribunal said that 
the claim to money would still have “to meet the standard required by international 
law” to be expropriatory.757 This means that it would have to meet the level of 
substantial deprivation and the access to due process or lack of it would not have 
been a determinative issue. It goes without saying that on a substantial deprivation 
analysis, the retrospective denial of tax refunds was a substantial deprivation of the 
claim to those moneys. On a direct expropriation front, the tax money was not given 
back by Ecuador’s treasury, therefore it was taken. The Occidental tribunal 
presumably did not go into the analysis because they had the national treatment (and 
                                                 
753 ibid; the Occidental tribunal also said the SRI’s decisions appeared to be founded on reason and 
fact, not prejudice or preference (Occidental Award at para 163). The SRI tried to bring some 
resemblance of order to the variety of contradictory practices, rules and regulations dealing with the 
VAT refund issue (Occidental Award at para 163). 
754 EnCana Award at para 196; in addition, Ecuador’s Tax Court and Supreme Court had differences 
of opinion which suggested proper due process (at para 196).  
755 ibid at para 197. 
756 ibid. 
757 Occidental Award at para 86. 
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fair and equitable treatment) protection to find Ecuador liable under (see Chapter 4), 
and so, unlike the EnCana tribunal, the Occidental tribunal “could afford to reject the 
expropriation claim – a frequently used satisfaction provided by tribunals to 
otherwise losing respondents, as it had been able to construct a jurisdictional and 
merits reasoning for the national treatment claim.”758 
 
3.5.4 Tax Arbitration: Intent vs Effect 
 
This section analyses whether the state’s intent to expropriate using tax measures 
can, on its own, lead to a finding of expropriation, or whether the tax measures must 
actually have the effect of expropriation regardless of the state’s intent. 
 
In Feldman, the arbitral tribunal recognised that Mexico had “opposed the 
Claimant’s business activities at every step of the way, notwithstanding a few periods 
when the rebates were granted.”759 The business referred to by the tribunal was the 
claimant’s cigarette business. CEMSA, the claimant’s company, was effectively 
precluded from exporting cigarettes and lost all profits derived from that business, 
which could suggest the existence of an expropriation.760 But, the right of the 
claimant/his company to export goods, a right which was purportedly ‘taken’ by the 
state, was a right the claimant never possessed.761 In addition, CEMSA traded in the 
exported alcoholic beverages business and these goods were also eligible for zero-
rate taxes (subject to the equivalent itemised invoices being obtained).762 The 
claimant remained free to pursue the export of the cigarettes business as well as other 
related export activities for which he could and did fulfil legal requirements for by 
obtaining the necessary invoices from manufacturers of alcoholic beverages763 to be 
granted tax rebates.764 Therefore, together with a lack of deprivation (see 3.5.6 
below), even if the intent of the Mexican tax authorities was to completely prevent 
the claimant from trading in the cigarette export business (it was and it did), the 
                                                 
758 Wälde and Kolo (n. 699) 445. 
759 Feldman Award at para 149. 
760 ibid at para 152. 
761 ibid; the reader is reminded that CEMSA could not obtain a permit to export cigarettes on the 
premise that audits were being carried out for tax refunds paid to the company over the years without 
the requisite invoices being submitted to the tax authorities. 
762 ibid at para 124. 
763 ibid at para 122. 
764 ibid at para 152; in addition to alcoholic beverages, the claimant had also in the past exported 
photographic supplies (at para 142). 
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effect on the entirety of the investment (i.e. on CEMSA) was not expropriatory 
because CEMSA was free to pursue other continuing lines of export trading765 which 
were unaffected by the tax authority’s measures on the cigarette business and thus 
CEMSA itself was not expropriated.766 
 
In Cargill, the arbitral tribunal’s finding regarding the sweetener tax and the 
claimant’s business in Mexico was similar to that in Feldman. The HFCS business 
was not CMSC’s only business in Mexico,767 and although the claimant argued that 
the discriminatory sweetener tax resulted in a near-total loss of the business income 
stream from HFCS,768 the sweetener tax’s effect on the subsidiary in its entirety (not 
only on the HFCS business) had to meet the requisite levels of deprivation (i.e. 
substantial).769 Effect, again, took primacy over intent. 
 
In Archer Daniels, the claimants stressed that the WTO Panel Report, Mexican 
officials’ proclamations and a Mexican Supreme Court pronouncement that the 
sweetener tax was discriminatory demonstrated that the tax amounted to a taking.770 
The claimants also said the sweetener tax had the effect of expropriation.771 The 
tribunal recognised that the effect-based doctrine was what other tribunals had relied 
on, namely that the tax would have to substantially interfere with the investment and 
would have to deprive the investor of all or most benefits of the investment.772 So, 
pointing to the claimants’ contention that the sweetener tax was discriminatory and 
therefore expropriatory, the tribunal said that “no expropriation occurs unless the 
measure’s degree of interference is substantial… [and] the alleged discriminatory 
character of the Tax – standing alone – is not a sufficient criterion for an 
expropriation.”773 
 
The Corn Products tribunal did not differ from the intent vs effect reasoning, also 
stating that “[i]t is not the case that, because a measure which affects property rights 
                                                 
765 ibid at para 152. 
766 ibid. 
767 Cargill Award at paras 197-199. 
768 ibid at para 368. 
769 ibid. 
770 Archer Daniels Award at para 232. 
771 ibid at para 240. 
772 ibid. 
773 ibid at para 251. 
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is discriminatory, it is therefore an expropriation.”774 Rather, for the Corn Products 
tribunal, if a tax measure is expropriatory, the host state cannot justify the 
expropriatory measure if it is discriminatory.775 
 
The Burlington tribunal recognised that the intent of a state is a factor that can help 
to distinguish between permissible and confiscatory taxation.776 In this respect, the 
state’s intent to deprive an investor and force the investor into abandoning its 
investment or selling at a distress price would indicate the existence of 
expropriation.777 The Burlington tribunal, however, determined that the effect of the 
tax measure plays a primary role over and above the intent,778 attributing its thinking 
to the decision in Tippetts. Intent can of course help to confirm the outcome of the 
effects test.779 In addition, the Burlington tribunal said that taxes are illegal if they 
are discriminatory, but even so, they would still have to meet the substantial 
deprivation test to be expropriatory in spite of their being illegal.780 This is a similar 
thought to what was written at the outset of this chapter, namely that a violation of 
the conduct requirements can help to determine whether a measure errs on the side of 
expropriation, but does not actually mean that an expropriation has occurred. As 
discussed at 3.5.6 below, Burlington was unsuccessful in its tax expropriation claim 
because it was not substantially deprived of its investment through the tax measures. 
In this regard and in the context of the coactiva proceedings not being expropriatory, 
the tribunal reiterated that the dispositive consideration was the “effects of the 
measures, rather than their underlying motivation”.781 
 
The Burlington tribunal took the view that Ecuador’s Law 42 at 50% did not have an 
expropriatory intent.782  Its intent was to replicate in the participation contracts the 
effect of the price adjustment clauses similar to those in the Tarapoa contract.783 On 
the other hand, the intent behind Law 42 at 99% was to force Burlington to “abdicate 
                                                 
774 Corn Products Award at para 90. 
775 ibid. 




780 ibid at para 402. 
781 ibid at para 482. 
782 Burlington Award at para 432. 
783 Burlington Award at para 432. 
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its rights under the [participation contracts].”784 Despite the state’s expropriatory 
intention, the tribunal said the intent behind the tax measure cannot on its own make 
up for the lack of substantial deprivation.785 Again, effects came out on top of intent. 
 
In Link-Trading, the tribunal focused on both the intent of the tax measures and their 
effects (discussed at 3.5.6 below), but did not expressly pitch intent against effect. 
An analysis of the award shows that the tribunal focused more on the importance of 
the effect because under the US-Moldova BIT, the claimant had to prove “the causal 
link between the measures complained of and the deprivation of its business.”786 The 
tribunal did, however, analyse whether the measures complained of were 
discriminatory, and they were not for the following reasons: (i) the changes in the tax 
regime impacted other retailers in the FEZ and not only the claimant;787 and (ii) in 
comparison to retailers outside the FEZ in Moldova, the claimant was not treated less 
favourably and as a matter of fact the claimant had benefits over those retailers 
because it imported goods into the FEZ duty-free and tax-free, deferring payment of 
the applicable taxes until the final resale, whereas local retailers outside the FEZ 
would have paid those charges upon import.788 The tax laws therefore did not put the 
claimant in a worse competitive position than other nationalities of retailers and the 
substance of the tax measures were not dissimilar to policies of many countries, 
despite the unfavourable change for the claimant.789 
 
In the Yukos cases, on the use of tax havens, the Quasar tribunal said that “[a]s a 
matter of fairness, tax authorities should not seek to shift the blame for the undesired 
policy to Russian businesses who took advantage of the policy”.790 The tax 
authorities were aware of the tax advantages derived by big businesses and engaged 
in debates on the subject791 and were aware that Yukos used a tax optimisation 
strategy (or could have easily known about it).792 The RosInvest and Quasar tribunals 
                                                 
784 ibid at para 455. 
785 ibid. 
786 Link-Trading Award at para 87. 
787 ibid at para 71. 
788 ibid. 
789 ibid at para 72. 
790 Quasar Award at para 57, quoting Vladimir Samoylenko, ‘Government Policies in Regard to 
Internal Tax Havens in Russia’ (2004) Tax Notes International 34. 
791 Quasar Award at para 57. 
792 Quasar Award at para 52. 
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judged the tax authorities’ contentions that they were not aware of the use of the low 
tax regions as being unpersuasive.793 The whole point of the tax regions was to 
“attract economic activity”794 and the regions “were authorised to grant… tax 
advantages by dispensation from the federal government by reason of their special 
development needs within the framework of macroeconomic policy.”795 There were 
two business options for companies to conduct their affairs and these were 
exclusively tax driven, namely the choice between remaining in a high-tax 
jurisdiction or remaining in a low-tax jurisdiction.796 Making a choice was not an 
abuse of the tax system797 because the taxpayer is entitled to choose between the 
relevant options798 and the Russian Tax Ministry shifted the blame for undesired tax 
policy to the taxpayer instead of reforming legislation.799  
 
The RosInvest tribunal decided that: (i) the interpretation of Russian law to make up 
a good-faith/bad-faith doctrine in the use of low-tax regions and relying on that to 
label Yukos and the trading companies as shams without economic substance was a 
novel application of Russian law and was not used before or against other 
comparable tax payers;800 (ii) the proportionality principle (on how much a company 
invests in the low-tax region in proportion to its gains) was not part of any law;801 
(iii) the interpretation of the VAT law was formalistic;802 and (iv) the doubling of 
repeat offender fines resulting in US$3.8 billion of tax liability on their own were not 
used in any comparable cases.803 For those reasons, the RosInvest tribunal found that 
the tax measures taken by Russia were not bona fide and were discriminatory.804 The 
tax assessments, according to the tribunal, when considering that they resulted from a 
three week audit and not a comprehensive six month audit and that no other 
comparable company was treated the same “can hardly be accepted as bona fide 
                                                 
793 RosInvest Award at para 451; and Quasar Award at para 57. 
794 Quasar Award at para 60. 
795 ibid. 
796 ibid at para 74. 
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798 ibid at para 69. 
799 ibid at para 57. 
800 RosInvest Award at para 449. 
801 ibid at para 450. 
802 ibid at para 452. 
803 ibid at para 453. 
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treatment.”805 Overall, the RosInvest tribunal found the: (i) the VAT assessments and 
fines were extraordinary and not bona fide and not non-discriminatory taxation 
measures;806 (ii) Yukos used ambiguous legislation that allowed the use of low tax 
regions to its advantage but done so in an open and transparent way, and the 
application of so-called good faith and proportionality principles by the Tax Ministry 
to make Yukos liable for profits of the trading companies was not bona fide and was 
in fact discriminatory treatment, especially in view of other companies using the 
same methods and not being treated as Yukos was treated;807 (iii) the repeat offender 
fines for US$3.8 billion for Yukos’ conduct that pre-dated the findings that it was a 
first-time offender was part of a cumulative effort in destroying Yukos;808 (iv) the 
YNG auction and purchase of YNG by BFG was a front for Rosneft that was 
organised in a manner to ensure state control of Yukos’ prized asset – “in short the 
Tribunal is convinced that the auction of YNG was rigged”;809 and (v) the 
bankruptcy auctions, although not foul of Russian law, were initiated and conducted 
by SocGen in association with Rosneft which therefore fitted in with “the obvious 
general pattern and obvious intention of the totality scheme to deprive Yukos of its 
assets”810 (emphasis mine). Russia’s intent was therefore to expropriate Yukos, and 
that intent was also made obvious by the discrimination against the company, 
whereas no other company was subjected to the same relentless attacks as Yukos was 
despite using almost identical ‘tax avoidance’ measures.811 Russia’s intent was put 
into effect by the tax measures and consequent auctions and liquidation proceedings, 
whereby Yukos’ assets were expropriated by removing them from the company and 
from certain individuals’ control812 (obviously mainly Khodorkovsky and Lebedev).  
 
On Russia’s Tax Ministry’s assessment of alleged sham transactions, the Quasar 
tribunal said that “[r]ather than [being] a part of the foundation of undoing a sham 
transaction, this seems to be an indicium of a sham tax assessment.”813 The Quasar 
tribunal also decided that Russia was hostile towards Yukos by first invalidating the 
                                                 
805 ibid at para 497. 
806 ibid at para 620(a). 
807 ibid at para 620(b). 
808 ibid at para 620(c). 
809 ibid at para 620(d). 
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811 ibid at para 621. 
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trading companies’ exports and making Yukos liable for VAT in excess of US$13.5 
billion on the basis of being the true seller, and then not allowing Yukos to apply for 
the VAT refunds – Russia tried to have it both ways.814 Also, by not giving Yukos a 
moment to catch its breath and dispose of its assets in an orderly fashion to cover the 
tax assessments, the Tax Ministry did not act like a legitimately operating tax 
authority would.815 This included the Tax Ministry’s refusal to wait for three years 
before acting on the writ of execution (it acted immediately, giving Yukos five days 
to pay its tax debts).  Although tax authorities should seek to collect monies 
expeditiously, that aim should be balanced with rational care and the right of the 
taxpayer.816 Such rationality was accorded to Rosneft when it became liable for 
YNG’s tax debts with a scheduled quarterly payment over five years agreed to by the 
Tax Ministry.817 The failure of the Tax Ministry to work with or even respond to 
Yukos’ multiple settlement requests was “disturbing to say the least”818 and if the 
real intent was to collect legitimately-owed taxes, Russia could have come to a 
satisfactory conclusion that did not involve the liquidation of Yukos.819 The quick 
sale of an asset the size of YNG and the lack of investigation by Russia before 
dismantling a company of Yukos’ magnitude820 proved the intent and effect of the tax 
assessments was to subjugate Yukos rather than to collect taxes.821 Therefore, the 
real goal behind the tax assessments against Yukos was a ploy to expropriate Yukos 
and not to legitimately collect taxes.822 The Quasar tribunal determined that Russia 
expropriated Yukos823 – it purposely did not say whether the expropriation was 
lawful or unlawful because its mandate was only to decide whether there had been an 
expropriation.824 
 
                                                 
814 Quasar Award at para 80. 
815 Quasar Award at para 170. 
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817 ibid at para 175. 
818 ibid at para 103. 
819 ibid; an investigation would have been required to decide whether Yukos could actually pay its tax 




822 ibid at para 177. 
823 ibid at para 186. 
824 ibid; it is obvious that the expropriation was unlawful because it was discriminatory, fell foul of 
due process and was discriminatory. It can be argued that it was in the public interest, but I am not 
saying that it was. 
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3.5.5 Tax Arbitration: Legitimate and Reasonable Expectations of the 
Investor 
 
In Feldman, under Mexico’s IEPS law, the presentation of detailed invoices to 
receive tax refunds had been a condition since from 1 January 1987 and this spanned 
through the time the claimant, Feldman, invested in Mexico in April 1990 until 1 
January 1998 when the law was amended to allow tax rebates only to the first sale of 
cigarettes in Mexico.825 Therefore, the invoice requirement was always written law, 
and although it was not always applied,826 it was not expropriatory and was a 
reasonable legal requirement backed up by rational policy – i.e. the Mexican tax 
authorities could straightforwardly, accurately, and without overstatement, analyse 
and process the tax amounts for which rebates were sought.827 Indeed, without the 
invoices, the claimant was unable to know and declare precisely the amounts of tax 
rebates CEMSA would be owed,828 and had on some occasions used formulas to 
estimate the tax refund amounts, which were accepted in 1992, but were grossly 
overstated in later years.829 The fact that the tax law’s invoice requirement was 
always law since Feldman’s investment in Mexico but had not been enforced could 
not give him a legitimate expectation that enforcement of the tax laws would not 
change. As noted by the tribunal, “tax authorities in most countries do not act in a 
consistent and predictable way.”830 Therefore, a line of conduct by tax authorities 
(i.e. their enforcement or non-enforcement of tax laws) cannot give an investor a 
legitimate expectation that such conduct would continue and there can be no 
expropriation on those grounds. 
 
In EnCana, part of the indirect expropriation claim was based on a legitimate 
expectation to receive VAT refunds. The EnCana tribunal recognised that a tax 
expropriation can occur if specific commitments have been made by the host state as 
regards tax measures,831 such as a tax stabilisation clause.832 Without a commitment 
being made by a host state to an investor/investments, the host state is entitled to 
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change its tax laws as it sees fit, with the investor having “neither the right nor any 
legitimate expectation that the tax regime will not change, perhaps to its 
disadvantage, during the period of investment”833 (emphasis mine). There was no 
such commitment made by Ecuador in EnCana. Therefore, if the economic benefit 
from the investment is reduced by taxation, in the absence of a specific commitment 
made by the host state to the investor, tax measures will not be expropriatory. 
 
Similarly, in Cargill, the tribunal rejected the notion that an investor could have 
reasonable investment-backed expectations that the tax law will remain stable unless 
such expectations arise from contract or quasi-contractual bases.834 
 
In Link Trading, the tribunal determined that tax measures which violate obligations 
given by the state to an investment can be abusive,835 and abusive tax measures can 
amount to expropriation.836 In that case, however, the tribunal agreed with 
Moldova’s position on the 10-year guarantee, concluding that Moldova did not make 
any specific obligations to maintain the customs and tax regimes applicable to the 
claimant’s customers buying in the FEZ.837 The claimant could not, therefore, have 
had a legitimate expectation that the tax regime would not change and so there was 
no expropriation on that basis. 
 
In El Paso, El Paso claimed that “[i]nvestors have a reasonable and legitimate 
expectation to be able to adjust their fixed assets for tax purposes in periods of high 
inflation.”838 This argument was rejected by the tribunal because there is no a duty on 
a state to adapt its tax regime in foreign investors’ best interests.839 Therefore, the 
calculation of taxes which is merely unfavourable to a foreign investor does not 
equate to expropriation.840  
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In Occidental II, the arbitration concerning the same Law 42 of Ecuador that 
resulting in the Burlington arbitration, the tribunal found Law 42 to be in breach of 
the participation contracts and therefore flouted the claimants’ legitimate 
expectations. In that arbitration, however, Law 42 was not considered to be a tax.841   
 
The analysis of the above tax arbitrations has shown that arbitral tribunals are willing 
to find a state liable for expropriation if a legitimate expectation has been breached, 
but investors cannot have legitimate expectations that the tax regime, both in terms 
of tax laws and enforcement of those laws, will not change, unless there is a 
contractual/quasi-contractual obligation thereto. So, the state’s power to tax, 
including its power to amend and create new tax laws, supersedes investors’ 
expectations that are based on anything other than contract/legal obligations given by 
the state to the investor/investment. In addition, even where legitimate expectations 
have been breached through a repudiation of contract rights, arbitral tribunals can 
still require a substantial deprivation of an entire investment.842 
 
3.5.6 Tax Arbitration: Extent of Deprivation 
 
In Quasar, the tribunal found the VAT assessments made against Yukos for $13.5 
billion and the subsequent disapproval for Yukos to apply for VAT refunds were 
“confiscatory to a degree which comes close to validating the claims [of 
expropriation] in their entirety on this basis alone”.843 The tribunal determined that 
the asset freeze in April 2004 was not a violation of international law on its own, but 
the timing and effect of the freeze in preventing Yukos from discharging its tax debts 
counted as part of the creeping expropriation.844 
 
The RosInvest tribunal determined that Yukos was substantially/totally deprived of 
its assets and the taking of Yukos’ assets as a result of the tax measures constituted 
an expropriation of the RosInvest claimant’s shares in Yukos.845 The cumulative 
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effect of Russia’s tax measures were judged as being an unlawful expropriation of 
Yukos’ assets.846 
 
In Feldman, one factor considered by the tribunal in rejecting the claim for 
expropriation was the fact that the claimant remained in control of his investment 
(CEMSA) at all times and had the potential to pursue other business activities 
through CEMSA as he had previously done.847 The Feldman tribunal reiterated that 
measures which are indirectly expropriatory require a resulting substantial 
deprivation which makes “formal distinctions of ownership irrelevant.”848 In the 
circumstances of that case, the claimant remained in control of CEMSA and in the 
past had used the company to export alcoholic beverages for which he was able to 
obtain the necessary itemised invoices and therefore receive tax refunds.849 The 
tribunal determined that because Feldman/CEMSA was able to concentrate on that 
line of business which he/CEMSA was not deprived of, there was no substantial 
expropriation of the entire investment. This brings up the question of whether the 
tribunal would have found Mexico liable for expropriating CEMSA if the cigarette 
exports were the company’s only line of business, or if the tribunal considered the 
notion of partial expropriation. It is clear that, had the cigarette business been 
CEMSA’s only income, or had the tribunal considered the notion of partial 
deprivation, there still would not have been an expropriation because the investor had 
no legitimate expectation of receiving tax refunds as the tax law requiring an 
itemised invoice was present before the claimant made his investment and there can 
be no legitimate expectation that tax authorities would not shift the enforcement of 
tax laws. 
 
In EnCana, the tribunal considered the claims to money to be investments/returns of 
investments only in respect of the direct expropriation claim. For the indirect 
expropriation analysis, EnCana’s investment was taken to be its investment in the 
subsidiaries.850 Despite the financial harm endured by EnCana through its 
subsidiaries being denied tax refunds, as well as having to pay back to Ecuador tax 
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refunds already given, EnCana continued to function profitably and was able to 
engage in its normal range of undertakings, i.e. extracting and exporting oil.851 The 
EnCana tribunal said that tax measures must be extraordinary, punitive in amount or 
arbitrary in their incidence just to be considered as indirect expropriation852 because 
an otherwise stance would result in the “universal State prerogative [of taxation 
being] denied by a guarantee against expropriation”853 because taxation would 
always be seen determined to be a taking of property.854 The decision in EnCana was 
that the change in VAT laws or their interpretation was not expropriatory because 
they did not bring EnCana’s subsidiaries to a standstill or render the value “derived 
from their activities so marginal or unprofitable as effectively to deprive them of 
their character as investments.”855 Therefore, the denial of tax refunds in the “amount 
of 10% of transactions associated with oil production and export”856 was not a 
substantial deprivation (denial of the benefits of investment in whole or significant 
part) of EnCana’s investment857 and the indirect expropriation claim was thus 
rejected. 
 
In Occidental, the same grounds for rejecting EnCana’s indirect expropriation claims 
applied, primarily that Ecuador’s tax measures did not “meet the standards required 
by international law”858 to be considered an expropriation that requires 
compensation. Ecuador did not deprive OEPC of the use or reasonably expected 
economic benefit of their investment and the tax measures did not affect a significant 
part of the investment.859 The tribunal asserted that had the requirements for a 
finding of expropriation been more lenient (i.e. less than substantial deprivation), 
OEPC’s expropriation claim would nevertheless have failed,860 but the tribunal did 
not expand on this point. We can presume this means that, should substantial 
deprivation be taken to be the denial of the benefits of an investment in whole or 
significant part, and it is impossible to put a universal figure on it, but say 90% of 
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profits,861 a lesser level of deprivation at 50% would still not have been deprivation 
enough in this case because the denial of refunds were likely to be in the region of 
10% of transactions associated with oil production and export.862 
 
In Burlington, the tribunal assessed the deprivation of Law 42 at 50% and at 99% in 
real impact terms, i.e. “had Law 42 payments not been made, the corresponding 
amounts would have become additional income for Burlington, to which the ordinary 
income tax and employment contributions would have applied.”863 The real impact 
was therefore around 60% of the actual tax.864  Burlington argued that Law 42 at 
50% had a devastating impact on its investment.865 Law 42 at 50% applied between 
April 2006 and October 2007. In 2006, Burlington made net profits of US$44.18 
million,866 and when taking into account that Law 42 at 50% applied for three 
quarters of 2006, Burlington made approximately US$33.14 million in profits during 
the period of Law 42 enforcement in 2006, diminishing Burlington’s profits by 
around 40%.867 During the 10 months of 2007 of Law 42 enforcement at 50% plus 
the two months at 99%, Burlington paid US$87.74 million in Law 42 taxes868 and its 
profits stood at US$30.95 million.869 Burlington would have made approximately 
US$52.64 million in profits had it not been subjected to Law 42 taxes. Its profits 
diminished by approximately 62.9% in 2007.870 On the basis of these figures, the 
Burlington tribunal did not think Law 42 at 50% substantially deprived Burlington of 
the value of its investment.871 
 
                                                 
861 Companies will seldom invest in a country if 90% of their profits will be taxed by the state because 
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Burlington argued that Law 42 at 99% destroyed the value of its investment.872 Law 
42 at 99% applied from November 2007 to March 2009, and therefore applied for the 
entire 12 months of 2008 which made an analysis of its impact in that year 
possible.873 In 2008, Burlington made US$203.09 million in Law 42 tax payments. 
Burlington’s accounts did not show profits for 2008 but this appeared to the tribunal 
to be due to a high rate of amortisation.874 On a per barrel of oil basis, Law 42 at 99% 
deprived Burlington of 62.3% of a barrel of Oriente crude875 and 73.9% of a barrel of 
Napo crude.876 This diminished Burlington’s profits considerably, but that did not 
make its investment in Ecuador worthless and unviable877 and the investment 
“preserved its capacity to generate a commercial return.”878 The Law 42 tax at 99% 
was therefore, in the opinion of the majority tribunal,879 not a substantial deprivation 
and not expropriatory on the foregoing bases.880 
 
In Archer Daniels, the tribunal also required a substantial deprivation of the 
investment. The loss of profits suffered by the joint-venture company (ALMEX) 
from 1 January 2002 until 31 December 2006 due to the imposition of the sweetener 
tax, including diminished profits from lost sales of HFCS in Mexico, “was not 
sufficiently restrictive to conclude the tax had effects similar to an outright 
expropriation.”881 In addition, the tax did not deprive the investors of the 
“fundamental rights of ownership or management of their investment” because they 
were at all times in control of ALMEX’s production, sales and distribution.882 
 
In Cargill, the claimant’s HFCS business was not its only income stream.883 The 
tribunal, therefore, required the sweetener tax to deprive the claimant from the 
investment in the Mexican subsidiary, not only the subsidiary’s HFCS business. For 
that reason, the sweetener tax’s effect on Cargill’s HFCS business in Mexico did not 
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equate to a “radical deprivation” of the claimant’s overall investment884 in the 
Mexican subsidiary. 
 
In Link-Trading, the arbitral tribunal did not find the claimant had made a valid 
causal link between the amendment of the tax regime and the downturn in its 
business.885 The claimant contended its business was expropriated on 8 August 1998 
when the partial exemption for its customers was removed, however, its sales 
actually increased in September 1998 and then continued to increase albeit at a 
decreased level through September 1999.886 Additionally, the timing of the business’ 
downturn with the Russian financial crisis of 1998, resulting with in the Moldovan 
Leu dropping sharply against the US Dollar from September 1998 until September 
1999, was actually a stronger causal link.887 Therefore, there was insufficient proof 
that the claimant’s business suffered a substantial deprivation and so it was not 
expropriated, primarily because of the insufficient evidence that the downturn of its 
business was a direct result of the tax amendments and not the devaluation of the 
Moldovan currency resulting in a decline in the claimant’s customers’ buying 
power.888 
 
Importantly, the Link-Trading tribunal said that whilst the amended tax regime could 
have contributed to the claimant’s losses, that was insufficient to prove an 
expropriation as having occurred, and if it were, tax expropriation would be a 
concept without limits, as most tax measures have cost impacts on customers.889 
 
In Goetz II, the arbitral tribunal referred to the abundant investment arbitration case 
law, confirming that an investor must be deprived not only of expected profits of an 
investment, but that the deprivation must result in either a loss of control of the 
investment or the rendering of the investment as purposeless.890 The Goetz II tribunal 
therefore ruled that the measures taken by Burundi that were complained of by the 
claimants, including the suspension of the tax exemptions, were not expropriatory 
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because they did not lead to a loss of control of the company/investment (AFFIMET) 
or the inability to use the company/investment.891 
 
In El Paso, the tribunal considered the export withholding taxes to be “reasonable 
governmental regulation within the context of the [Argentinian] crisis
892” (emphasis 
original). The withholding taxes that applied to hydrocarbon exports at rates between 
4.76% 16.67%893 had only a limited impact on El Paso’s property rights894 and could 
not constitute an expropriation895 and “cannot have caused a forced sale constituting 
an expropriation of El Paso’s shares in the Argentinean companies subjected to… 
[the] … withholdings”.896 In addition, the withholding taxes were levied on 
extraordinary revenues made by the oil exporting sector as a result of the devaluation 
of the Peso, not as a result of increased efficiency.897 Argentina’s expert witness 
therefore said “it made total economic sense to have a ‘compensated devaluation’ by 
relying on export taxes to raise revenues in the sectors that had most benefited from 
the devaluation.”898 The El Paso tribunal agreed, saying it was logical to establish a 
tax on those extra substantial revenues.899 
 
On analysis of the above cases, arbitral tribunals, predictably, required tax measures 
to have a substantial deprivation on the investor/investment to be expropriatory. This 
comes as no surprise because the threshold for the level of deprivation required under 
international law to find an expropriation is extremely unlikely to be lowered in most 
arbitrations, especially tax arbitrations. As noted by the EnCana tribunal, tax 
measures are in a special category when it comes to expropriation. If anything, the 
level of deprivation in tax expropriations must be not only substantial, but total. This 
is why the only cases in the history of investor-state arbitration under modern IITs in 
which tax measures on their own have been found to be expropriation has been the 
Yukos cases of RosInvest and Quasar. This is because, in addition to states being 
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sensitive when it comes to arbitrating their regulatory powers, the labelling of tax 
measures as expropriation if they amount to anything less than a total deprivation 
might be seen as too great an impeachment on the power to tax and lead to a 
backlash against arbitrators for putting foreign investors’ profits over and above the 
sovereignty of host states and their need to act in their public’s interest. 
 
3.5.7 Tax Arbitration: Dissenting Pro-Expropriation Opinions 
 
The dissenting arbitrator in Burlington, Orrego Vicuña, concluded that Law 42 at 
50% and 99% was expropriatory.900 In his opinion, no reasonable business person 
would conclude that paying 50% of revenue income, or more substantially, 99% 
thereof, would be profitable or valuable.901 For those reasons, finding a buyer would 
be near-impossible because of the effect of the state’s tax measures on the viability 
of the business.902 The arbitrator found Law 42 (and especially at 99%) was beyond 
any standard of reasonableness and the fact that Ecuador rolled the figure back to 
70% under the LET was proof of unreasonableness in itself.903 According to the 
arbitrator, although not unprecedented, a 50% tax on income “is very substantial”.904 
A 99% tax, on the other hand, was determined to be “not just an expropriation but a 
confiscation”.905 Although the arbitrator did not expand on the difference between 
‘expropriation’ and ‘confiscation’, it is in our opinion reasonable to assume, on the 
basis that the arbitrator expressed that a 50% tax is substantial deprivation (and 
therefore expropriation), that he meant a 99% tax is total deprivation and, therefore, 
confiscation. Finally, the arbitrator very briefly touches upon a human rights 
argument to make the case for substantial deprivation, stating that a 50% tax means 
the individual or entity works half of its time for the state, and at 99%, nearly all of 
its time for the state (albeit that in the circumstances of the case Burlington kept a 
certain minimum income).906 This raises a human rights issue of “freedom of the 
individual in a democratic society.”907 This is profound, because a substantial 
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deprivation can be defined as the deprivation of the use, control and enjoyment of 
investment, all of which are restricted under extreme taxation as was the case with 
Law 42 (99%). 
 
The dissenting arbitrator in EnCana, Dr. Horacío Grigera Naón, disagreed with the 
majority tribunal’s findings in EnCana and concluded that Ecuador’s actions were an 
expropriation under the Canada-Ecuador BIT. In relation to the direct expropriation 
claim, the arbitrator found the majority decision to require a breach of the conduct 
requirements including access to domestic courts in Ecuador created an exhaustion of 
local remedies requirement as a pre-condition to accessing substantive rights under 
international law (i.e. the BIT)908 which did not exist under the BIT. The majority 
tribunal, in requiring such exhaustion of local remedies consisting of a final 
determination by local courts, which was not required by the BIT, suggested the 
existence of a public international law hard-and-fast rule which is binding on arbitral 
tribunals.909 The application of the laws pertaining to VAT refunds to oil companies 
for manufactured goods was rather ambiguous and different courts in Ecuador at 
various times decided differently on the issue.910 The arbitrator explicitly stated that a 
final determination of the issue but Ecuador’s courts was not required,911 although 
since the EnCana tribunal relied arguendo on the Occidental finding that oil 
companies were due VAT refunds, they would have seen in the Occidental award 
that part of the Occidental tribunal’s decision was based a ‘final’ decision by the 
Special Taxation Chamber of Ecuador’s Supreme Court in a specific case, deciding 
that Article 69A of the ITRL did grant VAT refunds to oil exporters.912 Of course, as 
stated above and repeated here, the Feldman tribunal correctly stated that “tax 
authorities in most countries do not act in a consistent and predictable way.”913 
Therefore, even if some courts in Ecuador had ruled against the SRI, that clearly did  
not oblige the SRI (or certainly it did not make the SRI) act consistently regarding 
tax refunds to oil companies. There could therefore never be a ‘final determination’ 
of the issue, and so the majority’s apparent requirement of a final determination by 
                                                 
908 EnCana Dissent, at para 8. 
909 ibid at para 9. 
910 Occidental Award at paras 140 and 141. 
911 EnCana Dissent at para 10. 
912 Occidental Award at para 141. 
913 Feldman Award at para 113. 
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local courts, even if a determination need only relate to EnCana or its subsidiaries, 
would be a total barrier to investment arbitration or at the very least an unnecessary 
delay not required by the BIT. 
 
I will summarise and discuss here the dissenting arbitrator key points. Firstly, the 
tribunal’s assumption  arguendo that EnCana through its subsidiaries did have a right 
to VAT refunds, but then requiring a prior determination of the validity of the state’s 
objections to the granting of the refunds to be obtained from the courts of Ecuador 
under its own laws, gave the assumption little practical significance.914 The majority 
effectively required the claimant to pursue local remedies “before related claims 
under international law were ripe for a decision on the merits at the international 
level.”915 Although the majority tribunal did not want to be turned into an Ecuadorian 
tax court and “pick and choose between different and conflicting national court 
rulings in order to arrive at a view as to what the local law should be,”916 the 
dissenting arbitrator asserted that an international arbitral tribunal is entitled to study 
the host state laws and their interpretation by the host state courts and authorities at a 
specific point in time to come to a determination on whether the host state’s conduct, 
licit or illicit under its own laws, resulted in a treaty violation, whether the conduct 
began to have harmful effects on the foreign investor and/or its investments, and on 
the extent the harmful effects of the state’s conduct.917 The host State’s laws, 
administrative acts, practices and “other conduct attributable to the host State at the 
moment they had the effect of operating the deprivation of property” are facts or a 
cluster of facts for the tribunal to consider when determining whether there has been 
an infringement of the investor’s protection under international law.918  
 
If the income yield of an investment is negatively affected by “incoherent, 
unprincipled or contradictory host state conduct regarding the existence of tax 
burdens or the absence of tax benefits” it could directly give rise to a claim for 
expropriation which will not need to be addressed before the host state court unless 
required by the BIT, which was not the case in EnCana, nor will the aggrieved party 
                                                 
914 EnCana Dissent at  para 8. 
915 ibid at para 9. 
916 EnCana Award at footnote 138. 
917 EnCana Dissent at para 11. 
918 ibid at para 12. 
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have to go beyond what is specifically required by the BIT to seek redress.919 The 
arbitrator correctly asserted that denial of justice at the national courts of the host 
state had no role to play in this case.920 The fact that state conduct is under review at 
local level does not, under international law, prevent an arbitral tribunal from 
establishing the meanings and effects of state conduct under an IIT921 (unless 
prevented by the relevant IIT). Indeed, the Canada-Ecuador BIT specifically states 
that an “investor may submit a dispute to arbitration… only if… the investor has 
waived its right to initiate or continue any other proceedings in relation to the 
measure that is alleged to be in breach of this Agreement [the BIT] before the courts 
or tribunals of the Contracting Party concerned or in a dispute settlement procedure 
of any kind.”922 Simultaneously, the BIT does allow the investor to have a prompt 
review of its expropriation claim and value of its investment or returns by the 
judiciary or other independent authority of the host state,923 but the investor need not 
go through an appeals process to complete the review924 and exhaust local remedies, 
a so called “finality rule”.925 Therefore the mere fact that the investor had access to 
Ecuador’s courts was a nonsensical barrier to finding an expropriation in light of the 
relevant BIT as the investor had the right to seek recourse under the arbitration 
agreement contained in the BIT without exhaustion of local remedies. 
 
On the issue of investments that can be expropriated, the arbitrator stated that the 
BIT and its definition of investment did not distinguish between tangible or 
intangible property, but that protected ownership under international law, and most 
probably under comparative and constitutional law, requires the asset to be 
“susceptible of economic value for the actual or purported holder of rights on such 
asset.”926 The arbitrator was effectively reiterating that the nature of the asset which 
has allegedly been expropriated should not play a role in the tribunal coming to 
different conclusions when it must determine entitlement issues and the “reciprocal 
roles of national and international law and jurisdictions in connection with such 
                                                 
919 ibid at para 25. 
920 ibid at para 27. 
921 ibid. 
922 Canada-Ecuador BIT, Article XIII(3)(b); and ibid, para 29. 
923 Canada-Ecuador BIT, Article VIII(2); and EnCana Partial Dissent, para 31. 
924 EnCana Dissent at para 31. 
925 ibid at para 32. 
926 ibid  at para 14. 
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issues.”927 The arbitral tribunal should not have been, in the arbitrator’s view, 
apprehensive to consider that the ambiguity of Ecuador’s tax law and the conduct of 
the SRI could have resulted in an expropriation of EnCana’s investment. 
 
For the above reasons, the arbitrator believed the entitlement issues raised by the 
investor should have primarily been considered against the investor’s rights under the 
BIT, which included its rights under Article VIII(1) (expropriation).928 The dissent 
primarily focused on EnCana’s legitimate expectations, a right acquired through the 
BIT under its definition of investment, including “other property, tangible or 
intangible, […] acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of economic 
benefit or other business purposes.”929 The economic impact the arbitrator believed 
tax burdens which were unaccounted for when the investment was made could 
constitute a taking under Article VIII of the BIT where the negative economic impact 
of the unexpected tax burden can be projected for years to come.930 amendments long 
as the This is a form of ownership because of its financial value, and is a legitimate 
expectation directly protected by the BIT, and once the investment has been made in 
accordance to the national law of the host state, if the legitimate expectation to 
returns, in this case, tax refunds, suffers due to conduct attributable to the host state, 
that conduct will be reviewed in accordance with the BIT, irrespective of the level of 
protection offered at the national level of the host State.931 I do not agree with this 
view of the arbitrator because as the EnCana tribunal asserted (presumably 
unanimously as the dissenting arbitrator did not state that he disagreed with 
paragraph 177 of the EnCana award) and other tribunals have in some shape or form 
agreed, changes in the tax regime are expropriatory if they are extraordinary, 
punitive in amount or arbitrary in their incidence,932 correctly asserted, host states 
have the discretion to amend their tax regime, and this is limited only by such 
changes not being arbitrary, punitive in amount or extraordinary. I will nevertheless 
continue to summarise the dissenting opinion’s points on legitimate expectations as 
                                                 
927 ibid. 
928 ibid at para 15. 
929 Canada-Ecuador BIT, Article I(g)(vi). The text of Article I(g)(vi) actually has a double negative 
using the word ‘not’ twice. Removal of the double negative results in the positive text I have included 
in the text, as did the dissenting arbitrator at para 18 of the dissent. 
930 EnCana Dissent at  para 19. 
931 ibid at para 20. 
932 EnCana Award at para 177. 
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they are both important and interesting to analyse, especially since the arbitrator 
made a link between legitimate expectations of the investor and discriminatory 
conduct by the host state. 
 
Dr. Naón opined that an investor’s rights and expectations are created upon the 
investment being accepted by the host state according to its laws, and although the 
investor bears commercial and legal risks, the investor does not bear the risks that 
international law puts on the host state, including liability for discriminatory conduct 
that results in a detriment to the investor.933 
 
The arbitrator then analysed why Ecuador’s measures were discriminatory in his 
opinion. Firstly, he was confident that SRI’s interpretation of Article 69A of ITRL, 
and the support that interpretation received by Ecuador’s Congress with the 
publication of the Interpretative Law of 2004, was discriminatory, and because it 
lead to a deprivation of property, was a discriminatory measure contrary to Article 
VIII(1) of the BIT.934 Of course this is a violation of a conduct requirement and does 
not entail an expropriation as having occurred, but as stated at the introduction to this 
chapter, discrimination can help to prove that government measures err on the side of 
expropriation rather than non-compensable government takings. Secondly, the 
arbitrator believed that EnCana had a legitimate expectation of receiving VAT 
refunds on its investment based on other non-manufacturing export sectors of the 
economy being on the receiving end of such benefits935 (this is the link between 
legitimate expectations and discrimination).This expectation went hand-in-hand with 
the lack of specific laws (pre-2004) making clear that the oil and gas companies were 
exempted from receiving VAT refunds,936 and such laws ought to have governed the 
rule that petroleum companies would not be reimbursed VAT, rather than the 
administrative actions of the SRI deciding the matter.937 Furthermore, EnCana and its 
subsidiaries were not included in the exchanges between SRI and Petroecuador and 
                                                 
933 EnCana Dissent at  para 23. 
934 ibid at para 40. 
935 ibid at para 41. 
936 ibid. 
937 ibid; Ms. de Mena, the then Director of SRI, admitted that a law should have governed the premise 
that oil and gas companies would not receive VAT refunds, rather than the administrative 
determinations of SRI (ibid). Additionally, the SRI governing such a rule was carried out without 
clarity and known fact to any potential investors. 
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“were not and could not be privy to the internal exchanges, changes in position and 
possible misunderstandings” between the SRI and Petroecuador, who discussed 
whether VAT was absorbed by Factor X in the participation contracts or not.938 The 
arbitrator viewed the sequence of events between the SRI and Petroecuador as 
resulting in misunderstandings for the SRI which in turn resulted in conduct 
attributable to Ecuador causing discriminatory frustration of EnCana’s legitimate 
return expectations by “finally denying VAT refunds to EnCana’s subsidiaries.”939 
 
According to the SRI’s Director, it had always been Ecuador’s policy to deny 
refunds of VAT to oil companies. However, SRI did authorise the VAT refunds to 
EnCana’s subsidiaries between 8 March 2000 and 16 March 2001 through nine 
Granting Resolutions, which it granted in compliance with what it believed to be 
Ecuadorian Law.940 This gave the impression that EnCana’s expectations to receive 
VAT refunds were in fact legitimate in law according to Article 69A of the ITRL. 
The SRI Director’s reasons for granting the refunds was a processing mistake during 
the vast amount of VAT refund applications submitted following the enactment of 
Article 69A. However, in his dissent, the arbitrator said such an excuse is hardly 
credible, especially if the policy of not granting refunds to oil companies existed 
prior to Article 69A, and a more likely reason for the granting resolutions was the 
reasonable interpretation of the tax laws which were interpreted to grant VAT 
refunds to oil and gas exporters, the same rights afforded to other non-manufactured 
product exporters.941 
 
Exporters of non-manufactured products other than oil and gas, including exporters 
of “flowers, broccoli, tea, timber, bananas, shrimp, [and] fresh fish sectors” were all 
eligible for VAT refunds in Ecuador.942 The oil and gas sector, entirely composed of 
foreign companies, was not granted such right to VAT refunds, unlike the 
aforementioned sectors, who were not exclusively owned by foreign companies.943 
This reasoning led to the Occidental decision that Ecuador violated the national 
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treatment protection contained in the US-Ecuador BIT (see Chapter 4). The only 
non-foreign oil company in Ecuador at the time of the EnCana case was 
Petroecuador, who were either not subject to VAT, or if they were, the refunds to 
them were covered by funds from the government of Ecuador, with foreign oil 
companies not enjoying the same arrangement.944 The singling out of oil companies 
by the SRI prior to the Interpretative Law of 2004 certainly had a very discriminatory 
nature to it, and Ecuador could have been liable for the SRI’s conduct. In terms of 
any expropriation claims post-enactment of the Interpretative Law of 2004, the 
majority tribunal decided there could be absolutely no claim for expropriation post-
enactment, however, the dissenting arbitrator saw the Interpretative Law of 2004 as 
being valuable in determining whether Ecuador’s VAT refund policy towards oil 
exporters infringed the expropriation provision of the BIT either through the 
Interpretative Law on its own or in conjunction with the SRI’s policy against oil 
companies (pre-enactment of the Interpretative Law).945 The Interpretative Law 
prima facie has a discriminatory nature to it. Its clarification of Article 69A ITRL 
excludes oil companies from receiving VAT refunds because “petroleum is not 
manufactured, but is extracted from respective deposits.”946 Meanwhile, the 
exporters of non-manufactured products such as flowers and bananas did receive 
VAT refunds. There are no public policy or public interest motives provided in the 
Interpretative Law to distinguish between petroleum exporters and other non-
manufacturing exporters,947 a factor that edges towards the law being discriminatory. 
 
At the Ecuadorian Tax court proceedings before the enactment of the Interpretative 
Law of 2004, the question of Ecuador’s conduct being contrary to Article VIII of the 
Canada-Ecuador BIT was raised.948 The national courts of Ecuador have a right to 
decide on the issue because the BIT was part of Ecuadorian Law as it had been 
ratified by the government of Ecuador. EnCana’s Ecuadorian subsidiaries, AEC and 
COL, claimed at the Tax Court that SRI’s conduct against petroleum companies was 
discriminatory to which SRI rebuffed only on the basis of avoiding oil companies 
‘double dipping’ on tax refunds – i.e. the discriminatory application of Article 69A 
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946 EnCana Award at para 95. 
947 EnCana Dissent at para 43. 
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ITRL was not denied, but justified to avoid oil exporters from receiving VAT refunds 
from both the SRI and via the participation contracts with Petroecuador.949 However, 
Petroecuador did eventually confirm to the SRI that VAT was not included as part of 
Factor X in the participation contracts950 and EnCana would therefore not receive 
VAT reimbursements via Petroecuador. 
 
The SRI’s interpretation and application of Article 69A ITRL was not reviewed by 
the Tax Court in relation to the expropriation provisions of the BIT,951 whereby 
under Article VIII(2) they could have made a ‘prompt review’ of Article 69A ITRL 
or SRI’s interpretation of it, and overruled the legislation or its interpretation by 
virtue of being “incompatible with international law as incorporated into Ecuadorian 
law.”952 This puts in doubt the majority tribunal’s correctness for ruling that the 
national courts of Ecuador were open for the parties to decide on the dispute, 
resulting in a good faith finding of Ecuador and therefore declining EnCana’s 
expropriation claim. Although the domestic courts were open to the aggrieved party, 
the courts reviewed the tax laws according to national legislation, not the 
international law under the BIT. Therefore the majority tribunal’s decision to not 
want to be turned into a tax court of appeal, or court of appeal of any kind, had no 
real basis, especially since the tribunal was asked to consider the alleged violation of 
the claimant’s rights under international law (even though that was intrinsically 
linked to the claimant’s rights under domestic law) which was a matter that was not 
considered by the domestic courts. 
 
For an expropriation to be lawful, the measures must abide by the conduct 
requirements. The dissenting arbitrator evaluated whether the denial of tax refunds 
had a legitimate public purpose. The arbitrator stated that “raising public monies” 
was not reason enough to validate the public purpose of a tax measure.953  That is a 
fair assessment by the arbitrator because all claims of tax expropriation would fail on 
                                                 
949 ibid at para 47. 
950 EnCana Award at para 71; Dr Rodolfo Barniol, the then President of Petroecuador, to Dr de Mena, 
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a raising public monies defence. In EnCana, a genuine public purpose would have 
been to avoid EnCana’s subsidiaries from double dipping on tax refunds,954 however, 
this was a defunct public purpose as Petroecuador and the Interpretative Law of 2004 
ruled out VAT being refunded via the participation contracts,955 unless the 
participation contracts were renegotiated to include the refunds. Another public 
purpose which potentially existed in the Interpretative Law of 2004 and through 
SRI’s interpretation of Article 69A ITRL was the promotion of a specific 
interpretation of Article 69A ITRL, thus avoiding damage to Ecuador’s economic 
interests should that provision not be interpreted in a certain way.956 However, the 
Tax Courts referred EnCana and Petroecuador to the negotiation table to amend their 
production sharing agreement to include the reimbursement of VAT. Such 
renegotiation ruling in itself assigned an economic value to the investor from tax 
refunds and the host state would be in the same economic position whether Article 
69A was interpreted as allowing VAT refunds to oil exporters or not. This therefore 
ruled out the economic interests of Ecuador as being a public purpose for the refusal 
of VAT refunds to EnCana.957 
 
The arbitrator concluded that the “Tax Court decisions and other conduct attributable 
to Ecuador” had the practical effect of referring EnCana and its subsidiaries to 
renegotiate the production sharing agreements with Petroecuador,958 thereby 
recognising EnCana’s right to the economic value of VAT refunds, confirming 
EnCana’s legitimate expectations to a return protected under the BIT, and these 
estimated returns did not include the burden of paying VAT.959 The VAT refunds 
were a legitimate expectation when EnCana made its decision to invest in its 
subsidiaries in Ecuador, and this legitimate expectation affected the projected returns 
significantly.960 The Interpretative Law of 2004 worked to confirm EnCana’s 
legitimate expectation of a VAT refund, because the law sought to clarify the 
                                                 
954 ibid at para 53. 
955 There was the confusion between SRI and Petroecuador when SRI denied three refund claims by 
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956 EnCana Dissent at para 54. 
957 ibid at para 55. 
958 ibid at para 61. 
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meaning of Article 69A ITRL, which prior to the Interpretative Law’s enactment, a 
reasonable interpretation of the law (on which EnCana’s apparent legitimate 
expectation was based), was that oil exporters were entitled to VAT refunds on their 
inputs.961 The Tax Court decisions, the Interpretative Law and the President of 
Ecuador in a letter to the Director of SRI, all instructed Petroecuador and EnCana to 
renegotiate the participation contracts.962 However, this was not a clear legal remedy 
to re-establish EnCana’s entitlements under the BIT, because it was based on a 
consensual process to change the “fundamental bases on which, not only the 
investor’s returns were projected but, more than that… the investor’s very decision to 
invest.”963 This method to compensate EnCana tackled not only the VAT refunds at 
issue, but involved the renegotiation of the contractual and legal rights of EnCana as 
a whole, which the arbitrator viewed as a ‘pretend remedy’ to covertly refuse “any 
meaningful remedy at all.”964 The Interpretative Law, the instructions to SRI from 
the President of Ecuador and the instructions from the Tax Courts, all required the 
renegotiation of the participation contracts, but none of them provided any bases for 
the renegotiation to take place with an obvious outcome, with the tax burden being 
difficult to factor into the participation contracts.965 Additionally, the Ecuadorian 
Supreme Court decided  it was improper for the SRI and the Interpretative Law to 
rely on private contracts to determine issues of tax revenues owing to the Ecuadorian 
state966 because those avenues were outside of the control of the tax laws and the 
Ecuadorian tax authorities.967 This Supreme Court decision added further confusion 
to the determination of the issue of tax refunds because EnCana’s recourse was 
uncertain from the outset by having to renegotiate the participation contracts without 
an obvious outcome and was made more arduous by court determinations 
condemning such recourse. 
 
Therefore, the dissenting arbitrator deemed EnCana’s investment had been 
expropriated contrary to Article VIII(1) of the Canada-Ecuador BIT by conduct 
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attributable to the host state. Firstly, SRI’s reasons for denying the VAT refunds 
were flawed. SRI initially presumed the participation contracts included a 
reimbursement of VAT as a cost, which it was proven that they did not. Secondly, 
failing the first presumption, SRI’s interpretation of Article 69A ITRL was 
discriminatory towards oil exporters, all of which were owned by foreign investors, 
except for Petroecuador. Thirdly, the Interpretative Law of 2004 which confirmed 
and put into writing SRI’s interpretation of Article 69A ITRL was therefore also 
discriminatory towards oil exporters. Fourthly, whilst the Canada-Ecuador BIT did 
not require EnCana to seek redress at national level in Ecuadorian courts, EnCana 
did take up that option and although those courts were open and not blatantly biased 
against EnCana’s subsidiaries, the courts did not consider whether Ecuador failed to 
adhere to its obligations under international law. Therefore the majority tribunal 
should have evaluated Ecuador’s laws on the backdrop of the BIT and this would not 
have turned the tribunal into a court of appeal because the dispute would have been 
decided under different laws than those considered at domestic level.  
 
The majority tribunal found that the accessibility of the Ecuadorian courts and the the 
sincerity of the SRI’s Director (whose sincerity was contested by EnCana) had an all-
round effect of good faith by the Ecuadorian state and thus nullified the claims that a 
direct expropriation had occurred. The dissenting arbitrator found that these two 
good faith arguments, coupled with the fact that the BIT does not mandatorily 
require a claimant to seek redress at national level, had two powerful insights. The 
first insight is that the national courts being impartial from government agency and 
executive interference made no difference to the decisions at national level with 
regards to EnCana’s claims under international law because the claims under the 
ambit of the BIT were ignored by the courts. Therefore the impartiality and 
availability of the Ecuadorian courts made no difference to the redress EnCana 
sought at the international arbitration arena, so this should not have been relied upon 
in the majority tribunal’s decision making. Further to this first point, because the BIT 
did not mandatorily require EnCana to seek redress at national level,968 the 
availability of the national courts to the claimants should not have bound the arbitral 
tribunal’s own decision making process, no matter how competent the Ecuadorian 
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courts were. If EnCana’s subsidiaries did not make any claims in the national courts 
of Ecuador, the arbitral tribunal would not have sent them away to seek redress away 
at Ecuador’s courts, and likewise, the fact that they sought a prompt review at 
national level under Article VIII(2) of the BIT should not have been a detriment to 
their claims – i.e. if a finding of expropriation would have been plausible had the 
courts shown bad faith towards the claimants, what would have been the result had 
the claimants not sought justice at the national courts in the first instance? This 
notion of good faith or bad faith therefore should not have affected the majority 
tribunal’s reasoning in finding or dismissing the claim of a direct expropriation. 
Additionally, because the Tax Courts actually ignored the claims under the BIT, 
whilst that does not show bad faith, it should have proven to the majority tribunal 
that the decision on expropriation was theirs to make, rather than reject EnCana’s 
claims on the grounds of good faith of Ecuador’s courts. Indeed, it is not as though 
EnCana lost at national level on claims falling under Article VIII of the BIT, and 
sought a make-shift appeals court under international arbitration, i.e. the type that 
would trigger a fork-in-the-road provision had one existed in the BIT (which it 
arguably did under Article XIII(b)). Similarly, had the claims under Article VIII been 
considered by the Tax Courts, and had they been dismissed, that still should not have 
limited the feasibility of EnCana’s claims at arbitration.969 
 
The second insight is that the interpretation of Article 69A by SRI, which includes its 
Director at the time, despite their good faith, should not have meant the majority 
tribunal rule against EnCana. If a state, in good faith (and therefore by omission) 
discriminates against a specific company or sector of the economy, they should still 
be liable to pay compensation. The Metalclad tribunal as quoted above and quoted 
again stated that “covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has 
the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or 
reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the 
obvious benefit of the host State”970 will result in an expropriation, with the effect of 
                                                 
969 This is true unless the claims for expropriation under the BIT were the primary basis at the 
Ecuadorian court proceedings. If they were the primary focus of Ecuadorian court proceedings, the 
claimant therefore loses his right to claim in international arbitration according to Article XIII(b) of 
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the measure the primary focus to find an expropriation, rather than the intent of the 
state. Therefore, a finding of expropriation could have been the outcome despite the 
Ecuadorian authorities’ good faith. The Metalclad reasoning was considered in the 
indirect expropriation section of the majority tribunal’s ruling, however, they did not 
consider elements of the Metalclad reasoning such as the effect of a measure in the 
context of a direct expropriation. Of course it is important not to give investors a 
guarantee of investment success via IITs,971 however, on the basis of the arbitrator’s 
dissent in EnCana, the effect of an interpretation of a law (Article 69A ITRL) or a 
law itself (Interpretative Law of 2004) which detriments the returns that an investor 
legitimately expects could fall under the ambit of a Metalclad style reasoning. 
However, the EnCana tribunal seem to have adopted an Olguin style reasoning by 
focusing on the intent of the state rather than the effects of state measures. 
 
The majority tribunal responded to the arbitrator’s dissent in the EnCana award with 
five affirmations. Firstly, the tribunal assumed arguendo that SRI took a policy 
decision to deny VAT refunds to the oil industry by whatever means at its 
disposal.972 This assumption was diminished by the good faith of SRI’s then 
Director, which was not contested by EnCana. The Director took decisions in good 
faith on matters where the laws were unclear and unsettled,973 and had the Director 
acted in bad faith, the outcome of the tribunal’s findings would have been a finding 
of state responsibility.974 That means the majority tribunal did use an Olguin 
reasoning by relying on the intent of the state to determine if a measure is 
expropriatory rather than focusing on the effects of that measure. 
 
Secondly, any claim of an indirect expropriation of the subsidiaries themselves by 
the rejection of VAT refunds was not plausible at all because EnCana remained in 
complete control of the companies and they operated profitably.975 The tribunal also 
reiterated that there was no denial of a legitimate expectation to a tax refund because 
when the investment by EnCana was made to purchase what became its Ecuadorian 
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subsidiaries, no claims to VAT refunds were being asserted or allowed.976 When 
EnCana invested in its subsidiaries in 1999, they had not been making applications 
for VAT refunds since 1997 when the Ecuadorian interpretation of Article 87 of their 
Law on Hydrocarbons removed an exception for oil companies to be exempt from 
paying various taxes.977 The tribunal had to decide whether the denial by an 
executive agency acting in good faith of a complementary public law right, contained 
within an uncertain and recently updated domestic taxation regime, was 
expropriatory or not, and they answered in the negative. The crucial point was the 
ability of executive agencies to make decisions on questionable local laws in good 
faith, with national “courts available to resolve the resulting dispute” and the 
executive complies with judicial decisions not in their favour.978 The majority 
tribunal reiterated that Article VIII of the Canada-Ecuador BIT “does not convert the 
tribunal into an Ecuadorian tax court” to arrive at a view of what the Ecuadorian tax 
regime should be by picking and choosing “between different and conflicting 
national court rulings.”979 
 
Thirdly, the majority tribunal would only find Ecuador to be in breach of Article VIII 
of the BIT if an expropriation was ‘perfected’. Therefore, with the taxpayer and tax 
collector both unable to definitively determine whether the right to a tax refund 
existed given the uncertainty of the updated tax laws, the fact that the SRI made a 
determination on the ambiguous law and without abuses of authority did not result in 
an expropriation in the majority’s view, whether or not that determination was right 
or wrong according to the local law. 
 
Fourthly, the tribunal assumed EnCana’s stand on the local law was correct and did 
not examine EnCana’s interpretations of the laws, therefore even with the 
assumption that SRI had interpreted the laws incorrectly, the claim for direct 
expropriation still failed on the basis of good faith and open justice at national level. 
 
                                                 
976 ibid. 
977 ibid at para 58; EnCana’s claim of a creeping expropriation and unreasonable interference with its 
and its subsidiaries’ abilities to make use of and benefit from their economic entitlements by the 






Finally, unlike the dissenting arbitrator, the majority tribunal believed the national 
courts of Ecuador directing EnCana and Petroecuador to renegotiate the participation 
contracts should not be dismissed as a guise to elongate and deny VAT refunds to 
EnCana. The foreign investor would be able to reject that offer and seek solutions at 
litigation or arbitration, but the majority tribunal would not take an untested offer to 
renegotiate the participation contracts as evidence of expropriation. 
 
In my opinion, if, when the investment in Ecuador was made, the subsidiaries (and/or 
other oil companies) were not receiving VAT refunds, then there could not be a 
legitimate expectation of receiving tax refunds because legitimate expectations are 
made on making the investment. Even if certain rights exist when making an 
investment, states must and do amend their tax regimes and so absent a tax 
stabilisation clause or a law stabilising certain tax advantages for a specific period of 
time, there cannot be a legitimate expectation that the tax regime will not change to 
the investor’s detriment.  It is also unlikely that EnCana would have refrained from 
investing in Ecuador if the subsidiaries were not receiving tax refunds at the time of 
acquisition. Legitimate expectations of investors has in some respects found greater 
credence in the context of minimum standard of treatment, namely the fair and 
equitable treatment standard (FET).980 In the recent Micula award981 the tribunal 
clearly emphasised that in the context of FET, absent a stabilisation clause, investors 
must expect legislation to change.982 Like the national treatment standard, FET does 
not require a substantial deprivation of investment, and therefore claimants could 
potentially have a greater chance of success for breach of legitimate expectations in 
relation to the tax regime applicable to them under the FET standard. In fact, 
stabilisation clauses aside, a shift in the tax regime applicable to investments can 
result in a violation of FET if the investments were made on the basis of receiving 
tax incentives (and others) under a legislative regime for a specific period of time.983 
A repudiation of or a substantial change to those incentives will violate FET if: (i) 
the state has made a promise or assurance; (ii) the promise or assurance is relied on 
                                                 
980 See El Paso Award at paras 350-364; Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. 
Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, award of 11 
December 2013 (Micula Award), at paras 527-529. 
981 ibid. 
982 ibid at para 666. 
983 ibid at para 677 to 686. 
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by investors as a matter of fact; and (iii) such reliance was reasonable.984 As the 
tribunal in Micula stated: “it cannot be fair and equitable for a state to offer 
advantages to investors with the purpose of attracting investment in an otherwise 
unattractive region… and then maintain the formal shell of the [incentive] regime but 
eviscerate it of all (or substantially all) content.”985 
 
Therefore, in line with Micula, EnCana could not have had a legitimate expectation 
to tax refunds because there was no legitimate expectation of VAT refunds based on 
facts and circumstances in Ecuador or host state guarantees at the time the 
investment was made. In 1999, when EnCana invested in Ecuador, oil companies 
were not exempt from paying certain taxes, including VAT. If the dissenting 
arbitrator was correct in assuming that the granting of some VAT refunds to EnCana 
was not a processing mistake by the SRI but a reasonable interpretation of Article 
69A ITRL, that ‘reasonable interpretation’ did not on its own entitle EnCana to a 
legitimate expectation. Laws, regulations and their interpretations are subject to 
change, sometimes in favour of an investor and then to the disadvantage of that same 
investor. The uncertainties of legal regimes are part of investment risk. Therefore, the 
introduction of a law that advantages an investor does not create new rights for that 
investor to legitimately expect from then on throughout the remaining life of the 
investment. Governments must be free to create or modify tax regimes to act in the 
broader public interest.986 
 
On the indirect expropriation claim, even if EnCana was entitled to VAT refunds, the 
deprivation it suffered was not substantial deprivation in terms of the value of its 
investment as a whole. When EnCana submitted a Notice of Arbitration on 13 March 
2003, approximately US $80 million of VAT refunds were denied to EnCana.987 On 
13 September 2005, EnCana released a statement that it agreed to sell all of its shares 
in its Ecuadorian subsidiaries to a joint venture of Chinese petroleum companies for 
US $1.42 billion cash.988 Whilst US $80 million is a considerable amount of money, 
                                                 
984 ibid at para 668. 
985
 ibid at para 687. 
986 Feldman Award at para 103. 
987 EnCana Final Award, para 1. 
988 EnCana Corporation, ‘2005 News Releases: EnCana to sell its oil and pipeline business in Ecuador 
to Andes Petroleum Company for US$1.42 billion’, 13 September 2005 
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the alleged expropriation was for 5.6% of EnCana’s investment when considering the 
Chinese acquisition, and was therefore not a substantial deprivation and did not make 
ownership useless. According to the Third Restatement, to determine whether an 
action attributable to the state which results in a loss to a foreign national requires 
compensation, such action including taxation, state liability must be determined in 
light of all of the circumstances, and in light of all of the circumstances, I believe the 
EnCana tribunal decided the indirect expropriation dispute correctly. However, even 
the indirect expropriation claim could have been decided differently had it fallen to a 
panel of arbitrators who acknowledge the existence of partial deprivation to amount 
to an expropriation, such as the S.D. Myers tribunal who said in some contexts and 
circumstances a deprivation may amount to an expropriation “even if it were partial 
or temporary”989 or the GAMI tribunal who said that the “affected property must be 
impaired”990 to find an expropriation, not the whole property. 
 





In this chapter, the fundamentals of expropriation were acknowledged and discussed. 
The primary reason was to build up to the analysis of the arbitration of tax 
expropriation claims under modern investment treaties. It was necessary to engage 
the vast topic of expropriation to understand the fundamentals and principles that 
have shaped and continue to shape this monumental subject and crucial investment 
treaty protection with the end goal of evaluating how it applies to tax. This 
encompassed discussions on the history of the sovereign power to expropriate; the 
history of tax as expropriation; the development of the expropriation standard on an 
international level that has resulted in the almost uniform expropriation provisions in 
modern IITs; an analysis of the provisions of IITs, the differences between them and 
how they can impact on the arbitration of expropriation claims and specifically how 
                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.encana.com/news/newsreleases/2005/P1161204545248.html> (accessed 14 December 
2010). 
989 S.D. Myers Award at para 283. 
990 GAMI Award at para 126. 
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they can apply to the arbitration of tax expropriation claims; jurisdictional issues 
raised as a result of IIT provisions, namely tax vetoes; and an analysis of decisive 
arbitral awards that have helped construct the jurisprudence on what constitutes an 
expropriation. It was also important to explain the labels that are applied to 
expropriations and which labels can therefore apply to tax expropriation. With this I 
found the opportunity to examine and wage an opinion on and simplify some 
uncertainties in expropriation literature which have the ability to confuse those who 
are unlearned on the topic. This includes explaining whether indirect expropriation 
and measures tantamount to expropriation are two separate concepts or one and the 
same, of which the latter was ascertained;991 conducting a discussion on the 
difference and synonymity between the terms ‘taking’ and ‘deprive’ which can 
confuse a reader because of the different ways they are used in various academic 
materials;992 and opining on the difference between lawful and unlawful 
expropriation, concluding that expropriations that are on the right side of the conduct 
requirements but violate only the compensation requirement are lawful 
expropriations in lieu of compensation so long as compensation is withheld because 
the existence of expropriation must first be ascertained, because the parties cannot 
decide the amount of compensation that must be paid to the aggrieved investor, or for 
some other legitimate good faith reason depending on the facts of the case.993 
 
On the subject of tax expropriation, it is clear that the sovereign power to tax is 
capable of crossing the line from non-compensable government takings into 
compensable expropriation. This was recognised from over a century ago at a 
domestic court level, and despite the non-recognition of that fact by international 
arbitral tribunals of old,994 tax expropriation claims are now being in international 
investment arbitration, albeit with little success.  
 
When an arbitral tribunal finds a state liable for an investment treaty breach that 
means the state has violated international law, and that goes for all treaty protections.  
But when a state is found liable for expropriation, especially unlawful expropriation 
within the meaning I have given it, that denotes a violation of international law of the 
                                                 
991 Section 3.2.2.2 above. 
992 Sections 3.1.3.2 and  3.3 above. 
993 See opening section to this chapter. 
994 Section 3.1.2 above, namely Kügele (n.96) and Kaeckenbeeck (n. 101). 
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highest order in the investment arbitration context. This is because a state will be 
liable for expropriation when there has been a physical and/or legal appropriation of 
property or a substantial deprivation of the use and enjoyment of investment, except 
for the extremely rare circumstances when partial deprivation qualifies as 
expropriation. The only other treaty protection that is comparable with expropriation 
in terms of the conduct that can result in a treaty violation and the reputation that 
comes from liability under it is fair and equitable treatment. But even fair and 
equitable treatment does not require a substantial deprivation to be breached, and so 
a state found liable for expropriation on the one hand will come off looking worse 
than a state found liable for violating the fair and equitable principle on the other. 
 
A state that attains something of value by unlawfully expropriating an investment 
and fails to pay prompt, adequate and effective compensation and is found liable for 
such conduct is in effect found liable for the theft of foreign investment. That is why, 
bearing in mind that arbitration of the state’s power to tax is already a sensitive topic, 
the arbitration of tax expropriation claims runs the risk that, if liable, a state will be 
in violation of international law for its tax authority’s conduct as a robber baron writ 
large. Of course, “[t]ax authorities are not robber barons writ large”995 and so if a tax 
authority conducts itself as such, it will be within the reach of justice under 
expropriation provisions of IITs for arbitrary, punitive or extraordinary taxation, 
subject of course to any tax exclusions or tax vetoes that prevent the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction. 
 
Some of the most recent arbitral awards on tax as expropriation have recognised the 
sovereign power to tax, its non-compensable nature as a police power of the state and 
the assumption of legitimacy of the tax measures in question.996 Arbitral tribunals 
have also determined that a “… a blanket exception for regulatory measures would 
create a gaping loophole in international protections against expropriation.”997 
Therefore, the arbitration of tax expropriation claims is permissible, but “a mere loss 
in value of the investment, even if important, is not an indirect expropriation.”998 As 
established throughout this chapter and especially at sections 3.2.3, 3.4.4 and 3.5.6, a 
                                                 
995 EnCana Award at para 141(1). 
996 El Paso Award at para 290; Burlington Award at para 391. 
997 Pope & Talbot Interim Award at para 99. 
998 El Paso Award at para 249. 
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finding of expropriation under customary international law requires substantial 
deprivation. That is true no matter which regulatory powers of the state are being 
debated, but rest assured that if it is the state’s tax powers that are the subject of the 
arbitration, arbitral tribunals will be even more careful and strict in their application 
of the substantial deprivation standard because, from the expropriation perspective, 
“taxation is in a special category.”999 Foreign investors therefore face an uphill 
struggle in establishing their case. 
 
For the above reasons, only two tax expropriation cases from those examined ended 
with awards in favour of the foreign investor, namely RosInvest and Quasar, which 
were brought on the backdrop of the expropriation by Russia of the Yukos Oil 
Company, which was at the time Russia’s largest company and taxpayer. The 
expropriation of Yukos was an extraordinary affair that involved political prisoners, 
the control of natural resources, and most vitally for the purpose of this  thesis, 
extraordinary tax assessments, tax penalties and novel interpretations of Russia’s tax 
laws, coupled with the freezing of assets to prevent the payment of the arbitrary and 
punitive tax assessments (also resulting in the default of a loan), the subsequent 
seizure and auction of the shares in YNG (and purchase by the state-owned oil 
company Rosneft), and finally ending with the liquidation of Yukos and the purchase 
of most of its assets by Rosneft at auction. The RosInvest and Quasar cases therefore 
ticked all the boxes required not only for a tax expropriation, but an unlawful one at 
that. They had: intent and effect; they had total deprivation (over and above 
substantial deprivation); and Russia’s actions breached the conduct requirements 
which can help to prove that in the balance of things the government measures err on 
the side of expropriation and rather than bona fide taxation. In contrast with the 
Yukos cases, Burlington involved the taxing by Ecuador of hundreds of millions of 
dollars in oil revenues that the state was not entitled to under the participation 
contracts yet there was no substantial deprivation because the investments continued 
to yield profits. 
 
The EnCana case is perhaps the epitome of the unwillingness of an arbitral tribunal 
to find a state liable for tax expropriation and helps to reinforce the notion that the 
                                                 
999 EnCana Award at para 177. 
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customary international law standard of substantial deprivation is replaced with a 
requirement of total deprivation. The EnCana tribunal, in the direct expropriation 
claim, recognised tax refunds as investments or returns of investments/claims to 
money which had been withheld from the claimant/claimant’s companies, but put 
itself in a position to find those tax refunds to have been substantially or completely 
expropriated. Having positioned itself for finding an expropriation, the EnCana 
tribunal then barred itself from finding an expropriation by adding an extra hurdle, 
namely that the due process and non-discrimination (conduct) requirements must be 
breached for a finding of tax expropriation. That hypothesis simply is not how a 
finding of expropriation works – as already explained and reiterated throughout this 
chapter, a violation of the conduct requirements can help to prove that state 
regulations have been used in a manner that justifies their labelling as compensable 
government takings, but the first question must always be: “has there been an 
expropriation?” and if there has been an expropriation then a violation of a conduct 
requirement will denote an unlawful expropriation – that is the real role of the 
conduct requirements. So, in EnCana, the claimant’s investment in the direct 
expropriation claim was streamlined by the tribunal to meaning the tax monies taken 
and subsequently retained by the state, which the claimant was entitled to the return 
of, effectually a debt claim against the state. The EnCana tribunal itself recognised  
that “… a law which cancels a liability the State already has to an investor… is 
capable of amounting to expropriation.”1000 There can be no doubt on that very basis 
that the tax money had been expropriated by Ecuador, albeit without any culpa, but it 
is the effect and not the intent that must stand to reason in establishing an 
expropriation. 
 
The analysis of the treatment of tax expropriation claims in investor-state arbitration 
has shown that arbitral tribunals are strict in their interpretation of the customary 
international law principles in finding state liability for tax expropriation. Rather than 
lowering the threshold of substantial deprivation to partial or temporary deprivation, 
arbitral tribunals are actually inclined to increase that threshold for tax claims as well 
as require a violation of the conduct requirements. The difference between the Yukos 
cases and Burlington was a total deprivation of Yukos’ assets and therefore the 
                                                 
1000 EnCana Award at para 183. 
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shares of the claimants, whereas in Burlington the claimant’s profits were diminished 
considerably by the tax on oil revenues but not totally. The similarities between the 
Yukos cases and the EnCana direct expropriation claim were a total deprivation of 
the investments concerned, with the fundamental difference being no violation of the 
conduct requirements in EnCana. Without a total deprivation and violation of the 
conduct requirements, a state is likely to be found to have expropriated an investment 
only if it has entered into an agreement with the investor giving the investor a 
legitimate expectation that the alleged expropriatory conduct will not occur. 
 
Overall, arbitral tribunals are willing to entertain tax expropriation claims whether 
they are big or small and amount to considerable losses or minor losses relative to the 
investments at hand. Arbitral tribunals are likely, however, to find in favour of the 
host state, unless there has been a total deprivation of investment coupled with a 
violation of the conduct requirements, thereby making the alleged tax measures 
expropriatory in both intent and effect. This also puts into disarray the hypothesis 
which exists in academic literature on arbitration that the system is pro-investor and 
puts corporate profits ahead of the sovereignty and welfare of the state.1001 It is clear 
from the cases discussed in this chapter that not only did arbitral tribunals faced with 
tax expropriation claims recognise the special character of tax and the importance of 
the sovereign prerogative to tax, their decisions also reflected that special character 
as regards expropriation.  
                                                 
1001 See generally section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 4 The Treatment of Tax in National Treatment Claims in 
Investor-State Arbitration 
 
 “Equality consists in the same treatment of similar persons.”1 
 
The national treatment obligation contained in most international investment treaties2 
(IITs) seeks to enforce equal treatment of host state investors and investments and 
foreign investors and investments3 in like circumstances, thereby prohibiting 
nationality based discrimination. National treatment guarantees foreign investors are 
treated equally before the law, administratively in law (administrative equality) and 
are protected equally from the law (formal equality).4 National treatment has 
developed into a key element of international trade5 and could be “the single most 
important standard of treatment in international investment agreements.”6 
 
The wording of national treatment provisions in most modern day IITs, 
predominantly multilateral investment treaties (MITs) and bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs), have almost identical aspects in that they require the treatment of 
investors and/or investments of other contracting states to be no less favourable than 
the treatment accorded to nationals of the host state regarding the management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments. The national treatment 
articles in IITs differ in the following ways: 
 
                                                 
1 Aristotle, Politics, (4th Century BC), translated by Benjamin Jowett in Aristotle Politics (2005 
Digireads.com Publishing) 184. 
2 UNCTAD, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking’, 33 at note 
44 (2007), Document No. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5 <http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf> 
accessed 2 April 2012 – noting that from the BITs concluded in the decade of research between 1995-
2006, at least 52 BITs did not contain a national treatment provision. This is a fraction compared to 
the 2500 BITs in conclusion by 2005. Additionally, all countries that concluded BITs without a 
national treatment provision had concluded in those same BITs a most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause, 
and had previously concluded BITs with a national treatment provision, thereby enabling the national 
treatment provision to be imported from the other BITs. 
3 For ease of reading and writing, foreign investors and foreign investments will be used 
interchangeably in this context. 
4 Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties – Standards of 
Treatment, (Kluwer Law International 2009) 151. 
5 Christopher Dugan, Don Wallace Jr, Noah Rubins and Borzu Sabahi, Investor-State Arbitration, 
(OUP 2008), 398. 
6 UNCTAD, ‘National Treatment’ (1999) Doc No. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 (Vol. IV), Executive 
Summary <http://unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd11v3.en.pdf>. accessed 2 April 2012. 
213 
 
(i) by combining most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN)7 with national 
treatment; 
(ii) by applying national treatment to establishment rights8 (i.e. the foreign 
investor is not made to go through extra hurdles to establish an 
investment in comparison to a host state national) and some apply 
national treatment post-establishment only;9 
(iii) by specifying that the national treatment standard shall apply to investors 
or investments in like circumstances, or similar wording to that effect; 
and/or 
(iv) some treaties contain national treatment articles specifically in relation to 
taxation and other fiscal measures. 
 
The above differences will be addressed at 4.2 below. 
 
The national treatment standard as it is today was developed through centuries of 
treaty drafting to encompass the centuries of change and development in trade and 
investment. The historical background and development of national treatment is 
discussed next.  
 
4.1   Historical Background and Development 
 
4.1.1 Pre-Modern Day Agreements 
 
The origin of the national treatment principle has been traced back to ancient Hebrew 
law.10 The use of national treatment became more prominent during and after the 11th 
                                                 
7 MFN requires a host state to treat investors and investments of the other state party in a manner no 
less favourable than the treatment afforded to investors and investments of a third state. 
8 Article 1102(2), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – each party to accord national 
treatment with respect to “the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, 
and sale or other disposition of investments” (emphasis mine). 
9 Article 3(2), Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments, signed 11 December 1990, entered into force 19 February 1993 (UK-Argentina BIT). 
10 Michael Trebilcock, ‘The National Treatment Principle in International Trade Law’ (2004) Paper 8 
American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings, 1 
<http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=alea> accessed 1 April 2012. 
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Century, where it surfaced in agreements between Italian city states,11 as well as in 
commercial treaties concluded between England and continental powers and cities in 
the 12th Century,12 in addition to Hanseatic League treaties at that time and 
thereafter.13 Comprehensive BITs in the 17th and 18th Centuries featured national 
treatment, especially shipping treaties,14 in which a second treaty between Prussia 
and the United States15 became a pioneer of national treatment in shipping,16 
affording equal treatment “to that accorded to the to the ships of the contracting 
nation itself.”17 The 19th and 20th Centuries witnessed national treatment becoming a 
standard provision in trade treaties18 and was included in other types of treaties 
including the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property19 
(Paris Convention) and the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works
20 (Berne Convention). National treatment also featured in The Calvo 
Doctrine, formulated by Argentinian diplomat Carlos Calvo in his six-volume 
commentary, Le Droit International: Theorique et Pratique, appearing in five 
editions between 1868 and 1896. The Calvo Doctrine promoted the equality between 
nationals and aliens, and the doctrine emerged not because nationals were afforded 
preferential treatment in comparison to foreign investors, but because foreign 
investors from the United States and Europe would invoke diplomatic protection 
                                                 
11 ibid; and Michael M. Hart, ‘The Mercantilist’s Lament: National Treatment and Modern Trade 
Negotiations’, (1987) 21:6 J.W.T.L. 38. 
12 Trebilcock (n. 10) 1. 
13 ibid; and Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 152. 
14 Trebilcock (n. 10) 1. 
15 Articles II-VIII, Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Prussia and the United States of 
America, concluded 1 May 1828, entered into force 14 March 1829, available at: 
<http://www.archive.org/stream/cu31924017529250/cu31924017529250_djvu.txt> accessed 12 April 
2012. 
16 Wallace McClure, ‘German-American Commercial Relations’, (1925) 19 A.J.I.L 689, 692. 
17 ibid. 
18 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 152. 
19 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20 March 1883, whereby Article 2 is 
titled “National Treatment for Nationals of Countries of the Union”, and Article 2(1) states the 
following: “Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of industrial 
property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their respective laws now 
grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; all without prejudice to the rights specially provided for by 
this Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same protection as the latter, and the same legal 
remedy against any infringement of their rights, provided that the conditions and formalities imposed 
upon nationals are complied with.” 
20 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 9 September 1886, whereby 
Article 5 is titled “Rights Guaranteed” and whereby Article 5(1) states that: “Authors shall enjoy, in 
respect of works for which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other 
than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to 
their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention.” 
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against the host states in Latin America21 and were therefore placed in more 
favourable positions than nationals of host Latin American countries. The Calvo 
Doctrine states that “the responsibility of Governments toward foreigners cannot be 
greater than that which these Governments have towards their own citizens.”22 It is in 
this regard that the Calvo Doctrine promoted national treatment as a protectionist 
measure in favour of nationals, rather than the usual purpose which is to protect 
foreigners. 
 
Prior to World War I (WWI), especially during the years 1860 to 1913, international 
trade flourished on account of international treaties23 such as that between Prussia 
and the United States.24 National treatment and most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses 
brought about low trade barriers and scarce trade discrimination, especially as 
regards tariffs and aspects that result in high import tariffs such as quantitative 
restrictions, voluntary restraint agreements and exchange controls.25 The treaty 
networks built prior to WWI were devastated by the war, with high tariffs, import 
quotas, licencing requirements and foreign-exchange controls imposed thereafter.26 
This lasted until after World War II (WWII), with multilateral interwar period efforts 
“to contain protectionist pressures”27 failing to reach concrete agreements on both 
domestic and international economic scales,28 but nevertheless helping to shape 




                                                 
21 Centre for International Environmental Law, ‘International Law on Investment: The Minimum 
Standard of Treatment (MST)’, (August 2003) 1 
<http://www.ciel.org/Publications/investment_10Nov03.pdf> accessed 16 November 2010. 
22 ibid, quoting Carlos Calvo, Le Droit International: Théorétique et Practique, (5th ed, vol. VI, Paris 
1896), 231, translation by  Donald Shea, The Calvo Clause: A problem of International Law and 
Diplomacy (Minnesota University Press 1955) 18-19. 
23 Kerry A. Chase, Trading Blocs – States, Firms and Regions in the World Economy (Michigan 
University Press, 2005), 51. 
24 Treaty of 1828 between United States of America and Kingdom of Prussia, ratified and exchanged 
on 14 March 1829. 
25 Douglas A. Irwin, ‘The GATT in Historical Perspective’, (1995) Vol. 85(2) Am. Econ. Rev. 323 
(Papers and Proceedings of the Hundredth and Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic 
Association, Washington DC, 6-8 January 1995). 
26 ibid. 
27 ibid. 
28 ibid 324. 
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4.1.2 Interwar Multilateral Agreement Efforts 
 
The most significant interwar multilateral agreement effort came in the form of the 
Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners 1929 (1929 Draft Convention) 
which was considered at the 1929 Paris International Conference on the Treatment of 
Foreign Nationals (Paris Conference). The 1929 Draft Convention was not adopted.29 
Had it been adopted, it would have implemented far reaching national treatment 
obligations.30 Foreign nationals would have been entitled “to conduct commercial 
transactions of every kind”31 on the same terms as nationals.32  
 
Article 7 would have entitled foreign nationals to “complete equality, de jure and de 
facto” on par with nationals of the host state.33 Article 12 of the 1929 Draft 
Convention, titled ‘Fiscal Treatment’, required national treatment specifically for 
taxation purposes. Home state nationals would have been entitled to the “same 
treatment and protection by the fiscal authorities and tribunals as nationals” of the 
host state with respect to “taxes and duties of every kind or any other charges of a 
fiscal nature” levied on their “person and property, rights and interests, including 
their commerce, industry and occupation.”34 This arguably shaped the national 
treatment provisions in the successfully adopted post-war General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade in 1947 (GATT 1947). 
 
4.1.3 Post-War Multilateral Agreement Efforts 
 
National treatment was contained at Article III of the GATT 1947 and as discussed 
in Chapter 2 the GATT has been adopted into the World Trade Organisation’s 
(WTO’s) GATT 1994 (the GATT). The national treatment provisions are still used 
by members of the WTO via the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to this day to 
challenge the laws and regulations of other member states which are potentially in 
                                                 
29 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 153. 
30 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 17. 
31 Article 1, Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners 1929 (1929 Draft Convention). 
32 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 153. 
33 Ibid, quoting Article 7, 1929 Draft Convention. 
34 Article 12, 1929 Draft Convention. 
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breach of Article III.35 The GATT contains two national treatment provisions; one 
applies to taxation and other fiscal measures36 and the other applies to all other forms 
of regulation.37 Article III:2 of the GATT is an agreement by WTO members to 
refrain from taxing or applying other internal charges to products imported into their 
territories from other member states at levels greater than those taxes applied to like 
domestic products. Article III:4 is an agreement by WTO members, from a legal, 
regulatory and other requirements38 perspective, to treat products imported from 
other member states in manners no less favourable than those applied to like 
domestic products. A breach of those GATT articles would be found if the measures 
“afford protection to domestic production.”39 The national treatment by taxation of 
non-domestic products can find its roots in agreements which existed before the 
GATT, such as Article 7 of the Estonia-Lithuania Commercial Convention of 1934.40 
 
The International Chamber of Commerce’s 1949 International Code of Fair 
Treatment for Foreign Investment
41 (ICC Code) included national treatment 
provisions, whereby foreign investments would be given treatment no less favourable 
than treatment of a state’s own nationals,42 including no administrative or legal 
discrimination on grounds of nationality which therefore extended national treatment 
to entry and establishment;43 national treatment in legal and judicial protection of the 
person, property, rights and interests, including land and fiscal acquisitions, 
                                                 
35 WTO, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, adopted on 1 November 1996; WTO, Korea – Taxes 
on Alcoholic Beverages, adopted on 17 February 1999; and WTO Panel Report, Chile – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages, adopted on 12 January 2000; WTO, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the 
Automotive Industry, adopted on 23 July 1998; WTO, United States – Tax Treatment for "Foreign 
Sales Corporations”, adopted on 20 March 2000. 
36 Article III:2, GATT. 
37 Article III:4, GATT. 
38 Other requirements can include a requirement to purchase machinery for production from the 
country to which importation is sought in order to qualify for production subsidies – GATT 1947 
Dispute Settlement, ‘Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery’, Dispute No. 
L/833 – 7S/60, adopted on 23 October 1958. 
39 Article III:1, GATT. 
40 Estonia and Lithuania Commercial Convention, with Annexes and Protocol, signed 13 January 
1934. 
41 International Chamber of Commerce, International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investment, 
ICC Pub. No. 129 (Lecraw Press, Paris 1948), reprinted in UNCTAD, ‘International Investment 
Instruments: A Compendium – Volume III: Regional Integration, Bilateral and Non-governmental 
Instruments’ (1996), Doc. No. UNCTAD/DTCI/30(Vol.III), 275-278  
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/dtci30vol3_en.pdf> accessed 12 March 2012. 
42
 ibid, Article 3. 
43 ibid, Article 4. 
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purchases and sales;44 no nationality discrimination in the composition of 
shareholders or in the employment hierarchy of Directors, Officers and staff in 
general,45 unless an enterprise is directly concerned with national defence;46 and like 
the GATT, national treatment in respect of taxation,47 except that the GATT national 
treatment applies to ‘products’, whereas the ICC Code focuses on “no less favourable 
treatment in respect of taxation to the nationals” of other state parties48 (emphasis 
mine). The ICC Code was not adopted but was significant in shifting the language of 
international investment agreements from “state responsibility for injuries to aliens 
and their property… [to]… the protection of foreign investment with the object of 
promoting economic development.”49 
 
National treatment was also a guiding principle in the OECD’s Code of 
Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations
50 and the Code of Liberalization of 
Capital Movements,51 both of 18 October 1961, the year in which the OECD was 
established, and it remains in the revised 201052 and 201253 versions of those texts. 
 
The OECD’s 1967 Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property54 (OECD 
1967 Draft Convention), drafted as a model for future international investment 
agreements,55 insisted on the constant protection and security of property of foreign 
nationals, and non-impairment in “the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal of such property by unreasonable or discriminatory measures.”56 Article 1(a) 
of the OECD 1967 Draft Convention read with the accompanying commentary gives 
Article 1(a) a broad meaning, extending to national treatment,57 MFN treatment58 and 
                                                 
44 ibid, Article 5. 
45 ibid, Article 6.  
46 ibid. 
47 ibid, Article 7. 
48 ibid. 
49 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 21. 
50 OECD, Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations, 28 October 1961 and 2010. 
51 OECD, Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, 28 October 1961 and 2012. 
52 OECD, Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations, 2010. 
53 OECD, Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, 2012. 
54 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, adopted by the OECD Council on 
12 October 1967. 
55 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 154. 
56 OECD 1967 Draft Convention, Article 1(a). 
57 ibid, Notes and Comments to Article 1, 8(e)(iv): forms of discrimination would be evident from 




discrimination between different nationals of the same foreign state.59 The Article 
1(a) rights to non-discrimination would only have applied to post-establishment 
rights,60 whereas pre-establishment discrimination to prevent an investment from 
being made would have been permitted under Article 1(b). 
 
4.2      National Treatment Provisions in Modern Investment Treaties 
4.2.1 National Treatment and Most-Favoured Nation Combined 
 
National treatment is a relative standard. This means that to assess a claim by an 
investor against a host state for alleged breach of a national treatment provision 
contained in an investment treaty, a comparison will need to be made between the 
manner in which the host state treated the claimant investor or his investment and a 
national of the host state or an investment of a national of the host state. Likewise, to 
assess a breach of MFN, the same methodology applies except that the national (or 
investment of a national) of the host state is replaced by a national (or investment of 
a national) of a third state. For that reason, most investment treaties that contain 
national treatment and MFN combine the two into one article by adding a few words 
instead of adding an extra paragraph or two to the treaty (and most treaties do contain 
them and most treaties do combine them).61 
 
The Iceland-Mexico BIT62 is a typical example of a treaty that contains a national 
treatment and MFN combination clause.63 Article 3 of that BIT, titled ‘Treatment of 
Investments’, contains two national treatment and MFN clauses, one pertaining to 
investors and the other to investments:64  
                                                                                                                                          
58 ibid, Notes and Comments to Article 1, 8(e)(ii) and 8(e)(iii): forms of discrimination would be 
evident by differentiation in the treatment of property of “(ii) nationals of different parties; (iii) 
nationals of a Party and those of a third State.” 
59 ibid, Notes and Comments to Article 1, 8(e)(i): forms of discrimination would be evident by 
differentiation in the treatment of property of “(i) Nationals of the same (foreign) Party to the 
Convention.” 
60 ibid, Article 1(b). 
61 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 156. 
62 Agreement between the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the 
Republic of Iceland on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 24 June 2005, 
entered into force 6 June 2006 (Mexico-Iceland BIT). 
63 Article 3, Mexico-Iceland BIT. 
64 The distinction between national treatment provisions that focus on investors or investments is 




(2)  Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord investments of 
investors of the other Contracting Party treatment not less favourable 
than that which it accords, in like circumstances, to investments of its 
own investors or to investments of investors of any third State, 
whichever is more favourable to the investor concerned. (emphasis 
mine). 
 
(3)  Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord investors of the 
other Contracting Party, as regards the management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments, treatment not less 
favourable than that which it accords, in like circumstances, to its own 
investors or to investors of any third State, whichever is more 
favourable to the investor concerned. (emphasis mine). 
 
The reason that national treatment and MFN have been combined is MFN would 
apply in the same manner as national treatment would, so to add the words “or to 
investors of any third State” to each sub-article makes drafting sense. The only 
reasons not to have combination articles would be if the treaty will not have an MFN 
clause or will have an MFN clause but not a national treatment clause, or if the 
drafters wanted MFN to apply differently to national treatment, for example, in sub-
article (3), to not apply to ‘disposal’ of the investments.65 Other such treaties include 
most UK BITs (see for example the UK-Albania BIT66, the UK-Venezuela BIT67 and 
the UK-Malaysia BIT68), early US BITs (see for example the US-Ecuador BIT69 and 
                                                 
65 Even if this is the case, a treaty could contain a combination clause and then include ‘MFN for 
disposals’ as part of an exclusions clause. 
66 Article 3, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Albania for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, signed 30 March 1994, entered into force 30 August 1995 (UK-Albania BIT). 
67 Article 3, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Venezuela for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments, signed 15 March 1995, entered into force 1 August 1996 (UK-Venezuela BIT). 
68 Article 3, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of Malaysia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
signed 21 May 1981, entered into force 21 October 1988 (UK-Malaysia BIT). 
69 Article II, Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed 27 August 1993, entered into force 
11 May 1997 (US-Ecuador BIT). 
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the US-Argentina BIT70), and other bilaterals such as the Netherlands-Costa Rica 
BIT.71 
 
National treatment and MFN combination clauses will not be addressed further in 
this chapter. 
 
4.2.2 Investors, Investments, and Investments of Investors 
 
Investment treaties contain national treatment provisions that either apply to both 
investors and investments72 or to one of those, with investments of investors usually 
prevailing where a choice has been made.73 
 
National treatment provisions that apply to treatment accorded to investors instead of 
investments include those contained in the Iceland-Mexico BIT above and Article 
1102(1) of NAFTA. Article 1102(1) of NAFTA reads as: 
 
Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments74 (emphasis mine). 
 
Measures that will affect an investor rather than his investment include requiring a 
minimum share capital which is greater than that required for nationals of the host 
                                                 
70 Article II, Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed 14 November 1991, entered into 
force 20 October 1994 (US-Argentina BIT). 
71 Article 3(2), Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the 
Republic of Costa Rica and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, signed 21 May 1999, entered into force 
1 July 2001. 
72 UK-Venezuela BIT; UK-Malaysia BIT; UK-Albania BIT; Article 3, United States Model BIT 2012; 
Article 1102, NAFTA; and Article 10(1) and 10(3), Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). 
73 Article II(1) US-Argentina BIT; Article 4(2), Agreement Between the Government of the Republic 
of Chile and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection 
of Investments, signed on 28 November 1994, entered into force on 15 June 1996 (Chile-Croatia 
BIT); Article IV, Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic 
of Ecuador for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 29 April 1996, entered 
into force 6 June 1997 (Canada-Ecuador BIT). 
74 Article 1102(1), NAFTA. 
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state75 (establishment rights), or subjecting the profits of an investor’s investment to 
a higher rate of tax than that applied to nationals of the host state (impairment of 
conduct and impairment of expansion of the investment).76  
 
National treatment articles that apply to measures which affect investments of 
investors instead of the investors directly, include provisions like Article 3(2) of the 
Iceland-Mexico BIT and Article 1102(2) of NAFTA. Article 1102(2) of NAFTA in 
exactly the same as Article 1102(1), except that it applies to investments of investors 
instead of investors, i.e. “Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of 
another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords…” Some other treaties 
which separate the application of national treatment between investors and 
investments do not have the two provisions mirroring each other as they do in Article 
1102 of NAFTA, so it is common to find a NAFTA-type article that applies to 
investors as above (Article 1102(1), but to find the provision that applies to investors 
of investments reading as: 
 
“Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investments or returns 
of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party to treatment less 
favourable than that that which it accords to investments or returns of its own 
nationals…”77 (emphasis mine). 
 
The UK-Malaysia BIT’s national treatment provision on investments is typically 
wide to encompass anything which can show discrimination between a host state 
national’s investment or his returns and those of a foreign investor. A foreigner’s 
investments might by law be subjected to environmental regulation which applies 
more stringently on the foreign investment that it does on host state investments (de 
jure discrimination) or is applied more stringently on foreign investments (de facto 
discrimination). Similarly, taxes may be levied on a foreign national which are not 
                                                 
75 Article 1102(4)(a), NAFTA, “… no Party may … impose on an investor of another Party a 
requirement that a minimum level of equity in an enterprise in the territory of the Party be held by its 
nationals, other than nominal qualifying shares for directors or incorporators of corporations”. 
76 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc. v United Mexican 
States (ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/05/05), Final Award (Redacted Version) of 21 November 2007, at 
para 188. 
77 Article 3(1), UK-Malaysia BIT 
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levied on host state nationals, or the foreign investor might be declined tax rebates on 
exports.78 
 
Whether treaty articles on national treatment focus on investors and investments or 
only investments is unlikely to be a decisive factor for finding liability. For example, 
in Occidental, the claimant was successful in convincing the arbitral tribunal that 
Ecuador had breached Article II(1) of the US-Ecuador BIT which contains a 
provision requiring national treatment of investments.79 In Feldman,80 the tribunal 
found Mexico liable for breaching Article 1102 of NAFTA by giving Mexican 
exporters of cigarettes tax rebates on exports but not providing the same to the 
claimant/his Mexican company.81 Although the Feldman tribunal did not specify 
whether Article 1102(1) (national treatment of foreign nationals) or 1102(2) (national 
treatment of foreign nationals’ investments) was breached, referring to the breach 
being of Article 1102 generally (or maybe entirely), the tribunal did focus on the 
investor rather than the investment,82 namely because that was what the claimant 
based his claim on.83 Evidently, breach of national treatment on the same issue (in 
this example, tax refunds on exports) can be argued on an investor basis or an 
investment basis. 
 
It has been suggested that the IITs that apply national treatment to “enterprises or 
activities of enterprises”84 exclude investors “from national treatment in such matters 
as, for example, taxation.”85 I do not see how that would be the case. If a foreign 
investor establishes a company in a host state and the company does not receive 
                                                 
78 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 
3467, Award of 1 July 2004, at para 179. 
79 ibid. 
80 Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award of 
16 December 2002 (Feldman or Feldman Award). 
81 ibid, at para 187. 
82 ibid at para 166: “(a) which domestic investors, if any, are in “like circumstances” with the foreign 
investor; (b) whether there has been discrimination against foreign investors, either de jure or de facto; 
(c) the extent to which differential treatment must be demonstrated to be a result of the foreign 
investor’s nationality; and (d) whether a foreign investor must receive the most favorable treatment 
given to any domestic investor or to just some of them.” 
83 Feldman Award at para 157: “The Claimant… argues that… the Claimant is being treated less 
favorably than a domestic investor in like circumstances.” 
84 Article 3, Denmark and Indonesia Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and the Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments (with Protocol), signed 30 January 1968, not entered into force as of 1 June 
2013 (Denmark-Indonesia BIT). 
85 UNCTAD National Treatment 1999 (n. 6) 18. 
224 
 
national treatment for taxation purposes in comparison to companies owned by host 
state nationals, that investor will likely be able to bring a claim in his own name, as 
was the case in EnCana.86 This is possible subject to the relevant investment treaty, 
for example, the treaty applicable in EnCana was the Canada-Ecuador BIT. Article 
XIII(12) of the Canada-Ecuador BIT permits the foreign investor to bring a claim 
against the host state if an enterprise “is a juridical person incorporated or duly 
constituted in accordance with applicable laws of that” host state, and that company 
has allegedly incurred damage due to a breach of the BIT and the investor directly or 
indirectly owns or controls that enterprise.87 Some tribunals can see an even wider 
scope in BITs to allow a foreign national to claim under a BIT. In EnCana, the 
claimant brought proceedings on behalf of its subsidiaries who were operating in 
Ecuador but were actually companies incorporated in third states, i.e. not Canadian 
or Ecuadorian. That was permitted by the tribunal88 under Articles XIII(1) and (2) of 
the Canada-Ecuador BIT which permits an investor to bring a claim for loss or 
damage incurred by the investor for a measure taken or not taken by the host state in 
breach of the BIT. This is akin to the concept of piercing the corporate veil to allow 
the person who has suffered harm to bring a claim or who has allegedly caused harm 
to respond to a claim. Therefore, EnCana, the claimant, was able to bring a claim 
against Ecuador itself because although Ecuador’s alleged BIT violations affected 
EnCana’s third state incorporated subsidiaries, it was EnCana who would have 
suffered harm for any treaty violations. There are also some treaties which permit the 
host state-incorporated company which is owned or controlled by the foreign 





                                                 
86 EnCana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3481, Award of 3 February 2006, 
at para 118 (EnCana or EnCana Award). 
87 Article XIII(12)(a), Canada-Ecuador BIT. 
88 EnCana Award at para 118. 
89 Article 7(2), Agreement between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Malaysia for 




4.2.3 Pre-Entry and Post-Entry Application 
 
Most IITs do not give investors the right of entry to or investments establishment 
rights in a host state.90 Accordingly, in the majority of treaties national treatment 
applies post-entry/establishment (post-entry). The argument for granting national 
treatment post-entry only is demonstrated by the 1961 Draft Convention on the 
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens (1961 Harvard Draft), 
which was drafted to codify customary international law (i.e. codifying an 
international minimum standard of treatment). The 1961 Harvard Draft was drafted 
to make a host state internationally accountable to a foreign investor if there had 
been a clear and discriminatory violation of host state law.91 Therefore, if host state 
law does not give a foreign investor establishment rights on an equal basis to its own 
nationals, then the foreign investor would not have a course of action because host 
state responsibility would only arise if the foreign investor is deprived of rights 
already granted to him under the host state’s domestic law. 
 
A good example of a BIT which clearly states that national treatment will apply post-
establishment is the Turkey-Ethiopia BIT92 which states at Article III(2): 
 
“Once the investment is accepted, each Party shall accord to this investment, 
treatment no less favorable than that accorded in similar situations to 
investments of its investors or to investments of investors of any third 
country, whichever is the most favorable.” 
  
On the other hand, some IITs do require host states to allow the entry and 
establishment of investors and investments in their territories, for example United 
States BITs93 Canadian BITs94 and regional investment agreements such as 
NAFTA95 and DR-CAFTA.96  
                                                 
90 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 158. 
91 Louis B. Sohn and R. R. Baxter, ‘Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of 
Aliens’ (1961) 55 A.M.J.L. 545, 547. 
92 Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 16 November 2000, 
entered into force 10 March 2005 (Turkey-Ethiopia BIT). 
93 Article 3(1) and (2) of the most recent United States of America Model BIT 2012 (US Model BIT 




From a tax perspective, the inclusion of national treatment regarding establishment 
rights might only be relevant if charges are levied on a foreign investor or his 
investment pre-entry into the host state and these charges might be construed as 
being taxes.97 This scenario is an unlikely one and no such tax arbitrations have been 
reported. Therefore, the tax arbitrations which are discussed in this chapter and 
throughout the thesis relate to post-entry of the investor and/or investment into the 
host state. 
4.2.4 The Comparator 
 
It was established at 4.2.1 above that national treatment, as a relative standard, 
requires assessing the manner in which the foreign investor or investment has been 
treated and comparing it with a host state national or investment (the comparator). 
Many treaties98 guide the question by requiring foreign investors or investments to be 
compared to host state investors or investments in ‘like,’, or ‘similar’ situations or 
circumstances, meanwhile the majority of investment treaties stay silent as regards a 
comparator,99 for example: 
 
                                                                                                                                          
requires each party to “permit… investment..”); Article 3(1) and (2) of the most recent United States 
BIT (Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Republic of Rwanda concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, signed 
19 February 2008, entered into force 1 January 2012 (US-Rwanda BIT)) also includes “establishment” 
in its national treatment articles). 
94 Article 3(1) and (2), Canada Model BIT 2004 (“establishment”); Article II(3), Agreement between 
the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Armenia for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, signed 8 May 1997, entered into force 29 March 1999 (Canada-Armenia 
BIT) contains a national treatment article specifically for the parties to allow the establishment of 
investments; the Canada-Ecuador BIT contains the same establishment article as the Canada-Armenia 
BIT, and both BITs specifically exclude pre-entry rights through national treatment by titling the 
national treatment Article IV as “National Treatment after Establishment and Exceptions to National 
Treatment” (because there is no need to have establishment rights invoked twice in the same treaty. 
95 Article 1102(1) and (2), NAFTA, (“establishment”). 
96 Article 10.3(1) and (2), DR-CAFTA, (“establishment”). 
97 A tax which is described by a host state as a charge which is not a tax will not prevent an arbitral 
tribunal from seeing through the disguise (Hellenic Electric Railways Ltd v Government of Greece, 
Ad Hoc Arbitration, Geneva, Award of 18 March 1930), in which the arbitral tribunal rejected the 
distinction between social security contributions and taxes).  
98 The United States, Canada, Mexico and Turkey are commonly use a comparator in their BITs and 
MITs. 
99 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 159; the Chile, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Switzerland and United Kingdom do not commonly use a comparator in their BITs. 
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“A Contracting Party shall accord investments of the investors of one 
Contracting Party in its territory a treatment which is no less favourable than 
that accorded to investments made by its own investors…”100 
 
Another example of a provision which is silent on a comparator and applies national 
treatment to investors with different drafting to the example above is the UK-
Mozambique BIT,101 which reads: 
 
“Neither Contracting Party shall in its Territory subject Nationals or 
Companies of the other Contracting Party, as regards their management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their Investments, to treatment 
less favourable than that which it accords to its own Nationals…”102 
 
The two examples above together demonstrate the majority of national treatment 
provisions contained in investment agreements which are silent on comparators, with 
the former exemplifying provisions that apply to investments and the latter 
exemplifying provisions that apply to investors. It is also possible for treaties to put 
the two together, for example: 
 
“Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting 
Party and to their investments, treatment no less favourable…”103 
 
Treaties which do provide a comparator do not differ much in their wording to those 
articles copied above, they simply add to the national treatment provisions words 
such as “in like circumstances”. The recent UK-Mexico BIT104 is such an example, 
whereby the national treatment article is almost exactly the same as the UK-
Mozambique and most other UK BITs, with the addition of “in like circumstances”: 
 
                                                 
100 Article 4(2), Chile-Croatia BIT. 
101 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Republic of Mozambique for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
signed 18 March 2004, entered into force 12 May 2004 (UK-Mozambique BIT). 
102 Article 3(2), UK-Mozambique BIT. 
103 Article III, OECD Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Draft MAI). 
104 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the United Mexican States for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, signed 12 May 2006, entered into force 25 July 2007 (UK-Mexico BIT). 
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“Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investors of the other 
Contracting Party, as regards the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment 
or disposal of their investments, to treatment less favourable than that which 
it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors…”105 
 
The most common comparator in IITs is “like circumstances”, however variations 
have been used, including “like situations”,106 “similar situations”107 and “same 
circumstances”.108 The choice of words used by the drafters of treaties is not a 
defining factor. “Like” and “similar” are synonyms of each other,109 “situation” and 
“circumstances” are synonyms of each other,110 and although even “same” can be a 
synonym of “like” and “similar”.111 Although the primary definition of “same” is 
“identical”,112 the characterisation by arbitral tribunals of the subjects to be compared 
to determine whether nationality-based discrimination and anti-competitive practices 
have occurred is what is most important, whereby the apparent wider or narrower 
comparator clauses (“like” or “similar” versus “same”) will not be determinative of 
the issue113 for the same reason it is not an issue when the IIT does not refer to a 
comparator. The nature of national treatment requires a comparison to be made 
between a host state investor or investment and a foreign investor or investment to 
determine whether the foreign investor or investment has been discriminated against. 
                                                 
105 Article 4(2), UK-Mexico BIT. 
106 Article II(1) and (2), Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of  Senegal 
concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of  Investment, with Protocol, signed 6 
December 1983, entered into force 25 October 1990 (US-Senegal BIT). 
107 Article III(1) and (2), Turkey-Ethiopia BIT. 
108 Article 3(1) and (2), Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of Belize for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
signed and entered into force 30 April 1982 (UK-Belize BIT). 
109 The online Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines “like” as “similar to”; the OED says word 
“similar” originates from the Latin word similis which means “like”; the online Collins English 
Thesaurus (CET) puts “similar” as a top synonym of “like” and vice versa. 
110 The OED defines “situation” as “a set of circumstances in which one finds oneself”; the CET gives 
puts “circumstance” as a top synonym of “situation” and vice versa. 
111 The OED, using geometry as an example, defines “similar” as “having the same shape, with the 
same angles and proportions, though of different sizes”; and the OED provides “similar” as an adverb 
to “same”. 
112 The OED’s primary definition of “same” is “identical; not different”. 
113 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 162; it will also depend on the arbitral tribunal and the 
circumstances of the case. For example, in Corn Products International Inc. v United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility (Redacted Version) of 15 January 2008 
(Corn Products or Corn Products Award), the tribunal said that “Article 1102 [of NAFTA] requires 
that the investors (or investments) which are being compared are in like not identical circumstances” 
(emphasis original) (Corn Products Award at para 129), indicating that had Article 1102 required 




To make that comparison, it is logical to “compare like with like”,114 and that is the 
position whether an IIT is silent on a comparator, expressly uses the word “like” as a 
comparator (whereby most IITs that have a comparator use “like”), and even if 
“same” is used. Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Vienna Convention) says: 
 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.115 
 
National treatment provisions would be almost useless in an investment treaty 
context if the treaty drafters or the arbitral tribunal required an identical comparator 
because it is almost impossible for investments to be exactly the same.116 For that 
reason, the RFCC Consortium tribunal’s requirement that a comparator be identical 
(identique)117 when the investment treaty has not given a comparator is regarded as 
inappropriate.118 The national treatment articles in the Draft MAI contain “in like 
circumstances” in square brackets because some delegations felt that an implicit 
addition of a comparator was unnecessary and open to abuse in investment treaty 
arbitration, but for those delegations that did want a comparator included, that 
comparator to be included was “in like circumstances”,119 with “same” and 
“comparable” being rejected by most delegations as unacceptably weakening the 
standard of treatment.120 
 
                                                 
114Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 161; the Occidental tribunal paras 174-176 discussed the different 
between “like” investors or investments in an investment treaty context and “like products” from the 
GATT perspective. The tribunal (referring to the WTO Appellate Body Report for Korea – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages, AB-1998-7 (18 January 1999) para 118) recognised that “like products” in a 
GATT perspective is interpreted narrowly to include directly competitive or substitutable products, 
whereas “like” investors can relate to investors who share a condition (e.g. they are exporters of goods 
originating in the host state) - . 
115 Article 31(1), Vienna Convention. 
116 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 162 note 77; for example, location in the host state, size of office, 
size of factory, number of employees and countries to which exports are made will most likely differ 
in many respects. 
117 Consortium RFCC v Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Award of 22 December 
2003, at para 53. 
118 Newcombe and Paradell (n. 4) 161. 
119 OECD, ‘The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Commentary to the Consolidated Text’, (22 
April 1998) Doc. No. DAFFE/MAI(98)8/REV1, 10   
<http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng988r1e.pdf> accessed 12 April 2012. 
120 ibid, Draft Commentary. 
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In practice, therefore, the comparator will be the one in like circumstances, but then 
the choice of which (if any) host state investors or investments are determined as 
being in like circumstances as the foreign investor or investment is where decisions 
by arbitral tribunals plays the key role. How likeness has been determined in tax-
related investment arbitrations is discussed at section 4.3.1 below. 
 
4.2.5 Tax-Specific National Treatment Provisions 
 
Although most IITs exclude tax related issues from their national treatment and MFN 
provisions,121 some IITs differ completely and actually include tax-specific national 
treatment articles.122  
 
Article 12(1) of the 1929 Draft Convention (see 4.1.2 above) was a tax-specific 
national treatment provision which would have obliged signatories to accord national 
treatment to investors of other states with respect to: (i) taxes and any other kinds of 
duties; and (ii) any other charges of a fiscal nature. 
 
ICC Code, which was created as part of the International Chamber of Commerce’s 
drive to promote foreign direct  investment,123 and is therefore does not have 
                                                 
121 See 4.2.6 below. 
122Article 4, Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the 
Republic of Honduras and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, signed 15 January 2001, entered into 
force 1 September 2002 (Netherlands-Honduras BIT); Article 4, Agreement on Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, signed 9 May 1995, entered into force 1 May 1999 (Netherlands-South Africa BIT); 
Article 4, Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the 
Republic of Nicaragua and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, signed 28 August 2000, entered into 
force 1 January 2003 (Netherlands-Nicaragua BIT); Article 4, Agreement on the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Republic of Ecuador and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, signed 27 June 1999, entered into force 1 July 2001 (Netherlands-Ecuador BIT); Article 
4, Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Republic of 
Costa Rica and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, signed 21 May 1999, entered into force 1 July 2001 
(Netherlands-Costa Rica BIT); Article 4, Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Cuba, signed 2 November 
1999, entered into force 1 November 2001 (Netherlands-Cuba BIT); Article 5, Agreement on 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
and the Argentine Republic, signed 20 October 1992, entered into force 1 October 1994 (Netherlands-
Argentina BIT). 
123 International Chamber of Commerce, ‘ICC Guidelines for International Investment’ (2012), 3 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Policies/2012/2012-ICC-Guidelines-for-International-Investment/> 
accessed 27 October 2013. 
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signatories and is not a binding international instrument, also contains a tax-specific 
national treatment article, plainly stating: 
 
“The High Contracting Parties shall not give less favourable treatment in 
respect of taxation to the nationals of the other High Contracting Parties than 
to their own nationals.”124 
 
The Netherlands Model BIT 2004125 contains two national treatment articles, one 
general provision on the national treatment of investments at Article 3(2)126 and a 
provision for the national treatment of nationals of the other contracting state in fiscal 
matters at Article 4. The full Article 4 reads: 
 
With respect to taxes, fees, charges and to fiscal deductions and exemptions, each 
Contracting Party shall accord to nationals of the other Contracting Party who are 
engaged in any economic activity in its territory, treatment not less favourable 
than that accorded to its own nationals or to those of any third State who are in 
the same circumstances, whichever is more favourable to the nationals 
concerned. For this purpose, however, any special fiscal advantages accorded by 
that Party, shall not be taken into account: 
 
a) under an agreement for the avoidance of double taxation; or 
b) by virtue of its participation in a customs union, economic union or 
similar institution; or 
c) on the basis of reciprocity with a third State (emphasis mine).127 
 
There are three matters to address with this article: (i) what it applies to; (ii) who it 
applies to and in relation to which matters; and (iii) what the exceptions to its 
application are. I will address these in turn below. 
 
                                                 
124 Article 7, ICC Code. 
125 Kingdom of Netherlands Model Bilateral Investment Treaty – Standard Text (March 2004) 
(Netherlands Model BIT 2004). 
126 Article 3(2), Netherlands Model BIT 2004. 
127 Article 4, Netherlands Model BIT 2004. 
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(i) It applies to “taxes” (the levying of tax – i.e. tax rates); fiscal 
“deductions” (this will include tax concessions); and fiscal “exemptions” 
(this will include tax rebates and zero-rate taxes). 
(ii) The standard of treatment applies to the nationals of the other state-party 
who are engaged in economic activities in the host state and are in the 
same circumstances as the host state nationals or nationals of a third state 
(MFN obligation). “Nationals” is defined as natural persons of a party, 
legal persons constituted under the law of a party, and legal persons not 
constituted under a law of a party but directly or indirectly controlled by a 
natural or legal person of a party.128 “Economic activities” is not defined 
in the Model BIT but can be taken on its prima facie meaning as activities 
of a commercial nature which will include investments. 
(iii) The exceptions to its application are: firstly, favourable treatment 
accorded to host state nationals or nationals of a third state under double 
taxation treaties (DTTs) which are used to avoid individuals and 
companies from paying tax on the same income in two different 
jurisdictions; secondly, favourable treatment accorded on the basis of 
membership to customs unions (such as the East African Customs Union), 
economic unions (such as the European Union which in itself contains a 
customs union) and other unions (a catch all, such as membership of 
organisations such as the OECD); and thirdly, the reciprocity with a third 
state provision captures the incidence of a bilateral tax treaty (BTT) in 
which each state grants investors of the other state tax advantages in order 
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). 
 
There are two aspects of the Dutch provision which are of interest. Firstly, why is 
there a national treatment and MFN provision specifically for tax? And secondly, 
what is the meaning behind “same circumstances” in Article 4? The first question 
was recently answered by the tribunal in ConocoPhillips,129 brought under the now 
                                                 
128 Article 1(b), Netherlands Model BIT 2004. 
129 ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V., ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. 
and ConocoPhillips Company v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, 




terminated Netherlands-Venezuela BIT130 which contained the Dutch model 
provision copied above in essentially the same form.131 The tribunal concluded that 
matters of taxation “are subject only to the obligations stated in Article 4 and not to 
the more generally worded fair and equitable treatment obligation included in Article 
3.”132 It is therefore used as a tax-exclusion clause to except the application of fair 
and equitable treatment (contained in Article 3 of the Netherlands Model BIT but not 
contained in Article 4) to tax matters. Article 4 therefore allows states to limit their 
obligations under the “broad and absolute obligation of fair and equitable 
treatment”133 on account of the “special character of the power of a State to impose 
taxation”134 (emphasis mine). 
 
As to the second question, the most debatable aspect of Article 4 is that it applies to 
foreign nationals who are in the same circumstances as host state nationals and 
nationals of third states. How this would be interpreted by an arbitral tribunal is 
questionable because as yet it has not been arbitrated135 despite being prevalent in a 
number of the Netherlands’ BITs.136 I concluded at 4.2.4 above that whether a treaty 
contains a comparator or not is not fundamental to disputes because the tribunals are 
likely to use investors or investments in like circumstances in any event. Whether or 
not that is the case with this Dutch provision is not as clear cut because the general 
national treatment provision at Article 3(2) of the Netherlands Model BIT does not 
contain a comparator at all, whereas Article 4 contains a very stringent comparator 
which is marginally short of being “identical”. The Netherlands Model BIT therefore 
contains two national treatment provisions with each one on a different end of the 
comparator spectrum,137 and that is the reason why the Dutch intentions in using the 
words “same circumstances” may be perceived more stringently by an arbitral 
                                                 
130 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands and the Republic of Venezuela, signed 22 October 1991, entered into force 1 
November 1993 and terminated effective 1 November 2008 (Netherlands-Venezuela BIT). 
131 Article 4, Netherlands-Venezuela BIT. 
132 ConocoPhillips Award at para 315. 
133 ibid. 
134 ibid at para 316. 
135 “Same circumstances” was not examined in ConocoPhillips because the claimants agreed there 
was no claim under that provision (ConocoPhillips Award at para 332). 
136 The provision exists in the same or almost identical form in all the Dutch BITs referenced at (n. 
122) above. 
137 The reader is reminded that in the absence of a comparator being written in the IIT provision, the 
comparator will almost always be that in “like circumstances”, except for inappropriate decisions like 
that in RFCC (n. 117) above. 
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tribunal if and when called upon to examine the provision in any future arbitrations. 
That said, the hypothesis at 4.2.4 above that no two investors or investments are ever 
likely to be the same (the same being identical), and that an arbitral tribunal would 
not require that kind of comparator because it would neutralise the essence of the 
national treatment provision, still stands. Therefore, it is the author’s opinion that a 
comparator for the sake of Article 4 would not be determined in such a stringent 
manner because that could render it pointless under Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, however it would likely have to be viewed narrowly, with a comparator 
being very similar to the subject of the claim against the host state, and so the wide 
interpretation of like circumstances in Occidental (see section 4.3.1 below) is 
unlikely to be adopted and a tribunal may instead require that rather than a subject 
being compared to exporters of any goods, the subject would have to be compared to 
exporters of the same category of goods. 
 
4.2.6 National Treatment Tax Exclusions 
 
As already mentioned at 4.2.4 above, most IITs exclude matters of taxation from 
their national treatment provisions. There are two primary reasons that national 
treatment and MFN provisions are excluded from matters of taxation: 
 
(i) so that states retain maximum fiscal sovereignty;138 and 
(ii) following on from (i), so that states can grant favourable tax treatment to 
their nationals or nationals of a third state (would breach national 
treatment and MFN respectively but for the tax exclusions).139 
 
Maximum fiscal sovereignty includes avoiding investor-state arbitration and 
regulatory chill. 
 
                                                 
138 ibid, 36. 
139 Ibid; there is a third reason for the exclusion of national treatment and MFN provisions which I 
believe is too weak to include as a primary reason, that is “the complexity of tax matters may render 
such matters unsuitable for inclusion in the kind of standardized provisions that are typical of BITs” 
(ibid). The reason I feel it is weak is if tax matters are not too complex to apply to the standard 
expropriation and other IIT protections, then the same matters cannot be too complex to apply to the 
standard national treatment and MFN provisions. 
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Typical examples of tax exclusions include Article 4 of the France-Venezuela 
BIT;140 Article 4(4) of the Croatia-Spain BIT; Article 3(4) of the Germany-Saint 
Lucia BIT (which also contains a protocol that clearly states the national 
treatment provisions “do not oblige a Contracting Party to extend to persons 
resident in the territory of the other Contracting Party tax privileges, tax 
exemptions and tax reductions which according to its tax laws are granted only to 
nationals and companies resident in its territory”);141 Article 5(b) of the 
Denmark-Ghana BIT;142 Article III(4)(b) of the Turkey-Ethiopia BIT; and Article 
5 of the UK-Hungary BIT.143 Article 5 of the UK-Hungary BIT is a good 
example of a BIT article which rules out national treatment for matters relating to 
taxation, and it states:  
 
“The provisions in this Agreement relative to the grant of treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to the investors of either Contracting Party or 
of any third State shall not be construed so as to oblige one Contracting Party 
to extend to the investors of the other the benefit of any treatment, preference 




(b) any international agreement or arrangement relating wholly or 
mainly to taxation or any domestic legislation relating wholly or 
mainly to taxation”144 (emphasis mine). 
 
The reference in the above article to international agreements or arrangements is 
aimed primarily at double taxation treaties (DTTs) signed with third states. DTTs145 
                                                 
140 France-Venezuela BIT, signed 2 July 2001, entered into force 30 April 2004 (France-Venezuela 
BIT); see also Article 3(5), France Saudi Arabia , signed 26 June 2002, entered into force 18 March 
2004 (France-Saudi BIT). 
141 Protocol para. 3(c), Germany-Saint Lucia BIT; see also Protocol para. 3(b), Germany-Mexico BIT. 
142 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of the 
Republic of Ghana concerning the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 13 January 1992, 
entered into force 6 January 1995 (Denmark-Ghana BIT). 
143 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments, signed 9 March 1987, entered into force 28 August 1987 (UK-Hungary BIT).  
144 Article 5(b), UK-Hungary BIT. 
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are designed to prevent the double taxation of nationals who operate in the two 
jurisdictions of the signatories to a DTT and are likely to be taxed for the same 
income under both jurisdictions (therefore being taxed twice). DTTs will thus result 
in one jurisdiction not taxing an investor operating in its territory at all or at the full 
rate. There are therefore sound reasons for this exception to national treatment.   
 
The national treatment exception in the above article to domestic legislation relating 
wholly or mainly to taxation means the host state will not be liable under the 
investment treaty for granting preferential treatment, preferences and privileges 
under its domestic legislation to its nationals and those of a third state (no breach of 
MFN), and this type of legislation can be more discriminatory towards the national 
of the other party.146 
 
The China-Netherlands BIT147 also does not apply national treatment to international 
agreements and arrangements relating wholly or mainly to taxation.148 It does not, 
however, contain the exception to domestic legislation, meaning a discriminatory 
domestic legislation will be caught by the national treatment provision. The protocol 
to the China-Netherlands BIT does prevent a Netherlands investor from bringing a 
claim against China for breach of national treatment for any existing (at the time of 
signature) non-conforming measures (this applies to any measures including 
taxation), but it is endeavoured to progressively remove such measures.149 
  
The non-exclusion to the application of national treatment for matters relating 
taxation can be crucial to a claimant’s success under an investment treaty claim. In 
EnCana, the tribunal ruled against their jurisdiction for the claimant’s (EnCana’s) 
claim for breach of national treatment under Article IV of the Canada-Ecuador 
                                                                                                                                          
145 DTTs also typically exclude NT and MFN from tax matters (UNCTAD, ‘Taxation’ (2000), Series 
on Issues in International Investment Agreements, Doc. No. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/16, 2 
<http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit16_en.pdf> accessed 15 August 2011). 
146 Any discrimination could however be caught under the fair and equitable treatment provisions of 
such treaties, with these taxation exception to national treatment or MFN not applying to fair and 
equitable treatment provisions. 
147 Article 3(3), Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, signed 26 November 2001, entered into force 1 August 2004 (China-Netherlands BIT). 
148 Article 3(6)(b), China-Netherlands BIT. 
149 Protocol, Ad Article 3, China-Netherlands BIT. 
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BIT150 as well as its claims under Article II of that treaty,151 because Article XII(1) of 
the BIT excludes their application to taxation measures. Article XII(1) states, “except 
as set out in this Article, nothing in this Agreement shall apply to taxation measures.” 
The remainder of the sub-articles are airtight, explicitly allowing taxation measures 
to apply only to an alleged breach between the “central government authorities of a 
Contracting Party and the investor”152 and to expropriation,153 both of which are 
subject to the tax veto discussed at section 3.2.4 of Chapter 3. The only claim that the 
tribunal decided the merits of was the Article VIII claim for expropriation154 which 
was rejected155 (see section 3.5.3 of Chapter 3). This is in sharp contrast with 
Occidental, brought by a United States claimant (Occidental Exploration and 
Production Company (OEPC)) under the US-Ecuador BIT for the alleged breaches of 
national treatment; fair and equitable treatment; non-impairment of the management, 
use and enjoyment of the investment through arbitrary or discriminatory measures; 
and expropriation, all based on the same type of government measures taken by 
Ecuador’s tax authorities against EnCana (declining of tax rebates and retrospective 
denial of rebates previously granted). Unlike the Canada-Ecuador BIT, the US-
Ecuador BIT was held to allow claims for breach of national treatment through 
taxation measures. 
 
The tax inclusions/exclusions are contained in Article X (tax policies exclusions) of 
the US-Ecuador BIT which reads: 
 
1. With respect to its tax policies, each Party should strive to accord fairness 
and   equity in the treatment of investment of nationals and companies of 
the other Party. 
 
2. Nevertheless, the provisions of this Treaty, and in particular Article VI 
[dispute resolution between investor and state] and VII [dispute resolution 
                                                 
150 EnCana Award at para 146. 
151 Article II(1) obligation on the host state to encourage and create favourable conditions for investors 
of the home state; Article II(2)(a) obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment to the investor’s 
investments and returns; EnCana Award at para 107. 
152 Article XII(3), Canada-Ecuador BIT. 
153 Article XII(4), Canada-Ecuador BIT. 
154 EnCana Award at para 168. 
155 EnCana Award at para 199. 
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between both state parties], shall apply to matters of taxation only with 
respect to the following: 
 
(a) expropriation, pursuant to Article III; 
(b) transfers, pursuant to Article IV; or 
(c) the observance and enforcement of terms of an investment 
agreement or authorization as referred to in Article VI (1) (a) or 
(b), to the extent they are not subject to the dispute settlement 
provisions of a Convention for the avoidance of double taxation 
between the two Parties, or have been raised under such settlement 
provisions and are not resolved within a reasonable period of time 
(emphasis added). 
 
The provisions of Article X(2)(a) and (b) are straightforward to understand, i.e. 
expropriation and transfers respectively. Article X(2)(c) refers to the enforcement of 
terms of an investment agreement or investment authorisation between one party and 
an investor of the other party which are not subject to a DTT or are subject to a DTT 
but are not resolved under the DTT dispute resolutions provisions within a 
reasonable period of time.156 Reading Article X(2) on its own would entail national 
treatment exempt from taxation measures, however, the arbitral tribunal in 
Occidental decided that the obligation of a host state to “strive to accord fairness and 
equity” with respect to its tax policies at Article X(1) was “not devoid of legal 
significance,”157 and, despite the language of Article X(1) being less mandatory than 
the language of the national treatment, MFN and fair and equitable treatment 
provisions at Article II of the treaty, Article X(1) was still as mandatory as Article II. 
The tribunal decided that the term “nevertheless” at Article X(2) does not derogate 
from the legal effect of Article X(1) because it cannot be “read to mean that in 
respect of tax policies the host State could pursue an unfair or inequitable 
treatment.”158 Like EnCana, OECD was unsuccessful in its expropriation claim for 
not meeting the standards required to be deemed expropriated, but unlike EnCana, 
OECD had the benefit of claiming for breach of national treatment by taxation and it 
                                                 
156 Article X(2), US-Ecuador BIT. 
157 Occidental Award at para 70. 
158 Occidental Award at para 70. 
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was successful in that claim, as well as its claim for breach of fair and equitable 
treatment on the same merits. 
 
In a common and recurring theme of arbitral awards, tribunals make it clear that they 
are not bound by the decisions of other arbitral tribunals, but they do often use the 
reasoning of other tribunals, quote other tribunals, and reach findings in line with 
those other unrelated awards; that is how customary international law standards have 
developed over time, with different opinions formed that eventually make a set of 
informal but vital precedents. The arbitration of taxation issues in international 
investment disputes is fairly new domain and the Occidental tribunal’s assessment of 
the tax exclusions under the US-Ecuador BIT was the first assessment of a provision 
of that type (i.e. the not so clear cut ‘grey area’ exclusion of national treatment for 
matters of taxation). In Nations Energy,159 an arbitration under the US-Panama 
BIT,160 an almost identical provision as Article X of the US-Ecuador BIT was a focal 
issue. Article XI(1) (tax policies exclusions) of the US-Panama BIT is a verbatim 
copy of Article X(1) of the US-Ecuador BIT copied above, while Article XI(2) is 
almost the same but for a couple of redactions: 
 
2. Nevertheless, this Treaty shall apply to matters of taxation only with 
respect to the following: 
 
(a) expropriation, pursuant to Article IV; 
(b) transfers, pursuant to Article VI; or  
(c) the observance and enforcement of terms of an investment agreement 
or authorization, as referred to in Article VII (1)(a) or (b). 
 
Article XI(2) of the US-Panama BIT differs to Article X of the US-Ecuador BIT in 
two ways; firstly, for the purposes of enforcing the terms of an investment agreement 
or authorisation from a tax perspective, Article XI(2)(c) does not require the non-
                                                 
159 Nations Energy Inc., Electric Machinery Enterprises Inc., Y Jaime Jurado v The Republic of 
Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/19, Award of 24 November 2010 (Nations Energy or Nations 
Energy Award). 
160 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic Of Panama concerning the 
Treatment and Protection of Investments, with Agreed Minutes, signed 27 October 1982, entered into 
force 30 May 1991 (US-Panama BIT). 
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existence of a DTT, or where a DTT does exist, it does not require that the 
enforcement provisions under the DTT be invoked and to give those provisions a 
reasonable time to resolve the dispute; and secondly, it does not specify that the three 
sub-articles apply specifically to investor-state or state-state disputes. Despite these 
apparently minor differences, the US-Panama taxation article appears to be less 
restrictive than its US-Ecuador counterpart. This is partly attributed to the fact that it 
does not explicitly require disputes relating to investment agreements or 
authorisations that are subject to BTTs to first undergo dispute resolution under the 
BTT dispute resolution mechanisms and to give those mechanisms a reasonable time 
to resolve those issues and they can instead they can be brought under the BIT from 
the outset. The apparent less restrictive nature of the provision is, however, mainly 
because Article XI(2) of the US-Panama BIT does not state that matters of taxation 
in relation to expropriation, transfers and investment agreements or authorisations 
shall apply “in particular” to investor-state disputes or to state-state disputes as is 
seen in Article X(2) of the US-Ecuador BIT.161 
 
In Nations Energy, the arbitral tribunal departed from the decision of the Occidental 
tribunal, deciding that by using the words "strive to accord" instead of more 
prescriptive language such as "grant" or “shall”, the United States and Panama 
intended to limit from taxation measures the binding effect of the fair and equitable 
and national treatment rules.162 The Nations Energy tribunal further added that the 
“[n]evertheless, this Treaty shall apply to matters of taxation only with respect to the 
following...” (emphasis mine) in Article XI(2) clearly meant that Article XI(2) was 
an exception to Article XI(1), which undoubtedly meant that the commitment under 
Article XI(1) was outside the framework of the obligations.163 The Nations Energy 
                                                 
161 See below. 
162 Nations Energy Award at para 472 (original text at para 472 of the Award reads: “A criterio del 
Tribunal Arbitral, el artículo XI del TBI es claro. Al utilizar en el artículo XI.1 los términos 
“procurará otorgar” en lugar de un lenguaje más prescriptivo (como “otorgará”), los Estados partes 
han querido limitar el efecto obligatorio de la norma, excluyendo por tanto los recursos previstos por 
el tratado a favor de los inversionistas en el supuesto previsto en dicho artículo”). 
163 Nations Energy Award at para 473 (original text at para 473 of the Award reads: “El empleo, en el 
párrafo XI.2, de los términos “sin embargo este convenio se aplicará a los asuntos de tributación 
únicamente con respecto a…” claramente significa que el artículo XI.2 constituye una excepción al 
artículo XI.1, lo que sin ninguna duda implica que el compromiso previsto en el artículo X.1 queda 
fuera del marco de las obligaciones previstas por el TBI a cargo del Estado, cuya ejecución puedan 
reclamar directamente los inversionistas”). 
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tribunal therefore rejected its jurisdiction to decide on the alleged breaches by 
taxation of the national treatment and fair and equitable protections.164 
 
The different findings of the two cases is profound, not least because, despite the US-
Panama BIT tax exclusions (in Nations Energy) being prima facie less stringent than 
the tax exclusions of the US-Ecuador BIT (Occidental), jurisdiction was not granted 
under the US-Panama BIT but was granted under the US-Ecuador BIT. In addition, it 
interesting that the Occidental tribunal ignored the “in particular” wording contained 
in Article X(2) of the US-Ecuador BIT, i.e. that matters of taxation shall apply in 
particular to investor-state arbitration and state-state arbitration in relation to 
expropriation, transfers and investment agreements or authorisations (Article XI(2) 
of the US-Panama BIT  does not have the “in particular” wording). The inclusion of 
the “in particular” wording can be construed as significant if interpreted as meaning 
that matters of taxation in relation to disagreements on expropriation, transfers and 
investment agreements or authorisations are specifically subject to the investor-state 
arbitration or state-state arbitration under Articles VI(3) and VII(1) respectively; i.e. 
they are arbitrable; whereas although the host state must strive to accord national 
treatment in its taxation measures, if it does not, the issue cannot be arbitrated 
because unlike Article X(2) which explicitly subjects, for example, matters of 
taxation relating to expropriation to arbitration, Article X(1) does not afford the same 
explicit subjection to national treatment. Therefore, although it is, as the Occidental 
tribunal said, unlikely that the United States and Ecuadorian drafters intended to 
allow a host state to be unfair and inequitable in its tax policies, it would appear that, 
on this premise, it was their intention. The adoption of this school of thought would 
render the Occidental decision wrong. 
 
Furthermore or on the other hand, the inclusion of “in particular” in the US-Ecuador 
BIT could be interpreted as giving greater credence to the “nevertheless” in Article 
X. To better exemplify this point, I will paraphrase Article X(2): 
                                                 
164 Nations Energy Award at para 482 (original text at para 482 of the Award reads: “La exclusión de 
la materia fiscal es por lo tanto delimitada y no se aplica en los casos limitadamente enumerados por 
el artículo XI.2. Ahora bien, interpretar el artículo XI.1 como hacen los Demandantes llegaría a 
vaciar de todo sentido la admisión limitada de los asuntos tributarios, prevista en el artículo XI.2 





Although each Party should strive to accord fairness and equity including 
national treatment in relation to its tax policies, the investor-state arbitration 
and state-state arbitration provisions of this treaty shall apply with respect to 
matters of taxation only to the following: 
 
(a) expropriation, pursuant to Article III; 
(b) transfers, pursuant to Article IV; or 
(c) the observance and enforcement of terms of an investment agreement or 
authorization as referred to in Article VI (1) (a) or (b), to the extent they 
are not subject to the dispute settlement provisions of a Convention for 
the avoidance of double taxation between the two Parties, or have been 
raised under such settlement provisions and are not resolved within a 
reasonable period of time. 
 
The Occidental tribunal, however, did not put any emphasis at all on the “in 
particular” wording of Article X of the US-Ecuador BIT165 and the Nations Energy 
tribunal did not have the option to examine it because the wording does not exist in 
the tax policies article of the US-Panama BIT. The El Paso166 tribunal, however, was 
faced with a claim under the US-Argentina BIT167 which contains a tax exclusion 
                                                 
165 The non-inclusion of the “in particular” provision in Article XI(2) of the US-Panama BIT can be 
interpreted as insignificant because, if the protections under the BIT for expropriation or transfers are 
breached or relevant investment agreements or authorisations are breached, and the BIT applies to 
those protections and agreements in matters of taxation, if the breaches cannot be rectified with 
recourse to the investor-state arbitration and state-state arbitration mechanisms in the BIT because 
Article XI(2) does not spell it out, then the entire article would be pointless. In fact, requiring the 
inclusion of the “in particular” wording to invoke dispute resolution articles contained in an IIT for 
matters of taxation could be said to be akin to requiring, for the sake of making them arbitrable, the 
“in particular” provision to be included in every IIT article that contains standards and protections 
irrespective of whether they relate to taxation or not. The absence of the “in particular” wording in the 
US-Panama BIT, therefore, is insignificant, because giving it significance would deem Article XI 
meaningless in its entirety because there would be no recourse to arbitration despite the treaty 
protections being breached through taxation. Likewise, giving the inclusion of the “in particular” 
wording significance in the US-Ecuador BIT would result in matters of taxation in relation to 
expropriation, transfers and investment agreements or authorisations being arbitrable, but arguably 
rendering all other standards and protections contained in the BIT non-arbitrable because they do not 
apply “in particular” to the dispute resolution articles of the BIT. 
166 El Paso Energy International Company v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 
Decision on Jurisdiction of 27 April 2006 and Award of 31 October 2011 (El Paso or El Paso 
Jurisdiction Award or El Paso Award). 
167 Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, with Protocol, signed 14 November 1991, 
entered into force 20 October 1994 (US-Argentina BIT). 
243 
 
article which is a verbatim copy of Article X of the US-Ecuador BIT, at Article XII. 
The claimant in El Paso (El Paso) claimed for breaches of fair and equitable 
treatment,168 full protection and security169 and failure of the host state to accord 
treatment which is no less than that required by international law.170 Although El 
Paso did not claim for breach of national treatment, the discussion of the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction on the above alleged breaches was on exactly the same basis as the 
Occidental tribunal. 
 
The El Paso tribunal approached the subject by reading Article XII(2) as it is, 
including the “in particular” provision, stating: 
 
“According to Article IIX(2), the provisions of the BIT, in particular those of 
Articles VII and VIII (dispute settlement) [i.e. arbitration], do not apply to 
matters of taxation, except: (i) if the matter is connected with, or amounts to, 
an expropriation… (ii) if it is related to the compliance with and enforcement 
of an investment agreement or authorisation; or (iii) if it relates to 
transfers…”171 (emphasis mine). 
 
The El Paso tribunal’s paraphrasing of the tax exclusion makes it plainly clear that 
the provisions of the BIT do not apply if they relate to taxation and they especially 
will not apply to the dispute settlement provisions of the BIT, except for 
expropriation, etc. The El Paso tribunal found the “strive to accord fairness and 
equity” provision creates “only a best-effort obligation.”172 
 
Most importantly, Article X of the US-Ecuador BIT was considered by the English 
High Court in Ecuador’s challenge173 to set aside the Occidental award under 
sections 67 and 68 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act, claiming the arbitrators 
exceeded their jurisdiction.174 Although the court affirmed the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
under Article X(2)(c), it was judged that “apart from matters of taxation that come 
                                                 
168 Article II(2)(a), US-Argentina BIT; El Paso Jurisdiction Award at para 32. 
169 Article II(2)(a), US-Argentina BIT. 
170 ibid. 
171 El Paso, Jurisdiction Award at para 111. 
172 El Paso Award at para 291. 
173 Republic of Ecuador v Occidental Exploration & Production Co [2006] EWHC (Comm). 
174 ibid at para 3. 
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within the three identified exceptions [expropriation, transfers, investment 
agreements/authorisations], all matters of taxation are outside the ambit of the BIT” 
and “unless a particular “matter of taxation” comes within the ambit of Article X(2) 
(a) [expropriation], (b) [transfers] or (c) [investment agreements/authorisations], then 
the dispute resolution provisions of the BIT Article VI [investor-state arbitration] 
cannot apply to any dispute that arises between a State and an investor in relation to 
that “matter of taxation”.” 
 
4.3 Application of the National Treatment Standard in Tax Arbitrations 
 
This chapter will now turn to the requirements set by international arbitral tribunals 
and IITs that a claimant must meet to prove a breach of national treatment by the 
host state, and, specifically how those standards have been applied in tax arbitrations. 
 
4.3.1 The ‘Like Circumstances’ Comparator in Tax Arbitrations 
 
There cannot be a breach of national treatment unless the treatment of the foreign 
investor or investment can be compared with a host state like investor or investment. 
 
4.3.1.1 Economic Circumstances of a Comparator on Whom the Tax Measure Was 
Not Applied 
 
The relevant cases to discuss in this section are Archer Daniels,175 Cargill,176 and 
Corn Products.177 These were discussed in Chapter 3, however a quick recap of the 
facts is necessary. Archer Daniels, Cargill and Corn Products were three separate 
arbitrations brought under NAFTA, and for relevance in this chapter, under NAFTA 
Article 1102. They centred on an amendment of 31 December 2001 to Mexico’s 
                                                 
175 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc. v United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/05, Award (Redacted Version) of 21 November 2007 (Archer 
Daniels or Archer Daniels Award). 
176 Cargill Incorporated v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award (Redacted 
Version) of 18 September 2009 (Cargill or Cargill Award). 
177 Corn Products International Inc. v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, 




Impuesto Especial Sobre Producción y Servicios (IEPS) which translates to ‘Special 
Tax on Production and Services’. The amendment was alleged to discriminate 
against companies owned by investors of the United States in the soft drink 
sweetener industry178 (sweetener tax). The claimants/their Mexican subsidiaries were 
producers and distributors of high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS), a product produced 
and distributed in Mexico entirely by companies owned by American  investors.179 
As a cost-effective alternative to Mexican-produced cane sugar, soft drink 
manufacturers substituted cane sugar with HFCS or blended the two together. The 
sweetener tax was levied not on HFCS itself, but on beverages that contained 
HFCS180 and on services used to transfer and distribute HFCS and soft drinks that 
contain HFCS,181 and this caused soft drink manufacturers to revert back to using 
mainly cane sugar which became the cheaper option. The sweetener tax was 
suspended on 5 March 2002 by the President of Mexico and the suspension was 
lifted by the Mexican Supreme Court on 12 July 2002, who deemed the suspension 
as unlawful, and importantly, stated that the tax had the “non tax-related purpose” of 
“protecting the Mexican sugar industry.”182 In that respect, the sweetener tax was 
introduced by Mexico on the back of failed negotiations with the government of the 
United States to allow surpluses of Mexican sugar to be sold on the United States 
market.183 So the tax was enacted as a countermeasure to the alleged non-compliance 
by the United States with their NAFTA obligations184 and/or to help the domestic 
sale of Mexican cane sugar which was in surplus; what is certain is it succeeded in 
the latter effect. 
 
 
A WTO panel was constituted at the request of the United States to determine 
whether the sweetener tax was in breach of the GATT.185 The tax was found to 
breach: (i) the first sentence of Article III(2) of the GATT,186 namely a product of 
                                                 
178 Cargill Award at para 105-106. 
179 ibid at para 106. 
180 ibid at para 107. 
181 ibid at para 105; and Archer Daniels Award at para 2. 
182 Cargill Award at para 109. 
183 ibid at paras. 71 to 79; Corn Products Award at paras 33 and  para 37; Cargill Award at paras 81 to 
99. 
184 Corn Products Award at para 63. 
185 WTO, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, adopted on 24 March 2006. 
186 ibid 161 at para 9.2(a)(iv). 
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one WTO contracting party being subjected, directly or indirectly, to taxes in excess 
of those applied to like domestic products; (ii) the second sentence of Article III(2) 
as read with Article III(1) of the GATT,187 namely that the tax was applied to 
imported products to afford protection to domestic products; and (iii) Article III(4) of 
the GATT,188 namely that the imported products were being treated less favourably 
in comparison to like products of Mexican origin in respect of the laws, regulations 
and requirements affecting their sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. 
 
There was a fundamental difference between the questions before the arbitral 
tribunals and those before the WTO. The WTO had to determine whether the 
product, HFCS, was like Mexican cane sugar (it was concluded that they were 
directly competitive or substitutable”)189, whereas the arbitral tribunals had to decide, 
most importantly, whether the claimants/their Mexican investments, as 
producers/suppliers of HFCS, were in like circumstances with Mexican cane sugar 
producers/suppliers to the soft drink industry.190 
 
(i) Cargill  
 
In Cargill, Mexico contended that the domestic sugar cane producers were 
not in like circumstances with American investors in HFCS because the 
economic situation of the sugar cane industry was dire and the HFCS industry 
was healthy.191 If the economic disparity between sugar and HFCS was the 
basis for the rationale and objective of the tax measure in question,192 then 
Mexico may have succeeded in proving that Cargill or its Mexican 
subsidiaries were not in like circumstances with producers of cane sugar, 
therefore disproving the claim for breach of Article 1102 of NAFTA. Mexico, 
however, did not succeed with that argument193 because the sweetener tax 
was found not to be a measure designed to advantage the sugar industry, but 
one designed to disadvantage the healthy HFCS industry (as retaliation 
                                                 
187 ibid 161 at para 9.2(a)(ii). 
188 ibid 161 at para 9.2(a)(iii). 
189 Cargill Award at para 194; and WTO Panel Report (n. 185) 127 at para 8.78. 
190 Cargill Award at para 196; Archer Daniels Award at para 204. 
191 Cargill Award at paras 201 and 208. 
192 ibid at para 209. 
193 ibid at para 209. 
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against the United States government), effectively driving HFCS out of the 
market,194 and the fact that sweetener tax did benefit sugar producers was 
irrelevant because the tax was levied to pressurise the United States 
government into living up to other NAFTA obligations.195 The sweetener tax 
was therefore aimed at the United States investors in HFCS because those 
investors have the lobbying power to influence the United States 
government,196 and for that reason, the difference in the economic 
circumstances was irrelevant on the facts, especially because the dire state of 
the sugar industry was not the reason that the tax was levied.197 
 
In Cargill, therefore, the economic disparity between producers of competing 
products was not a solid enough argument to prove that said producers were 
not in ‘like circumstances’ for tax purposes.198 
 
(ii) Archer Daniels  
 
The comparator debate in Archer Daniels was not as drawn out as it was in 
Cargill, with Mexico claiming in Archer Daniels that the lack of access to the 
United States market for Mexican sugar producers proved that Mexican cane 
sugar producers and American HFCS producers and suppliers showed a 




                                                 
194 ibid at para 208. 
195 ibid. 
196
 ibid at para 209. 
197 ibid. 
198 ibid; Mexico also tried to distinguish between HFCS suppliers to the soft drink industry and cane 
sugar suppliers to the soft drink industry for two other reasons: (i) HFCS suppliers invested in more 
goods than only sweeteners (sugar cane suppliers invested only on the one product; and (ii) the sugar 
industry was highly regulated (as regards pricing) whereas the HFCS industry was not (Cargill Award 
at para 197). (i) was dismissed because like circumstances was to be construed as whether Cargill was 
in like circumstances “in respect of its HFCS business” with domestic sugar producers (Cargill Award 
at para 199); and (ii) was dismissed because the tribunal could not see the relevance of the difference 
in levels of regulation, a point which Mexico did not expand upon either, seemingly unable to justify 
their own argument (Cargill Award at para 200). 
199 Archer Daniels Award at para 198. 
200 ibid; see section 4.3.1.2 for the Archer Daniels discussion on no identical comparator. 
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(iii) Corn Products 
 
In Corn Products, Mexico put forward a number of arguments to prove that 
cane sugar producers and HFCS producers were not in like circumstances for 
tax purposes on a number of economic circumstances bases: (i) the United 
States did not allow Mexican producers of cane sugar access to the American 
sweetener market whereas United States investors in HFCS had access to the 
Mexican sweetener market;201 (ii) due to the financial crisis in the Mexican 
sugar industry, producers in a financial crisis cannot be taken to be in like 
circumstances with producers that are financially secure202 –  on this point, 
Mexico relied on the decision in GAMI203 in which the GAMI tribunal 
decided that sugar producers in financial hardship were not in like 
circumstances with sugar producers that were not;204 (iii) the price of sugar 
was subject to financial regulation but HFCS was not,205 which in turn affects 
the investors in those products; and (iv) the trade association that the claimant 
was a member of lobbied against extending access of the United States 
market to Mexican sugar producers and were therefore not in like 
circumstances.206 
 
Overall, the arbitral tribunal rejected Mexico’s arguments, finding without 
doubt that Mexican sugar producers operated in the same business or 
economic sector as American HFCS producers,207 the sector being sweetener 
suppliers to the soft drinks industry.208  
 
More specifically: (i) whether Mexican producers of sugar had access to the 
United States market “was entirely irrelevant to the decision to impose the 
[sweetener] tax”209 (emphasis mine) and it was actually imposed because of 
                                                 
201 ibid at para 125. 
202 ibid at para 105. 
203 GAMI Investments Inc. v United Mexican States, NAFTA Arbitration, Final Award of 15 
November 2004. 
204 ibid at para 114; Corn Products Award at para 107. 
205 Corn Products Award at para 69. 
206 ibid at para 125. 
207 ibid para 120. 
208 ibid. 
209 ibid at para 129. 
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HFCS’s share of the Mexican market;210 (ii) the fact that the trade association 
that the claimant was a member of lobbied against Mexican sugar producers 
having greater access to the American market actually reinforced the point 
that HFCS and sugar producers were in like circumstances;211 and (iii) if the 
financial and surplus problem in the sugar industry was price regulations, said 
regulations could have been softened, yet they were not, and instead a tax was 
levied to increase the price of HFCS.212  
 
4.3.1.2 Different Products, Like Investors and Investments in Tax Treatment? 
 
(i) Archer Daniels 
 
In Archer Daniels, Mexico contended that although HFCS and cane sugar are 
like products for the purposes of Article III of the GATT as confirmed by the 
WTO Panel, that does not mean HFCS and cane sugar producers are in like 
circumstances.213 The tribunal decided that, whilst HFCS and cane sugar 
producers were not identical comparators “even though they compete face-to-
face in the same market … when no identical comparators exist, the foreign 
investor may be compared with less like comparators, if the overall 
circumstances of the case suggest that they are in like circumstances.”214 The 
appropriate subjects for comparison with respect to the treatment of Archer 
Daniels through the levy of the sweetener tax was, therefore, Mexican cane sugar 
producers, because they compete directly with one another to supply sweeteners 




                                                 
210 ibid; in addition, the tribunal said that Article 1102 of NAFTA requires investors or investments to 
be in “like not identical circumstances” (emphasis original) (ibid). 
211 ibid at para 135. 
212 ibid at para 127; the price regulation argument was also rejected on the grounds that the products at 
issue were interchangeable and indistinguishable from the point of view of soft drink customers (ibid 
at para 126). 
213 Archer Daniels Award at para 192. 
214 ibid at para 202. 
215 ibid at para 204. 
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(ii) Cargill  
 
In Cargill, Mexico argued as they did in Archer Daniels, that HFCS producers 
and cane sugar producers were not in like circumstances because they produce 
different products. The tribunal referred to GAMI216 and Pope & Talbot217 which 
were two cases in which the foreign investors and domestic producers were not in 
“like circumstances” despite producing the same products and competing in the 
same market.218 Therefore, more than a likeness of goods is required to choose 
with whom the tax treatment of the foreign investor must be compared with and 
in the circumstances, sugar (i.e. sweetener) producers and suppliers to the soft 
drink industry were in like circumstances with HFCS (i.e. sweetener) producers 
and suppliers to the soft drink industry.219 
 
(iii) Corn Products 
 
In Corn Products, Mexico put forward the same arguments as it did in Archer 
Daniels and Cargill above about the irrelevance of the WTO decision that cane 
sugar and HFCS are like products under the GATT.220  Although the tribunal 
accepted that like products under the GATT does not denote like circumstances 
of investors in investment treaty arbitration (which the claimant did not argue),221 
it is not irrelevant.222 The tribunal said that where investors produce like products 
and the measure (in this case, a tax) discriminates against one of the like 






                                                 
216 GAMI (n. 203). 
217 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v Government of Canada, NAFTA Arbitration, Interim Award of 26 June 
2000. 
218 Cargill Award at para 195. 
219 Cargill Award at paras 211 and 214. 
220 Corn Products Award a para 102. 
221 ibid at para 121. 




(iv) Occidental  
 
One of the most fundamental decisions in national treatment jurisprudence on 
choosing a relevant comparator was Occidental. The reader will recall from 
Chapter 3 that the Occidental (and EnCana) dispute centred on the retrospective 
and prospective denial of VAT refunds to the claimant, OEPC, which was paid 
on locally purchased or imported goods that became part of their fixed assets, 
raw materials, inputs and services.224 OEPC was granted refunds for VAT it had 
paid on its inputs for exported oil under Ecuador’s Internal Tax Regime Law 
(ITRL) as it was effective prior to 30 April 1999.  The ITRL was amended, 
effective 30 April 1999, with Article 69A granting refunds to for VAT paid on 
local purchases or imported goods used in the fabricación (manufacture) of 
goods to be exported. On the basis of Article 69A, Ecuador’s tax authority, the 
Sericio de Rentas Internas (SRI), issued denying resolutions to OEPC’s requests 
for refunds and issued retrospective denials for refunds already granted. 
 
OEPC was granted VAT rebates for applications it made between July 1999 and 
30 April 2001,225 which were denied retrospectively on 1 April 2002,226 as were 
subsequent applications for rebates between January and March 2003.227 The SRI 
denied refunds based on their interpretation of fabricación (manufacture) in 
Article 69A of the ITRL, which the SRI did not extend to oil production,228 and 
in case their interpretation was wrong, the SRI said the VAT refunds were 
covered in OEPC’s participation contract with the state-owned oil company 
Petroecuador.229 The participation contract did not provide for VAT refunds,230 
therefore it had to be determined whether Ecuador had a case to answer for 
breach of national treatment under Article II(1) of the US-Ecuador BIT.  
 
                                                 
224 Article 65 of the Ecuadorian Tax Law (pre-April 30th 1999); Elihu Lauterpacht and Christopher 
Greenwood, International Law Reports: Volume 138 (CUP 2010), 70. 
225 Occidental Award at paras 32 and 135. 
226 ibid at para 32; SRI Resolution 234 of 1 April 2002. 
227 ibid; SRI Resolution 406 of 31 January 2003 and SRI Resolution 026 of 6 March 2003. 
228 ibid at para 135. 
229 ibid. 
230 ibid at para 143. 
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OEPC based its national treatment argument on being compared with Ecuadorian 
nationals who are exporters of goods involved in activities such as mining, 
fishing, lumber, flowers, bananas and African palm oil,231 for which the SRI 
granted VAT refunds under Article 69A of the ITRL.232 These exporters were 
argued to be in like situations with OEPC, because although they were not oil 
producers, like situations encompasses companies engaged in exports even 
though they are in different sectors.233 Ecuador disputed this on the contention 
that ‘like situations’ “can only mean that all companies in the same sector are to 
be treated alike,”234 and Petroecuador, being the only Ecuadorian oil producer, 
was not granted VAT refunds.235 
 
The arbitral tribunal agreed with the claimant’s interpretation of “like 
circumstances”, and that it cannot be interpreted in the narrow sense put forward 
by Ecuador because “the purpose of national treatment is to protect investors as 
compared to local producers, and this cannot be done by addressing exclusively 
the sector in which that particular activity is undertaken.”236 Therefore, to assess 
the treatment in taxation of OEPC as compared with Ecuadorian nationals, 
Ecuadorian producers who export goods, albeit other than oil, were the chosen 
comparator.237 
 




 was another NAFTA Article 1102 arbitration and was also the subject of 
discussion in Chapter 3. Another quick recap is necessary here in light of the national 
treatment claim. The claimant was a United States national who was the sole owner 
and controller of Corporación de Exportaciones Mexicanas, S.A. de C.V. (CEMSA), 
                                                 
231 ibid at para 168. 
232 ibid at para 136. 
233 ibid at para 168. 
234 ibid at para 171. 
235 ibid at para 172. 
236 ibid at para 173. 
237 This finding is parallel to the comment by the dissenting arbitrator in UPS v Canada (see 4.3.2.2 
below) who stated: “It is possible for two investors or enterprises to be in the same sector or to be in 
competition and nonetheless be quite unlike in respect of some characteristic critical to a particular 
treatment.” (UPS Dissent at para 16.) 
238 Feldman Award (n. 80). 
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a company incorporated in Mexico which engaged in buying, reselling and exporting 
cigarettes.239 The dispute centred on Mexico’s Ministry of Finance and Public Credit 
(Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público) (SHCP) declining retrospectively and 
prospectively refunds to CEMSA for tax paid on exported cigarettes,  which between 
1990 and 1997, a ‘zero tax rate’ applied to exported cigarettes240 under Mexico’s 
IEPS. 
 
A brief overview of the facts are: (i) CEMSA bought cigarettes from volume retailers 
and the price paid to the retailers included tax;241 (ii) in order to be granted tax 
refunds under Article 4 of the IEPS, CEMSA had to prove the tax paid on cigarettes 
“separately and expressly on their invoices”242; (iii) only producers and resellers who 
have purchased cigarettes from producers have the breakdown of tax paid,243 
meanwhile producers were unwilling to provide CEMSA with a breakdown of the 
taxes244; (iv) CEMSA was granted and paid refunds for exported cigarettes between 
June 1996 and September 1997245; (v) rebates to CEMSA were terminated on or 
before 1 December 1997, accompanied by a refusal to pay rebates for exports made 
in October and November 1997 in the amount of US$2.35 million246; (vi) on 14 July 
1998, CEMSA was audited by SHCP and was ordered to repay approximately 
US$25 million for rebates paid from January 1996 to September 1997, with interest 
and penalties247; (vii) from 1 December 1997, companies were required to register on 
the Sectorial Exporters Registry to qualify for tax rebates and CEMSA was declined 
registration;248 (viii) registration on the Sectorial Exporters Registry was denied on 
the basis of an on-going audit of CEMSA for its earlier claims for tax rebates249; and 
(ix) two Mexican companies (Mercados Regionales and Mercados Extranjeros) 
which were owned by Mexican nationals were also resellers and exporters of 
cigarettes, were unable to produce invoices stating the tax paid on cigarettes 
                                                 
239 Feldman Award at para 10. 
240 ibid at para 8. 
241 ibid at para 15. 
242 ibid. 
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244 ibid at para 118. 
245 ibid at para 19. 
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separately, were granted tax refunds during the same periods that refunds to CEMSA 
were denied, were granted registration on the Sectorial Exporters Registry as 
cigarette exporters,250 and they had not been audited by SHCP for rebates paid to 
them.251 
 
Unlike Archer Daniels, Cargill or Occidental, the comparator in Feldman was easier 
for the arbitral tribunal to ascertain. Mexican-owned producers of cigarettes who 
also traded in exports were not in like circumstances with CEMSA,252 however, 
Mexican-owned traders of cigarettes who purchased Mexican cigarettes for export, 
namely Mercados Regionales and Mercados Extranjeros, were in like circumstances 
with CEMSA because they carried out the same activities253 and were therefore the 
perfect comparators against whom to compare Mexico’s taxation measures. 
 
4.3.1.4 Different Services, Like Investors and Investments in Tax Treatment? 
 
In UPS v Canada,254 a United States company that provides postal services in 
Canada brought a claim under Chapter 11 of NAFTA for breach of national 
treatment at Article 1102.255 The claim was commenced against Canada in part for 
the enforcement of its customs laws allegedly being unfair to the claimant.256 UPS’s 
investment in Canada was a Canadian subsidiary called ‘UPS Canada’ which was 
incorporated under the laws of Ontario257 UPS believed that the Canadian state-
owned Canada Post Corporation was given advantages over UPS and UPS Canada 
(together UPS, unless specified) under with respect to customs laws. 
 
                                                 
250 ibid at para 23. 
251 ibid at para 161. 
252 ibid at para 171. 
253 ibid at paras 171 and 172. 
254 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v Government of Canada, NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration, 
Award on the Merits and Dissent of 24 May 2007 (UPS, UPS Award or UPS Dissent). 
255 UPS also claimed under Article 1103 – most-favoured-nation; Article 1104 – the better of national 
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UPS contended that “UPS is in ‘like circumstances’ with … Canada Post by virtue of 
the fact that they compete in the same market and for the same market share. Canada 
Post non-monopoly products are generally substitutable with UPS courier 
products.”258 Like most developed countries, Canada benefits from two international 
goods importation services: (i) goods imported via the express consignment industry 
(i.e. courier services); and (ii) good imported via international postal traffic received 
from foreign postal administrations.259 UPS provided services in the former (the non-
monopoly ‘products’), whereas Canada Post provided services in both (with 
international postal traffic being the monopoly held by Canada Post). 
 
Unlike other tax-related arbitrations that have been examined in this chapter, UPS’s 
claim was not based on how it was treated for its own tax purposes (e.g. by being 
levied with a tax (directly or indirectly) or by not being granted tax refunds). Instead, 
the claim was based on customs laws that UPS had comply with in relation to taxing 
the goods being imported into Canada through its courier services.  
 
Canada adopted different customs measures for the importation of goods by courier 
and by mail because the manner in which the goods arrive for importation for each 
method is different.260 The tribunal was convinced this was necessary261 and that 
assertion was correct because it is the norm for countries, including the United 
Kingdom and the United States, to adopt different customs procedures for post and 
courier services262 because the operators of post and courier services “have different 
objects, mandates and transport and deliver goods in different ways and under 
different circumstances.”263 
 
For customs purposes, UPS operated under Canada’s Courier Low Value Shipment 
Program (CLVS Programme) while Canada Post operated under the Customs 
International Mail Processing System (CIMP System) and through an agreement 
                                                 
258 ibid at para 87. 
259 ibid at paras 7 and 96; the foreign postal administrations are those administrations belonging to 
countries that are members of the United Nation’s Universal Postal Union (members currently stand at 
192 countries as at 22 November 2013). 
260 ibid at para 100. 
261 ibid at para 99. 
262 ibid at para 118. 
263 ibid at para 116. 
256 
 
between it and the Canadian Department of National Revenue (Postal Imports 
Agreement).264 The Postal Imports Agreement was a secret agreement dated 25 April 
1994 but was disclosed to UPS in 1999.265 Canada Post used the CIMP System and 
the Postal Imports Agreement for its mail as well as its courier services. 
 
The customs laws that benefitted Canada Post directly in a financial manner which 
UPS claimed was a breach of Article 1102 of NAFTA were: (i) an exemption for 
Canada Post to pay interest and penalties for the late payment or non-payment of 
duties or taxes266; (ii) the ability of Canada Post to levy and retain a handling fee of 
CA$5 for the collection of duties and taxes from recipients of packages imported 
through the postal system267; (iii) an exemption on Canada Post from charging 
recipients of packages imported through the postal system a 7% goods and services 
tax on the CA$5 handling fee268; and in summary of the foregoing (iv) the failure or 
neglect by Canada to accord to UPS national treatment by “failing or neglecting to 
ensure that Canada Post charges duties and taxes to Canadian importers on packages 
imported by Canada Post through the postal system for which duties and taxes are 
payable and has allowed large volumes of packages to be imported into Canada 
without the collection of such duties and taxes. Where packages are imported by 
UPS Canada, duties and taxes are appropriately collected. As a result of the 
differential treatment, Canada Post receives a competitive advantage over UPS 
Canada, to the detriment of UPS Canada.”269 
 
Despite the above being a wide array of measures, they can be summarised in three 
points: (i) UPS Canada performed services for Canada’s Border Services Agency 
(Canada Customs) without compensation, whereas Canada Post was remunerated for 
performing the same270; (ii) UPS Canada had to pay cost recovery fees for services 
that Canada Customs officers perform in connection with UPS Canada’s imports, 
whereas similar charges for not imposed on Canada Post for its imports271; and (iii) 
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Canada Customs did not levy the same fines and penalties against Canada Post as it 
did on UPS Canada and Canada Customs did not collect duties and taxes prescribed 
by law from Canada Post in the same manner or extent as it did with UPS Canada.272 
 
The arbitral tribunal, by a majority, dismissed UPS’s national treatment claim 
because the treatment accorded to postal traffic is different to the treatment accorded 
to courier operators “for the simple reason that circumstances are not like.”273 The 
tribunal reiterated that is the case in the United Kingdom and the United States, and 
that the customs procedures are fully compliant with international conventions.274 
Therefore, since postal services and courier services are not ‘like’, the majority 
tribunal held that Canada Post and UPS were not in ‘like circumstances’ “in respect 
of the customs treatment of goods imported as mail and goods imported by 
courier.”275 This is a fair decision with respect to the differential treatment for 
customs purposes between post and courier services. A different decision on that 
issue could have opened Pandora’s Box in all countries that adopt different customs 
procedures for the importation of goods by post and courier. The majority tribunal 
did, however, fail to focus narrowly on Canada Post’s courier services. For example 
in Cargill, Mexico contended that Mexican sugar producers were not in like 
circumstances with Cargill because the Mexican sugar producers only invested in the 
one product, whereas Cargill invested in more than only HFCS.276 That argument 
was dismissed by the tribunal who said that the determination as to whether sugar 
producers and Cargill are in like circumstances must be decided “in respect of its 
[Cargill’s] HFCS business” only.277 Arguably, similar application was plausible in 
UPS as well and that is what formed part of the separate opinion of the dissenting 
arbitrator. Canada Post’s courier business had at least three close substitutes for UPS 
Canada products,278 Canada Post explicitly compared their products with UPS 
Canada’s products in internal documents279 and Canada Post routinely determined 
the prices of its own courier service products with reference to UPS’s and UPS 
                                                 
272 ibid at para 31. 
273 ibid at para 118. 
274 ibid; the conventions are the United Nation’s Universal Postal Convention and the World Customs 
Organisation’s Kyoto Convention.  
275 UPS Award at para 119. 
276 Cargill Award at para 199. 
277 ibid. 
278 UPS Dissent at para 21. 
279 ibid at para 24. 
258 
 
Canada’s competing products.280 The dissenting arbitrator stated in his opinion the 
facts as they were with respect to Canada Post’s courier business, that being Canada 
Post “sees UPS and UPS Canada as its competitors, sees the class of products at 
issue in this dispute as one in which parallel Canada Post and UPS products directly 
compete, and takes actions in response to that competition between parallel products 
of Canada Post and UPS.”281 This was therefore persuasive evidence that Canada 
Post and UPS were in like circumstances with respect to customs actions concerning 
the courier business.282 UPS, having more than met the like circumstances test by 
establishing that it was in like circumstances with Canada Post regarding the courier 
business,283 should have been alleviated from proving it was in like circumstances 
regarding postal services, because it clearly was not, and the burden should have then 
been shifted on Canada to of disprove that Canada Post and UPS were in like 
circumstances with respect to the courier business.284 
 
4.3.2 Less Favourable Treatment and Nationality-Based Discrimination in De 
Jure or De Facto Application of Tax Measures  
4.3.2.1 Less Favourable Taxation Treatment and De Jure and De Facto Tax 
Discrimination with Intent 
 
In Archer Daniels, the arbitral tribunal found that the sweetener tax reduced 
ALMEX’s (the claimants’ investment) profits on the sale of HFCS and thus impaired 
ALMEX’s ability to “conduct or expand operations to satisfy the domestic demand 
for HFCS in Mexico.”285 Article 1102 of requires foreign investors and investments 
to be treated no less favourably than home state investors and investments with 
respect to “… expansion … [and] conduct …”286 The effect of the tax was 
determined to result in United States producers and distributors of HFCS receiving 
less favourable treatment than that accorded to Mexican sugar producers287 since soft 
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drinks containing cane sugar were exempted from the tax.288 The imposition of the 
tax thus targeted the HFCS industry, composed of United States investors including 
the claimants in Archer Daniels, while the domestic cane sugar industry was 
protected.289 In addition, the tribunal found the sweetener tax imposed dissimilar 
taxation on directly competitive products (HFCS and cane sugar) which was 
“discriminatory and contrary to the national treatment principle in under Article 
1102”290 and that was the underlying intent of the enactment of the tax.291 The 
sweetener tax clearly discriminated de jure and de facto between Mexican investors 
and United States investors, with the written letter of the law affecting investors in 
HFCS (and therefore United States investors) and the application affecting the same 
investors, whereas it did not affect Mexican investors in cane sugar (de jure or de 
facto) even though they competed with United States investors in supplying 
sweeteners to the soft drink industry. The result of the discrimination was less 
favourable treatment being accorded to the claimants. Together with the 
determination that the claimants and Mexican cane sugar suppliers to the soft drink 
industry were in ‘like circumstances’,292 the arbitral tribunal in Archer Daniels 
concluded that the sweetener tax denied national treatment to the claimants and their 
investment (ALMEX) in violation of Article 1102 of NAFTA.293 
 
In Cargill, the arbitral tribunal also concluded that the sweetener tax was a violation 
of national treatment,294 with the treatment received by suppliers of HFCS to the 
Mexican soft drinks industry being less favourable than the treatment received by 
cane sugar suppliers to the same industry295 and that as a result of the sweetener tax 
the competitiveness of HFCS suppliers diminished.296 In addition, as regards 
discrimination, the Cargill tribunal forthrightly stated that the sweetener tax was 
discriminatory both in intent and effect297 (de jure and de facto) because it was 
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directed at United States producers and suppliers of HFCS to make them put pressure 
on the United States government,298 with Mexican cane sugar suppliers obviously 
exempted from the taxation measures. 
 
In Corn Products, Mexico maintained that the sweetener tax was enacted as a 
response to the financial crisis of the domestic sugar industry in Mexico and not to 
target HFCS investors, that the HFCS industry was a central feature of the financial 
crisis.299 This argument was rejected because it confused the nature of the measure 
with the motive for which it was taken.300 Whilst the motive behind the imposition of 
the sweetener tax was to address the crisis in the Mexican sugar industry,301 the 
nature of the tax treated producers of HFCS less favourably than sugar producers, 
and a laudable goal that the state believes is necessary does not take from its 
discriminatory nature that results in less favourable treatment of foreign investors.302 
 




In Occidental, the SRI (tax authority), as explained above,  retracted granting 
resolutions for VAT refunds and issued denying resolutions because of its face-
value interpretation of the relevant Ecuadorian tax law which stated that VAT 
refunds were to be granted for goods used in the ‘manufacture’ of exported 
goods. The SRI cannot be faulted for that interpretation since even the 
Ecuadorian Tax Courts ruled the same in one case between a company called 
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Repsol YPF Ecuador SA and the SRI,303 however, the Special Taxation Chamber 
of Ecuador’s Supreme Court provided a final ruling in that case, deciding that 
Article 69A of the ITRL did grant refunds to all exporters, including oil 
exploration and production companies, with ‘manufacturing’ encompassing 
every type of production activity.304 The tribunal made a determination on the 
matter itself by examining Article 169 of the Ecuadorian Tax Law Regulations 
which included the requirements for filing for a tax refund and “ratified the 
general purport of the Tax Law in respect of the rights of exporters, 
manufacturers and “producers to a refund of VAT paid on the purchase of goods 
and services.”305 The Occidental tribunal decided that OEPC did have a right to 
tax refunds under Ecuadorian tax legislation306 and that reimbursement was due 
also under Andean Community Law307 and Andean Community Law was 
binding on Ecuador.308 Accordingly, there was no de jure discrimination by 
Ecuador. However, since the foreign investor (OEPC) was not granted refunds 
that it was due while Ecuadorian exporters of other products were granted 
refunds, the interpretation of the non-discriminatory law followed by the SRI 
resulted in OEPC receiving less favourable treatment than that accorded to 
Ecuadorian companies309and that had a de facto discriminatory effect. The SRI’s 
interpretation of the law came from confusion and a lack of clarity in the law and 
practices relating to it and that confusion and lack of clarity resulted in some 
form of arbitrariness,310 however the arbitrariness was deemed to be unintended 
by the SRI311 and there was no discrimination against foreign-owned companies 
with intent.312 A violation of national treatment does not rest on a finding of 
intended discrimination (and if it did then the entire principle would be 
weakened). 
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Together with the finding that OEPC were in like circumstances with Ecuadorian 
exporters of other products (see 4.3.1.2 above), the tribunal concluded that 





In Feldman, the claimant contended that the law in question was not 
“discriminatory on its face”,314 i.e. there was no question of de jure 
discrimination in the Mexican tax law, but it was applied in a discriminatory 
manner, i.e. there was de facto discrimination in the application of the tax law. 
The claimant argued that Mexico’s SHCP de facto discriminated against his 
company (CEMSA) in the years 1996 to 2000.315 In evidence of the 
discrimination carried out between 1996 and 1997, the claimant pointed to the 
admittance of Mexico of paying money to three cigarette reseller/exporter 
companies in September 1996, a period in which the claimant and his company 
were denied tax rebates or when efforts were being made by the SHCP to recoup 
rebates already paid.316 For the period 1998 to 2000, the claimant contended that 
the SHCP permitted at least Mercados From the years 1998 to 2000, Mexico’s 
SHCP permitted at least three Mexican-owned cigarette resellers/exporters 
(including Mercados Regionales and Mercados Extranjeros) to export cigarettes 
and receive tax rebates.317 Additionally, the Mexican-owned ‘like’ companies 
were not retrospectively audited for tax rebates paid to them by the SHCP.318 
Mexico argued that the claimant argued only on the basis of de facto 
discrimination and because the claimant could not prove de jure discrimination in 
Mexico’s tax law, it would be inappropriate for the arbitral tribunal to find a 
violation of national treatment the failure of SHCP to provide a benefit that they 
did not have the authority to provide in law,319 and, with regard to the audits, 
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Mexico contended that when there are companies in like circumstances, the fact 
that one has been audited sooner than the others does not indicate discrimination. 
 
The Feldman tribunal decided that, where there is de facto discrimination in the 
application of the tax law, it is irrelevant whether the law is de jure 
discriminatory.320 What was imperative on the facts in Feldman was that rebates 
were in fact given to Mexican investors in like circumstances whereas the foreign 
investor was not and the de facto difference in treatment was sufficient to 
establish a denial of national treatment.321 The tribunal also held that the claimant 
need not prove the discrimination was based on his nationality because that 
would “tend to excuse discrimination that is not facially directed at foreign 
owned investments.”322  This decision corresponds to the Occidental decision in 
which there was also no de jure discrimination in Ecuador’s tax laws, and this is 
wise because an otherwise determination would give all legislators and their 
actors free reign to discriminate and get away with it because the written letter of 
the law is de jure non-discriminatory. 
 
The Feldman tribunal thus concluded that the claimant made a prima facie case 
for differential and less favourable treatment by Mexico’s SHCP as compared 
with the Mexican-owned cigarette resellers/exporters, Mercados Regionales and 
Mercados Extranjeros,323 also ruling that Mexico’s promise of conducting audits 
of those Mexican-owned companies being weak and unpersuasive.324 The 
tribunal also decided that the Mexican tax law (Article 4(3) of the IEPS) which 
was used to discriminate against and provide less favourable taxation treatment to 
the claimant was effectively waived for Mexican-owned companies.325 The 
tribunal concluded that the factual pattern of the taxation treatment accorded to 
the claimant was more than a “minor error or two” and instead was a pattern of 
official action/inaction over a number of years which resulted in de facto 
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As discussed at 4.3.1.4 above, UPS Canada were not found to be in ‘like 
circumstances’ with Canada Post by the majority of the arbitral tribunal, 
however, it will be beneficial to briefly examine the view of the dissenting 
arbitrator who did find the UPS Canada to be in ‘like circumstances’ with Canada 
Post in respect of the courier business. 
 
Dean Ronald A. Cass, the dissenting arbitrator, had to decide whether: (i) UPS 
Canada having to pay Canada Customs for services similar to those received by 
Canada Post from Canada Customs for free was a violation of the national 
treatment principle at Article 1102 of  NAFTA; (ii) Canada Customs paying 
Canada Post for materials handling for undertaking customs handling services 
but not compensating UPS Canada for the same was a violation of Article 1102; 
and (iii) the fines and penalties levied by Canada Customs on UPS Canada which 
were not levied on Canada Post the practice of collecting taxes and duties from 
UPS Canada being more stringent than the practice to Canada Post was a 
violation of Article 1102. The arbitrator found the differences to be substantial.327 
The arbitrator rejected Canada’s attempt at justifying less favourable treatment 
by necessity due to the differences between postal imports and courier imports,328 
differences which Canada Post’s courier services had the benefit of enjoying.329 
Canada’s necessity defence for the difference in treatment between mail imports 
and courier imports which resulted in less favourable treatment being accorded to 
courier imports, in the arbitrator’s opinion, actually should have resulted in less 
favourable treatment being accorded to mail imports by necessity. On the facts, 
greater customs compliance and therefore greater Canada Customs resources 
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were necessary for the requirements of Canada Post’s mail products and services, 
therefore, charging UPS Canada and being more stringent on UPS Canada for tax 
compliance for fewer resources used by UPS Canada and greater tax compliance 
by UPS Canada should have resulted in UPS Canada being treated more 
favourably than Canada Post and certainly not less favourably.330 Canada Post’s 
courier products and services were therefore accorded more favourable treatment 
than the treatment accorded to UPS Canada and the “manifest inconsistency” 
between the customs treatment of Canada Post as compared with UPS Canada for 
similar products which were handled on similar bases for similarly situated 
customers was concluded by the dissenting arbitrator to be a violation of Article 




In this chapter, the superfluous characteristics of national treatment have been 
analysed and discussed, building up to the analysis of the treatment of tax in 
investor-state arbitration of alleged national treatment violations. We have learned 
that the equal tax treatment of foreign investors and investments with like host state 
investors and investments is rooted in the history of the national treatment principle, 
whereby the very development of the national treatment standard in a general sense 
stemmed in part from the equal tax treatment of like domestic and foreign products. 
 
The study of national treatment in tax arbitration has entailed an analysis of arbitral 
awards dealing with jurisdictional issues and merits of claims. The jurisdictional 
issues have centred on exclusions to the application of tax measures to national 
treatment protection in IITs. Tax exclusions are generally very clear cut, such the 
exclusion contained at Article 5(b) of the Denmark-Ghana BIT which states that the 
national treatment and MFN protections do not apply to “…any international 
agreement or arrangement relating wholly or mainly to taxation or any domestic 
legislation relating wholly or mainly to taxation.”333 The arbitral awards that 
contained discussions on tax exclusions under national treatment claims were 
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brought under the US-Ecuador BIT (Occidental), the US-Panama BIT (Nations 
Energy) and the US-Argentina BIT (El Paso). Those treaties, whilst excluding tax 
from national treatment protection, obliged the host state to act fairly and equitably 
with its application of tax policies. The Occidental tribunal found the obligation 
meant that tax was included in national treatment protection, whereas the El Paso 
and Nations Energy tribunals refused jurisdiction because it was “only a best-effort 
obligation.”334 The English High Court confirmed that the fairness and equity 
obligation did not except national treatment protection from the tax exclusion in the 
US-Ecuador BIT335 and the Occidental tribunal therefore overreached its jurisdiction 
by deciding the national treatment claim.336 The Occidental tribunal, by giving 
themselves jurisdiction to entertain the national treatment claim, shows that arbitral 
tribunals are willing to be more flexible in their approach that to alleged national 
treatment tax violations than they are tax expropriation. This is especially so in 
respect of the Occidental tribunal’s decision on the merits of the national treatment 
claim.  
 
Once a comparator in like circumstances to the claimant or claimant’s investment is 
identified, the question before the arbitral tribunal is “has the foreign 
investor/investment been treated less favourably in comparison with the host state 
national investor/investment?” In taxation, a foreign investor is treated less 
favourably than a like circumstances host state investor if any tax advantages given 
to the host state investor are not reciprocated, and this includes anything in relation to 
the levying and collection of taxes, such as: a tax is levied on the foreigner but not 
the host state national; the foreigner pays a higher rate of the same tax; tax laws are 
applied more stringently on the foreign investor; or the foreigner does not benefit 
from tax advantages given to the host state national such as tax refunds on exports. 
The same applies to the differential tax treatment of foreign investments as compared 
with host state investments. 
 
In Feldman, finding Mexico liable for violating the national treatment protection  by 
enforcing its tax laws (including the invoice requirement) against the claimant’s 
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investment was a de facto violation and relatively easy for the tribunal to recognise 
the differential tax treatment. Similarly, the de jure and de facto discrimination and 
less favourable treatment accorded the claimants and their investments in Archer 
Daniels, Cargill, and Corn Products was also very recognisable – a tax was levied 
and enforced that affected producers and suppliers of HFCS (an industry owned in 
Mexico by United States investors) to the soft drink industry whereas the comparable 
and competitive producers and suppliers of cane sugar to the soft drink industry were 
not affected by the tax. It is clear, therefore, that arbitral tribunals apply the 
principles of national treatment to taxation in the same manner as they do with any 
other regulatory measures of the state. In fact, in Occidental, the arbitral tribunal 
went as far as adding to the jurisprudence of national treatment in order to find 
Ecuador in violation of national treatment through tax. To that end, whilst national 
treatment of like investors and investments under IITs is not the same as national 
treatment of like products under the GATT, previous jurisprudence on the IIT 
national treatment principle narrowly defined the domestic comparators by requiring 
a strong correlation between the domestic investors/investments and the foreign 
investors/investments,337 namely that they trade in the same sector and are 
competitors of one another, as they were in Feldman, Archer Daniels, Cargill and 
Corn Products. The Occidental tribunal expanded the principle by deciding that 
investments in different sectors of the economy that are not competitors but export 
their products are in like situations, thereby putting exporters of oil (OEPC’s sector), 
bananas, flowers and seafood in the same boat and finding that the claimant was 
treated less favourably by not being granted tax refunds. 
 
Overall, in investor-state arbitration, tax is treated the same as any other state 
measures that can and have allegedly violated the national treatment protection. If a 
comparator is established and that comparator has been treated favourably in the de 
jure and most importantly the de facto application of tax, arbitral tribunals will not 
stop short of finding a state liable for breaching international law through its 
sovereign power to tax.  
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Chapter 5 Final Comments 
 
In this thesis, the treatment of tax in investor-state arbitrations in which expropriation 
and national treatment violations were claimed have been studied. We have learned 
that: tax is capable of being expropriatory; the characterisation of allegedly 
expropriatory measures as taxes will not prevent arbitral tribunals from examining the 
merits of a claim – i.e. the impact of the state measure defines whether it is an 
expropriation,  not the form; finding a state liable for tax expropriation requires the 
state to have violated the conduct requirements and this also denotes an intention by 
the state to expropriate through tax; and of course the investor must prove that the tax 
measures had the effect of expropriation. With regards to the latter point, the 
customary international law standard of deprivation for finding liability of 
expropriation is a substantial deprivation. There have been cases (non-tax) in which 
arbitral tribunals have lowered the threshold of deprivation to find states liable for 
partial or temporary deprivations. As we learned in Chapter 3, arbitral tribunals 
presiding over tax expropriation claims are highly unlikely to lower the threshold to 
finding state liability for expropriation and are in fact likely to view the substantial 
deprivation standard very strictly and in a manner that might require a total 
deprivation of property. This hypothesis stems from the fact that only two cases 
resulted in a finding of tax expropriation and they involved a total deprivation of 
investment,
1
 whereas another case that had a seemingly substantial deprivation
2
 failed 
on the merits. In addition, another case that involved a total deprivation of a claim to 
money was not an expropriation because it did not violate the conduct requirements,
3
 
which is not the role of the conduct requirements. The analysis of the treatment of tax 
as expropriation also demonstrated that arbitrators do not consider tax expropriation 
claims lightly and will not find a state liable for tax expropriation (thus benefitting 
investors’ profits) unless the expropriation is arbitrary and wipes out all benefits of an 
investment. The research undertaken has therefore concluded that tax does have a lex 
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specialis character under the customary international law of expropriation because 
arbitrators apply stricter rules to finding a state liable for tax expropriation by 
requiring a total deprivation of investment and a violation of the conduct 
requirements. 
 
The analysis of the treatment of tax in alleged national treatment violations has 
established that arbitral tribunals generally apply the normal principles of national 
treatment jurisprudence to tax arbitrations of that treaty protection. We have seen that 
it is relatively easy for investors to prove a violation of national treatment protection 
once a comparator is established who has been treated more favourably in the de jure 
and most crucially the de facto application of the host state’s tax laws. It is clear, 
therefore, especially compared with the treatment of tax in expropriation claims, that 
tax has a lex specialis character in the application of expropriation rules but not in the 
application of the national treatment standard. Tax does, however, benefit from 
special treatment under IITs by exclusively being excluded from applying to national 
treatment protection. 
 
The stark contrast between the difficulty in proving a tax expropriation claim and the 
simplicity in proving a national treatment claim demonstrates why national treatment 
is generally excluded from applying to tax measures in most IITs, whereas a state 
need not shy away from allowing the application of expropriation to tax measures 
because arbitral tribunals will seldom find them liable under that investment treaty 
and customary international law principle. 
 
This brings us to the assessment of whether states have done the right thing for their 
tax sovereignty by excluding the application of national treatment to tax measures. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the deliberation of the state’s sovereign power to tax, as with 
any disputes on the legitimacy of the state’s sovereign actions, would ordinarily be 
entertained by the courts of the host state by reason of the parties’ residence, lis 
pendens, or other. By signing and ratifying IITs, host states relinquish sovereignty not 
only to arbitral tribunals made up of foreign private individuals, but to foreign 




It is clear from the evidence in Chapter 4 that there is high turnout of arbitral awards 
in favour of the investor for national treatment tax violations in comparison to how 
many claims there have been. This is especially so because all that is required to 
prove a violation of national treatment is the differential treatment between the like 
investors or investments, whereas tax expropriation requires a substantial or total 
deprivation of investment. Seeing as states change their tax laws periodically, 
including tax rates, tax exceptions, tax exemptions, and all sorts of tax advantages 
that might apply to some but not all investors or investments, they run a high risk of 
being in violation of international law under national treatment protection if it applies. 
This demonstrates that, in lieu of the exclusions contained in most IITs to the 
application of national treatment to taxation measures, states would be at risk of being 
respondents to an abundant and unprecedented number of tax arbitrations, as well as 
possibly succumbing to regulatory chill and relinquishing their tax sovereignty to 
some extent to foreign investors. Tax expropriation claims, on the other hand, will be 
few and far between because it is a very rare occurrence where a state’s tax laws will 
be alleged to be expropriatory, and tax expropriation claims are seldom likely to 
result in a finding of state liability. States have, therefore, definitely managed to 
curtail the impact on their tax sovereignty by including exclusions in IITs on the 
application of national treatment to taxation measures. Moving forward, I would 
therefore recommend that states, both capital importers and exporters, draft tax 
exclusions in their IITs in relation to national treatment and most-favoured-nation 
treatment principles. I also recommend that the tax vetoes for expropriation claims, 
which exist in only a handful of IITs are included, are included more uniformly in 
states’ IITs. This will help countries to avoid frivolous tax expropriation claims as the 
tax authorities from the home and host state can agree than a tax expropriation has not 
taken place. These are simple safeguards that will help to preserve the tax sovereignty 
of states and preserve expenditure on possible litigations, which, ironically, are likely 
to be funded by tax revenues. On the other hand, I would recommend that businesses 
with international investments and strong lobbying power lobby their governments to 
make tax more arbitrable under IITs by removing tax exclusions to national treatment 
protection in existing IITs and not including the same in future IITs. Business should 
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